Ethics

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


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


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

THE INTERNATIONAL
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# CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE IDEAL OF NATIONALITY.

G. F. BARBOUR.

THERE are certain points in the history of civilization at which ideals, previously unquestioned, are tested and put upon their defence. At the present time the principle of nationality, which in most past ages has been accepted as above dispute, is undergoing such a testing process. Its claims are being set against those of the wider principle which may be described from slightly different points of view as humanitarian, cosmopolitan, or universalistic. Now the place of this wider principle or ideal as one of the highest ends of human progress is too clear to be overlooked or denied; and, since we cannot seek to displace it, the question arises whether the ideal of nationality must be rejected as outworn and as a mere hindrance to progress, or if both may continue to be held as supplementary and not inconsistent.

Is the principle of nationality abrogated by that of universal brotherhood, or may it be conserved as an essential part of the latter? The question is a living one; and not only is it answered in various ways, but it may be approached from several different points. Of these three may be named. It would be possible to attempt a general survey of recent thought, with the object of determining whether the cause of nationalism is a grow-



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ing or a declining one. Or the inquiry might be confined to either of the two great forms in which the doctrine of universal brotherhood has been brought forward in our own time; for it has been founded both on the basis of economic socialism and on that of an essentially religious view of the solidarity of mankind. Each method of inquiry has its own advantages and its own importance; but in this essay the last will be the line chiefly followed. Historic and economic considerations will not be excluded, but the main question treated will be, How does the religious view of mankind as one in their deepest nature and their ultimate destiny affect the principle of nationality?

Further, I shall take Christian ethics as for the present purpose representative of the ethics of the higher religions; not only because it is wise to write of what one knows best, but because of the advantage of keeping the discussion within definite limits, and because the question is especially urgent at the present time for those nations of the West, which in form at least accept the Christian standard as authoritative. To limit the discussion in this way does, indeed, raise a considerable difficulty, but it is balanced by a corresponding advantage. The difficulty is due to the fact that Christianity arose at a time when the currents of national life had grown feeble,—when indeed they had been well-nigh merged in the single mighty stream of imperial history, or were fast sinking to rest in the level expanse of the *pax Romana*. Thus the writers of the New Testament were comparatively little concerned with the duties of patriotism and the problems of citizenship; and we are forced to gather their views in the main from scanty references and indirect allusions. But this fact in the origin of Christian ethics, while it reduces the amount of the direct data, has the advantage of bringing clearly before us the remarkable parallel between that age and our own.

The first and second centuries of our era marked the

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close of a long period during which old landmarks and barriers had been successively removed, and nation after nation had been drawn from its isolation to share in the great commerce, of ideas as well as of merchandise, which united the shores of the Mediterranean and which extended even to the distant East. Thus there arose a great mingling of races, languages, customs, and religions,—a mingling which opened the possibility of a richer and more varied experience, but which at the same time tended to deprive the nations, which thus contributed to the common stock, of their most distinctive characteristics as well as of their hardier and simpler virtues. Nor is there any need to show at length how all this is repeated to-day in that mingling, not only of various races but of contrasted ideals and warring systems of life and thought, which is passing before our eyes. Here, then, the task of Christianity is the same once again as in its early days, that of mutual interpretation and reconciliation.

But this is not a complete statement of the case. Although many of the circumstances of nineteen centuries ago are being reproduced, and reproduced with an acceleration proportioned to the speed of steam and electricity when compared with the swiftest ships or posts of the Roman Empire, yet there are counter-tendencies which bear most directly on this problem. For nearly two centuries before the Christian era, the tendency towards the obliteration of national distinctions in a single unified civilization under one strong rule had advanced in an almost straight line. There was little to check this tendency in thought or literature or art, and any attempts at the revival of nationality in the political sphere were quickly and decisively put down.

But in modern history there has been no such direct and even course traceable. The eighteenth century, as an 'age of Reason,' tended towards cosmopolitanism; for when life is tried by purely rational standards its universal elements are inevitably exalted at the expense

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of those differing traits of taste and temperament which distinguish race from race. But with the great romantic movement at the beginning of the nineteenth century, these differences once more gained recognition. The emotional side of man's nature,—sentiment, impulse, and all that is included in the word 'romance,'—were once more given free play, and found expression in the eager study of the past, and in particular of national history and art. Thus, in spite of the cosmopolitanism of Goethe, its greatest figure, the romantic movement did much to reawaken the spirit of nationality and to prepare the way for the political and militant nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century. So the thought arises that in the twentieth century, whose tendencies are still so hard to interpret aright, the greatest problem will be the reaching of a synthesis of these two elements, in which the patriotism of the romantic movement with all its warmth of appeal to the imagination and the devotion of the good citizen, may find its due place beside the enlightened yet somewhat chill and abstract cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century.

This may seem something of a digression; but it at least suggests that the parallel between the present state of the world and that of Roman times is not altogether complete. There is an element of contrast due to the presence of several great empires in place of one, and to the persistence beside them of smaller nations which retain a clear self-consciousness and a vigorous and distinctive national life. All this adds to the complexity as well as to the interest of our problem; yet it does not annul the instructiveness of the comparison between these moments in ancient and modern history. Our age is at all events near enough to that in which Christianity arose to enable us more readily to appreciate the effect of, as well as the preparation for, its clear proclamation of universalism.

That proclamation has always been its central message. It had its origin, indeed, amid the nationalism

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and the measure of exclusiveness which marked Jewish religion; but it quickly passed into a freer air, proclaiming the equal value of all men before God as an essential truth. It emphasized the obligation laid upon all and the high destiny open to all, whatever their race or social standing. Thus it soon became the most powerful of the many forces which were undermining old distinctions and working towards the upbuilding of a moral society on a basis broader than any hitherto known. Nor did it only point forward, like Jewish prophecy, to a cessation of old feuds and to a harmony of nation and nation in the future. The unity which it proclaimed was at once more fundamental and more immediate, a unity of spiritual life, in which there was "neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female" (Gal. iii. 28). Or, in so far as the idea of nationality persisted, membership in even the most privileged of all nations appeared but as a type of a spiritual state,—"he is a Jew which is one inwardly" (Rom. ii. 29).

It is the most familiar of truths that this sense of human brotherhood, thus brought down from the remote atmosphere of philosophic theory or poetic aspiration and realized on the common soil of every day life, gave no small part of its triumphant energy to the early Church. To a world weary of never-ending conflict, and already reaching out towards a closer union and a deeper comprehension between all followers of truth and goodness, this message, and the fact that it was in a measure realized, brought a new light and hope. Not that the need for strife and conflict had passed: the call to brotherhood was also a call to arms, yet it did not summon to a conflict between one race and another, but to one in which all good men might join against "the corruption that is in the world."

This sense of solidarity, which drew men closely together amid the welter of nationalities of that time, and which gave the Church strength to face and finally to bend the whole power of Rome, had to make its way

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in the face of many obstacles. And the same obstacles exist in great measure to-day. If in many cases the western nations have attained to a larger measure of understanding and respect, there are others in which a jealous and watchful rivalry is still the prevailing temper. But more serious than any alienation of nation from nation within the wider branches of the human family, are the questions which rise out of the misunderstanding and mutual contempt which arise from the contact of these different branches. Here we are confronted by those inter-racial problems, social, industrial, and political, which make 'the color-question' so insistent and so menacing wherever it arises. It assumes many forms, by which statesmanship is already taxed and must ultimately be baffled unless a spirit of brotherhood comparable to that of early Christianity can be reawakened. In this all-important region the difficulty is practical rather than theoretic. *How* the different interests of different races, in varying stages of civilization, are in fact to be adjusted, we are often unable to see; yet, at the same time, we may say confidently that such an adjustment must prove impossible on any other ground than that of mutual understanding, mutual respect, mutual forbearance, and mutual service. These may be taken as four steps in the progress towards the ideal held up in the New Testament; and they apply not less to the relations of race with race than to the thought and action of individuals. They form the preliminary to all the work of inter-racial statesmanship,—the indispensable equipment both of the statesman and of those who form the material of his craft.

But the question remains how much this involves. Does the ideal of human brotherhood, so clear in its ultimate demand, yet so hard to work out in the life of the world, necessarily abrogate and abolish the ideals of loyalty and patriotism? Tolstoi and others have held that it does, and that the humanitarianism of Christianity is so direct in its method as well as so wide in its

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scope that no room is left for the intervention of a narrower loyalty; and those who urge this view can always point to the hatred that has been stirred up and the havoc that has been wrought in the name of the love of country. Thus, it can be made to appear that the 'principle of nationality' is just a euphemism for that spirit of exclusiveness and vindictiveness which the highest morality and religion seek to exorcise. On this view the perpetuation of old divisions between one nation and another runs directly counter to the Christian spirit and forms in itself a final obstacle to its realization.

Yet there is a strong and deep human instinct which rebels against this conclusion. If patriotism has often been associated with intolerance, if love of one's own country has often been identified with hatred of other countries, this is no true account of the spirit of nationality in its nobler forms; nor can we without reluctance dismiss a conception which has so often awakened, guided, and sustained the noblest aspirations and energies of man. If there are in the New Testament indications that the spirit of nationality is not to be regarded as an unfriendly force, and if it is possible to distinguish between a higher and a lower patriotism, then these mighty factors in human history may be conserved without danger, and may even be made ancillary to the wider Christian principle of human solidarity and brotherhood.

In the life and teaching of Jesus, a recognition of the good that there is in nationality can be looked for in one point only, his attitude to his own people. There are not a few things to show how deep a reverence he felt for their traditions and history, and how deep a concern for their future destiny. His own ministry was almost entirely confined within the borders of the Jewish nation, and in all outward observance, which did not directly conflict with his own mission, he bore himself as a pious Jew. Indeed so clearly does this appear in

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the Synoptic narrative that some interpreters have even held that Jesus never definitely crossed the borders of Jewish particularism, but that the universalism of the early Church was originated by St. Paul; and, while this may be a paradoxical view, it would never have taken shape unless there had been in the life of Jesus a quite distinctive devotion to the past history and the spiritual interests of the Jewish nation.

Thus, while the teaching of Jesus was in essence universal, it had a special urgency for and adaptation to the sacred people to whom 'as concerning the flesh' he belonged. On the one hand, he enjoined such universal duties as that of the forgiveness of enemies, and taught that the mere fact of membership in the Jewish nation was no substitute for the faith which could grow strong outside its borders, and that in the absence of this faith the privilege of the Jews became a hindrance rather than an advantage; while in proclaiming that mercy and helpfulness were the tests by which men would finally be judged, he applied this test to 'all nations,' and not to the Jews alone (Matt. v. 39 ff.; viii. 10-12; xxv, 32. *Cf.* Luke x. 29 ff.). But if these and like sayings represent the deepest current of his teaching, the other side was not unrecognized. With the Jewish longing for political emancipation, Jesus had little concern; or rather he definitely cut himself off from it as from an influence dangerous to his own more spiritual work. Yet, as we have in part seen, he was far from being indifferent to the special claims and hopes of the Jews. He encouraged his disciples by recalling the national history; he recognized that the Jewish people had the first claim on his own ministry and on that of his followers; and in the lament over Jerusalem as in his triumphal entry into the city he showed how closely the idea of his own mission had been bound up with that of the redemption of his nation. (Matt. v. 12; x. 5, 6; xv, 24; xxi. 1-11; xxiii. 37.) More might be said on this point; but it is sufficient to suggest that the universalism of the Gospels is

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not necessarily exclusive of the truth that different peoples may each have its special aptitude, fitting it to work out some one of the many varying aspects of the Christian ideal.

This suggestion is confirmed by the study of the Pauline Epistles. While St. Paul did not originate, he certainly established and placed beyond challenge the inherent universality of the new religion. To this aspect of his work was due the charge of disloyalty to his nation which he was often compelled to answer. But even if he had never been assailed by the Judaizing party, we may believe that he would still have felt impelled to show that the fullest recognition of the unique historical place and work of the Jewish people was in no degree inconsistent with the truth, which he so steadily proclaimed, that all national distinctions faded into insignificance when compared with the new unity which was irradiating the world's life. (*Cf.* Rom. ii.-iii. 2; ix.-xi.) His faith had burst the bonds of Jewish legalism, but he did not therefore hold the fate of the Jewish nation or his own duty towards it as of little account; for he earnestly asserted his readiness to give up his own share in the Christian fellowship and hope, if only his "kinsmen according to the flesh" might thereby enter in (Rom. ix. 3.).

With the writings of St. Paul there enters also a conception to which the early Fathers not seldom returned, —that the Jews were not the only people who had a definite and essential place in the *præparatio evangelica*. An appreciation of what the clear intellect of Greece and the strong purpose and firm hand of Rome might do to enrich and strengthen the thought and will of the Church began to find its place. At first indeed the recognition was carefully guarded; yet even in the Epistle in which St. Paul most strongly condemns the natural 'wisdom' of the Greeks as inadequate to the spiritual need of the world, he tells how he had sought to place himself at the standpoint of those who were outside the

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scope of the Jewish Law that he might win their understanding and allegiance (I Cor. i. 21-23; ix. 21). The reality of his appreciation of the nobler side of Greek thought shines out clearly in the report of his speech on the Areopagus; and in the narrative of the Book of Acts, as in the counsel of respect and submission to rulers in the thirteenth chapter of Romans, there are clear indications of the value which he set upon his Roman citizenship, and of his sense of the service to humanity and religion performed by the firm rule of Rome. It is true that for St. Paul, as for Plato, all earthly citizenship was but an imperfect type of citizenship in the Heavenly City. Yet in their own place in the divine economy these things were not without importance: they were good gifts which might be turned to good account, even if they were not essential to the spiritual life. Thus we may hold that he would have applied to political liberty with all its dignity and responsibilities, what he said of civil liberty, "If thou canst become free, use it rather" (I Cor. vii. 21).

We may now turn to view the question from the other side, by considering certain of the tendencies which are actually at the present time making for the break-down of national exclusiveness and for a more cosmopolitan ordering of human life. Among these tendencies, we may pass over those which are directly inspired by an ethical ideal. But there are other tendencies belonging to the economic order, of which the full strength is only now beginning to be understood, and which are thus more difficult to evaluate rightly.

(1) The attempt to understand these forces at once carries us into a very different atmosphere,—that of modern industry and finance in all their complexity and ramification. In spite of all efforts after commercial isolation, these great forms of human activity refuse to be confined within national boundaries and show an increasing international character. The fact of this internationalization of modern industry and finance, with the

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consequent dependence of each nation's prosperity on the credit and prosperity of its neighbors, has been made familiar by the writings of Mr. Norman Angell. He has shown how any nation which tries by force of arms to destroy the trade of a neighboring people must inevitably bring loss, if not industrial ruin, upon itself in the attempt; and he looks to the realization that aggression must react disastrously on the aggressor as the great safeguard of peace in the future. He holds that when the financial interdependence of the modern world, hitherto understood only by a few experts, comes to be a generally known and accepted fact, then the present appalling competition in armaments will be checked, and the warlike spirit in Europe will die away. When it is once seen that the present military rivalry is not only contrary to moral ideals, but futile from the standpoint of material interests, it will die a natural death; and the precarious 'armed peace' of to-day will pass into an industrial comity of nations, safeguarded by the knowledge that the threads of their prosperity are inextricably interwoven.

This analysis is full of interest, and holds out not a little hope for the future. It is something to know that high finance, which has in the past had so much to answer for in the fostering of political greed and the desire for aggrandizement, not to mention other faults, is now at last beginning to appear as a check upon militarism and an advocate for peace. Its accession may, indeed, bring a new driving-power and a practical character into the movement for the lessening of hostility between the nations; and it is certainly, as Mr. Angell claims, calculated to impress the average man. Yet, the question must arise how far we shall really be carried towards a true and permanent sense of human brotherhood by the doctrine of the omnipotence of the credit nexus (which replaces the 'cash nexus,' on which Carlyle and other great teachers of the nineteenth century poured such scorn). It may indeed help to make the first step,—

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the immediately urgent step,—possible; but if old evils are not to recur in new forms, some higher ideal of human relationship, some firmer ground of international unity, must be discovered.

This is in fact recognized by Mr. Angell when, in the second part of "The Great Illusion," he takes up the "psychological case for peace." In this connection, he lays great stress on the effect of the modern growth of rapid transit and communication in breaking down national divisions and causing a kinship of interest to grow up between the same classes in different countries. It appears that this is rapidly substituting a horizontal division between class and class for the old vertical divisions between country and country. In the last decade international organizations have grown and multiplied. In particular, the Trade Union and Socialist movement has become international; and employers of labor are now seeking to counteract this new development by themselves joining hands across the frontiers of Europe. This tendency is summed up in sentences which Mr. Angell quotes from Mr. Baty's work on "International Law": "The modern citizen is becoming at once cosmopolitan and class-centred. Let the process work for a few more years; we shall see the common interests of cosmopolitan classes revealing themselves as far more potent factors than the shadowy common interests of the subjects of States. . . . We are therefore confronted with a condition of affairs in which the force of nationality will be distinctly inferior to the force of class-cohesion, and in which classes will be internationally organized so as to wield their force with effect. The prospect induces some curious reflections."[1] Most certainly it does; and one of the most urgent is the question whether *this* cosmopolitanism will not have dangers as great as those of the nationalism which we know.

For there will be something tragic in the progress of

[1] See "The Great Illusion," pp. 140-1, 245-53.

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our modern life if it carries us away from one long-standing form of misunderstanding and rivalry only to plunge us more deeply into another. The greatest virtue of the spirit of nationality has been just this,—that whenever it has been both strong and pure it has welded together classes and ranks, whose interests must always have been in some degree divergent, into a unity with common aims and a common power of self-devotion. Thus the love of country has provided a ground on which men might meet in forgetfulness of class-interests no less than of private gain, only remembering and working for the good of the whole realm. In this ideal, which has been something more than a mere dream in all the great periods of history, there may well be seen a nearer approach to the Christian standard than in the conception of a world-wide union for the protection or promotion of class-interests. A true nobility may indeed be shown in the latter form of contest by those who identify themselves with the cause of the disinherited and oppressed. But the more such a movement cuts itself adrift from national loyalties and becomes purely economic, the more difficult does it become to imagine it as inspiring the warm and chivalrous self-devotion which we associate with true patriotism. At the best, one form of exclusiveness is banished, but another and hardly less dangerous form enters in its place.

Further, if the approach of a class-war is one of the greatest dangers of the present day, and if, as we know to be the case, the whole resources of modern governments are strained in the attempt to arbitrate and reconcile, what hope of such an arbitrament will there be if the contest is transferred from the national to the world-wide arena? If the moral authority with which the government of a man's own fatherland speaks to him is not strong enough to awaken a spirit of conciliation and respect for the claims of others, is it likely that any international authority that we can imagine will succeed? If the unifying force of patriotism fails to recon-

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cile class and class, there may well be no issue save the cruel one of untempered economic war.

(2) Two other disquieting tendencies of modern cosmopolitanism also claim our attention. The first is the tendency of civilization to extinguish all differences, and reduce life everywhere more and more to a common type. We may admit that the aim of those who most consciously and earnestly seek to direct its course is to raise the general level of human nature; but unhappily the result of modern 'progress,' so largely impersonal in its mode of working, includes a vast amount of 'leveling down' as well. Standardization is everywhere the rule, and the color and variety of life fade away before its advance. It is indeed true that uniformity, in dress, customs, language, and mental outlook, has great practical conveniences and advantages; and it may even be suggested that it is only the artist and the student of life, who have leisure to delight in contrast and variety, who suffer through their disappearance. These considerations might indeed satisfy us if each nation only surrendered its own characteristics in order to assume the best that other nations had to afford; but our modern uniformity is determined too often by cheapness rather than by excellence. It is the commodity which is most economically produced on the greatest scale, or the habit which is most easily acquired, that becomes dominant and almost universal; and so the varied color of the world passes into a monotony which is not less monotonous because it is 'up-to-date.'

Nor can it be said that this is a merely imaginary danger. At the Universal Races Congress held in London in 1911, one speaker after another emphasized the fact that inter-racial harmony is far from involving uniformity; indeed the latter was pointed out rather as a risk to be avoided than as an end to be pursued.[2] It is true

[2] As an example, I may quote the words of a distinguished English authority on ethnology, Professor Haddon: "I believe largely in the comparative permanence of what are called racial characteristics; I sincerely

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that the contact of different races has been in the highest degree fruitful in the past, and may be so again; but it can only be so if the races are indeed *different,* and if they are able, even amid the freest interchange and commerce of ideas, to maintain their distinct individualities and to bring their varying contributions. The new tendency to uniformity might prove just as fatal to this fruitful exchange of ideas and experiences as was the old isolation. Assuredly, such exchange cannot take place between those whose nature has been bleached to a single pallid monotony.

(3) But there is a yet graver danger in the fortuitous cosmopolitanism of modern life. If it merely diminished the color of the world, this would indeed be an impoverishment to the race, but it might leave the individual very nearly where he stood before; for the most intense experiences of his life will come to him equally whether he lives in a vast and uniform society, or in one that is highly differentiated, where individual character obtains free play. But in the mingling at haphazard of many races, there is involved for each the breaking down of old restraints, and hence the possibility of grave moral peril. The great meeting-places where the currents of Oriental and Occidental life have come together have indeed produced a vivid and brilliant type of life, but hardly one that has been morally stable and sound. Nor is this hard to understand. In the first contact and clash of diverse races, the members of each see around them many unfamiliar and enticing customs. Their own traditional restraints fall away, and they fail to appreciate or adopt those of the nation with whom they have but now come into touch. This process can be traced

hope they will not be merged into a common world. . . . Nearly every group of peoples has developed its own mentality, its own psychology, ideas and ideals. We need to preserve the difference between those ideas and ideals. If you merge them, you get a common,—a very common,—humanity. All progress takes place in the reaction between extremes. All philosophy has arisen from a mixture of races which brought to one another different ideas and ideals." ("Record of Proceedings," p. 26.)



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in all the great meetings of East and West, of civilized and savage man; and, in a minor degree, it may be seen in the contact of nations more nearly akin. For it is always easier to understand unfamiliar vices than unfamiliar virtues. It may well be the case that no nation in reality "wears its heart upon its sleeve." There are always reserves that are not readily laid aside, depths which only time and sympathy can sound; and it is in these that the finer soul of nationality must in most cases be sought. Any fool can appreciate and imitate his neighbour's vices, but only the wise man has patience to study, to understand, and to follow virtues which at first, and perhaps for long, are strange to him.

This, then, is the most serious danger involved in the mingling of nationalities which is so marked a feature of our day. It is easier to break down than to build up, and harmful influences tend to travel more swiftly than those that are helpful. As we saw at the outset, this was the situation which early Christianity had to meet, and in face of which its victories were won. But to-day the breaking down of old barriers and restraints is not yet so complete as it was then. In many lands the spur of national and patriotic feeling is still strong; and, when this has proved so mighty an instrument of moral discipline in the past, teaching restraint and calling for unselfish effort in the common cause, may it not still be used in the same great interest at once to support and to concentrate the wider humanitarian impulse which, without such direction, is apt to dissipate its energy in too wide a field? There may indeed be a few great men whose enthusiasm can compass the width of the world without any such dissipation, and without (in Aristotle's phrase) becoming 'watery' through too great diffusion. Yet even for them there must be some added zest in work done for their own people; and the average man will find his moral enthusiasm not lowered but raised by the touch of patriotism, whether he be working di-

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rectly for the good of his own country or seeking to represent and apply her ideals in service beyond her borders. In this way, a patriotism purified of its narrower and less worthy elements may be recognized as an ally rather than a foe to the Christian 'enthusiasm of humanity.'

We have indeed seen that there are dangers attendant on the ideas of patriotism and nationality. They may come to be identified with an attitude of exclusiveness and intolerance, just as they may be appealed to in justification of a spirit of aggression and reckless national aggrandizement. But we have seen a danger on the side of cosmopolitanism as well,—the danger that, in the break-down of nationality, its assured good may be destroyed as well as its not infrequent evil, and that this good (the spirit of self-effacement and discipline, and the rich variety of national life) may prove hard or impossible to replace. But if the ideal of mere cosmopolitanism is thus an imperfect one, may it not be possible to find another in which both dangers are avoided, and which will thus prove a more adequate instrument for the application of the principles of Christian ethics to the life of the world?

This end may perhaps be attained if we adopt a conception, not so much cosmopolitan as *international.* The distinction may seem over-subtle, but there is a real difference between the former ideal, which seeks to gain the universal end through the negation of nationality, and the latter, which strives to include what is best in nationality in a wider synthesis.

This distinction is suggested by the concluding words of a paper, submitted to the Universal Races Congress by Dr. Lange, the General Secretary of the Interparliamentary Union: "I do not see any ideal in international uniformity. On the contrary, national and racial diversity is in my opinion a condition of progress and life. The very word *international* has the word *national* as one of its component parts, as an essential condition

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of its meaning."[3] The problem thus comes to be, can this international ideal be worked out in practice, and can it be made a ruling principle of action? Can the love of country, rightly directed, be made to subserve instead of opposing the wider love of mankind? Was Mazzini right when he taught that nationality was the lever by which humanity should be raised, and that each nation should bring its own contribution to the advancement of the world in the rivalry not of violence but of service?[4] If so, this ideal has an abiding place in the working out of the Christian hope for the world.

It is true that a great change of emphasis is needed. The idea that the true patriot is the man who most vigorously misunderstands and misrepresents other nations must be banished once for all. Instead of the animus of the natural man, with its fine objectivity and its unwillingness to pause and think, there must enter a more reflective spirit. The first duty to be enforced is that of understanding one's own country, in her deeper character, history, and traditions; and when this has been in some measure performed, a doubt may have emerged whether the duty of misunderstanding one's neighbour is really as fundamental as one had at first supposed. Not that the patriotic impulse will thus be weakened: it will rather be purified by a deeper appreciation of national needs as well as of national glory. For self-criticism is an essential factor in true patriotism, and when this leaven has once begun to work, it will join with a just enthusiasm for the things that are admirable in one's country's life, to assist in the appreciation of the characteristics and ideals of other peoples.

This idea that the path to the appreciation of alien ideals lies through an intelligent loyalty to those at home

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[3] "Interracial Problems," p. 123.

[4] Such a friendly rivalry is already arising not only in the spheres of science and of scholarship, but in the all-important sphere of social service; nor does any nation hesitate to give others the benefit of its experience and achievements in this form of endeavor.

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has at first the appearance of a paradox. Yet it merely involves the application to nations of an undeniable fact of individual morality,—a fact which at once becomes clear if we compare the summation of the moral teaching of the Old Testament in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour *as thyself,*" with the Golden Rule, which makes the treatment which we desire from others the standard of our conduct toward them. The truth which these sayings attest is that each man's self-knowledge is the only starting-point from which he can set out to know, and hence to respect, the feelings and rights of others. Only on the basis of his own inner life can he understand that of his fellows; the supreme duty of sympathy presupposes that he who would exercise it must himself have felt. And the present contention is that there is here a true analogy, even though it is often unrecognized, between the moral relations of man with man and those of race with race.

We may test this theory, that loyalty to one's own country is the only avenue to respect for the loyalties of others, by referring as briefly as may be to certain of the chief expressions of patriotism. Of these the spirit of warlike courage is the first in time, and it is also the least in favor of our analogy. For here, if anywhere, the clash of aims is of the essence of the matter, and the one end of patriotic action is to thwart the designs and ambitions of the opposing patriotism. Yet even here it cannot escape notice that, in all the nobler ages and forms of the military spirit, it has been regarded as necessarily including a ready recognition of the valor of opponents. Hence, while the objects of the combatants are directly opposed, each may hail with admiration the spirit of the other; and this mutual respect is grounded in the fact that each recognizes in his opponent a loyalty like that which he strives himself to display. Such a feeling has emerged in many different ages, but one of its most familiar expressions is to be found in the story of the Third Crusade; for the char-

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acters of Saladin and Richard came to typify the fact that true nobility implies not only personal courage but a generous recognition of its presence in the enemy. Thus there is here at least an approach to the universal application of the standards of patriotic endeavor.

The case becomes clearer when we consider more peaceful but not less essential forms of the love of country. Of these forms the most direct is the love of the land itself in all its features. In its highest degree this love is hardly possible to even the most appreciative of passing strangers, for it depends on the steady devotion of one who knows his country, not in the garb of one season alone, but in the whole range of moods which come with the varied circle of the year. But while this is the prerogative of those alone who dwell in the land, they are not thereby disqualified from the appreciation of other countries. Rather the love of their own prepares them to enter in a measure into the similar love felt by other peoples.

So it is also in regard to national achievement in literature or art, or in any of the other great departments of human activity. Every man has a unique opportunity of understanding the attainment of his fellow-countrymen in its inner spirit and meaning; yet his appreciation of what they have done may and ought to prove not a hindrance but a help towards understanding the parallel yet diverse achievements of others. It has indeed been said that the conflict of ideals of culture is one main cause of the rivalry of nations; but if there be some truth in this, it can be but a limited truth. For it is not the diligent student of his own country's culture who is most ready to decry that of other countries: it is rather the Philistine, whose mind has been disciplined neither by the study of his own inheritance nor by the effort to appreciate that of others.

Once more, that high form of patriotism which is rooted in love for the great names of the past may best be learned at home. There is a continuity of national

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tradition, which enables the work of those who have moulded this tradition to be understood and revered by those of their successors who worthily enter into it, as it can hardly be by strangers. At least there is an added intimacy which belongs to a compatriot alone. Few men have spoken to Europe as Luther spoke; yet his most learned and most ardent student outside the German race must feel that there is something which *he* can never attain in the tone in which an unlearned fellow-countryman speaks of "*unser* Doktor Martin Luther." But while this is so, it is not less true that there is nothing exclusive in reverence for the great dead, but that he who seeks first to understand the great names of his own nation will in so doing fit himself to appreciate the master-spirits of other countries as well. Each nation has a unique capacity, as well as duty, of honoring its own great men; but, in proportion as its members show themselves able to do so rightly, they will also become able to enter into the great common heritage of mankind.

This gift of loyalty to national ideals which is the deepest spring of racial endurance is more elusive and impalpable than we often realize, and it may be strongest where it is least tangible. Of its power the persistence of the Jewish race gives the most remarkable proof. Cut off from all the outward supports of patriotism, their last great military leader slain two thousand years ago, their country to the vast majority only a far-off memory and a dream, dispersed among many peoples and forced to use many different tongues,—they are yet united by the indestructible bond of a common tradition and a common belief in the divine vocation of their race; and thus they have been able to resist the shattering impact of centuries of dispersion and persecution and to wield at the end of it all a mighty influence on the thought and action of the world. Nor could they have accomplished what they have for mankind as a whole, had their racial tenacity and coherence not been proof against this repeated persecution and dispersion.

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Only by maintaining their individuality have they been able to contribute an element of unique value to human progress. And, if our argument has not led us wholly astray, this represents the ideal not for one people alone, but for all. So far from contradicting the Christian principle, it is in full accord with it, that the different nations should lay aside, not their identity, but only their exclusiveness and intolerance, and by proving faithful to their several destinies should forward the wider destiny of the world.

This thought received one of its noblest as well as earliest expressions in the vision which came to a Jewish prophet twenty-six centuries ago, of the place which his people should take in history. The words of his vision will fitly conclude this paper, for they express in the terms of that distant age, the ideal which I have tried to indicate, of a state of society in which the nations shall form a unity, not reached through material subjection to an external empire, nor through the abdication by any of its own destiny, but through the desire to bring each its own powers and gifts freely and willingly to the spiritual intercourse of a harmonious world:

"In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt, to Assyria, and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt, and the Egyptian into Assyria; and the Egyptians shall worship with the Assyrians. In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth; for that the Lord of hosts hath blessed them, saying, Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel mine inheritance" (Isaiah xix. 23-25).

G. F. Barbour.

Edinburgh.

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# THE HEGELIAN CONCEPT OF THE STATE AND MODERN INDIVIDUALISM.

H. S. SHELTON.

THE present short article is an attempt to show that the attitude of many of those who have treated the theory of the State from the philosophical point of view, towards the unending controversy between individualism and socialism, is far too favorable to what is commonly known as socialism. It is a demurrer against the widespread opinion that the advocacy of a maximum of direct state control is warranted by valid philosophical theory. So far as it goes, it seeks to rehabilitate individualism, if not, in the writings of any representative, as a complete and adequate philosophical theory, at least as a practical basis for state action. It upholds the view that the arguments of the current school of political philosophy, so far as they are contrary to individualism, are invalid, and, so far as they are valid, are not available against the most extreme individualism, or for any form of regimentarian socialism.

Modern philosophies of the State may briefly be classified under two headings, the individualist, represented by Mill and Spencer, and the Hegelian, of which the most prominent representatives are the late T. H. Green and Dr. Bernard Bosanquet. There can be little doubt that the mass of academic opinion has gravitated towards the Hegelian side. Of the works of Hegel himself I have no authority to speak. Nor am I concerned to discuss whether he, on the one hand, or Mill and Spencer, on the other hand, produced the clearest, the most complete, the most philosophical account of the structure of the State. What concerns me here is to examine what has been considered to be the political bias of his teaching, and the undoubted bias of the teaching of the ablest of his English representatives.

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Of the use that has been made of the writings of Hegel by the ablest of the socialist school of thought, there can be no dispute. It is evident even in popular essays and reviews. Mr. Bernard Shaw, in one of the Fabian essays, states that the Socialists were pupils of Hegel, while the Whigs were pupils of Bentham and Austin.[1] The great influence of Hegel on Lassalle, and the way in which that writer's whole outlook on life was modified by the Hegelian philosophy, is a matter of common knowledge, as is also, in a lesser degree, his influence on Marx. It is not, however, German social democracy that we are considering so much as political thought in the English-speaking world.

In England, the direct political influence of Hegel is small. It is only recently that any of his works have been translated, and some sections of his political philosophy have not, as yet, been rendered into English. Adequate knowledge of his work is thus confined to a very small class of highly educated philosophers. Thus it is not with Hegel that we have to deal, but with the Hegelians. Direct Hegelian influence is not, therefore, in England, to be seen in what is technically known as socialism. It is very doubtful whether either Green or Dr. Bosanquet could rightly be called by that name. But the main influence tends to socialism in that it favors and countenances the modern tendency to do more and more by means of the direct action of the State. For this I take to be the fundamental line of division between the two schools of thought. The first, which we will call individualist, desires to leave as much scope as possible to individual endeavor. It regards the State and its activities as a necessary evil. The second, which we may term socialist, desires to extend, so far as possible, state activities and state control. To that extent, socialist thought is in harmony with monarchic or oligarchic ideas, for, whether or no we are to be ruled and

[1] Humboldt edition, 1891, p. 223.

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controlled, in great things and in small, to a greater or a lesser extent, is a more fundamental question than the particular form which the ruling power, for the time being, may assume. And the prominent thinkers who are properly known as Hegelian, though they may differ in many things, agree in thinking that a true ideal of political theory lies in the direction of maximizing rather than minimizing the control of the State. This influence, then, it will be convenient to examine more closely. We shall, therefore, glance shortly at the work of the late T. H. Green and we shall look somewhat more fully at some of the views of Dr. Bosanquet.

The work of Green, interesting and valuable as it is from a literary and historical point of view, has small significance with regard to the present controversy. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, the critical part of the "Principles of Political Obligation" ends with Rousseau and makes no mention even of the earlier utilitarians. The political views of J. S. Mill, whom Green greatly admired, are not criticized, while the social portion of Spencer's philosophy was not written until after Green's lectures were composed. It is thus very difficult to state his exact position with regard to his contemporaries. Then, again, the main aspect of his lectures is ethical, and, as such, not within the scope of our present inquiry. On actual and political questions the conclusions are somewhat hazy. Let us take, for example, the vexed problem of compulsory education, a problem which, it must be admitted, has greatly puzzled utilitarian philosophers. Green's view can be gathered from the following passage: "But the answer to the objection is that a law of compulsory education, if the preferences, ecclesiastical and otherwise, of those parents who show any practical sense of responsibility are duly respected, is, from the beginning, only felt as compulsion by those in whom, so far as this social function is concerned, there is no spontaneity to be interfered with; and that, in the second generation,

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though the law with its penal sanction still continues, it is not felt as a law, as an enforcement of action by penalties at all."[2]

It would, perhaps, be difficult to find an instance of state compulsion more necessary practically and less easily justified in theory than education. Mill put forward some kind of defense, and Spencer, more rigidly logical, maintained that both the compulsion and the education were illegitimate extensions of the sphere of action of the State. But Green's solution of the problem is no solution at all. The underlying assumption behind it, and behind much other Hegelian argument, is that when a system is so established that resistance is useless and criticism futile, the loss of liberty entailed is not really felt. In this particular case, Green's remarks are simply not true. Anyone acquainted with the lives of the poorer classes must be aware how enormously important to them is the age when the children begin to add to the family income. So long as there are any poor, even if a hundred generations elapse, the compulsion must be felt as an enforcement of action by penalties.

It is not, however, so much in Green's practical conclusions, which are vague and commonplace, as in his attitude of mind towards the State that he comes into contact with the most extreme individualism. There is implicit an attitude of respect, even reverence, towards the government which is certainly not deduced from knowledge of those engaged in it and of the manner in which it is carried on. The dominant note is the grounds of political *obligation,* which he interprets not as the obligation of the State and of those who direct it, towards the individuals whom they rule, but as the obligation of the individual to reverence and serve the State. Actually and practically, few are likely to deny the existence of such an obligation. That is not the point in dispute.

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[2] Collected Works, Vol. II, p. 515.

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But, in order to deduce, within reasonable limits, the existence of some such obligation, it is not necessary to go behind the actual machinery of government as we know it, and its foundation on monarchy, oligarchy or democracy, as the case may be. No one, again, will deny that, for the stability of the State, it must carry with it the actual or tacit assent of the mass of the people governed. In this sense, government must rest on general will. But, general will, in this sense, means merely that no considerable section of the people is in active disagreement. Green, however, following Hegel, attempts to find in this concept something much more binding and much more subtle. He regards the obligation of the individual towards the State as absolute so long as the State expresses 'general will.' What exactly it means is undefined. It is not the unanimity[3] of Rousseau, because, then, conflict is impossible. It is not the will of the sovereign, or of the ruling power, whatever the ruling power may be, or of a bare majority, or of a majority of any size. What is it? Students who understand Green (and Hegel) better than I, may be able to give some answer. Meanwhile the individualist critic may demur to the introduction into philosophical and political discussion of a mystical concept, utterly illogical in a detached philosopher such as Green. It seems a faint echo of the Catholic idea of the Will of God. But the Catholic, who discusses whether or no and how far the will of the State is in accordance with the Will of God is, at any rate, logical, though the discussion is often trivial waste of labor. But the introduction, by a sceptical philosopher such as Green, of an undefinable general will, to which all must bow, is surely a useless and metaphysical complication of a subject which is, in any case, complicated enough. So far as any practical in-

[3] Rousseau says that for a will to be general it is not *always* necessary for it to be unanimous, and a unanimous will is not necessarily general. But the nearest practical approach to Rousseau's ideal is a convention when votes are taken before citizens have time to discuss and form factions.

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ferences are made, the inferences must be rejected. Moreover, clear discussion of philosophical theory is only possible when cobwebs of this kind have been swept away.

These critical remarks must not be understood to imply lack of appreciation of the work of Green. General criticism of his work would be entirely out of place in the present short article. But it is important to notice this doctrine in the writings of so famous an exponent, because inferences which he did not make have been made from it and can logically be made from it. Green himself was a Liberal and not out of sympathy with many of Mill's practical conclusions; nevertheless, his exposition of general will, if logically carried out, can be used as a powerful argument against writers of the individualist school.

The doctrine of 'General Will' is more fully expounded by Dr. Bosanquet,[4] who traces to Hegel the somewhat irrational form it has taken in modern philosophy. He shows how Hegel adopted it from Rousseau, whose theories of social contract, and whose identification of general will, for all practical purposes, with the will of all, does make it, with him, slightly more intelligible. Dr. Bosanquet also defends Hegel from what he thinks to be the popular misconception that he was particularly enamoured of Prussian bureaucracy. We find the State praised as the actualization of freedom, in what way is not quite clear. But the general will is as undefined as ever. We are told that it is the rational will, even though people are not aware of it. Who is to determine what the rational will may be is unexplained.

Dr. Bosanquet, though he would be the last to disclaim the term Hegelian as a correct description of his general attitude of mind, here branches out boldly into original thought and brings to the support of his thesis

[4] "Philosophical Theory of the State," 2d ed., pp. 240ff., and elsewhere. The capitals are Dr. Bosanquet's.

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certain psychological notions which are distinctly of modern growth. Now Dr. Bosanquet is a very learned, a very able, and a very experienced philosophical writer, and all his published work is worthy of careful study and consideration; yet it is very doubtful whether he strengthens his case, on this particular problem, by his learning and research. His most suggestive illustration and argument is found in the analogy of the army and the crowd, and his contention is that in the army is the nearest approach to general will (pp. 160ff.).

But yet, where is this will that is not the sum of the particular wills? It vanishes when we attempt to grasp it. There is the will of the general and the wills of the units, and what else is there? There is, of course, organization, and there is subordination, but I am unable to see that anything new is introduced of the nature of will. The one essential for a successful organization is that the particular wills should coincide. Each particular will desires victory, and each particular will has confidence in the ability of the head to do all that is possible to achieve that end. That is the ideal, and in so far as the ideal is not realized, the efficiency of the organization is impaired. Discipline is difficult to maintain, the morale is broken, the army runs away in time of stress.

I am, of course, aware, that modern psychologists have shown that there is something latent in a crowd which is not the sum of the wills of the particular units. A wave of feeling passes over it. The crowd acts as one man. The same, no doubt, is found in all grouping. But Dr. Bosanquet is careful to say that this is not his meaning, stating that "the level of intelligence and responsibility will be, as a rule, extraordinarily low."

But, surely, we must not take the army as the type of society, still less as the type of the State. The power, influence, and sphere of action of the State is, as a matter of fact, increasing, and is becoming more and more regimentarian. But that this subserves the realization of any true ideal is a very controversial statement. The

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philosopher can hardly accept the well-worn maxim, *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem* (p. 185), as an adequate justification. With many of Dr. Bosanquet's arguments and statements on particular points, it is not difficult to agree, and he, himself, in practice, would not wish his analogy to be pressed too closely. With him, as with Green, it is not so much on particular questions that extreme divergence from the views of individualist thinkers is to be found. It is in the attitude of mind. It is in the attempt to find this indefinable something called general will, and to identify it with the will of the formal State. So far as Dr. Bosanquet is engaged in proving that there are inconsistencies in Rousseau's conception and the form which he gave it, I am in full agreement, but I cannot discover that Dr. Bosanquet himself succeeds in attaching to his concept any intelligible meaning. The maxim quoted above may well be applied to the concept, general will.

What Rousseau himself meant by his sovereign inalienable general will is somewhat obscure. Dr. Bosanquet says he follows Hobbes very closely. But one thing is clear from the most cursory glance, and that is that Rousseau's general will is confused and obliterated, immediately we pass from a pure democracy and form State of any kind whatever. A complicated and bureaucratic government, according to Rousseau, is the last source from which any valid general will is likely to emerge. Thus, the use made of the concept by Hegel and the Hegelians is precisely opposite to that intended by the author. Rousseau's doctrine was fundamentally an assertion of the virtue of a pure democracy, and is unintelligible in any other sense. We are thus still more entitled to view with suspicion any use of the idea in favor of autocracy, bureaucracy, or the extension of the sphere of state government. It was originally intended to convey the opposite impression. But, surely, in view of the confusion that necessarily arises, it would be best not to make deductions from what is, after all,

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a semi-mystical doctrine, explicable in a scholastic sense, but utterly out of place in modern philosophy.

With the putting of this concept in its place, it will be seen that the theoretic foundations for such ideas as that the individual has no rights against the State, or that a powerful ruling paternal government is a desirable outcome of modern civilization, become doubtful and uncertain.

There are other ways in which the work of Dr. Bosanquet tends to undermine the democratic ideal. In the first place, though sympathetic towards the ideas of Hegel, he continually criticizes adversely the political philosophies of the two great individualists, Spencer and Mill. It is no part of my task to maintain that these criticisms are always mistaken or undeserved. I am not committed to the defense of the system of either writer in every detail, and I am in no way disposed to deny that flaws can be found in the exposition of both of them.[5] But it is desirable to defend them in certain points specially relevant to the present essay. In some ways, both Spencer and Mill are more open to attack than the majority of political philosophers. Both were essentially practical in aim. Both descended to particulars. And it is in the application of philosophic ideas to particular cases that the fiercest controversies are likely to arise. Again, those who favor their school of thought are unable to agree with many details. But the essential standpoint of both of them was the assertion of the paramount importance of individual liberty. It is where criticisms touch this question that they call for a reply.

One of these points is certainly fundamental. The assertion of the principle of individual liberty, and of the limits of the authority of the State over the individual is said to be self-contradictory and the argument

[5] An estimate of Spencer's political philosophy will be found in this JOURNAL, April, 1911.



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is said to be equally available for extreme collectivism.[6] The assertion is somewhat staggering. The views criticized are to be found principally in the fourth chapter of Mill's "Liberty" and in the latter part of Spencer's "Justice." Mill's views are not easy to summarize either in his own words or in any other. Expressed briefly, Mill maintains that the State is only justified in interfering with the individual when individuals interfere with "the interest of one another, or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the laws and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury or molestation."[7] Spencer expresses a similar idea much more clearly and epigramatically in his famous phrase: "Every man is free to do that which he wills provided he infringes not the equal freedom of every other man."

Dr. Bosanquet's criticism is founded mainly on the assertion that every action of every man, in greater or in less degree, affects the interests and well being of others, and, therefore, we are informed that Mill's principle can be used to justify both administrative nihilism and administrative absolutism. For this statement, considered as a purely verbal criticism on certain of Mill's passages, especially if some ambiguous phrases are isolated and called characteristic, there is something to be said. There are faults in the exposition of every philosophic writer and there are limits to the power of language to express thought. Moreover, Mill's essay was essentially popular and topical, and, possibly, on that account, did not reach that standard of philosophical exactitude which no one was able to maintain better than he. But Mill's meaning and the trend of his argument

[6] See particularly "Philosophical Theory of the State," p. 63, but the same statement is found in several parts of the work.

[7] This passage is a quotation from "Liberty," 3d ed., p. 134.

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are perfectly clear. If we attempt to apply the principle practically, and to advocate state interference solely on Mill's ground, we shall soon find how short a distance it will take us. *De minimis non curat lex.* How healthy an exercise it would be for would-be legislators to justify all their laws solely on the ground that the interference of individuals with the rights and interests of others was so serious as to warrant penal interference! Indeed, as a practical guide, Dr. Bosanquet does not dissent. But here again the whole exposition is obsessed with the Hegelian general will. Dr. Bosanquet asserts that the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions cannot possibly hold good, and gives as his own criterion "what the coercive authority is and is not able to do towards the promotion of the good life." What is good life? To criticize the criterion in detail would be superfluous, because Dr. Bosanquet would admit that the criterion is dependent upon the concept of general will. I would, however, make one remark. I am of opinion that the two criteria, if both are worked out with sufficient care, will amount to much the same thing. I should be the first to maintain that, when the rightful sphere of state action is passed, any attempt to promote 'good life' is not only indirectly harmful, but directly futile. The danger of Dr. Bosanquet's criterion lies in the fact that it is so easy plausibly to infer from it an almost unlimited extension of state activity. Spencer's formula of justice expresses the individualist idea much more clearly and succinctly than does any part of the work of Mill. This principle Dr. Bosanquet does not criticize systematically, but merely describes as a crude enunciation of the alien nature of the self and the law. But are not the self and the law alien in practice, so soon as the sphere of the law is extended beyond a very narrow limit? To defend or to criticize Spencer, however, would be but to repeat the substance of my previous article.

Another point at issue is the relation between the

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State and society. Dr. Bosanquet accuses both individualists and socialists of not recognizing the vast importance of the whole social development of mankind.[8] No particular individualist thinkers are mentioned in that passage. In view of his criticism of Mill and Spencer that they crudely and wrongly enunciate the alien character of self and law, it will probably be understood to refer to them. Whether it is so intended, is doubtful. In any case, it is well to point out that the criticism is invalid. Indeed, in the case of Spencer, it is almost absurd. As every student of his work is well aware, no modern philosopher, nor, I think, any philosopher of any age, has given such careful attention to the class of human institutions called (for lack of a better name) voluntary. His profound realization of their importance in human evolution is one of the reasons which caused him to oppose, in every possible manner, the extension of state activity, well knowing as he did that a powerful State is bound to hamper such activities and to render smaller the chances of development and improvement.

It is, however, necessary to warn all those who are interested in the interrelation between philosophy and politics against a similar fallacy from which the Hegelian philosophy is by no means free. By the State, Mill, Spencer, and the man in the street mean the formal machinery of government. In some political philosophies. the term is widened so that it may be interpreted as almost identical with society. The relation between the individual man and the State is a very complicated, but is, at least, a comprehensible problem. The relation between man and society is a problem which has no beginning and no end. The individual and the human environment continually act and react. Even here, however, the obligation is by no means all on one side. For any clear discussion it is essential that these two aspects

[8] See Introduction to second edition, p. xxvii.

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should be kept separate and distinct. Dr. Bosanquet himself, notwithstanding the warning he gives in the introduction, is not free from the fallacy.[9] Needless to say, any such confusion will tell against individualism and in favor of socialism, because, whatever may be the relation between man and society, it is evident that society in all its aspects will exercise over the individual man a much greater degree of control than can any formal State. The confusion between, or, it would be better to say, the indistinct separation of society and the State is certainly not a feature of Spencer's work, nor do I think it is to be found in Mill, but it is a fallacy to which the Hegelian philosopher is particularly prone.

It will be well to summarize and focus the arguments and criticisms of this short essay. Its object is practical rather than theoretical, and critical rather than constructive. It is intended to clear away one of the obstacles in the way of the formulation of a true (or, not to beg the question, shall I say of an individualist?) theory of the State. That obstacle is found in certain developments of Hegelian thought, which, if valid, point to the conclusion (in the words of Dr. Bosanquet) that no true ideal lies in the direction of minimizing the individuality or of restricting the power of the State. My own personal view is directly opposed to this, but of that view it is not possible here to give a direct defense. All that has been attempted is to show that valid philosophical theory is not against it. This I have attempted in two ways. One way has been briefly to reply to certain criticisms that have been urged against the great individualist philosophers. The other way has been by a critical examination of the concept of 'general will,' which can be briefly and roughly restated as follows:

In the time of the scholastic philosophers, it was natu-

[9] See particularly p. 185: "We have hitherto spoken of the State and society as almost convertible terms."

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rally the business of philosophers to uphold the power and authority of the temporal sovereignty, both on account of the Pauline injunction, and also because of the vast influence of the Papacy. The great problem then was to decide within what limits the will of the sovereign corresponded to the Will of God. And the schoolman was strictly logical because, in matters directly or indirectly connected with religion, he had, when necessary, a definite and practical means of discovering what the Will of God actually was. With the decline in the power of the Papacy, the divine right of sovereignty was retained, with less logic, by Protestant philosophers. Rousseau's doctrine of general will is, for all practical purposes, an assertion of the divine right of a pure democracy. The divinity has vanished, but the inalienable, indivisible and absolute character remains. This concept, however, with Rousseau, was a minor feature, the main idea of the "Social Contract" being freedom and democracy. The Hegelians have dispensed with the democracy and disguised the freedom till it is quite unrecognizable, but retained the 'General Will,' which, with them, is a mystical concept with no clear and intelligible meaning whatever. It is, however, used as a support for the increase in the power of the State, however the State may be constituted.

With the rejection of this concept, the Spencerian ideal of freedom is the only one that remains.[10] A powerful, controlling, paternal State may be defended as a product of evolution, or as an adaptation to environment, or as a practical necessity in the present state of affairs. But there is no ideal behind it. The individualist is, therefore, entitled to treat the State, and, indeed, all forms of control of human beings by each other, as a necessary evil, and to regard as the great problem of statecraft how to reduce that evil to the mini-

[10] That is, from any but Catholic and scholastic premises. From the Catholic point of view, there is a case for paternal government, but even Catholicism is not inconsistent with the Spencerian ideal of freedom.

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mum. Whatever may be the difficulties, or the objections in the way of such an ideal, the philosophical demurrer, raised by the Hegelian school, falls to the ground.[11]

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## ART, PHILOSOPHY, AND LIFE.

HORACE M. KALLEN.

IN the esteem of mankind the creation and the pursuit of the beautiful has from time immemorial been an honorable calling and a notable devotion. Anciently its instruments were assigned to the gods; its excellence was held no less than divine. Apollo and Hephaestos, Pallas and Hermes are these sources of the lyre and the forge, the pipe and the letter; from their protection and favor springs the power to create beauty. In our day, if we have abandoned Apollo and Pallas, we still cling to divine gifts, to inspiration; we still prize the works of the poets and the sculptors and the musicians above all other things. Only a lonely moralist, here and there, has presumed to challenge the worth of these delectables or to deny them a high place in the hierarchy of moral excellence. But most of us, if we could not be Virgil, would be Maecenas; indeed, in these later days, I am not sure that we should not prefer to be Maecenas: to outbid Europe for costly paintings, to collect first editions and ancient manuscripts; to fill our houses with glassware and porcelain, with postage-stamps and antique

[11] The following passage from Dr. Bosanquet ("Philosophical Theory of the State," p. 78) is of some interest. "We shall then be compelled to agree with Bentham, Mill, and Spencer that 'self-government' and the 'general will' are meaningless phantoms, combinations of hostile factors, incapable of being united in a real experience." This article does not raise the problem of self-government. I am not aware that Spencer dealt with the question of general will, but if he did do so, he answered Dr. Bosanquet's criticisms in advance.

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weapons; privately and publicly to support a poet, to encourage a musician, to send a lovely girl to Paris to learn dancing or singing, an ambitious boy to Florence to learn to paint. In our day Maecenas is more honorable; Virgil, much costlier, is less significant. If we appreciate more intensely the old Horatian regret, we find life too fleeting and art too long only for the purchase of ancient excellence, not for the creation of contemporary perfection. A distortion of the old Talmudic form of the same regret strikes perhaps nearer home. "How labour increaseth!" cries the venerable Rabbin, "and how short the day!" It may be that we regret the pressure of affairs which prevents us from enjoying native excellence, that our hunger for beautiful possessions in which to take breath is but the natural reaction upon our thirst for accelerated and unbeautiful achievement; we seek merely compensation in the former for the felt lack in the latter. The business of life is apparently so dreary a thing that its decoration with bought and extraneous ornament, like an African belle, is better than its unlovely nudity in field and city. So we hang the poor blossomless plant of our national life with artificial flowers. The decoration may be spotty, a malformation on the body politic, a distortion and an evil cause. Yet the knowledge that it is possessed may enhance the value of what it is to beautify; its sole contemplation may, for the time being, shut out of mind the parts it does not conceal. The art-museum, like the saloon, is much visited and promises and achieves the same results. So we labor toward the possession of art and we seek in the possession of art to forget our labor.

This condition of things argues a disorganization of society to most people less disquieting than unnatural. A civilization like ours must necessarily have a strong antiquarian interest, for our civilization is our inheritance. Without the library we are savages once more. But the library should be not a morgue but a pantry. A healthy existence cannot sanely go on in a charnel house,

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and the life which finds the things more excellent among the dead can hardly be an excellent life. There is, after all, less in common between the 'old masters' and the newest life, than between the 'old masters' and the 'new art.' We have abandoned Galen and Paracelsus for Harvey and Pasteur, but we still measure St. Gaudens and Whistler by Michaelangelo and Raphael. This would be no impropriety if the deepest-lying motive were proper, but who shall say that it is? For us art is no longer long, because like all things excellent, it is rare and difficult; it is long because it has accumulated through the ages and we seem not to escape from the labyrinth of the heaped-up *débris*. We call most things beautiful because they are old, not because they are beautiful; where Horace sighed over the hard road to beauty, we sigh over the length of the catalogue.

Yet, whether with Horace we see in art the fulfillment and perfection of nature; or with Arthur Symons we see in it a mystery and a relief, art is practically the whole of life. Stripped to its bare fighting weight, human existence is reduced to the restricted range of the African bushman or the Australian black-fellow: to satisfy the most elementary needs,—to feed, to breed; under the moon's influence to dance and to howl,—these activities make the barren sum of the nudest living of mankind. They are the mechanical expressions of instincts, operating without light, a mystery in their processes, a mystery in their results. Art arises whenever any of these spontaneous activities reveals a use unthought of in the act, unsought for in the need's self-expression. Art in its primary forms is the æsthetic devoted to a use. This use, once found, is remembered, and when the activities which produce it end no longer in themselves, but aim at this use, they become instrumental and constitute a craft. The earliest art is industrial art. The pointing of a spear and the bending of a bow, the disorderly leaping converted into the rhythmic and therefore less-fatiguing magical dance, the free howl, turned into a sym-

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bol for a thing, these conserve something other than themselves, they help and perpetuate what they are not, and by that fact become arts of utility. Almost the whole, according to some, the very whole of civilization, consists of such arts,—extensions of instincts looking beyond themselves; secondary and derived activities, superposed one upon the other, until finally they make the cumulus of modern life. Instrumental, serviceable to some other thing not itself, though this life is, it rests at bottom on something which has no use, which serves no purpose, outside of itself; on something that is spontaneous, free, and irresponsible. That something is partly those instincts which make the fighting weight of life. Their operation is unharnessed, their activity is uncontrolled by a master-idea, they are self-sufficient; their process makes real the energy and capacity of the body, they look to no ulterior end, they perpetuate no event but themselves. They are like play. Any art which may be so described is called a *fine art;* it is æsthetic as opposed to industrial and utilitarian. Industry, then, rests in free play and may be said to culminate therein. For the end which any instrument may serve must be either itself an instrument toward another end, or a final resting place, having no use beyond itself. Should every particular element of civilization serve to bring about or to keep going some other element, the whole of civilization can yet have no other end, beyond itself. Like play, it is free and spontaneous. For what is the whole of civilization but a collection of industrial arts? At bottom, therefore, art and labor are coincident; all labor is art, and all art is fine art. There is no paradox in this assertion. It merely summarizes the history of civilization; it sees progress as the fusion of instruments with ends and of ends with instruments. It is the recognition of the most fundamental character of life itself,—its *un*instrumentality, its æstheticalness, its having, as a whole, no extraneous outlook and no extrinsic value.

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But if this is the case, the question obviously arises, why quarrel with the archæological interest in the arts especially called fine? The divorce of this interest from the rest of life must in this case be only apparent; and even if genuine, it is still an interest, profound, final, all-absorbing and self-sufficient, possessed of just that character I have said is fundamental to the whole life. If the dead past alone gives supreme beauty to contemporary society, the past is by that very fact no longer dead, but intensely vital. If the end to which all labor is directed is the possession of memorial forms of bygone days, these forms are the very crown and flower and consummation of life. Reproach cannot touch them, criticism falls off from them, broken and futile. They scorn justification, for by them alone is justification possible. The goal of life is the master and judge of its processes and instruments. Add now to the loveliness of the past whatever beauty we deign to see in our present day, and what shall philosophy say to them or of them,—philosophy, of recent years a petty many-worded bore, worthless and weak beside the mighty onward sweep of the sciences, the alluring sweetness of the arts. How shall it presume to challenge the very standard and touchstone of life, demand its credentials and visé its passports? Is not art rather to judge of philosophy than philosophy of art?

There are many who would give this question the affirmative answer. Life is for them a brutal and worthless struggle from which the calm marbles and placid tints and rhythms of the arts are a relief and salvation. Others again, among them even such as find in art a refuge and relief, would respond with a decided negative. For these philosophy also is an art, an outspanning art, embracing the others in its scope and holding them dissolved in its wider harmonies. They would consider philosophy the very art of arts. Challenged and apparently outstripped by science, jostled and crowded by industry, bent double and almost broken by

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the avoirdupois of its metaphysical hump, the aboriginal right of philosophy in the soul's service and delight remains unshaken. For philosophy is that natal act of imagination, that primitive vision of things absent in terms of things present, which helped man to his livelihood, even at the risk of his life. This primeval function still persists. It is the saying of a last word about what is and what is not; it is the deliverance of an ultimate judgment about excellence and evil; it is the enlistment in life's service of all that environs life. Justly reproached with dogmatism on the one hand, on the other with artificiality, philosophy nevertheless remains the discipline to man most natural, most spontaneous, most liberal. The material of the arts is the naked experience alone; the material of philosophy is that experience and all that is born of it or nourishs itself thereon. The consummation of life is indeed beauty, but it is the beauty of philosophy.

How, then, more explicitly, are life, art, and philosophy related? First we have identified life with art and art with philosophy, then we have denied the identities we have established. What, properly, are the relations these things bear to each other? Let us consider.

The motives or situations from which any form of activity springs must be such as to make this activity natural and inevitable, and when natural and inevitable, also desirable. If the world in which man lives had been congenial to him from the start, then perception might have been satisfaction and the operation of memory a rehearsal of pleasures. Experience being throughout good, each moment of its unbroken flux revealing unique and immediate excellence, no part of it would require especial treatment. Existence would then have been a beatitude, not an adjustment. Or again, had human life been ephemeral and momentary, a flash of activity expressing its own nature, a pyrotechnic flowering of the spirit, man might have come and gone without reference to the environment at all. Like Mr. Sanatayana's

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cherub, he might have fulfilled his being and realized his potentialities by repeating the multiplication table and then dying. Man, however, though not an eternal god, is something more permanent than a dialectic operation or a pyrotechnic flash. He can live only in reference to things. Had he failed to remember them, he would have failed to survive. He discovers early that the world is a process in which he happened, but which was not made for him. The flux in which he tries to maintain himself seems composed wholly of capricious eddies and treacherous whirlpools. To a mind untutored or primitive, nature seems yet rather stepmother than mother; to a sophisticated mind, she is still alien enough to require a supplementary and compensating heaven. Hence, to comprehend the whole of nature, to define her character, is the most primitive, the most compelling, and the most vital necessity of human life. Man's knowledge determines the manner and stability of his existence, its quality and duration. And this knowledge in its primeval intention, and in its ultimate outcome, is philosophy.

If this be true, we may gather something of the scope, the purpose and the meaning of philosophy, and may discover its relation to life and to art. If this be true, we see philosophy as a definition of the universe as it was in the beginning and as it ultimately shall be. It is an attempt to envisage the whole of the reality which environs us in a single symbol, to bind the unresting flux in bands of inexorable law, to understand it in terms of constant and unchanging substance. So philosophy is, indeed, identical with life, its beginning and its end. The child that calls every living person that it meets 'mamma,' that treats its toes, its chairs, its dolls and its pets in exactly the same way, beating and petting each, is no less a philosopher than the great scientist who sees in the movement of nature the mutations of a single substance according to an immutable law. The baby defines and interprets its varied world in terms of a

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single familiar and congenial being, its own warm feeling; the scientist acts in just the same way, though his term is different and may be used for other reasons. Both envisage the whole universe with one look, both define it with one instrument in a single insight. Both in so far as they define the *whole* environment, the immediate and the absent, in ultimate terms, are philosophers; the child no less than the expert, the expert no more than the child.

Now philosophy may arise as a slave labors, because of the compelling necessity of circumstance. It is then an industry responding to outer demands, but having no inner sanction. On the other hand, men may philosophize just as a dog howls at the moon or a bird sings, because to philosophize is to express spontaneously a natural capacity, because it is a flowering of the body's function into the spirit's forms. Then philosophy is all pleasurable and absolute. Its warrant is the inward righteousness which instinct gives to all natural activities, and it is then self-sufficient, looking to no ulterior end and springing from no ulterior motive. As such it is a fine art, called technically dialectic. But finally, men may engage in speculation not only because speculation is natural and congenial, nor alone because the environment compels it, but because, being free, spontaneous, and being also required by the circumstances of life, it serves and expresses *both* its occasions, and at one and the same time adapts man to his environment and expresses and fulfills his nature, realizes, as professional philosophers would say, his being. In the final instance, philosophy is neither a slave's task, nor a child's joy; it is a moral art; it is a life. The task of the slave and the joy of the child are elementary; they are at the bottom of all human activity, practical and speculative. On the one hand the environment exacts under duress of death a working theory of its character; on the other, the soul bursts into cries and carols to express its perturbation or delight. Each activity alone may give rise

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to philosophy, the first to woodcraft, to common sense, to science; the second, to poetry, to music, to theology, to mathematics, to all forms of dialectic. But the first alone is by anything more than accident, humanly valuable beyond the moment of its appearance, since it gives a cue to future stability in the environment characterized. The second is only fortuitously good in the outer world. It has no reference even to the nature from which is springs, its outcome may be, all too often the betrayal of the soul that bears it. This is the form of philosophy at which the science and the business and the art of our modern world so sneer. And not without justice, though the sneerers forget that such philosophy is less philosophy than verbal art, nor do they see that it may insist that science and art and business pursued for their own sakes shall share the reproaches they level at itself.

Discourse becomes purely philosophic when labor and spontaneity are at one, when use is married to joy. This union is the condition of moral excellence, and as philosophy always aims to harmonize the greatest number of terms in this union, in order to define the whole world, we may honorably assign to it the highest excellence. Thus as merely furnishing a standard for a right nature of the arts, seen as a portion of the whole which philosophy studies and defines, philosophy is entitled to examine and to judge even so much-desired an excellence as art.

But the consideration of the right nature of art is only half our task. It will reveal art's character, the laws and conditions of its development; its procedure will be like that of science; it will be only the physics of art. But science, physics, or natural philosophy is not pursued, as we have seen, for its own sake. It springs from a need to its satisfaction. Natural philosophy is therefore only half of philosophy,—the other half, perhaps the more important half, is ethics, or moral philosophy. We shall barely have begun our philosophy of art, if we

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should content ourselves with merely determining what art is. A complete philosophy of art must also describe what art is good for, must determine its value. Now the problem of values is the moral problem. It presupposes an ultimate standard and an eternal ideal. No thing, with reference to itself alone, is either good or bad. Considered by itself it merely *is,* and that is the end of its story. Taken together with other things, however, it acquires worth, for it can affect their being for better or for worse. The primary business of ethics is therefore to ascertain its standard of judgment. Professional moralists have had great dialectical quarrels about the nature of that standard for human life; some have called it pleasure, others duty, self-sacrifice, self-realization; a few, —happiness. But most of those who have studied the matter have failed to observe that in naming these things they have invariably named some more or less partial interest of life itself, and that only the word happiness stood for the greatest number of these interests, designating a collection of them, activities which, once started, tend to perpetuate each itself. When one interest dominates the others, diverting them from their true channels to its own fulfillment, we call that interest the actuating principle of a man's life. So a miser is actuated by love of gold, and this love perverts to its use his need to eat, to love, even to serve the State. All these are *sacrificed* and *subordinated* that his interest in possessing gold may fatten and flourish. By means of the interest which controls him, a man is characterized and his place in the moral world is assigned.

Dominating interests require, however, a higher standard of judgment than they themselves are, and that standard we call happiness. Happiness is the coöperative organization of the largest possible number of interests in a harmonious and self-sustaining life. It is higher than other standards, such as duty, or self-sacrifice, or self-realization, because it is more comprehen-

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sive, embracing as nearly as possible all the interests whose activity is called life. It is the highest good, for from the human outlook, life itself is, as we have seen, good for nothing but itself, while the rest of the universe is good or bad according to its effects on life. Life perpetuates itself; the aim of life is more life, while lifeless things do not actively perpetuate themselves, but serve only as instruments in the conservation of life. We may say, then, that life is the centre and seat of all values and the determinant of all truths; whatever is found excellent in use or in itself, is so found with reference to life, is found to have kept life stable, or to have increased it, to have lent it strength or delight.

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that this life is primarily group life or even more widely social. It is not. It is an individual and private life. The primary aim of society is not self-preservation, but the preservations of its members. Society persists in the interest of the individual, not the individual in the interest of society. Society is the instrument of private happiness, and it is altered and reshaped as it succeeds or fails in safeguarding this happiness for its members. The State and its activities are only those contents of the world which the individual finds more worthy to love or to hate, they are found good only in that good's service to the private spirit, evil because they menace or hurt what the private soul treasures. The individual is the standard of value, the rest of the world is only its content. That this standard is invariably human would be a gratuitous addition, were it not for repeated reference to unhuman standards, anciently to the gods, currently to supermen and beasts. But pearls are intrinsically repugnant to the use of swine, metaphysics to the joy of dog-faced baboons; nor is it for nothing that human wisdom has so often seen fit to repeat that the ways of God are inscrutable and past finding out. For when known and recorded, are they not blasphemously like



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man's ways, and his aims like man's aims? Now the ways and aims of man have looked toward his remaining forever man, not towards turning himself into superman or God. Nor is it pertinent to look back to the ape or the tiger. If the law of self-preservation means anything, our hypothetical simian ancestors were humanized altogether in spite of themselves. The life, then, which is the court of last resort in any question of value, in any issue regarding beauty or truth or goodness, is happy human life. This life is affirmed in its very denial. It is the measure of animation and of death. Even he who dies by his own hand asserts its rule of happiness and bows to its potency. For he seeks not to escape from life, but from life's disturbances. The living soul, which thinks death, must live,—to think it good. It denies, not life, but with the advocates of small or impoverished life, with ascetics, with mystics, with pessimists, it denies a quality and suffering in life. It chooses only between life and life, not between life and not-life; riddance of the present evil, not the void to come; not death, but peace. And peace, even the peace called death, as a living spirit knows it, is known only in the terms and affections of life; is held fast in the magic round of vital feeling which renders it good; valuable for passion, needful to the stability and conservation of life. In the last analysis, death is unthinkable: the inner discrepancy of what thought of it you will is patent when you consider how purely negative are its qualities. What honest meaning can be discovered in the notion of man's awareness of being unaware, his sensation of insensibility, his feeling that he does not longer feel? Yet this you must think when you think of death. Is it not futile, then, to ask whether life is worth living? All that has ever been shown in answer is that one kind of life is worthier living than another, but the measure of worth has been a form of life itself, always. And, therefore, we may agree that in the profoundest and truest sense of that much-abused phrase, man is in every

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deed and thought of his existence, the measure of all things. What worthiness in things he can consider is a worthiness for him; their natures interest him only in so far as they are relevant to the stability and joy of his being. He may be only an incident in their history, but in his they are the conditions of his continued existence; by them he lives or dies. Valuation of the world, accordingly, is the most fundamental and most important activity he engages in.

We are now in the position to complete our definition of philosophy. We have already seen philosophy as man's definition of the ultimate nature of the whole environing universe. We see now that it is a definition made in the interest of sustaining and perpetuating human happiness. Since man must live in his world, he must know his world, but he does not live merely to know; in so far as knowing is different from living, he knows in order to live. But when his knowledge extends to his entire environment, and consists not only of a definition of it, but also in a judgment of its worth, in terms of his own continued happiness, then his knowledge is coincident with his life, and this knowledge is philosophy. It is a combination of physics and ethics,—life's definition of the universe in the prosecution of its vital interests.

Bearing the fact in mind, we shall be able to avoid a very serious historical error to which philosophy in a large degree is subject. This error is the confusion of the worthy thing with its worth. A great philosophic school, the transcendental or idealist, bases its claims to distinction on just this confusion. Finding that there is some consonance between the order of nature and the desires of man, this school makes the order of nature depend on the desires of man, or of a creature, the absolute, they to a large degree make in man's image. So in the last analysis they identify things with the values of things. For Hegel the essential need of man is the attainment of self-consciousness; his world is therefore altogether an eternal dialectic process, attaining to self-


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consciousness. For Fichte man's deepest nature is the completion of a duty or a plan; his world is therefore man, the plan, the completion, united in identity. The followers of these men carry this confusion into very details of life. But clearly, things are not identical with their values. A coin has an intrinsic nature quite apart from that given it by the die; the die's valuation, indeed, depends on this nature; we do not make double eagles of copper. Neither desire nor need can determine as by creation, the character of what satisfies both or either, though the relevance of that character to desires and needs determines its value and fixes its place in morals. Specific things are found before they are wished for; things must be, before they can be good. Nature precedes and is the ground of ethics. Self-knowledge is only knowledge of our capacity for action on things, derived from spontaneous and unplanned action on these things. Among them the responses one makes and finds, the outcome of one's conduct in the conservation of one's life, are acknowledged expressions of things' nature, the definition of their essence, the formulæ or laws of their behavior. The more invariable, fixed and constant these responses are, the greater our trust in them, the safer they, as actual revelations of the character of things. They become guides in the judgment of values, definitions serving as cues and signals, which if really eloquent of the beings they signify, lead to preservative accommodations on the part of man.

Now the method, which, in the description and appreciation of reality, keep the fundamental trait of life constantly in mind, applying life's ultimate conservation in happiness as the standard of the validity of any of man's activities, is called pragmatic. The pragmatic method refers always to the ethical motive which urges to knowledge, and judges knowledge in the degree in which it satisfies that motive; but while asserting the relation between the two, it does not identify them, as does the

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idealist. It keeps each in its proper sphere, insisting on the aboriginal and ultimate priority of the happy life as a standard for all else.

There is in this method nothing startling or novel. It is the method common to all sentient existence. The daily life consists of its application; it is the ordinary way of business and of leisure. Nor, indeed, is there a single philosophy that fails to apply it, even the philosophies of those who began by reviling it as subversive of all surety and ended by calling it a worthless commonplace. A commonplace it surely is, as must be all things potent and fit, the temporal flux, the rigidities of space. Subversive of surety it cannot be, for it is an application of the pragmatic method to itself to call it dangerous or destructive. It differs from the pragmatism common to all philosophies first in this—that those who use it as a pragmatic method are conscious of its nature and the mode of its operation, while in the history of philosophy, since its use was inevitable and instinctive, its use was blind. Whenever the true or the good or the beautiful has been invoked as norm, wherever there has been asserted any human preference, from a straw to immortality, wherever evil has been made subordinate to good or anything harmonious with some aspect of human nature has been made eternal, there the pragmatic method has been used. And from this point of view, what philosopher shall escape pragmatism, even among its enemies? For as well assert that a falling man who denies belief in the principle of gravitation does not fall, as deny that a standardizing thinker does not make use of the pragmatic method because he refuses allegiance in discourse to the body of pragmatic doctrines. Examine any system in the honorable history of philosophy, from Plato to Royce, and you shall in every case find that the ultimate thing invoked, that for the sake of which goodness and harmony and beauty are, is some interest which the thinker, or in his opinion, mankind, set as the core of happiness.

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But philosophic and natural pragmatism, the pragmatism of William James and the pragmatism of history and common sense, have yet another important point of difference. Philosophic or conscious pragmatism insists on thought's answering relevance to its given object, the environment in which man must live; on the operation of thought to conserve the values of life here and now and immediately, in this world, rather than beyond this world. It insists on so representing the environment that destruction shall be eliminated and the basis of life enlarged. It seeks control of the world by representing it, in natural law and in moral precept. It would, with Spinoza, see the universe under the aspect of eternity, in terms of fixed and immutable concepts, heavy, yet invaluable in the service of the race; yet again it would live by the most ephemeral glimpses, if thereby mankind could achieve a more excellent life in this, its world. Pragmatism chooses excellence at any price rather than to go altogether without it. It would build well, rather than build for ages. When truth is called a coherent system or is said to be independent of man, or beauty is designated the archetypal good, it points out that this description is made in the service of some interest and must stand or fall according to its service, and it adds furthermore that that one interest itself stands or falls, pragmatically, as it aids or hinders the greatest interest, a happy life. This, few systematic philosophies, professionally rather than humanly made, past or present, consent to recognize. Their interest has been mainly dialectical and lyric, mainly the consistent elaboration of an artistically complete doctrine, rather than the truth which is born of the interplay of life with its environment. The terms of metaphysicians relate to natures and regions which are congenial to the life of man in eternity but rarely to the actual environment in which life does go on or fails. Conscious pragmatism insists that the descriptions of the world shall square not only with our desire, but before all, with the definite con-

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ditions of its satisfactions. For the world must be known as it is before it can be rendered amenable to the ideal. The sculptor who does not understand his marble will carve no goddess; he will only spoil his chisel. An adequate philosophy therefore will keep the ethical interest both fundamental and ultimate; but just because that interest is the beginning and end of life, it will look to see nature as she nudely is, lest it define an ideal which shall merely ruin its own being in this world of ours. For conscious pragmatism the region of happiness is not in a heaven metaphysical or theological; it is in the immediate and sublunar sphere which is the occasion of our conceiving heaven at all.

Thus the philosophy of art has before it a double task. It must first consider the nature of art, in terms of its content,—its aims, its instruments, its processes. This task carries it into many fields, for art is as wide as life and as old as history. History, technology, psychology, metaphysics, economics, the philosophy of art will have to draw upon all of these before it shall have dealt even superficially with the content of art. The other half of its task is ethical—it is the criticism or evaluation of art. Having seen what art is and what it aims at, philosophy's next task will be to test it by its consistency with happiness; its adequacy to a harmonious and stable human life. Though this business of criticism is last in the order of discourse, the final step in the application of the pragmatic method, it is, in the business of living, first. The initial and final epithets man gives the world is *good* and *bad*. These words signify the fundamental categories of life—the pragmatic categories *par excellence*. They are implied in all judgments and designate definitely the types of reaction open to an actively self-conserving creature. Conduct is the beginning and end of all philosophy. For the good is a relation which things bear to man and links him irrefragably to the natures to which he can attribute it; and life is the pursuit of good things. These are judged

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good by the impulse which seeks them, and what is that impulse, if not the impulse to live? This is what determines the criteria of the ideal, of happiness——rightly to understand which is the essence of the spiritual insight. Its complement is the policy of life, in which the methods and operation that give the ideal a location and an existence are made explicit. They are the ideal's instruments; the ideal is their outcome. Art, considered as civilization or as fine art merely, involves both,—the vision of an ideal of happiness, the exercise of a practice which shall attain it. Its goodness will vary with the degree in which it serves and extends all life's potencies, with the harmonious actualities it prepares, and renders enduring, stable, happy. This life in all its breadth and depth, as it expresses itself in social organization, religion and science as well as in art, we invoke, of necessity as art's measure. Art must be evaluated with reference to the consistent perpetuation of all these activities or of as many as the maintenance of the greatest possible whole of life allows.

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## MARTINEAU ON THE OBJECT AND MODE OF MORAL JUDGMENT.

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PRESENT-DAY thought, under the lead of idealism, has traveled away considerably from Martineau's ethical position. His position requires modifications in detail perhaps, but in the main still remains, in the writer's conviction, the most faithful interpretation that we have of our moral consciousness. In this paper an attempt will be made to state Martineau's position on "the object and mode of moral judgment"; to clear it from misunderstandings; to point out its differences from the

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idealistic position; and incidentally to discuss the relative merits of the contending theories.

There is general agreement among ethical writers that our voluntary actions have an end, and it is the end that gives value or meaning to them. Common speech bears this out when it speaks of a person doing a thing to satisfy his revenge, or his intellectual curiosity, or his pleasure, or something else. Our actions are meaningless without one of these objects. It should be noted here that oftentimes we have a series of actions to satisfy one of these objects, and the whole train of actions gets its value from the end; as when a person obtains leave from his employer and takes a railway journey to see a sick relative.

What is the character of these ends, and what is their number? In common speech 'ends' and 'desires' are used interchangeably. We say, *e. g.*, that the end of a series of acts was intellectual curiosity, or the acts were undertaken with a view to satisfy the *desire* of intellectual curiosity. For the sake of simplicity we shall confine the term 'desires' to 'ends,' though strictly speaking we can not even have intermeditae acts without a desire for them.[1] There is a controversy here as to whether these 'desires' (which Martineau calls 'the inner springs of conduct') are mere feelings or have an object in view. When I am influenced by love, am I influenced by a mere feeling only, or am I conscious of a loved object? Clearly the desires (ends) are both reason and feeling. For, as psychology tells us, knowing, feeling, and willing are inseparable aspects of consciousness. And it is but a verbal difference whether we express a desire in terms of thought or feeling,—say, *e. g.*, that I am influenced by the feeling of love, or am moved by the consciousness of a loved object. Martineau's criticism of the verbal confusion here is very effective. "Sketch for us," he

[1] This restriction of connotation has the sanction of ethical writers. It is to be found in the writings of Dr. D'Arcy and Dr. Mellone, to mention only two names.

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says, "a 'constitution of man's nature' without naming the 'objects of his desires'; or make a list of the 'objects of his desires,' observing silence as to the 'constitution of his nature'; and we will then admit your distinction. Meanwhile, we discern in it only this: You examine human feelings as craving the objects; they examine the objects as craved by the feelings. What would be thought of two rival schools of magnetic science, of which one, in its anxiety to disclaim all connection with 'the house over the way' should announce, 'They measure the force with which the loadstone attracts iron; we measure the force with which the iron tends to the loadstone'?"[2]

The concrete acts in which the ends find expression are infinite. But the ends, the springs of conduct, are determinate, and psychology gives us a list of these. These ends or desires conflict, and it is the work of our consciousness to organize these conflicting ends, according to their value, into a unity. In this, we find Professor Dewey agreeing, in the main, with Martineau when he says: "Conduct as moral may thus be defined as activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon."[3]

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[2] Martineau, "Essays," Vol. III, pp. 364f.

[3] Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," p. 209. A classification of ends (or desires) has been condemned as abstract. Professor Mackenzie *e. g.*, says, in his "Manual" (p. 133): "What induces us to act is the presentation of some end to be attained. Consequently, if we are to have a list of motives, this list should take the form rather of a classification of ends to be attained, than of feelings that exist in our minds. *Further, these ends would have to be arranged, not under any such abstract headings as 'ambition,' and the like, but in accordance with their actual, concrete nature.*" (The italics are ours.) The condemnation of a classification of ends, like Martineau's, as abstract, is to commit oneself to the position that no two duties are the same in essentials. The implications of this latter position might be briefly touched on. No two duties being the same in essentials, the formation of habits and the moral judgment of others are both equally out of the question,—these depending on the contrary position: a similarity in essentials in our duties. The good, therefore, is individual to the exclu-

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So far there has been a fair agreement among the rival schools. Ethics deals with the self-conscious, deals with ends or desires. But the difference in the rival schools emerges here: 1. Are desires (or ends) good in themselves or good because of the end (a summum bonum)? 2. Do we know the character of our desires (or ends) by intuition or experience?

Martineau holds that in choosing between contending desires, we know,—previous to any experience of results,—their character. In other words, we intuitively discern the worth of two conflicting springs of conduct. For example, when 'love' and 'hate' contend, we know, independently of the experience of results, that love is superior to 'hate.'[4] This does not mean that Martineau denies ends to our actions. The actions are concerned with the satisfaction of the two ends stated. What Martineau stands for is that the ends are good in themselves and not good because of *the* end (the summum bonum). Does this not commit us to mental anarchy; a number of ends pulling each its own way? We shall see later how Martineau meets this difficulty.

But let us address ourselves now to our first question! Are ends good in themselves? or, Have desires an ethical value? The idealist doctrine knows only one good end, not a number of good ends; the proximate ends being but means, and good or bad because of the ultimate end. On this the following observations might be made: (1) It commits us to the position that neutral means make a good end. On its own ground, it could be met by the

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sion of its being common. Dr. Rashdall lays down the truer position on this point, when he says: "The very heart of our moral conviction is that there is something which every rational being, in so far as he is rational, must recognize as intrinsically right, *that that something must be the same for all persons under the same conditions, and cannot be dependent upon the subjective caprice of particular persons.*" ("The Theory of Good and Evil," Vol. p. 151. The italics are ours.)

[4] In making this statement I have not lost sight of exceptions to a graduated scale of springs of conduct. For a discussion of the bearing of exceptions on the validity of the scale, see p. 67.

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criticism that it separates the means from the end and so commits an abstraction. If the means and the end are organically related, as idealists very rightly point out,[5] how can we have a good end without good means? how can the whole be good without the parts being good.[6]

(2) It leads to a *reductio ad absurdum* inasmuch as we can never reach the end without considering the proximate end as *good in itself*. Idealistic writers themselves admit this,—whether consistently or not, is another matter. Dr. D'Arcy says, *e. g.*: "But this subordination to the ethical principle (*i. e.*, the summum bonum) does not mean that the end (*i. e.*, the act) which corresponds to each desire, or interest, is to be sought as a means to a further end. The proximate end is, in every case, the good in itself, and should be sought for its own sake, as the good of the case. . . . It is not necessary for the moral man to look further. Indeed, it is a sign of moral health, and the best way to do well whatever has to be done, not to look further, but, for the time being, to seek the immediate end as if it were ultimate."[7] We have, also, Professor Dewey saying the same thing: "But the very nature of right action forbids

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[5] "The mind must not only have an end before it, . . . but must have a conception of the *means* to the end. These means, however, are not intrinsically distinct from the end. They are only the proximate ends; *they are the end analyzed into its constituent factors.*" (The italics are ours. Dewey's "Psychology," pp. 369-70.)

[6] This point is made by Dr. Rashdall in the following quotation: "We could have no ideal of what is good for society as a whole unless we had a power of pronouncing that this or that particular moment of conscious life is good or bad. Our conception of the moral ideal as a whole is built up of particular judgments of value, though particular judgments of value have to be progressively corrected by our growing conception of the moral ideal as a whole." ("The Theory of Good and Evil," Vol. I, p. 96.) For a discussion of the latter part of this quotation where Dr. Rashdall differs from Martineau, see below (p. 68).

Paradoxical as it may seem, idealism holds the contradictory doctrines: (1) that means and ends are organically related, and (2) that evil means may make a good end,—evil being good in the making, at one and the same time.

[7] "A Short Study of Ethics."

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that the self should be the end in the sense of being the conscious aim of moral activity. For there is no way of discovering the nature of the self except in terms of objective ends which fulfil its capacities, and there is no way of realizing the self except as it is forgotten in devotion to these objective ends."[8]

(3) Rigorously carried out, it will commit us to an absurd form of the doctrine of self-denial. It will mean that we could not take delight in our natural affections, as nothing is good but the end. Nay more, we should have to dislike these affections if we wished to realize the end; otherwise we should be guilty of considering a proximate end as good in itself. In a passage of trenchant criticism Dr. Martineau has shown up the fallacies of this position. After pointing out that this theory requires us to make a desert of our hearts that the end might reign alone, he says: "These moralists may well appear to common men to have neither body nor soul, when they can propound rules so wide of nature. Were they ever hungry? and did they make a point of seeking the things upon the table only as means to moral ends? —and provided the end (say, of recruiting their strength) was accomplished, did they survey the dishes with ghostly impartiality, or reproach themselves with a sinful preference of roast mutton over gruel? Did they ever take a fancy to a fine picture? and did they succeed in desiring it exclusively with a view to encourage art, or educate the taste of the visitors to their drawing-room? Did they ever long for a bunch of grapes for a sick child? or a carriage for an invalid wife, and feel remorse because the wish had no 'moral end,' and came only of pure affection?"[9]

(4) Finally, it falsifies the doctrine of self-realization with which it is made to go by idealists. If the capacities which constitute the self demand fulfilment, and if morals is a matter of direction, and not of suppression,—as

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[8] Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," pp. 391-2. [9] "Essays," Vol. III, p. 358.

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idealists themselves tell us,—then it logically follows that our desires are good in themselves. The logical conclusion of the doctrine that desires are not good in themselves would be pessimistic self-abnegation, and not self-realization.[10]

Martineau's conclusion on this point is that ends are good in themselves, but at the same time there is a gradation among them. To quote Martineau: "Morality fulfils its office, not when it has suppressed the natural ends, but when it has prevented any one from being disappointed of his natural ends, and awakened every one to seek them with earnestness *proportioned* to their worth."[11]

Another way in which Martineau's position is controverted is by saying that a desire (or spring of conduct) is not good in itself but because of its consequences, and this brings us to our second question: Do we know the character of our desires (or ends) by intuition or experience?

As we have seen, all voluntary action is purposive and has an end. Martineau fully recognizes this, as has been already pointed out. But the word 'end' is capable of a double meaning. It could mean either (1) purpose or object in view or (2) consequences,—the after-effects or results of an action. Taking advantage of this ambiguity the idealist tries to make out that purposive action is action which has knowledge of its consequences. But this does not necessarily follow. Purposive action doubtless has a knowledge of its character. But this knowledge may be through intuition and not through observation of consequences. It is here that Martineau joins issue with

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[10] It will be noted that the idealist's denial of reality to *a number of good ends* in the interests of the summum bonum is but the ethical counterpart of his denial of reality to human personalities in the interests of the Absolute, in metaphysics.

[11] "Essays," Vol. III, pp. 358-9. For the sake of simplicity, I have made no mention of evil desires. A desire good in itself becomes evil, out of its proper place.

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the idealist. He argues that we know the character of our actions through intuition and not experience (observation of consequences). The idealist, as Professor Dewey acknowledges, is an empiricist in morals.[12] We are here face to face with the old controversy of motive (or springs of conduct) versus consequence, and shall take it up.

When we speak of judging a spring of conduct by its consequences, we have included in the consequences the willing of the spring of action. When I am moved by 'love,' the realization of the object of love is included in the consequences. This part of the consequences has been called "the ultimate consequent as apprehended and desired," by Professor Muirhead. And Professor Muirhead has shown that it is only this part of the consequences that gives moral character to action. If we deny this, then we shall be landed in the absurdity of calling 'good' the action which has only the appearances of it.[13]

Thus we see, first, that the only sense in which the consequences can be spoken of as truly justifying an action, does not invalidate the judging of an act by the spring. It is only another way of putting the same thing.

But, it should be noted that consequences are not generally understood in this sense, when they are spoken of as justifying conduct. The common appeal to consequences is illustrated by the fear of Heaven's displeasure, *e. g.,* the appeal to keep in the straight path. But this appeal to consequences does not do without a recognition of intuitive principles. We must know God's wrath as *right in itself first,* before we can morally appeal to it as an incentive to keep in the straight path. This

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[12] "The empirical theory of conscience is that the individual has no immediate knowledge of right and wrong, either as to particular acts or general principles, but that such knowledge is the outgrowth of continued experience. Logically this is all the empirical theory is required to mean; and in this strict sense, empiricism seems to be true." (Dewey, "The Study of Ethics," p. 92.)

[13] "The Elements of Ethics," (3d ed.), pp. 62ff, 107.

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knowledge of God's wrath, and pleasure as well, goes with our knowledge of every spring. Again, the appeal to the sorrow caused by bad living to our near and dear ones, is but an appeal to attendant other springs of conduct leading to the same effect. This does not mean that the consequences make a thing right, for we justifiably disregard the sorrow in some cases.

The consequences, as we have seen, have to be known as *right in themselves first,* and this means an appeal to the springs. Consequences do not come to us labelled as good and bad, and we have to decipher them. One has to be a kind man first, to make out a kind consequence; an ambitious man, to make out an ambitious consequence, etc. In other words, we must know the character of the corresponding spring of action before we can judge a consequence. So we conclude, secondly, that the appeal to consequences, as generally understood, is but an appeal to a number of attendant springs which make for the same effect.

The strength of the appeal to consequences has lain in the vagueness of it, and in the use of abstractions like 'the greater good,' 'self-culture,' etc. But the moment we realize that such abstractions provide no helpful criterion of judgment, and that ultimately we are thrown back upon the circle of our springs of action,—each spring being distinct from another and not the explanation of it,—that moment the strength of the appeal is gone. The appeal to consequences, as generally understood, commits itself to a psychological confusion as to our springs of conduct, merging them in one another and failing to perceive their distinctness.

Some of the implications of judging acts by consequences as opposed to springs, intuitively discerned, might here be pointed out. (1) It commits us, in the hands of its consistent exponents, to an evolution of morality from un-morality, of reason from un-reason. It commits us to frank empiricism in morals. This we have already touched on, and shall now treat of more

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fully. Professor Dewey, for instance, would have us accept the view that man begins as a creature of impulses, ignorant of their character and rank. Then by an observation of the consequences of these impulses (which are non-rational and blind, be it noted) his moral consciousness is evolved. The following illustration from Professor Dewey will explain his position. "The first meaning of an impulse of anger," he says, "is simply *blind reaction,* but this reaction has consequences (relations to others, habits established, etc.), which are, from that time on, part of the impulse. This tendency to act without thought, to set up hostile relations to others, is now the meaning which the impulse has for the self. Or the *blind reaction* of anger is against some meanness; it serves to do away with that meanness and to brace the self."[14] The transition from the non-moral to the moral is further illustrated in the following quotation from the same author: "It is only through taking into account in subsequent acts consequences of prior acts not intended in those prior acts that the agent learns the fuller significance of his own power and thus of himself. . . . In subsequent experience these results, mere by-products of the original volition, enter in. *Outer* and non-moral for the original act, they are *within* subsequent voluntary activity, because they influence desire and make foresight more accurate in detail and more extensive in range."[15] The only criticism we need make on this position is to say with Martineau that from the un-moral to the moral there is no road. In the second stage here, Professor Dewey has surreptitiously taken for granted the very thing he has to prove,—how a creature of blind impulses can ever judge moral consequences; a prior intuitive knowledge being necessary, as we have seen, for judging moral consequences.

We have our contention further borne out by Professor

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[14] Dewey, "The Study of Ethics," p. 22. The italics are ours.
[15] Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," p. 261.



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Paulsen. He carries this position to its logical conclusion and justly remarks that,—a point which less consistent thinkers on his side fail to see,—"if before reaching a decision, we should have to figure out all the possible favorable and unfavorable effects of a deed, we should never act." Some contrivance has to be found which would save us from this *impasse*. Accordingly we find Professor Paulsen explaining: "Hence the process is abbreviated; acts are as a rule *automatic reactions*, which are released, without much calculation, by circumstances, by the occasion."[16] This explanation is frank and logical, though self-destructive, for it is nothing short of a metaphysical legerdemain to evolve morality out of un-morality, as it is to evolve mind out of mere sensations.

(2) If the subsequent internal consequences of an act alone reveal its character, then we cannot know wrong before committing it. It thus commits us to the position "Be ye vicious in order to be virtuous," and confuses virtue and vice. Professor Dewey admits this conclusion frankly. Says he: "Only because the bad act brings to light a new good is its own badness manifested. The reaction of the deed upon character, in other words, brings that character to consciousness; it shows character its own powers and requirements, and thus enables it to pass judgment upon, *i. e.*, to appreciate its own unworthiness. . . . Only the man becoming good recognizes evil as evil."[17]

(3) If we do not know the character of an act before doing it, then human responsibility is struck at the very root. For, to be responsible, we must be conscious

[16] "Introduction to Philosophy," Engl. Transl., p. 428.

[17] But does not Professor Dewey, in speaking of the character coming into consciousness, by the reacting of the deed on it, take for granted the power of moral discernment previously latent in it? Is this not giving up empiricism for intuitionism? But even so, the position is an evolution of morality from unmorality, a transition from unconscious to conscious character; and so as fatuous an attempt as to evolve consciousness out of sensations.

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of the character of the alternative acts before us, previous to the choosing of one of them.

In the foregoing pages we have examined the arguments advanced against Martineau's intuitionism. In the concluding section we shall examine the arguments advanced against Martineau's theory of the existence of a scale of higher and lower in our springs of action. Martineau's scale has been criticised with great acuteness and fairness by Sidgwick. His criticisms still hold the field and need an answer. Very rightly Sidgwick concentrates his criticism on the ethical essentials of the scale,—the question of a higher and lower among our springs of conduct,—rather than on the psychological details of its working out.

Before taking up Sidgwick's criticism, it will be worth our while to note his theory of the moral judgment on which his criticism of Martineau is based. Sidgwick's theory in substance is that in a conflict, we judge the *effects* of two lines of possible action, with reference to the ultimate end. "The comparison ultimately decisive," says Sidgwick, when a serious question of conduct is raised, "would inevitably be not a comparison between the motives primarily conflicting, but between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which they respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end of reasonable action."[18]

Two points stand out in connection with Sidgwick's theory of moral judgment. The first is: What is it we judge,—motive or consequent? The second is: What is the relation of the effects to the end, or, of means to the end? The first point we have already discussed sufficiently in the previous sections. As to the second point, all that we need say is that it makes the end an entity over and above the means (so denying that virtue is in the end and making the latter formal), failing to grant

[18] "Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau," p. 361.

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that the springs of action are good in themselves and not because of consequences.

Now as to Sidgwick's criticism of the scale. (1) He points out that in a conflict between the lower motives (*e. g.*, love of ease and love of gain) the conflict is never decided by a duel between them singly, but higher considerations intervene (like regard for health and ultimate efficiency) on the winning side (*i. e.*, love of ease) and thus give the victory. I do not see how these higher considerations invalidate the conflict between the two lower springs. They are but the attendant springs, as we have seen, which make for the same effect, and to fail to distinguish between them and the original spring (*i. e.*, the lower springs in this case) is but to be guilty of a psychological confusion. If pressed hard, Sidgwick's contention further suggests that the lower motives are not good in themselves and have no place in the economy of our moral lives,—a position which Sidgwick himself combats in the criticism following.

(2) Sidgwick again points out (a) that the relationship between a pair of springs of conduct, in point of rank, is not universal as pointed out by Martineau; that this relationship has exceptions,—a lower spring being sometimes preferred to a higher, as 'love of ease' to 'culture'; and (b) that Martineau's scale does not allow its proper sphere to a natural impulse; it having always to give way to those higher on the scale.

The two criticisms are related, and had better be considered together. Whenever a natural impulse is allowed its sphere (as when we prefer 'love of ease' to 'culture'), the relationship of their rank is interfered with, and the scale stands condemned; and whenever the higher is preferred when it is justifiable to choose the lower ('love of ease' instead of 'culture' when our constitution requires it), the lower is not allowed its proper sphere, and so, again, the scale stands condemned. It should be noted, in passing, that these criticisms have a just application with reference to a hard and fast, and

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rigid scale, and that they are both based on a common objection,—the failure to allow exceptions in such a scale.

In arguing, therefore, that there are exceptions to the scale, Sidgwick is borne out by our consciousness. It might be thought that the admission of exceptions invalidates the intuitive perception of gradation. It is not so, however, if the intuition includes the exceptions. And this is our contention. We know intuitively where the rank holds and where exceptions come in. Thus we can allow a natural impulse its proper place in an intuitively graded scale, without hurt to the gradation itself.

It will be urged that it is a consideration of consequences, of circumstances, and not intuition, that determines the exception. We may ask, however, whether consequences and circumstances are not taken into consideration in the non-exceptional cases; whether judgment is pronounced in spite of consequences and circumstances in such cases. Consequences, we have sufficiently seen, have no meaning except in terms of the springs, and the same may be said of circumstances.

We may well pause here to note that exceptions do not invalidate an intuitive scale if they are perceived intuitively, as we contend. We shall have to allow exceptions to the moral rule on any theory. We are familiar with the problem in utilitarianism with its difficulty of harmonizing 'rational self-love' and rational benevolence,' as seen in Sidgwick's position. Idealism with its theory of self-realization does not escape it. For, while we are told to realize all our faculties, one faculty has to be sacrificed to another: 'art,' for example, to 'morality.' Dr. Mellone sees the contradiction, and the right solution has been suggested by him. In substance he states that this contradiction is an element attaching to our present imperfect condition. In the perfect state it will be possible to develop all our faculties without developing one spring at the expense of another.[19]

[19] Mellone, "Philosophical Criticism and Construction."

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(3) The other example mentioned by Sidgwick, of a higher spring giving way to a lower,—*viz.*, 'compassion' to 'resentment,'—suggests the second qualification in Martineau's theory: that in the hierarchy of our springs of conduct there are a number of springs of equal rank. His example would properly come under this formula. In a well-blended character none of these elements (*i. e.*, 'compassion' and 'resentment' or 'love' and 'anger') should give way to the other. Else it will become 'sentimental' or 'vindictive,' as the case may be. The other primary passions (in Martineau's scale),—'fear' and 'antipathy,'—hold the same relationship to 'compassion.' In a well-blended character all these elements should be present together. Still, among these equals, 'compassion' holds a superior place, being *primus inter pares* so to speak,—a point in which Sidgwick agrees with Martineau and with commonsense.[20]

(4) One more criticism of the scale deserves notice. Professor Upton points out that in history there has been a change in our estimation of the relative ranks of our impulses, and that Martineau's scale, while expresing the Christian consciousness very well, would not express the pre-Christian. Professor Upton concludes from this that our individual judgments depend on our moral ideal, and change because the ideal is progressive.[21] This also is, in substance, Dr. Rashdall's position noticed before. To this our reply is that judgment by the moral ideal does not render a scale superfluous, it being only another name for it. As Martineau well says:[22] "But in detail this good (the supreme good) will require the preference now of one natural end, now of another, according as the comparison which occasions it shifts with varying circumstances up and down the scale of impelling principles." The fact of moral development,—of change in our moral judgments,

[20] "Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau," p. 358.
[21] Upton, "Dr. Martineau's Philosophy," p. 144.
[22] "Essays," Vol. III, 364ff.

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—brings out the point that the scale as it exists to-day (*i. e.,* the present ranking of the springs of conduct) has not existed from the beginning (*e. g.,* in the Old Testament vindictiveness is superior to love). The reason for it is the "moral disorder of our world," or "the incomplete stage of our present existence," however you choose to describe it. Moral progress, under the circumstances, consists largely of straightening out the scale, as it were. This does not discredit intuitionism; it only proves that moral progress has been largely a progress from error to truth, rather than from truth to truth.

We have, therefore, been led, under the stress of Sidgwick's criticism, to qualify Martineau's theory in two ways: First, that there are exceptions to the general rank of impulses; and that these exceptions are *intuitively* discerned. Secondly, that there is an order of springs of equal rank in the hierarchy. These qualifications have been, we think, suggested by Martineau, though not worked out and do not, in our consideration, affect his central position,—that there is a graduated scale of our springs of conduct intuitively discerned,—a position on which turns the question, as we have tried to show, whether our ethics shall be personal or materialistic.

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## PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON LEGAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

The institution of the conference was suggested by the action of the Association of American Law Schools in officially recognizing the need of a conscious philosophy of law and by the preface which its Committee drew up to the Modern Continental Legal Philosophy Series. An inquiry by Professors Cohen, Overstreet, and Pitkin showed considerable interest in the subject among teachers of philosophy as well as teachers of law, and a first meeting, under the chairmanship of Professor Dewey, was called to discuss the Relation of Law to Social Ends. The formal meetings for the reading and discussion of papers took place on Friday afternoon, April 25, 1913, at the College of the City of New York, and on Saturday morning and afternoon, April 26, at Columbia University. On Friday evening, after an informal meeting on methods of coöperation between teachers of philosophy and teachers of law, on motion of Professor Felix Adler, a committee was appointed to report on a plan of a permanent organization. The committee, consisting of the chairman, the secretary, and Professors Creighton, Kirchwey, Lewis, Pound, and Tufts, recommended at the beginning of the session of Saturday afternoon that those present organize themselves into a permanent conference on Legal and Social Philosophy and that the next meeting take place November 28-29 to discuss the problem of Administrative Justice. The report was accepted, and the temporary officers and committee were constituted into an Executive Committee of the conference. The place of meeting was left to the Executive Committee, who subsequently accepted the invitation of Chicago University. The expenses of the first meeting were met by voluntary contributions.

M. R. Cohen,
*Secretary.*

Abstracts of the papers read follow:

The Philosophy of Law in America. Roscoe Pound.

1. *How did there come to be so complete a separation of jurisprudence and philosophy in Anglo-American juristic thought?*

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To some extent such a separation took place everywhere in the nineteenth century. We simply carried it to an extreme. There were three causes that operated generally: (1) The need of special development of jurisprudence as a separate science; (2) reaction from abuses of the philosophical method which grew up while it held the whole ground; (3) the need of stability and certainty in the stage of maturity of law and consequent call for analytical rather than philosophical method.

Other reasons for the attitude of the Anglo-American lawyer toward the philosophy of law are peculiar to our legal system. One of these is a tradition averse to system, averse to legal science and averse to legal philosophy. At least from the time of Coke, want of system has been a point of pride. Another cause is to be seen in the dominance of the practitioner in Anglo-American legal education. Our law did not come from the universities, but from Westminster Hall. Again, account must be taken of the mode of growth in Anglo-American law as compared with Continental Europe. The one has grown through judicial empiricism, the other through juristic science. A philosophical tradition was handed down by the Roman books; a wholly practical tradition by the English precedents. Finally, American law is a product of the nineteenth century, a period of stability which required and relied on analysis rather than philosophy.

2. *The present situation with respect to philosophy of law in America.* The absolutistic ideas which have prevailed so largely in American legal thinking came from Grotius in two ways; on the one hand through Blackstone, on the other hand through American publicists of the eighteenth and first part of the nineteenth century who followed the Dutch and French publicists and civilians. The historical school and the metaphysical type of the philosophical school which prevailed in the nineteenth century were closely akin. One sought to discover an ideal law through history, the other sought to find it through logical development of an abstract idea. These views were reconciled by saying that jurisprudence had two sides: the historical unfolding of the idea of liberty as men discovered the rules and principles by which to realize it, and the logical unfolding of the principles involved in the abstract conception. This doctrine was taught in one of our law schools as early as 1849 and was given currency by the writings of Sir Henry Maine. Its influence be-

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came marked as American students began to go to Germany and German ideas took root in our universities. Later it was reinforced by the positivists. Many cases where judicial opinions show the effect of Spencer's writings might be cited. But the positivists got their data from the historical jurists and looked at them through the metaphysical spectacles of that school. All four of the nineteenth century schools came to Kant's position as to the end of law, though for different reasons and in different ways. American lawyers affected to ignore philosophy of law. But whenever they looked beyond their law books to current thinking on right and justice, they found that the traditional individualism of the common law was justified by science. Thus the ultra-individualism of professional thinking in America is due to the mutual action and reaction of an individualist legal tradition and an individualist legal science.

Five causes operated to give a peculiarly intense individualist color to American common law. (1) The English common law, the basis of our system, was made in the stage of strict law, of which individualism is a prime characteristic, whereas Continental Europe received, not the old *ius civile,* but the classical Roman law, which represents the stage of equity or natural law. (2) The common law preserved something of the individualism of Germanic law. (3) Puritanism gave that added emphasis to individualist ideas in the formative epoch of American legal thought that served to stamp them upon our law so thoroughly. (4) In the controversies between courts and crown in seventeenth century England political exigencies led the common law to take the position of guaranteeing individual interests against the state and against society. (5) The circumstances of frontier or pioneer or rural American communities of the first half of the nineteenth century reinforced the now well-settled individualism of our legal system.

Happily our Anglo-American practice is much better than our preaching. While our theories have been wholly individualistic, a complete change has been taking place beneath the surface in the actual course of judicial decision. If this advance has been irregular and halting, it must be said the community has by no means been settled in its ideas, and that economists, sociologists, students of politics, and philosophers have not been out of Egypt so very long themselves. The great change which has taken place in thought in the present generation has blinded

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us to the progress which has been quietly going on in the law, and has brought into sharp relief the contrast between the orthodox legal creed and the newer conception of justice.

3. *The problems of philosophical jurisprudence in America.* Five problems may be noted: (1) the province of rule and of discretion in the administration of justice, (2) system of the law as a whole, (3) the theory of law making, both legislative and judicial, (4) the theory of the interests to be secured by the legal system and (5) application and enforcement of law.

In conclusion, the future of philosophical jurisprudence, or at least of philosophical method as one of the chief methods of jurisprudence, seems assured. The psychology of juristic thought, the psychology of judicial decision and the psychology of judicial law making are untrodden fields in Anglo-American legal science which will yield rich rewards to the pioneer. But before all, in the period of liberalization by infusion of ideas from without which is at hand, philosophical working out of social ends (so that they may be realized through rules and standards formulated by the judge and the legislator and developed by the jurist), is imperative. The law is ripe for such an infusion and it is actually in progress. It is largely for the philosopher and the philosophical jurist to give form and consistency to this process to the end that it be rapid and yet effective for its purpose.

THE ETHNOLOGICAL APPROACH TO LAW. A. A. Goldenweiser.

Writers on comparative jurisprudence like Post, Steinmetz, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Sutherland, and others, have not, so far, properly used the methodological principles of modern ethnology. Thus Kohler, for instance, has built up an entire system of law on the assumption of the former universality of maternal descent and its priority to paternal descent. With the fall of this doctrine, his legal system loses its foundations. Legal institutions or customs, like other cultural traits, can be properly evaluated only when studied in their cultural setting. Thus the marriage institution of the Kwakiutl cannot be understood if its relationship with the potlatch system be ignored; nor can the potlatch itself be understood if its objective manifestations alone are examined. The taboos and confessions of the Eskimo are reflections of the economic conditions among these people.

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Australian data referring to regulated combats may serve as illustrations of the great variety of perfectly standardized social-protection devices that may exist in a relatively very primitive community.

A circumstance of importance for any theory of the evolution of law, is the fact that developed systems of legal procedure embracing witnesses, oath, the ordeal, occur in the Old World including Africa, whereas the American civilizations have produced no such systems.

A program of research in primitive law should include such topics as (1) The Standardization of Custom, involving the mechanism of standardization; its agents and agencies, and the problem of social pressure; (2) the Deviations from Custom, more particularly, who deviates? in what forms? what is the social reaction towards deviations from custom, and, more generally, what are the relations between the conservative and progressive elements in a primitive group? (3) The Formulation of Law: to what extent does it become the subject of conscious reflection? who does the formulating? what are the relations between formulated and unformulated law? (4) The Evolution of Law, including: the rise of legal institutions and official representatives of law; effect of the institutional character of law on the formulation of law; and the effect of the development of law as an institution on custom.

JHERING'S THEORY OF LAW. Isaac Husik.

An exposition of Jhering's *Zweck im Recht.*

THE RELATION BETWEEN LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY. W. W. Willoughby.

While not identical, legal and political theory are so nearly related and to so considerable a degree overlapping, that a separation of them is difficult. Political theory may be divided into the two departments of analytical and teleological political philosophy: the one seeking to determine the nature of political institutions by the legal characteristics exhibited by them; the other, aiming to define the institutions by the purposes for which they exist. Upon its analytical side, political theory thus constitutes a department of analytical jurisprudence. So, similarly, the aims of teleological political theory and of final jurisprudence are almost the same. In fact, the only important dis-

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tinction between a system of ideal law and a political utopia is that in the latter there must necessarily be included, in addition to a statement of the general principles of right which should be recognized, an outline of a scheme of governmental organization through which these principles may be declared and enforced. In conclusion, emphasis was placed upon the value of political and legal theory in developing those fundamental principles which must be clearly apprehended if reforms in the law, whether substantive or procedural, are to be intelligently and beneficially applied.

RESPONSIBILITY. H. Rutgers Marshall.
(No abstract furnished.)

CRITERIA OF SOCIAL ENDS. James H. Tufts.

A legal conception which plays an important part in the consideration of how far organized society may properly further social ends is that of public purpose. The paper undertakes to examine certain judicial decisions and opinions with a view to discover how 'public purposes' are defined. Three distinct types of criteria for this conception are discovered, which appear to the lay mind impossible of consistent application to the various concrete cases in such a way as to account for the decisions reached. Some of the courts are apparently of the opinion that a consistent line of reasoning is followed; others reject absolutely certain of the criteria proposed. The three types are: (1) Deductive, (a) direct from a supposedly definite concept of the essential character of 'public' purpose, or (b) indirect, from the concept of what is essentially private, and hence not properly, public; (2) Historical, the term public being solely "a term of classification to denote the objects for which, according to settled usage the government is to provide," (3) Teleological, or experimental, public need and the appropriateness of public agency being the only test, and no definite concept possible.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court has by decision or opinion passed upon several proposals, approving (1) the compulsory lowering of a dam to relieve flooded meadows, (2) municipal water supply, (3) municipal gas and electric lighting, but disapproving as not properly public. (1) Aid to rebuild prop-

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erty burned in the Boston fire of 1872, (2) municipal coal and fuel yards, (3) improvement of housing by purchase of land and construction of houses. It has relied chiefly on deductive arguments. The criteria employed were: (i) *Direct* aim versus resulting benefits. This, however, is rejected in another decision of this court, and in recent decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court. (ii) The number of persons affected. This, however, would be difficult to apply to the case of coal supply so as to justify disapproval. (iii) Affecting persons "as a community and not merely as individuals." But it is not clear that to keep houses from burning down affects the owners as a community, while to aid in rebuilding affects them solely as individuals, nor that the water we drink affects us as a community while the houses we live in affect us merely as individuals. The chief stress in the housing opinion is laid upon the indirect deductive argument that buying and selling land and houses is a 'natural right,' and hence the government must not compete. But it is well known that individuals have also engaged in selling water, gas, and electricity. The decisions and opinions may all be wise, but it is difficult to say that the reasoning by which they are supported is logical.

As for (2) usage, it may be said that it has probably played a more important part in the actual conclusions reached than is indicated by the attempts to find deductive grounds for them. No one would question its value if, taken in its proper limitations as indicating merely what has prevailed in the past, whether by royal prerogative, or public opinion, or sheer accident.

The teleological test (3. above) is increasingly employed by the U. S. Supreme Court. It is held to justify a conception of public purpose in one State which does not necessarily apply in States of different climate, or resources. This makes an interesting reversal of the logic of type (1), for instead of beginning with a fixed concept of what is public and deciding cases by deduction as to whether they do or do not fall under that concept, the method is to see whether the end proposed is desirable and can be reached exclusively or most appropriately by public agency. If so this is a strong reason for holding the purpose to be 'public.'

The Massachusetts Court in one case employs this line of reasoning also: "There is . . . a necessity of having water, common to the inhabitants of a community, which cannot well be

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met except by the exercise of public right, and therefore the furnishing of water has been regarded a public service." If it had relied upon this in the housing opinion, it might or might not have reached the same result, but it would certainly be upon more tenable ground philosophically than in relying upon natural rights. It would also avoid the embarassment of using fixed concepts which cannot possibly be applied consistently to all its series of cases.

THE CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL WELFARE. Felix Adler.

The proposition is often put forth with some emphasis that all legislation should be directed toward securing the social welfare. But stated in this manner it is quite devoid of novelty. Legislation has always been directed toward what was believed to be the social welfare. The Brahminical authors of the code of Manu would have scouted the idea that the laws they framed, though bristling with privilege for the sacerdotal class, were not also conceived in the interest of Indian society as a whole. The Russian autocracy would press a similar claim. On the eve of the French revolution a singular plea was made to show that the interests of France required the integral preservation of the prevailing system. The progress that has been achieved consists not so much in relating legislation to social welfare, but in the conception of what social welfare consists in.

In this paper I shall attempt briefly to analyze the elements that enter into the notion of social welfare or the public good as at present held in the United States, and at the close I shall offer a suggestion as to the direction in which a higher ideal than that now prevailing may be looked for. Turning to our analysis, four components may be distinguished: 1. Individualism; 2. Modified Individualism (by which I understand the employment of collective action for the securing of individual ends); 3. Darwinism; 4. The Influence of Religion.

1. The principle factor in the prevalent conception of social good is individualism. To understand the sense which this word carries and the spell which it still exercises especially in the United States, we must remember that what is called individualism is a reaction against Feudalism. To suppose that Feudalism is a thing of the distant past implies a superficial reading of history. On the contrary, the modern world is still in the full

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swing of reaction against Feudalism. America was peopled by persons who sought relief from the pressure of feudal institutions in Europe, and every year our population is swelled by thousands of immigrants who, actuated by this anti-feudal tendency, help to keep it alive and strengthen it in this country. Now the genius of Feudalism was expressed in the idea that a man may attain the fulfillment of his selfhood in another, the inferior in the superior, the vassal in the lord, the humble serf in the master. Vicarious achievement of greatness was the characteristic note in feudal loyalty. The servant in the house might speak of his master's splendor as if it were his own. In a certain sense it was his own. That which he could not arrive at in his own person he reached in the person of his Lord. Just as vicarious attainment of moral perfection was the key-note in religion, vicarious earthly achievement was the key-note in secular life.

Individualism is at bottom a protest against this view. Describing a circle around the individual, it affirms that every man shall fulfill the end of his being in that circle. This is the origin of the demand for liberty, equality, and the unhindered pursuit of happiness. Of course, the obvious fact that men are dependent on one another for the attainment of their purposes could not be denied. The individual is clearly under the necessity of making excursions beyond the self-circle in order to fulfill himself. But he does so in order to bring back, so to speak, the booty he captures outside, into his own lair. True to its fundamental notion strict individualism assesses all social activities in terms of the profit they yield for the agent. Strict individualism is consistently subjective. Pleasure is the common denominator by which it determines the value of all social acts.

Feudalism was based on wrong transitive relations, wrong because implying the indelible inferiority of the many to the few. Individualism is based on the denial of the objective validity of the transitive relations. They are treated as mere means to a subjective result.

2. Socialism in all its forms leaves intact the individualistic ends but resorts to collective action as a new method of attaining them. That Socialism is through and through individualistic in tendency, with emotional fraternalism superadded, is the point I would especially emphasize. It seeks to apply the fable

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of "The Bundle of Sticks" for the benefit of each and all of the sticks.

3. Darwinism manifests its effects in two opposite directions: In encouraging a certain ruthless sort of selfishness by its doctrine of the survival of the fittest, leading even to short cut proposals to exterminate the unfit. On the other hand, mutual aid and coöperation as factors in evolution make their appeal to the more sympathetic natures, and the theory of evolution in general has encouraged a belief in the possible development of a higher human type.

4. The teachings of religion have supplied the material betterment movements of our day with a spiritual back-ground (we are to try to make men more comfortable, seeing that they are our brothers), but have not thus far provided a new and adequate definition of the spiritual end itself in the interest of which material improvement is to be operated.

In the United States at present we are passing out of the phase of strict individualism into the second phase of socialistic individualism. At the same time we are still maintaining the false principle that the individual can find the end of his being in the self-circle. We are still ignoring the objective transitive relation. We are still essentially hedonistic with a tinge of biblical ethicism added that strangely contrasts with our main conception of social wellbeing.

If, in closing, we look to the future and ask in what direction teachers, philosophers and seers (those who see ideals beyond the ones at the moment current) should endeavor to mold public opinion, my own answer would be in the direction of the concept of organicity. The problem of the future is to raise the transitive relations to the rank which belongs to them. Feudalism was right in affirming that a man must fulfill himself in the life of others. It was wrong in asserting that the few are superiors and the majority inferiors. The problem is so to interpret the social relations that men shall promote each others ends and shall find the common denominator no longer in pleasure but in the moral uplift experienced in enriching and thus revealing the organic life of the whole.

LAW AND PROGRESS. George W. Kirchwey.

(No abstract furnished.)



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THE CONTENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE. S. N. Patten.

Natural justice assumes the type of environment under which primitive nations lived and the motives that control men in antagonistic tribal societies. To bring it into relation to modern needs I shall put in parallel columns the basis on which two types of justice depend.

| LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. | SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. |
|---|---|
| FIRST PREMISE. | |
| Human nature reveals its own impotence, and hence the need of external control. | Human wants are dynamic, which tendency of itself creates improving forms of social control. |
| SOURCES OF DISCIPLINE. | |
| War. | Work. |
| REASON FOR SUBMISSION. | |
| Sovereign. | Prosperity. |
| MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS. | |
| Peace. | Income. |
| END TO BE SECURED. | |
| Liberty. | Progress. |
| DEFINITIONS. | |
| Natural justice causes the same individuals to be eliminated or subordinated and the same individuals to survive and prosper as would happen in a state of nature. | Social justice restricts both extremes of society, thereby increasing the prosperity of the socially intermediate. |

This table is self-explanatory, but some sources of misunderstanding may remain. The older view of human nature emphasized its defects, and because of them a sovereign was demanded. The newer view starts not from human nature, which is investigated with difficulty, but from human wants which are easily measured. The older view emphasized war as the source of discipline and the means through which character is formed. Work gets this place in the newer scheme. Submission in the older scheme was due to the love or fear of rulers. To-day the only sovereign, is prosperity. If we accept a gold standard or a tariff, if we permit the continuation of monopolies or a money trust, or if we submit to the evils of a rising cost of living or of a bad distribution of wealth, we do it because it is demanded by prosperity, and not because of commands from superiors. We measure this prosperity in income just as our ancestors tested governmental efficiency by the peace it brought.

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Social justice must be as definite and as objective as the primitive code it supersedes. It must draw from social life its general and abiding principles with the same care that judicial decisions have promulgated and interpreted the so-called natural law of earlier ages. To contrast the old and the new I shall again resort to the device of parallel columns.

| NATURAL JUSTICE. | SOCIAL JUSTICE. |
|---|---|
| The doctrine of | The doctrine of |
| CONSERVATION. | POSSESSION. |
| STRUGGLE. | SOCIAL VALUES. |
| POSSESSION. | A LIVING WAGE. |
| EQUALITY. | EQUALIZED ADVANTAGE. |
| LABOR VALUES. | SUPERIOR ADVANTAGE. |
| PERSONAL RIGHTS. | PERSONAL EQUALITY. |
| FREE CONTRACTS. | A SOCIAL MODE. |

The doctrine of possession is scarcely altered by being socialized. The great change comes from the contrast of labor values with social values. The older jurisprudence grew out of primitive conditions where labor was the chief origin of wealth, and hence the courts view all wealth as the result of individual toil and sacrifice. Present facts do not justify such a view. The primitive man thought he received his income through his contact with nature, and hence viewed his income as self-made, and not as society made. In the latter case, a budgetary relation exists between each man and society, the assets of which have a social origin.

If economic values are social, deductions from this fact should be made as to the advantages which personal contact with the environment create. Superior advantages are localized in ways that permit of their exploitation by a few. The right of the State to prevent an exploitation of the masses follows from this fact. Those who possess local advantages must yield control when public advantage demands a general use of local resources. A case of this kind is now awaiting decision by the American people. The State of Columbia controlled the region where the Panama Canal is building. What compensation is due Columbia? Under the doctrine of sovereignty Columbia has unlimited claims, which could, if recognized, block the building of the canal. Is there any difference between the right of a nation to a neck of land that prevents international commerce and its right to prevent the free passage of ships through a strait that

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borders her shores? We refused to pay tribute to the Moors in Africa, and to Denmark for entrance to the Baltic. Shall we pay tribute for a similar right to cross the Isthmus of Panama?

The application of the doctrine of equalized advantage is of importance as it affects both external and internal trade relations. A protective tariff is an attempt to equalize environmental advantage. By it the local advantages of particular regions are taken from their possessors and distributed more widely among the workers of the world. If these local advantages have a social origin, this process has a justification. The same problem arises in internal trade in connection with transportation. The rates to the seaboard are fixed not on the basis of cost, but with the view of equalizing the trade of various cities. New York, which has the lowest cost, has the highest rate; and other parts have rates inversely to the cost of transportation. This is a case of equalizing advantage. It has a justification if the local advantages of each city and transportation route are not the result of the labor expended by the people interested in the various cities or routes, but are socially created. A good rule for foreign commerce would be: Give to all sections the same advantage and to each section some advantage over the outside world. The same rule in internal trade would be: Give to each section an equal advantage in production and transportation, and to each section some protection for its local advantages.

Society is at present abnormal in that wealth is aggregated at one extreme, and numbers at the other. Two opposing modes are thus created instead of a harmonious growth at the center. The control of society by the one extreme means reaction; by the other, revolution. This condition of unstable equilibrium has continued so long that it is regarded as natural. Recently, however, evolution has been playing a larger part, and the upbuilding of a true social mode is in progress. The rich are losing in wealth, and the poor in numbers. Progress consists in those changes that create advantages for those of moderate income who have the industrial qualities of the rich and the working power of the poor. This change is not primarily one of heredity, nor of industrial efficiency, but of a redistribution of the social surplus to which all have an equal claim. In the past the end of law was to protect property and liberty. In the future

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the social mode should have the advantage that progress creates. If the courts recognize this fact, a ready means would be found for passing from the old to the new justice without revolution or despoilation.

We are often told that the province of judges is rigidly to interpret legal doctrines. If they prove inadequate, the legislator and not the court, should provide a remedy. Social legislation is, however, based on emotional demands, and cannot be secured except by an agitation promoting revolution even if it does not create it. The choice is between emotional justice with its evils, and the acceptance of social principles by the court. Slavery in Europe was abolished, not by a sudden revolution, but by increasing the restrictions that in the end made slavery unprofitable. In the same way we should secure a living wage. The evils of low standards could be removed if the courts took a liberal view of the law and economic facts involved. There is no prescribed division of powers between the legislative, judicial and executive functions which can be accepted. The natural evolution is for the executive and the judicial to encroach on the legislature. In this way emotional outbursts are prevented, and orderly evolution displaces the crude countermovements of revolution and reaction.

OUR LITIGIOUS SYSTEM. E. L. Henderson.

Our system of legal procedure is litigious. Judge and jury, whose function it is to see that justice is done, are for the most part passive spectators in the contest between the plaintiff and the defendant. The active investigation of the facts and the law is left to the opposing attorneys, who are not primarily *investigators* interested in getting truth and justice, but *advocates* possessed with a desire to win. This system has the advantage of being the product of natural growth. It is individualistic in spirit, leaving to the persons most concerned the responsibility for beginning action and for properly presenting their own cases. It has four main advantages: (1) It invokes the powerful motive of self-interest to inspire the zeal of the advocate in his work. The theory is that the most complete exposition of the facts which is available will come from the cases made out by the contesting parties. (2) Since each party in a litigation is responsible for its own case, it cannot complain at

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the presentation of this, and is, therefore, compelled to be satisfied at least with everything but the decision. (3) The passive attitude of judge and jury is more favorable to impartiality than the more active one of the investigator. Partiality is especially in evidence where the officers of the law who are responsible for the detection of criminals set themselves to frame up cases against suspects. (4) The costs of litigation deter from unjustified, trivial or needless law-suits, and also tend to check wrongs which by bringing about litigation may lead to great expense.

On the other hand, the extreme individualism of the litigious system is a source of grave defects: (1) It matches the wits and the enterprise of the attorneys and so ultimately the resources of the contestants, rather than the facts for and against a case. Each party suppresses evidence against it and distorts testimony to suit its case. It fights. As in the mediæval trial by combat, with which it is directly akin, litigation makes the decision rest upon factors irrelevant to the issue of justice. (2) The expenses of litigation discourage those who are wronged from seeking redress, especially if their resources be slender. (3) The lawyer trained to the task of the advocate, is put in the attitude not of seeking justice, but rather of winning his case. Hence the legal profession develops no sense of responsibility for such laws and such procedure as will most efficiently secure justice.

In some instances of legal procedure the judicial authorities assume active responsibility for the investigation of the facts and law regarding the cases brought before them. Such methods may be denominated inquisitorial rather than litigious. The inquisitorial system could be employed far more than it is at present by extending the use of investigating commissions appointed by the courts. The development of a profession of legal inquirers might tend to diminish the need for advocates and to transform them into searchers for truth and justice. The method of inquisitorial commissions is the only one by which reliable and adequate expert testimony can be obtained.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AS THE BASIS OF LEGAL EDUCATION. William Draper Lewis.

Every society is composed of one or more groups. The concept on which these groups rests is sometimes racial, sometimes

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territorial, and sometimes economic unity, but usually a mixture of all three. The group is real. The essence is the consciousness of unity among its members. The conceptions of groups and their relations prevalent among the members of any society are the social ideas of that society.

The study of the growth of social ideas is or ought to be an important branch of social science. It is that branch of social science which has a direct bearing on the study of law.

Our idea of the things which the law student should study will depend on our conception of the nature of law and the nature of the service which the community has a right to expect from the legal profession. Law is a form of expression of a social idea. The existing social ideas of a people are the product of the environmental history of its groups. These ideas are in the course of constant modification by the differences between past and present environment. When a law ceases to represent the social idea of a group, the members begin to regard it as unjust. It is vitally important that law should express dominant social ideas. Without a reasonable correlation between law and social ideas orderly progress is impossible. There is no such thing as abstract justice. That is just in any community which corresponds to the community's felt sense of right.

The community has a right to expect that the legal profession will administer law efficiently. Law is administered efficiently, only when being administered impartially and as rapidly as is consistent with reasonable care that the principles of law are so applied as to make the law correspond to changes in dominant social ideas.

To understand this statement, it is necessary to understand the difference between a legal rule and a legal principle. The difference, though perhaps one of degree rather than one of kind, is fundamental. A legal rule is always applicable to the facts to which it is intended to apply. Whether first expressed by legislative action or judicial decree, once fixed, a rule of law should not be altered by a judge. A judge may help to make a rule of law, not to unmake it.

A legal principle, while it always tends to apply, is never universally applicable. Two legal principles often apply to the same facts and are in opposition. A judge, in deciding many cases, not only has to know the legal principles applicable, but their relative importance. If he is worthy, when two principles

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apply to the facts of a case and are conflicting, he places the emphasis where the dominant existing social ideas require that it should be placed.

If law is a form of expression of a social idea, and one of the necessary functions of courts is to mold the law to meet changes in social ideas as they occur, social science, and especially that branch of it which deals with group development and the growth of social ideas, is a necessary part of legal education. The fact that it is the judge who nominally alone performs this function does not lessen the force of this conclusion. The legal writer has always had an effect on the law; the judge is taken from the ranks of the legal profession, and the work of the judge cannot be adequately performed without the assistance of a well trained bar.

The importance of the social sciences as part of the training of the lawyer is greatly increased by existing conditions. In the last few years there has been growing among all classes a distrust in the justice of the law. This is due to the fact that we are passing through a period of comparatively rapid change in our fundamental social ideas. When social ideas are undergoing rapid change, then the lawyer and judge, necessarily grounded in principles expressive of past conditions, are apt to be out of touch with current social ideas unless their training tends to make them interested in social questions.

It is not likely that results of marked value will come from adding to present courses in law modern teaching in economics, sociology and history. Law students need courses showing the development of legal principles given by men capable of pointing out the relation between the principle and the social idea on which it rests. Such men do not now exist. They will have to be evolved from the necessity of the situation.

THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL LEGISLATION. M. R. Cohen.

The process whereby the law becomes a fit instrument for the realization of justice or other social ends is seriously retarded by the prevailing theory that the proper function of the judge is always to find the law and never to make it. This theory, like that of the rigid division of the powers of the State, or of the faculties of the mind, is typical of eighteenth century rationalism with its over-sharp antithesis of determination and freedom, reason and will, judiciary and legislature. In actual

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life legislatures are not as free nor courts as bound as the traditional view maintains.

The basis of the prevailing view is to be found in the morally or logically obligatory character of most legal rules. Judges and lawyers feel themselves obliged or bound by this rational order and find it difficult, therefore, to view themselves also as creators of it. The application, however, of the evolutionary standpoint to this as to other situations involving *a priori* elements, shows no real contradiction between the obligatory character of legal rules and the fact that judges and lawyers are largely responsible for their development.

The process of judicial legislation may be considered under three heads: direct legislation, interpretation, and application. (1) As life is constantly developing new situations and judges are compelled to decide every case before them according to some rule, it follows that they must develop new rules. Because of their natural conservatism, and to mitigate the shock of innovation, fictions are invented whereby the new rules are treated as ancient members of the legal body. The process of inventing new rules consists mainly in stretching old rules and modifying them to new situations (*e. g.*, the law of common carriers as applied to railroads, etc.). When the new wine can no longer be poured into the old bottles, new ones are created by the invention of conditions implied by law, presumptions which are often contrary to fact, and, in the case of great creative judges like Mansfield, Gibson, or Shaw, by the open announcement of new legal rules based on the prevailing ideas of justice, public policy, and general view of the nature and fitness of things. (2) The prevailing theory views the process of interpretation as a merely passive one in which judges merely open their eyes and read the preëxistent law. But no legislators, codifiers, or constitutional framers, can foresee all the possible situations that will arise in the future, and provide for every case or emergency. The necessarily abstract character of general laws requires supplementary legislation on the part of those who have to administer them, and the rules for their interpretation are, as a matter of fact, calculated not so much to help us find the actual intention of the legislature, as rather to help us give statutes a form and content which will adapt them to the complicated needs of life. (3) The application of laws has generally been viewed as a merely mechan-

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ical process of subsuming the particular act or case under the proper rule or category. In practice, however, this involves a highly technical and fine art of weighing conflicting claims and principles and of finding compromises that will minimize social friction. The process involves, among other things, (*a*) an analysis and appreciation of the different factors in the living situation, and (*b*) a comprehensive perception of the relative importance and subordination of the different possible principles of the law. The former (*a*) involves a definite attitude to ethical and social problems based on some general philosophy of life, and the latter (*b*) a definite philosophy of the particular legal system, its functions and limitations.

THE SOCIAL ENDS IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION. G. A. Black.

The preamble of the federal constitution puts a remarkable enumeration of social ends in relation to the supreme law of the United States. In the supposed limiting case, United States of the World, the distinction between the end to provide for the common defense and the end to insure domestic tranquility vanishes; and the former is transformed into the latter. This conception of one social end as dropping out of discussion, because transformed into another as society enters a new state or condition, is differently applicable to the end of securing the blessings of liberty. For into the difference between reserved and granted power is transformed the identity of liberty in relation to law when a given society first chooses its own form of government, with reservation of power to amend it. After that, the term liberty tends to drop out of discussion, and public interest centers wherever the conflicting, but by no means irreconcilable, claims of reserved and granted power are conspicuously in evidence. At present these general considerations prescribe a closer consideration of cases in which some prohibition in the fourteenth amendment is set up as a defense against some new assertion of the police power. The Oklahoma bank case is singularly interesting, for in it, and then only in decisions of our highest court, the police power is defined in terms that set recognizable limits to the valid exercise of the power as a means to public welfare. Until such limits are definitively established, the relation of liberty to our law stands in jeopardy.

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## BOOK REVIEWS.

PRESENT PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES: A Critical Survey of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism, and Realism, Together with a Synopsis of the Philosophy of William James. By Ralph Barton Perry. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1912. Pp. xv, 383.

This work, as the author says in his Preface, is not intended primarily to be descriptive or historical but rather is critical (p. vii). Naturalism, idealism, and pragmatism are discussed and criticized from the point of view of realism, which is stated constructively in the last part. It is scarcely worth while to inquire whether Professor Perry's account of the theories he rejects is in all respects fair, for in the nature of the case the matter cannot be decided. Throughout the book the discussion is of contemporary problems,—problems which none of us views in historical perspective,—and therefore the criterion of objective statement and criticism does not exist. If Professor Perry esteems slightly a theory which the idealist esteems highly, the latter naturally thinks that idealism is put in a false light by Professor Perry's summary treatment of the point. On general principles one is as likely to be right as the other. On one vital point, however, there is no room for difference of opinion; every criticism in the book is manifestly fair in intent. No one who finds his own convictions criticized will have the least ground for objecting to the spirit of the criticism. The author has endeavored to find the strength as well as the weakness of the views which he rejects. He has not only a broad but a thorough knowledge of the writings of his opponents and his motive is manifestly only the desire to get at the truth. To this he adds great clearness both of thought and expression. Criticism undertaken in this admirable spirit and with so much seriousness of purpose is the best fate that can befall any philosophical theory.

The book shows throughout the same interest in the bearing of realism upon religion that appears in Professor Perry's other writings. The antithesis of theory and belief, and of science and religion, forms the basis upon which in his introduction the author distinguishes the four philosophical tendencies which he

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treats. Naturalism represents an exclusive devotion to science, while idealism represents an equally exclusive and often romantic devotion to religion. Pragmatism and realism are latter-day efforts to mediate between the two and to mitigate the narrowness of each. Pragmatism leans in a general way toward idealism and "is never far removed from dogmatic anthropomorphism." Realism shares with naturalism the regard for the rigorous methods and exact results of science, but it escapes an exclusive regard for physical fact (pp. 39f.).

There is a good deal of what Professor Perry himself calls pseudo-simplicity in this introduction. The antithesis between theory and belief is made a good deal sharper and clearer than it actually is, and the working relations between the two are not discussed as they should be. Moreover, the relations of the four tendencies in philosophy to science and religion are by no means so simple as Professor Perry represents them. A more profound consideration of this question appears to be essential if realism is to be presented as a mediator between the facts of science and the hopes of religion. Indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that the greatest defect in the general structure of the book is its failure to follow up this problem, as the introduction seems to promise. The last chapter on "A Realistic Philosophy of Life," where one expects this promise to be finally fulfilled, is really the least maturely considered in the book. Much of what Professor Perry urges against Mr. Russell's pessimistic outlook upon civilization has no connection whatever with realism (cf. p. 347); it consists merely in pointing out the possibility that the universe may contain more than Mr. Russell's science has yet discovered. On the other hand, realism seems to have some special difficulties in playing the rôle that Professor Perry assigns to it. It is not enough to point out that "there is no reason why an identical process should not obey many laws, and laws of different types" (p. 342), and that therefore the same act may be mechanical in one phase and teleological in another. Even the fact that some processes are considered in both lights does not go far toward justifying religious hopes. These hopes will hardly be satisfied with any position short of a subordination of mechanism to teleology, and it does not appear how realism can supply such a faith. The most that Professor Perry really claims is that his philosophy justifies the acceptance of mechanism *and* teleology. Upon

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realistic grounds one would have to say that the one set of relations is 'over and above' the other. And on empirical grounds, the generality and permanence of the mechanical relations give them a great handicap over the teleological ones, so far as hope is concerned.

Since Professor Perry's criticisms are all from the point of view of realism, one's interest naturally centers in the part of the book where he develops his own theory constructively. One finds here, however, as Professor Perry himself says, that one is still largely in the realm of criticism. About half of the whole section on realism is devoted to "A Realistic Theory of Mind" and a large portion of this chapter is taken up with showing that consciousness is not exclusive. Considering Professor Perry's intention to present realism in its religious implications, it would have been quite natural had he discussed the non-exclusiveness of consciousness with reference to the conception of personality or individuality. It seems that the realist has some special difficulties here. Minds are not exclusive, it is held; the content of one mind may be content also of another. A given content may be more easily possessed by one mind than by another, but this is due only to what may be called advantages of position; nobody can have quite the same chance to know my organic sensations as I have. The difference between my mind and yours, then, appears to be merely the difference between the contents that have got into one and not into the other, which certainly seems to be an extremely formal way of expressing the difference between two radically distinct kinds of person. Or is it to be understood that there are different types of experiencing relation? Or perhaps every experience is an unique relation. Consciousness is not creative; is it also not distinctive, in the sense that my awareness is precisely like every other person's? A similar question, it is clear, may be asked about one consciousness in its different modes. Is the "relation characteristic of consciousness" the same when one desires as when one merely knows. Apparently Professor Perry regards it so, for the same symbol is used to express both (p. 333), and the difference between desiring and knowing is put into the terms. We have then a 'desiring subject,' a 'finding subject,' and presumably indefinitely many other subjects, as many, that is, as there are nuances of subjective nature. Now, all these subjects are, of course, independent of the 'relation

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characteristic of consciousness,' with the result that if I desire something, it requires a further 'relation characteristic of consciousness' to enable me to know that I desire it. Professor Perry maintains in his final chapter that "in a sense every individual is morally a law to himself," and also that consciousness is not impotent (pp. 343ff.). It does not appear, however, that either position is derived especially from his realism.

When we pass beyond these criticisms of the theory of exclusiveness to the realist definition of mind, we find the following: "Elements become mental content *when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of the central nervous system,*" (p. 299); "Content of mind must be defined *as that portion of the surrounding environment which is taken account of by the organism in serving its interests*" (p. 300). One hesitates to criticize these definitions because the exposition of them is so brief that one feels no assurance that one has understood exactly what they mean. In the case of the first, however, it seems clear that whatever difficulties there are in defining consciousness are turned over wholesale to the nervous system; mind simply is the thing which the nervous system selects. This would be more enlightening if we did not know vastly more about consciousness than we do about the nervous system. Moreover, the use of the term 'selection' in this connection is not self-explanatory. The nervous system can hardly be said literally to select part of the objects which surround one. One suspects that the phrase 'to select in the specific manner of the nervous system' is at bottom a roundabout way of saying that consciousness is consciousness. The second definition, aside from the fact that it seems not to be descriptive of what one ordinarily means by mind, is especially difficult because Professor Perry does not give any explanation whatever of interest. It is said to be used in the biological sense rather than the psychological, but whether this is regarded as part of the realistic method or is only the accidental choice of an example does not appear. So far as the example is concerned, interest is identified with the impulse to self-preservation, though other 'special' interests are mentioned. Interest is distinguished from the nervous system, though together with the nervous system it constitutes the 'action of the mind' (p. 304). Apparently interest is an ultimate which cannot be explained, but it certainly ought to be defined.

The realistic theory of knowledge claims as an advantage over

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other theories that it abolishes the dualism of mind and body, thought and things (p. 308). Thought is a peculiar kind of relation among things, not a different substance. But here again one sometimes feels that the realist is throwing too great a burden upon a phrase. It is perfectly possible to offer a solution of dualism in realistic terms that is quite as formal as that given by subjectivism. In fact, one suspects that the realist sometimes makes an identification of thought and things that is in all respects as vicious as that of which he accuses the idealist. In the present instance, this appears in the somewhat halting treatment that Professor Perry gives to the distinction between knowledge and experience. Professor Dewey's restriction of the term knowledge to intellectualized experience he apparently regards as only a peculiarity of terminology, and pragmatism is charged with a 'disparagement' of concepts (pp. 225ff.). Later the distinction between mediate and immediate knowledge is recognized (pp. 326f.), but one feels that an inherent difficulty is constantly slurred over by calling both 'knowledge' indiscriminately. More particularly, there is no explanation whatever of meaning in the case of mediate knowledge, and surely the explanation of this point is precisely the crux of the realistic position. "It [the idea] is an idea of something by virtue of the fact that it is connected through my plans or expectations with some portion of the environment" (p. 327). But the content of mind is itself only a selected portion of the environment. Does Professor Perry mean that one portion of the environment is connected with another portion? Doubtless it is, but this is hardly a description of meaning. So far as the truth of mediate knowledge is concerned, the criterion is said to be simply the success or failure of my plans (p. 327).

The same identification of thought and things seems to lie at the bottom also of Professor Perry's argument about external relations and the method of analysis. "The method of analysis presupposes that the nature and arrangement of the parts supplies the character of the whole." Otherwise "analysis and description by specification would not constitute knowledge at all" (p. 319). The only alternative to the method of analysis so interpreted is to be "content with an immediate or mystical apprehension" of a whole. But what force has this argument unless 'constituting knowledge' is taken as virtually identical with 'constituting the thing known'? By means of abstractions I

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may properly be said to know a complicated whole, but there is surely no reason for saying that the concrete thing is made out of abstractions, unless indeed I think of the elements of my knowledge as also the elements of being, and unless I assume that in analyzing it I am actually taking it apart into its constituent parts. It is a truism that the nature of a whole is not merely the sum of the characters of the parts. But is it not also true that, as a matter of experience, the total, concrete nature of the whole is prior to the *disjecta membra* of analysis? This fact does not appear essentially more 'mysterious' than any other fact of experience, and it does not even render it especially mysterious that conceptual analysis should enlighten experience, provided one has considered the relations between conceptual knowledge and experience. Realism, of course, does not admit all of these propositions and no doubt we have to do here with two widely divergent points of view. The test, however, is this: A concrete whole being given, is it not easier for logic to explain the existence and nature of elements, aspects, abstracted conceptions, than it is for metaphysics, assuming the existence of abstractions, to construct concreteness out of them? The method of analysis as interpreted by Professor Perry has no claim to self-evidence. Like any other useful principle, it can create fallacy if it is taken without criticism or qualification. Professor Perry, I believe, corrupts the principle of analysis and turns it into a fallacy by a process essentially similar to that by which another useful principle gives rise to what he calls the 'speculative dogma' (pp. 64ff.).

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DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE: An Essay Toward a Philosophy of Evolution. By L. T. Hobhouse. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xxix, 383.

Professor Hobhouse's book is planned on a fine broad scheme and carried out with impressive power and judgment. It is a book perhaps rather for the general student of philosophy than for the specialist in ethics, but assuredly it ought not to be neglected by the latter. In the main, contention is bound up with a profound belief in the importance of ends, and the all-importance of reason and rational method in the conduct of life.

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The author does not claim to reach demonstration, but he does put forward the hope that he has shown grounds for holding his conclusion to be probable, or, as he might prefer to say, on the way to truth.

The scope of the book is so large and, in spite of its breadth, there are so many details that it is not easy to summarize it. Put roughly, the main thesis seems to be this: the world-process consists of an emergence *into* consciousness and into harmony of elements that are acting from the first *on* consciouness though not *in* it, and that are capable of harmony though as yet not of harmony. The goal of such a process would be an all-embracing intelligible system where every part coöperated with every other. Observation of the facts round us and in history, the movements of animals and of ourselves, the actual progress of mankind and the development of consciousness from protoplasm, even maybe from inanimate matter, all indicate an approach to such a consummation. The first part of the book deals with these results of observation, fruits of the empirical method, and the bold outline in my last sentence gives no idea of the wealth in Mr. Hobhouse's masterly review. But there rises the second question: Have we reason for hoping that the goal may be reached? And to answer this comes the metaphysical attempt to fix the place of reason in the universe.

Mr. Hobhouse rather expressly dissociates himself from any profused form of idealism; yet his attempt seems inspired throughout by the spirit of Hegel. That attempt falls into two parts. In the first place, he argues, when we set out to understand the world, we soon find that the intellect cannot be satisfied with anything short of the principle of teleology. This, however, will by no means take us all our way. "Arguing from the ideal of thought, we can prove only that so far as reality is fully intelligible, it must be a teleological process." (p. xiii). But, in the second place, "the principle which underlies mechanism,"—and mechanism, I take it, Mr. Hobhouse holds we are bound to accept at least as *a* category for the universe, if an imperfect one,—this principle can, he thinks, be shown to imply "that all variable relations must be resolvable ultimately into relations holding between the terms as such." This appears a vital point, and would be hotly contested by some thinkers, a contest which the present reviewer is certainly not competent to decide. Accepting the position, however, there would seem



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to be little difficulty in accepting Mr. Hobhouse's further contention that variable relations therefore "must belong to a whole, the elements of which necessitate one another at some point of time. Such mutual necessitation must run through all that is real, and constitutes a harmony or self-maintaining system." Hereupon Mr. Hobhouse gives a fresh turn to the old way of dealing with the problem of evil, a very interesting turn for those who believe in the essential perfection of an intelligible whole and the postulating of such a whole by all thought, and who yet cannot deny that evil exists. "Since such harmony does not exist and could not have vanished if it had existed, it must be in the future, and the actual order of reality is determined teleologically by the impulse to realize it."

I suppose it would follow from this that, in the present and the past taken *without* the future, nothing *could* be completely intelligible. Conceivably, if we followed out this line of thought, we might get new light on the question of free-will. The resentment of the plain man against determinism lies in his horror at the thought that he is for ever limited to his past and his present; somehow, he feels, they are, and for some must be, inadequate to what he has in him: something calls to him as to the daughter of kings in Meredith's poem, "Thou art thy future, not thy past."

Again, this way of looking at things might throw light on the exceedingly difficult questions that narrowed all ideas about "the sub-conscious self," and the sensations of which we are not fully conscious. It seems impossible to doubt that such sensations exist, and yet there is something very puzzling and baffling about them: it does not seem intelligible at bottom to speak of a sensation which you do not feel, or of really feeling it if you are not even momentarily conscious that you do. Perhaps, therefore, the right way out of the tangle might be to admit that until they were lifted into consciousness, these inchoate feelings were in fact *un*intelligible, that a being only partly conscious can only be understood if conceived as one growing into full consciousness. I am not quite sure if this line of thought is in harmony with Mr. Hobhouse's, but I think it is. One of his most inspiring passages is that where he claims that deeper views of life and larger synthesis are pressing themselves in some obscure way upon our minds, but that we can only come into real possession of them and they can only become real

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through the long toil of reasoning. "The working of the unconscious does not cease as the sphere of the rational advances. . . . The more thought becomes conscious of itself, the more clearly it must realize the limited extent and the area which it has actually and definitely reclaimed, and the less it can refuse to acknowledge any value in the obscurer and inexplicit promptings of forces that lie beyond its ken. In these circumstances there are three royal roads to fallacy. The first is to regard explicit analyzed articulate experience in its existing incompleteness as the sole and sufficient measure of reality, and to dismiss the world of poetry and art, of religious emotion and enthusiasm to a limbo of beautiful imagination. The second is to despise the articulate and abandon the effect and extend its sphere. The third and commonest is to take as articulate truth that which has its foundation, essentially in the inarticulate." Over against these false methods is set the work of reason mastering experience, a work which appears unsatisfactory only "because, at any stage, there is more working in the mind than can get itself clearly expressed. The world of mind is not irrational, but at any stage, short of its perfection, it is imperfectly rational. . . . The weakness or defect of reason is equally the weakness or defect of the non-rational elements. Its extension to them, their inclusion within its sphere, is their redemption."

Thus, then, we have one characteristic of the ideal goal toward which the world is moving: the attainment of a clear grasp by consciousness of all that has been operating *on* consciousness, and this might be described in general terms as the attainment in one sphere of full and articulate correlation. But there is another characteristic, similar but in another sphere, *viz.*, the coöperation of all individual centers of consciousness in harmonious and productive activity. It is plain from what Mr. Hobhouse says on this point that he does not consider the nature of this harmony to be determined merely by the satisfaction to the individual soul simply taken as such. A discovery about it is a discovery about an "inherent characteristic of the spiritual order." It is not, in short, *any* kind of satisfaction at which we aim, but a satisfaction with special and definite characteristics, even though we do not as yet know what these are in detail. So much, indeed, is involved simply in saying that the good for the individual implies a harmony between himself and

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other individuals, but Mr. Hobhouse means much more than this. In speaking of the system based on the greatest happiness principle and that alone, he says: "It failed to satisfy the deep-seated conviction that man,—not only the individual, but the race,—has a function to perform, a part to play in things, that even if the race as a whole could be happy without performing this function, something essential would be missed." Again, it is clear that he conceives an ultimate state where the claims of society and of the individual are reconciled in a way far surpassing anything now. As it is, man and society are often at variance, and it is not always man who is to blame. "For in the instincts, the needs, the impulses of the personality are implicit all the strands that connect the individual with the whole life of mind, whereas in the actual fabric of society wherein he is called to play his part, the requirements of the spiritual order may be very imperfectly met. . . . The problem is so to conceive the claims of personality as to make them not disruptive of the social order but working constituents of social harmony."

True, it is a problem, and a mighty one. Mr. Hobhouse sees that in the working out of it intuitively, much depends on whether we conceive mankind as moving forward to master possibilities or not. The value we attach to liberty depends on that: those of us who worship liberty do so in the belief that through error, so it be active, man attains to truth, because in all the operations of mind truth is working. But if we are wise, we know how long the process is and how heavy the price. To make us pay the price, we must believe that "the amplitude of time" will bring the purchase. "If it were merely a question of realizing immediate good as it appears to us, coercion would be always in place. Liberty has its value only in a far longer game" (p. 196). Mr. Hobhouse does not in the most distant way touch on the question of immortality; but it may be asked in this connection if it can ultimately be avoided.

London, England. F. MELIAN STAWELL.

ETHICS. By the Rev. Hastings Rashdall, D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D. London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913. (The People's Books Series.) Pp. iii, 96.

The publishers of 'The People's Books' are to be congratulated on having secured the services of Canon Rashdall to write the

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volume on ethics in their series; his "The Theory of Good and Evil" (1907) is one of the two or three best recent books on the subject, and the present volume, which is practically a condensation of that work, exhibits all the merits which we are accustomed to expect from his writing,—acuteness in argument, sobriety of statement, freedom from dogmatism on the one hand and from washy enthusiasm on the other. It repeats in small compass and popular form the well-known features of his ethical position. These are, briefly, the utilitarian definition of the rightness of acts as depending on their consequences, combined with denial of the traditional utilitarian view that the value of consequences depends on the amount of pleasure and pain they contain, and, finally, insistence on the objectivity of moral judgments.

I am inclined to think that Canon Rashdall is right on all these three points; my own criticism is that he does not seem clearly to have distinguished from one another the various difficulties that must be faced before they can be regarded as established. For instance, where several alternative courses of action are open, which is it one's duty to select,—that which will actually produce the best total results, or that which there is reason to think will produce them? No light is thrown on this difficult question. Again, he holds that the fact of an action's being the one which will (or probably will) produce the best results is a mark by which it can always be recognized as right; and he would say, I think, though he does not make this clear, that this is not merely *a* mark of rightness, but is *the only* mark. Yet there might be more than one characteristic belonging to all right actions and to no others: the intuitionist who believes that the presence of a specific moral emotion is an infallible guarantee of the rightness of an action might say that every action accompanied by this emotion was also one which produced the best results. Another question of which the treatment does not seem quite satisfactory is that as to the nature of the ends of moral action. While rightly rejecting hedonism, Canon Rashdall does not grapple with the different problems raised by the fact that all things that have intrinsic value are complex and always (or almost always) contain pleasure.

There is a certain weakness, finally, in his discussion of the objectivity of moral judgments, which comes from his failure to


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notice that, as Mr. G. E. Moore has pointed out,* the 'objectivity' and 'rationality' of moral judgments imply that they are true at all times and under all circumstances. When we say that 'this is good' or 'this act is right' are 'objective' truths, we do not merely mean to deny that what these propositions are concerned with is the feelings or thoughts of a particular man or men at a particular time; we mean also to assert that, if they are true, then the thing in question would always be equally good, and any act which produced exactly the same results would be right whenever it occurred. Were Canon Rashdall to develop his view of the rationality of moral judgments along these lines, he might perhaps reconsider much that he says about the connection between morality and religion in his last chapter. Though he refrains from basing morality on religion, he does not believe that for an atheist "our moral judgments can carry with them the same kind of objectivity that they do for the theist," arguing that, unless we can suppose them to be in some way the expression of a divine mind, moral laws will not be on the same level of objectivity with physical laws. But when it is seen that moral judgments, when true, are true in the universal kind of way just indicated, there is no reason for denying to them as much objectivity as belongs to the propositions of physics or mathematics.

London, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS. By Henri Bergson. Authorized translation by T. E. Hulme. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. vi, 79.

Mr. Hulme is to be congratulated on his excellent translation of Bergson's sketch of metaphysics which appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for January, 1903. He has done a service to many readers in England and America, for in Bergson's larger works the fundamental ideas of his philosophy are complicated by so much detail that they are often difficult to grasp. The present essay, stating them as it does simply and clearly, saves the student a good deal of unnnecessary trouble.

* In his review of Dr. Rashdall's "The Theory of Good and Evil" in *The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1908, and in his "Ethics" (Williams & Norgate, 1912).

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In answering the question What is metaphyics? Bergson uses a two-fold method. Starting from the assumption that the knowledge at which metaphysics aims must be something more absolute and complete than, and different in kind from, anything that occurs in everyday life or in science, he first tries to solve the problem by elimination. He gives us, that is to say, a *critique* of knowledge, directed towards exposing the deficiencies of ordinary intellectual processes. Then, when by this method of exclusion we have reached some idea of what the knowledge attained in metaphysics will *not* be like, he sketches the subject-matter of metaphysics and the kind of conclusions that may be expected. But it is the critical line of argument that is most prominent in this essay. Roughly, Bergson's *critique* of everyday knowledge and of science is as follows. In the first place, all such knowledge is tainted at the source: it is not disinterested, being always based on practical convenience; always relative to our needs, it can never be absolute. In the second place, it works by means of concepts and analysis. But concepts are only symbols, or artificial patterns, useful for telling us about things, but incapable of helping us to penetrate into their inmost nature; they are fixed, and, therefore, cannot adequately represent the essential mobility of the real. Again, concepts involve analysis, and analysis always falsifies. The decomposition of wholes into elements is legitimate, indeed, because convenient, but meanwhile the nature of the whole has slipped through our fingers. In any case, we cannot understand a whole by mere enumeration or juxtaposition of its parts; how much less when the supposed parts are not real parts but only symbols. The hopelessness of this attempt to understand reality by conceptual analysis is seen in the secular antinomies of philosophy. Bergson constantly takes motion in space as an example of a reality stubbornly recalcitrant to scientific explanation: however refined our scheme of points, instants and particles, there always is some simple residue inexpressible in terms of concepts. But his crucial case is the sense which, he asserts, we all have of the unity of our consciousness; here analysis into psychological elements is palpably false, because every man has (or can have if he will take the trouble) a direct intuition of that simple process, combining unity with multiplicity, which constitutes his mental life. And this immediate intuition of ourselves is the ideal of knowledge, for in it we

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really put ourselves inside the object of consciousness; it is no longer relative, but absolute.

This, then, must be the type of the knowledge at which metaphysics aims; there would be no such study as metaphysics unless we could put ourselves inside all reality in the same kind of way as we are aware of our own minds from inside. Bergson thinks that we can do this, because all reality is,—though not to the same extent as our own minds,—a mobile process characterized by what he calls *durée*. There is, in short, a peculiar act (intuition) specially adapted to grasp a peculiar object (*durée*), and while in self-consciousness this object is grasped in perfection, with practice the philosopher will attain to intuitive knowledge of the external world as well.

Leaving aside the thousand difficulties raised by this theory, I have only space to indicate here what seems to be its fundamental fallacy. Everything depends on the following argument. No whole is merely the sum of its parts; therefore no whole has any real parts. But whenever we think about wholes, we think of them as composed of parts, and indeed all thinking involves a perception of relations between parts. Therefore, in thinking we never grasp the true nature of reality, which is only given in the simple intuition of wholes. To refute this reasoning, it seems sufficient to observe that, from the premise that no whole is merely the sum of its parts, the conclusion that no whole is composed of parts,—that there are no real parts at all,—does not follow.

London, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON. By Edouard Le Roy. Translated by Vincent Brown, M. A. London: Williams & Norgate, 1913. Pp. viii, 235.

The new philosophy of M. Henri Bergson has recently become so widely known that a very distinct need has begun to be felt for some form of commentary upon it which shall help to make the general outlines clear to those who either have not yet faced the original, or else have found themselves too much overwhelmed by its eloquent persuasiveness to submit it to honest examination.

M. Le Roy has undertaken in the present book to supply this want. The way he has dealt with his subject is admirably suited to his purpose. He does not attempt to say too much. The

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book falls roughly into three parts, the first two dealing with the method and the main results to which it has led, while in the third, in a series of notes added at the end, the various main notions involved in M. Bergson's philosophy are explained rather more fully than was possible in the previous part. Here, then, we get a clear and concise statement of the main features of M. Bergson's philosophy, with little comment and no criticism, for these fall outside the plan of the book. In any case, however, it is clear that M. Le Roy finds himself so much in sympathy with the views he is stating that on the fundamental points very little criticism would seem to him required. It is this very sympathy in essentials, in the case of a philosopher who has never himself been a pupil of Bergson's, but has arrived independently at his own conclusions, that makes his statement of the case so valuable. We get the advantage of two original presentations of the same case; if one way failed to bring home to us its real meaning, the other may sometimes have a happier inspiration, and suddenly we understand.

M. Le Roy rightly claims that the most original and essential thing in Bergson's philosophy is his new method of thought. Critics completely misunderstanding him sometimes accuse him of discrediting all use of the reason and preaching a return to effortless immediacy.

Perhaps the most valuable thing in M. Le Roy's book is the clear way in which he explains the precise nature of M. Bergson's method. Once having grasped this, the results to which it has so far led are much easier to follow. The brief sketch of these, which forms the second part, is very valuable in showing clearly the connection between Bergson's various theories, and enabling us to survey his work as a whole. It is not possible for M. Le Roy to treat any particular point in much detail, but in the case of steps of fundamental importance he indicates the line the proof follows, without working it out.

From this sketch he passes on to the future results which may be expected to follow from the application of this same new method in other fields. M. Bergson's work is by no means completed: there are still many philosophical subjects on which he has not touched. About ethics he has as yet written nothing.

M. Le Roy however does not consider this new philosophy in any way incompatible with religion: he even holds that the application of its method might well produce evidence strongly

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in support of such belief. But on this question he allows himself only a few words. Having undertaken to give only M. Bergson's own views, he feels he has no right to lay stress on a subject on which M. Bergson has not yet written.

As a sympathetic commentary on this new philosophy M. Le Roy's book is admirable, but it suffers inevitably from the very thing which makes its value. For those who already sympathize, at least in part, with M. Bergson's views, it adds fresh insight, and the meaning is clear. It is likely, however, to strike less favorably those who have not yet accustomed their minds to the new point of view. If they look for a perfectly clear cut use of terms according to rigidly fixed definitions, they will be disappointed (and in that case probably disgusted also). Perhaps this is inevitable. The claim of this new method of thought to supersede the formal use of concepts in favor of language, which creates new ones to express new intuitions as it goes, is the very thing its opponents are least ready to admit.

Over one very important point, however, critics would have a right to complain. M. Le Roy does not give anywhere in this book a satisfactory account of M. Bergson's theory of Time. The question of Time is so fundamental that its omission must certainly be admitted to be a serious defect in a book otherwise deserving nothing but praise.

London, England. KARIN COSTELLOE.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. By H. Wilson Carr, D.Litt. London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913. Pp. 93. The People's Books Series.

This little book is the second contributed by Mr. Carr to the series called 'The People's Books.' It is meant to convey to non-specialists some idea of the problems of epistemology, and in this I think it should succeed; though it is a little difficult to be sure whether what is quite intelligible to one who is familiar with these questions will be equally clear to those who are now meeting them for the first time.

Mr. Carr takes over Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description and says that the problem of truth and error only concerns the latter. This is rather too sweeping. The problem applies to all propositions, and the fact that when a proposition is founded purely on knowl-

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edge by acquaintance, as *e. g.*, '2 is less than 3,' it is liable to be self-evidently true, is no ground for denying that the question: What is meant by truth? is applicable to it. I do not know either why Mr. Carr, after carefully distinguishing sense-data with which we are acquainted from independent reality which we infer from them, should say on page 19 that "all reality whatever is composed of sense-experience."

Mr. Carr goes on to deal with the view that truth means agreement with reality. This, he says, must be true in some sense, but the question is in what sense. He rejects the view that the correspondence can take the form of copying on the ground that to know whether a copy is good or bad you must know both the copy and the thing copied. Whilst I agree with his rejection of the copying theory, I think this particular argument rests on confusing the *meaning* of truth with a *test* for it. His argument only shows that if copying be the meaning of truth, it will give us no test for the truth of any proposition. But this does not prove that copying is not the meaning of truth; there is no reason why a knowledge of truth's meaning should supply a test of its presence. A better argument of Mr. Carr's is that ideas are acts of knowing realities, and, as such, psychical; and therefore not copies of those realities which are often physical. Nevertheless, a case could be made out for correspondence of a kind between the sense-data that are the objects of ideas and the realities which are inferred from them and are only known by description. But obviously this would not cover the whole field of truth.

Mr. Carr next deals with the coherence theory of truth and introduces us to the Absolute as "the idea of an object which realizes perfect logical consistency." Our author has a good deal of sympathy with the arguments that lead to the Absolute because he accepts (as a good Bergsonian) the usual antinomies about space, time, and motion. He offers us a new antinomy about motion, *viz.*, that a body cannot move in a continuous medium: it cannot enter a filled space till the medium has left it whilst the medium will not be caused to leave it till the body has begun to move. I do not see why motion must be supposed to take place in jerks; why should not the two processes go on together, the liquid flowing out from the front of the body and circulating round it to fill up the space that it leaves at the same time as the body moves forward?

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Mr. Carr comes to the startling conclusion that no purely logical objections can be made to the arguments for the Absolute and that the reason for rejecting the theory is that it fails to provide a criterion by which any particular proposition can be judged. He then gives us a very fairminded account of Pragmatism which claims to remedy this defect. Needless to say, he cannot make that tissue of confusions consistent with itself and with what we know ourselves to mean by truth. In the course of his argument, which seems to me quite sound, Mr. Carr introduces the Theory of Relativity and says that it shows that our former views about space and time were wrong. This is, I think, quite gratuitous. All that it shows us is that we have always been inclined to forget some of the implications of our practical methods of *measuring* lengths and durations.

In the seventh chapter on "Illusion" Mr. Carr gives us an account of Bergson. It does not seem to me to make that author any more plausible. No doubt the senses and the intellect are selective, but why should mere selection produce illusions like space and time? And what possible ground is there for supposing, that, because the intellect cannot deal with life, therefore the one reality (by making selections from which the intellect produces illusions) is life? And why should it be of more practical value to life to have illusions about itself than to have correct information? One more confusion is between the two propositions 'everything changes' and 'everything is change.' The former may very well be true; but it does not imply the latter, which still seems to me to be nonsense. And if both be true together, we have the still more nonsensical proposition 'change changes.'

In the last chapter the troublesome subject of error is considered. To meet the difficulty that the object of an erroneous judgment is certainly not nothing and yet is not real, two suggestions are offered. One is, I think, meant to be Mr. Russell's theory of judgment and the other is Prof. Stout's view about 'real possibilities.' If Russell's theory be meant, it appears in too simple a form to be plausible, for the reference to many-term relations is dropped, and this is essential. In quoting Meinong in connection with Prof. Stout's theory, it seems to me that Mr. Carr is under some confusion. He uses the word 'supposition' for what is supposed, whereas Meinong only used *Annahme* for the psychical act of supposing. And Mr. Carr seems to hold

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that 'suppositions' in his sense differ from the objects of true judgment, whilst Meinong holds that the objects of *Annahmen* ('Objectives,' as he calls them) are the same as the objects of judgments. But it is possible that I may have misunderstood Mr. Carr here, for he is rather condensed, and it is doubtful whether his popular readers will make much of this eighth chap-

St. Andrew's University. C. D. BROAD.

ON THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL: A Contribution to the Phenomenology of the Thought Processes. Thesis approved for the degree of doctor of science in the University of London. By Francis Aveling, Ph.D., D.Sc., D.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. x, 225.

Dr. Aveling's purpose is to discover what is in consciousness "when we think the universal or the individual." He accordingly devised experiments to produce the mental phenomena concerned. He arranged ten sets each of five pictures, which were displayed to his subjects one at a time, along with one of ten nonsense words, corresponding to the ten sets. For example, 'Ferod' was the word for pictures of boys running, leaping, etc. After each session in the learning-period, the words were exposed as stimuli, the subject reacting when "the meaning of the word appeared in consciousness in any form": introspections were then taken. After the learning-period, the words were given as the subjects of incomplete sentences, *e. g.*, "All Ferods are ——," "The largest Sorab is ——," etc. These were calculated to make the words "function as universals or individuals." The subjects had to complete the sentences, and introspections were taken. His main conclusions are as follows:

The words acquired meaning by an association process, where either a concept was abstracted from the objects or they were subsumed under a concept previously so obtained. This concept, which need not be accompanied by sensorial elements, when revived by the word gave it its meaning. Thinking always involves such concepts. When images occur, they give the concept stability. Images seem to be necessary in thinking an individual.

It is needless to show the connection of this with the work of such psychologists as Bühler, and all interested in this recent development of experimental psychology will appreciate

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Dr. Aveling's book, especially as he gives a fairly full selection of the introspective evidence.

But Dr. Aveling is not always satisfactory in his use even of familiar terms, or in his psychological analysis. For example, in using the tripartite division of the modes of being conscious of an object (p. 124), he implies that concepts are to be so classified under one of these heads. Yet he makes them the objects of each of these modes of being conscious. Again, they are "referable to the process of cognition" (p. 137). They convey meaning, but he often identifies meaning and concept, and each of them with "objects," "relations," and "values." He does not explain whether, when I am thinking of x, my concept is my thinking of x, or whether I am thinking only of a concept, or of a concept and also of something which is really x. Somehow or other, he implies, I can cognize what is not a concept, *viz.*, that to which a concept refers: this he usually makes a "meaning" [one of his vaguest terms], and this in turn becomes a concept!

He does not seem to have any right to say that "conceptual contents" are the "only necessary elements of thought, by association of which thought processes can alone be explained" (p. 148). Images were frequently reported as giving the meaning (p. 187), and are held by him to be necessary in thinking of an individual (pp. 185 *ff.*, and appendix). Nor does he sufficiently explain the relation of the conceptual elements to the sensorial elements in the original perception from which they are abstracted. He holds that to have a sensation is to cognize it and that a concept is necessary for this even in the most elementary consciousness: this would be quite intelligible only if we knew exactly what he means by concept and its relation to cognition, but it does not at all seem obvious, and an important school of experimental psychologists would absolutely deny it.

I have selected only one illustration of defective and ambiguous analysis. He also uses such phrases as tendency, potentially, condensed, conflues, without explaining precisely what he means by them. There is a note on p. 250 where he says that the concept as a mental process is actual, but that as concept, whether pure or accompanied by imagery, it is non-actual, from the point of view of the phenomenology of mental process. Whatever this means, he has not used the distinction which seems

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to underlie it, in the main part of his essay, and the meaning of "concept" becomes still more vague.

One or two of the many points about such experiments may be remarked. The judgments about the subjects of the incomplete sentences may very easily have been mere memory judgments, in a number of cases, where all the thinking had been done before: and this real process may have occurred previously to the learning-period, and at that time been reproduced pretty much in the same way. At any rate, the necessity of completing a sentence is a very inadequate reproduction of the way we think. Dr. Aveling gives a historical introduction, the latter part of which will acquaint his readers with some of the recent work in this department of psychology.

Trinity College, Cambridge. RICHARD SMITH.

CHARACTER AND LIFE. Edited by Percy L. Parker. London: Williams & Norgate, 1912. Pp. x, 240.

This book is a symposium, in which five well-known authorities discuss the subject of character in relation respectively to Evolution, Society, Art, Bohemianism, and History. Dr. Russel Wallace, the most distinguished of the five contributors, writes of "Evolution and Character" with freshness and originality. He is, of course, a strong upholder of the theory of natural selection as the predominant method of organic evolution, but he does not believe that it will account for the higher mental or spiritual nature of man. This nature, he holds, is not the mere animal nature advanced through survival of the fittest, but is probably due to some spiritual influx. Further, he gives strong reasons for thinking that there is no good evidence of any considerable improvement in man's average intellectual and moral status during the whole period of human history. If we accept the view that acquired characters cannot be transmitted by inheritance, it is certainly difficult to see how such improvement could have come about, for there has been no other selective agency at work. As Dr. Wallace says, "There has certainly been no special survival of the more intellectual and moral, but rather the reverse." Advance in knowledge and material civilization does not necessarily imply advance in intellectual or moral capacity. Dr. Wallace believes, however, that there will be an advance in character in the not distant future,

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and that it will be brought about by education and by selection through marriage. These two factors, of course, act in quite different ways. Education, on the view of the non-transmissibility of acquired characters, can do nothing to raise the general level of innate capacity; its effect can only be permanent by becoming part of the social inheritance. With regard to the other factor, it is a relief to notice that Dr. Wallace has no fatuous dreams of men and women taking the advice of experts as to whom they are to marry; he believes that selection will come into operation when an improved social system renders all women economically and socially free to choose. Mr. J. A. Hobson contributes a suggestive essay on "Character and Society." He draws a picture of the ideal man of the future, being careful to preserve a balance between the more social and the more individual qualities. The first characteristic of this man will be self-respect, which must be founded on a recognition of justice in the political and economic order. This self-respect, however, easily falls into self-assertiveness, and needs to be corrected by a "socialization" of the will. In his remarks on the future development of the family and on the use of leisure Mr. Hobson is very sound. His concluding reflections on the continuity of nature present an interesting contrast to Dr. Wallace's view that the universe was made for the sake of man. The remaining contributions are by Mr. Walter Crane, Mr. Harold Begbie, and Dr. Emil Reich; they are distinctly inferior to the first two.

London, England. J. B. PAYNE.

VITAL LIES: Studies of Some Varieties of Recent Obscurantism. By Vernon Lee. London: John Lane, 1912. Two vols., pp. xxii, 262; 217.

I am entirely at one with the author of this book in disliking and distrusting the anti-intellectual reaction which is so prominent a feature of much recent thought. William James's contention that truth is man-made,—that "you can say of it [an opinion] either that it is useful because it is true, or, it is true because it is useful. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing"; his suggestion that the sub-conscious part of our minds gives us intimations of the true nature of reality which are denied to normal consciousness; the Bergsonian glorification of

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instinct and action at the expense of intelligence; Father Tyrrell's theory of the symbolical value of religious ideas, which, because they satisfy our moral and mystical needs, are supposed to be in some way evidences for the truth of Christianity; Mr. Ernest Crawley's anthropological apologia for religion, according to which we ought to teach Christianity and to defend it against socialists, because the religious practices of primitive men were the means by which useful moral qualities were developed; M. Georges Sorel's belief in the unique efficacy of myth as such,—a belief which made him write a book to say that the Syndicalist's ideal of a general strike is unrealizable, and ought for that very reason to be preached to the working classes: I agree in deploring all these views and in thinking them based upon fallacies. At the same time I doubt whether there is, as the title "Vital Lies" implies, any one fallacy at the bottom of them all. If there be, it is very hard to discover and state clearly; and the chief fault of the book seems to me the author's failure to see the necessity of doing this. One result of this failure is that she is sometimes betrayed into unfairness to opponents.

It is scarcely fair, for instance, to William James and Father Tyrrell to group them as 'vital liars' in the same class with Mr. Crawley and M. Sorel. Crawley and Sorel hold, it seems (I have not read their books), that it always has been and still is a necessity of evolution that the mass of mankind should hold certain false beliefs. No false beliefs, they say, no progress; and they infer that the lies in question ought to be bolstered up. Now the position of James and Tyrrell is quite different from this. Neither of them advocates what he thinks false on the ground that it is necessary to life. Tyrrell thinks, and James inclines to think, that a transcendental reality is actually revealed in states of mystical emotion, and in them only; and the Pragmatists hold that useful and satisfactory beliefs are true. Like most honest people, Vernon Lee feels that there is something disreputable in propagating lies because, though known to be lies, they are thought useful; she says that this is to lower the standard of intellectual honesty and to destroy the credit of all teaching (ii, 182). Yet she admits (ii, 146) that delusions may sometimes be of immense utility, and in fact the position of such a writer as Sorel is much stronger than she seems willing to allow. It may well be that the persistence of certain emo-



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tions is necessary to the well-being and progress of society, and that these emotions are inseparably connected with false beliefs. If so, the conclusion that we ought to support these beliefs cannot be lightly set aside, though I would not deny that it is a conclusion which deserves to be regarded with the greatest suspicion. Meanwhile it does not seem just to fasten any odium of this kind upon James or Tyrrell. It is all very well to say that this is what comes of pattering with the truth, that Pragmatism is the root from which spring those dreadful flowers, Mr. Crawley and M. Sorel; but we cannot hold the Pragmatists responsible until we have laid bare the fallacy common to all the examples of obscurantism.

What, then, is this common fallacy? Vernon Lee takes it, I think, to be that they all set an excessive value on the instinctive, emotional, irrational elements in human nature. They underestimate the importance of the intellect; and she often speaks as if the typical form which this error takes were the confusion of 'what is' with 'what ought to be,' or of 'I think' with 'I desire.' For her the universe is full of hard facts which often defeat our aspirations, and to which we have to adapt ourselves as best we can; she is impatient with all those slipshod minds which, from a mixture of laziness and dishonesty, will not recognize the objectivity of truth, and in one way or another subject it to desire. This she feels to be a betrayal of what is noblest in man, the hard-won supremacy of reason. But here there is some ambiguity. Even if it be true that the Pragmatists and Modernists do commit this particular fallacy of confusing thought with desire, there is no evidence that Crawley and Sorel commit it. And even if all four do set excessive value on emotion and instinct, the sort of value which they have in mind seems not to be the same. James and Tyrrell value these elements because they think them a surer guide to truth than reason is; but that cannot be the reason why Crawley and Sorel value them, because they are either indifferent to the truth of the beliefs bound up with the vital emotions, or else actually think that the beliefs are false.

The book, in short, though full of good points, especially in the polemic against Pragmatism, is not systematic enough. But it is extremely interesting as the expression of a rationalistic temperament. I said that the author was impatient with the mystical obscurantists; what is distinctive of her is, however,

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that she is not merely impatient. She is too receptive and wide-minded for that, too sensitive to every wind of culture that blows. She may not have achieved the concentration of the professional philosopher, but she moves with familiar appreciation among the literatures and arts of all times and all countries, and shows a sympathy with diverse points of view which is rarely found in philosophers. In particular she has a profound emotional understanding—and this is most surprising in a rationalist—of religious feelings, to the description of which she devotes several moving pages (i, 245-250). She broods tenderly and wistfully over the immemorial delusions of mankind. Unlike the mischievous character in Ibsen's 'Wild-Duck,' from which her title comes, she would never go about pulling off people's wigs to reveal the nakedness of their heads. Only, when philosophers begin to argue that the wigs are real hair, it is too much for her, and the instincts of the lover of truth rise up in revolt.

London, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

ETHICS AND THE FAMILY. By W. F. Lofthouse. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1912. Pp. xvi, 403.

This book is written from what may roughly be called a socialistic point of view. Its method follows, in an important particular, the method of Herbert Spencer. When its author would analyze the meaning and value of any social institution of our time, he is inevitably driven to consider 'primitive races' and 'savage tribes.' For example, we find (p. 302): "We must ask ourselves what is the place of religion in human life. This large question leads us inevitably back to that dim region in which we tried to discover the beginnings of the family." On page 58 we read: "Let us then advance into the strange jungle of primitive customs and ideas relating to the family, to see what can be learnt from them about its origins." The results of Mr. Lofthouse's inquiries are, however, directly opposed to Mr. Spencer's conclusions. Family life at its best gives us the ideal towards which the State must move. "The predatory and competitive instincts (they cannot be separated) of which the orthodox economists constituted themselves the high priests must in the end, like another Philistine Dagon, bow before a holier and more fundamental power. It is the

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glory of that power to bind together human beings of both sexes, of varying capacities, and of all ages, in a society which apportions to each according to his need, and expects, and obtains, from each according to his skill and strength" (p. 255).

Mr. Lofthouse holds that the family, rather than the individual, is the social unit. He maintains that the family group is the essential minimum within which the social virtues are developed. He believes family life, with its mutual affection, mutual care, and recognition of responsibility of the whole for each and all of its parts, is the seed bed from which alone society can hope to raise that quality of human character without which the highest and happiest social life must forever be impossible. But he differs from the more distinguished writers who have claimed that this unique power belongs to the discipline and opportunities of family life,[1] in that he thinks the State can, without impairing family life or lessening the discipline of its affections and responsibilities, provide, not only old age pensions, free meals for school children, the endowment of motherhood; but abolish destitution, "guarantee to all normal human beings within its territory a reasonable minimum of the objects of human need and desire," . . . and "in return for such guarantee the State shall enforce the right use of these objects, and shall sternly put down any attempt at waste or neglect." "The State will require a certain amount of cleanliness, industry, and attention to the well-known laws of health" (p. 394).

One wonders if Mr. Lofthouse contemplates a time when the State will guarantee to a man a wife, or to a woman, a husband? Yet these are surely "objects of human need and desire" which may well seem to fall within "a reasonable minimum," especially in the eyes of so ardent an advocate of family life. Our author has indeed an enviable belief in the power of the State. He speaks (p. 294) of the community (and obviously means the State), "Compelling right acts, and preventing the performance of wrong ones." I have tried to let my quotations show not only the position of the writer, but the quality of his thought and style.

De Quincey made a distinction between the literature of

[1] He mentions especially Professor B. Bosanquet, from whom he differs at length (p. 291, *et seq.*) and Mrs. B. Bosanquet (p. 254).

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knowledge and the literature of power. We have been used to think of the latter as the gift of wings lent to an identical content, by means of a new medium of expression. The democratization of literature may require us to welcome a new literature of power which bears to the literature of knowledge the relation which the average Sunday sermon bears to the Bible. The new sermon finds a larger audience than the old, it displays about as much and as little critical acumen as did its forerunner, but it performs the perhaps useful function of drawing attention to the sayings of greater people, and mixing them with sufficient of our own imbecility to make us feel interested in them. When the heart of the teacher is in the right place (as in the book before us), it is easy to forgive the shortcomings of the sermon. The next in order will carry the interpretation one step further, let us hope.

The book is of to-day (it discusses Mr. Lloyd-George's Insurance Act) and of to-day only. The ephemeral nature of the sermon is its excuse and its justification: but need it be so long?

London, England. MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

MARRIAGE, ITS ETHICS AND RELIGION. By the Rev. Principal P. T. Forsyth, M.A., D.D. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1912. Pp. viii, 152.

Mr. Forsyth's book is an expansion of a lecture delivered in connection with the National Council of Public Morals. It is inspired by a desire to reply to those whom Mr. Forsyth regards as the most dangerous opponents of marriage as he understands it, namely, those "critical Idealists, who would dissolve the traditional view of the sanctity of marriage under the belief that its fixity is a premium on hypocrisy, and that they are exalting and purifying it." These people attack the traditional view of marriage in the name of freedom, but they play into the hands of the vicious, and they do not see the damage which would be caused if their views were adopted by society generally. Moreover, views destructive of the traditional view of marriage are supported by the literature of our time. We live in a literary age, and for this reason the æsthetic or erotic view of marriage tends naturally to be stressed, because this view lends itself best to literary effect.

Mr. Forsyth discusses marriage as it concerns the individual,

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as it concerns society, and as it concerns religion. He emphasizes the mutual disciplinary value of marriage. But the most interesting portions of his book are those in which he treats of divorce and what he calls "leasehold marriage," *i. e.*, marriage terminable by consent. He does not take the extreme sacramental view of marriage which, while it may believe that indissoluble marriage would yield the best results for society generally, yet declines to ground the sanction of marriage on any consideration of consequences, but simply on the command of God. And he would not agree that there is no logical stopping-place between this view of marriage and "leasehold marriage." The logical outcome of the sacramental view of marriage would seem to be that the remarriage of widowers and widows is adulterous. In Mr. Forsyth's view marriage "may be less than a church sacrament, but it is a moral; it is certainly more than a contract." "If not a sacrament, it is a means of grace." When Christ spoke of marriage he was not legislating. He was thinking of marriage "theologically, not sociologically, as an expression of the will of God for His Kingdom, and not as a piece of natural social ethic." "If Jesus was a legislator, Christianity must be monkery or Tolstoiism." The church ought to refuse to marry a guilty divorced person, but Mr. Forsyth offers us a most ingenious justification for the remarriage of the innocent party. Just as the exclusiveness of the marriage tie is destroyed by death, so the exclusiveness of this relation is destroyed by infidelity. "Hence, if the second marriage of the survivor is lawful after death, it is similarly lawful to the moral survivor after the other's death by infidelity and divorce." "Leasehold marriage," Mr. Forsyth argues, would lead to the degradation of the status of women. Women would suffer most from any relaxation of the traditional view of the marriage tie.

University College, Cardiff. E. H. STRANGE.

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINT. By R. M. McConnell, Ph.D. London: John Murray, 1912. Pp. vi, 339.

The object of this book may be broadly described as the discovery of the true ground for the punishment of criminals. The first part consists of the discussion of four theories of punishment,—the expiation, retribution, deterrence, and reformation theories,—the *pros* and *cons* of which are very ably set out.

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The author will have nothing to do with expiation or retribution as such, and calls his own theory that of 'social utility.' The sole aim is to be the protection of society, and in so far as punishment for retribution, deterrence, or reformation contributes to this, it is justified. The author next proceeds to discuss society's *right* to punish, which, he maintains, can only be upheld on purely utilitarian grounds, and must be dissociated from any theory of moral responsibility based on moral freedom. This involves a discussion of the whole question of freedom, which occupies twelve chapters, and is undoubtedly the weakest part of the book. The author's position is that of complete determinism,—a position maintained with a confidence and dogmatism evidently founded on the belief that it is 'the fundamental axiom of all science.' Of course it is no such thing, but only an empirical principle which is found to hold good in many sciences, but is by no means established in the case of human actions. "The admission of freedom," says Dr. McConnell, "would be fatally embarrassing to scientific procedure. Science is bound up with the denial of freedom in any and every sense of the word." This is, of course, a *petitio principii;* it is assumed that psychology must necessarily fall into line with the other sciences. The essential nature of volition is missed, because it is assumed that volitions must be assimilated to events which take place as the result of the play of mechanical forces. "The will, in the act called choosing, selects inevitably the course followed. It is shut up to just one choice." The obvious answer to this is that, if the course followed is inevitable, the case is not one of choice at all. In face of the overwhelming testimony of human consciousness to the fact that it is possible to act in a given situation in any one of different ways,—a testimony founded not only on the experience of the moment, but on the fact of remorse,—Dr. McConnell maintains that it is impossible; and his sole ground is the supposed requirements of science. Because something must happen in any given situation, it is held to be the only thing that could have happened. The only alternative view is supposed to be that of 'free will,'—namely, that human actions are uncaused. 'Free' and 'uncaused' are treated as synonyms, and thus the libertarian view is misrepresented. For this view does not necessarily imply that our actions are unaffected by motives, but only that in the last resort the outcome of the 'conflict of motives' is determined not

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by their respective strength, but by the will, and that until the will acts there is real contingency. Dr. McConnell, however, does not, like Mr. Blatchford, draw from the determinist position the conclusion that we should not be punished for our actions. On the contrary, he holds that "determinism alone affords a reasonable justification for praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing, a person for his behavior." If we take determinism in the very wide sense which Dr. McConnell gives to it,—namely, that the environment, heredity, and past history of an individual are contributory causes of his actions,—the conclusion is certainly justified; for, if actions are entirely uncaused, certainly no amount of punishment will have any effect, either deterrent or reformatory. But it is when he gets off the 'free will' controversy that Dr. McConnell is soundest. His book is valuable as showing the enormous part played in the causation of crime by conditions for which the criminal is completely irresponsible,—such as insanity, epilepsy, or other abnormal states; and still more as emphasizing the effect of social conditions, such as poverty, overcrowding, and misdirected education. His final conclusion is that, though *moral* responsibility is to be repudiated, everyone is *socially* responsible for his behavior, "in the sense that society will deal with him in a manner which his behavior indicates to be necessary for social protection." In other words, the criminal is dangerous to society, and, even if he could not help his actions, he must be punished for the sake of society. This is a conclusion with which few will quarrel, and the social grounds for punishment are forcibly and exhaustively presented. Though the metaphysical argument which forms so large a part of the book seems to me unsound, this does not affect the value of the rest.

London, England. J. B. PAYNE.

THE DECLINE OF ARISTOCRACY. By Arthur Ponsonby, M.P. London: Fisher Unwin, 1912. Pp. 320.

Should any incautious young aristocrat open this book, he would surely find food for reflection. He might even go so far as to make away with himself or discover the following fact,—that all his life, or rather, from at least a generation before he was born, he had never been given a chance. He would, at the least, I am afraid, be very much startled and shocked to find

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the tender memories of his early days dealt with so unkindly. If is, indeed, a melancholy tale, and the young aristocrat has all our sympathies.

His mother evidently went to the trouble of bearing him, as unfortunately no one else could do that for her; after which event, her duties being ended, he was handed over to the ignorant care of a line of nurses and governesses (both of whom, may have been paid less than the cook). Then came a year or two at a private school, learning Greek paradigms and also a good deal of roughness and intolerance, in preparation for entering an effete institution called a great public school, at which he was made to misspend about five years, and after which, he is told, he wasted three or four years at Oxford or Cambridge.

But what were his parents thinking of all this time? Evidently thought to them was a luxury. For he finds that "you cannot ascertain their whereabouts without consulting the most recent newspapers. . . . They migrate from one hunting ground to another as the diminution of the game impels them. Their residences, vast and substantial as they are, serve only as tents and wigwams." No wonder, he soliloquizes, if such as himself, and the idle rich in general, are not a quite satisfactory class of people.

All of which is mainly true. But this small criticism may be perhaps legitimately made, that Mr. Ponsonby has a little overshot his mark, or rather, he has brought down his game with a charge too heavy and too scattered. Yet it need hardly be said that Mr. Ponsonby writes with power and discernment, and with eminent sanity; and his essay is packed tight with the products of close and temperate reasoning, in language which is tense and pointed, and with a style which is a thought too colorless. All of which goes to say that Mr. Ponsonby has well proven, or reproven, his case.

Manchester, England. OSCAR ECKHARD.

THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS VALUE OF THE NOVEL. By Ramsden Balmsforth. London: George Allen & Co., 1912. Pp. xix, 217.

This book consists of a series of sermons or Sunday evening addresses delivered to a congregation at Capetown. The subject of them is sufficiently indicated by the title. After an in-

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troductory section, a series of novels is taken, one for each sermon, the plot of each is briefly described, and then the preacher points the moral.

It displays a certain share of welcome originality when a preacher looks for inspiration to some other quarter than the conventional text from the Bible. And certainly the extent to which fiction may be a moral (or immoral) inspiration is too often apt to be forgotten, so that one is glad to see it recognized. But for all that, it is very doubtful if such a book as this was worth publishing. In the first place, sermons very rarely, if ever, should be published at all. The spoken word, as a rule, aims at producing its results in a different way from the written. And words that will produce a real and valuable effect when heard will appear mere commonplace rhetoric when read over in the colder and more critical atmosphere of the study. That is, indeed, as it should be. It needs a genius to combine the different requirements of immediate emotional appeal and close reasoning. And the mass of people who are not geniuses should content themselves with trying to fulfill one at a time. Further, an individual novel is a particularly unfortunate choice as a peg on which to hang a moral disquisition. The really good novel points a moral (like the "Scarlet Letter") or raises a problem (like "Elsie Venner") not by expounding it to us in general terms, but by trying to bring it home to us by presenting it in a concrete instance. And it really spoils the whole effect to explain elaborately afterwards what the moral or problem is. It reminds us of those irritating people who always insist on telling us what is going on in a play which we are watching, or in explaining to us the point of a joke which has been made.

The list of books chosen is a curious one, containing works of very varying merit. It includes George Eliot's "Adam Bede," Hawthorne's "Scarlet Letter," Victor Hugo's "Les Misérables," Mrs. Lynn Linton's "Joshua Davidson," "Dickens' "Hard Times," Oliver Wendell Holmes's "Elsie Venner," Mrs. Humphrey Ward's "Robert Elsmere," and James Lane Allen's "Indicating Purpose." It will be noticed that they are nearly all books of a generation or two ago. Not that that matters, of course, when they are dealing with great moral problems, which are the same in all ages. But this is not always the case. Is there, for instance, much help for us in the difficulties of our

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own time to be gained from reading the story of a man who ceases to be able to believe in Christianity after reading Darwin, and who then comes to the conclusion that the only truth to be found lies in natural science?

The author's own position is not made very clear. His moral teaching is unexceptionable, if not very original. For the rest he seems inclined to a vague, benevolent agnosticism about religious matters, tolerant of everything except clear thinking and definite beliefs, which come in for the familiar abuse as "hard and fast dogmas." Such a state of mind is revealed, for instance, in the extraordinary statement that "if we worship in Spirit and in Truth, we shall care far more for truth than for dogma," as if we could care for a 'dogma' which we did not believe to be the truth. He loves vagueness and mystery, and his religious emotion center round, " 'The Eternal, not ourselves,' 'The Unknowable,' 'The Absolute,' 'The Moral Law,' 'Spirit,' 'God,'—all being mere names for the ever-varying manifestations of the wondrous Power which lies hidden, in its reality, from our vision." It is a familiar attitude. But we could wish that its numerous advocates displayed a little more realization that it is far more obscurantist, far more a negation of the claims of the intellect and the reason, than any of the 'dogmas' which they so strongly denounce.

G. C. Field.

University of Manchester, England.

The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead. By J. G. Frazer. Vol. I. The Belief Among the Aborigines of Australia, the Torres Straits Islands, New Guinea and Melanesia. The Gifford Lectures, St. Andrews, 1911-1912. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xxi, 495.

It may have occurred to some readers besides myself that for the task of scientific generalization Dr. Frazer has a dangerous power of writing beautifully on details. This, of course, makes his books more widely attractive; and, as a contribution to what he calls descriptive anthropology nothing could be more delightful than the present volume. Not indeed that the facts themselves are delightful; most of them are very far from it; the charm is in the skill with which they have been marshaled and the facility with which they are presented. Yet in the way of re-

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sults little more emerges than new illustration of Tylor's and Spencer's theses. For a time, while we are dealing merely with "the seed of religion," that is to say, with the fear of ghosts, the evidence seems to tend to Spencer's Euhemerism, which would derive all gods from deified ancestors. When we come to the comparatively advanced religion of Fiji, however, we find that "the Fijians distinguished two classes of gods: first *kalou vu,* literally, 'Root-gods, that is, gods strictly so called, and second, *kalou yalo,* literally, 'Soul-gods,' that is, deified mortals" (p. 440). As no direct transition seems to have been observed from soul to (cosmic) god, the apparent evidence of Euhermerism, therefore, disappears, and we are thrown back on some more indirect derivation of religion from animism such as is suggested or left open by Sir E. B. Tylor.

How little bearing anthropological inquiry has on the rational question concerning the permanence or impermanence of the individual soul is shown by both introduction and conclusion. This is admitted by Dr. Frazer. After collecting all the mass of evidence set before us about the history of man's beliefs, he has to end for the present with no more than the half-statement of a bias. To those, he says, who take a lofty view of human nature, "it is easy and obvious to find in the similar beliefs of savages a welcome confirmation of their own cherished faith, and to insist that a conviction so widely spread and so firmly held must be based on some principle, call it instinct or intuition or what you will, which is deeper than logic and cannot be confuted by reasoning." There are others, however, "who take a different view of human nature, and who find in its contemplation a source of humility rather than of pride"; who, "when they turn their eyes from man himself to the place he occupies in the universe," are "overwhelmed by a sense of his littleness and insignificance." These "find little in the beliefs of savages to alter their opinion"; rather, "they say that if such drivellings do not refute the belief in immortality, as indeed from the nature of things they cannot do, they are at least fitted to invest its high-flown pretensions with an air of ludicrous absurdity."

By way of comment I shall not try to draw from the facts generalizations that Dr. Frazer has not drawn. The question I am more distinctively interested in is the rational question; and here I confess to the opposite bias. When we think of material vastness as implying the power of the human mind to conceive

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it, this, it seems to me, is exalting and not humiliating; and historically it may well be argued that exaltation is the spontaneous feeling; for it was above all that of Bruno, the first of the moderns to seize imaginatively the notion of the stellar universe as generalized from the new astronomy of sun and planets. The view that presented itself to him as humiliating was that of scholasticism, for which the stars were of diviner substance than the earth. For the new astronomy, said Bruno, the earth, the habitation of man, is itself a star. The conception of human nature to which Dr. Frazer seems to incline is that of Augustine or Calvin without the theology; and to some it may be a matter of regret that anti-theologians should (as they so often do) make rhetorical appeals to this quasi-Christian humility against the philosophies that "think nobly of the soul."

In any case, illusions and errors have part in the natural process of man's beliefs. We may, if we choose, lament over this, but we are brought to no conclusion. For a result worth anything, I hold that we must turn not to 'instinct,' whether of savages or of civilized peoples, but to rational investigation. Regarding this, my analysis of what I know agrees entirely with Dr. Frazer's (p. 26): if I am to learn anything about my own immortality, it must be by inference: I do not know it directly. The proper method, however, I hold to be that of metaphysics, against which he is perhaps not free from prejudice. This I infer from a certain contrast of tone between the present volume and the brief apology for ritual superstition in *Psyche's Task*. Such institutions as taboo, Dr. Frazer there shows, though of no value in themselves, have aided in supporting, till reason was ready, the main institutions of society. As a pendant, no doubt, he could just as easily have written a panegyric on the scepticism by which they were destroyed; showing how, by breaking down taboos, it enables the types,—better, as we conceive,—that lived more by reason and less by custom to triumph over those that could find no substitute, to keep them socially coherent, for fear and authority. The sort of pendant I should propose now to add is not precisely this (for historians of rationalism have provided it in advance), but rather a panegyric on the mythologizing imagination which prepared the metaphysical question, What kind of being is the bearer of life and thought? It is in the neglect to say a word in its favor that I seem to discover the touch of anti-metaphysical bias.

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I am pleased, however, to be able to quote a sentence in defence of the poor savage, showing that he was not at a level quite so low as that to which some recent philosophies are supposed (with whatever justice) to reduce the normal man: "If there ever has been any race of men who invariably acted first and thought afterwards, I can only say that, in the course of my reading and observation, I have never met with any trace of them, and I am apt to suppose that, if they ever existed anywhere but in the imagination of bookish dreamers, their career must have been an exceedingly short one, since in the struggle for existence they would surely succumb to adversaries who tempered and directed the blind fury of combat with at least a modicum of reason and sense" (p. 266).

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF MODERN LEGISLATION. By W. Jethro Brown, LL.D., Litt.D. London: John Murray, 1912. Pp. ix, 331.

Professor Jethro Brown's book opens with a Prologue on Anarchy. "Perhaps the supreme service of the doctrine of anarchy," he says, "is to be found in its challenge to traditional assumptions in politics. Any one who has faced that challenge fairly, and has sought to balance its strength and weakness, will approach the study of the principles of legislation with a new interest and a wider outlook" (p. 37).

Part I is occupied with a "Statement of Principles." Nineteenth century ideals of liberty have, according to Professor Brown, two aspects, from which are derived two fundamental principles, the worth of man and the unity of society (p. 98). The State, in other words, should regard each citizen both as an end in himself and as a means to the general well-being. And thus, "What differentiates modern politics from the politics of preceding centuries, is not the discovery of something entirely new, but the growing recognition of the significance, for the purposes of political science, of truths that have long been . . . attested by the seers and the prophets of the ages" (pp. 110-111).

In Part II are considered "Principles in Application"; the element of truth in individualist theory and the qualifications

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suggested by modern thought and experience; individual rights as conceived by various political theorists and as realizable in modern states.

Part III deals very briefly with "Problems of To-day and To-morrow." Professor Brown's general outlook is that of most modern "Progressives." He regards representative government, provided it is "representative in fact as well as in idea" (p. 154), as superior, for most purposes, to all alternatives and, though not a socialist, he looks forward without misgiving to a large extension of the functions of the State.

His book is characterized by clear, if not by profound, thinking, by conspicuous intellectual honesty, and by a strain of poetry and human emotion, which in books of this type it is a rare and pleasant experience to encounter. Excepting that it lacks an index, the book is well fitted to serve one at least of the purposes, for which, the author tells us, it was designed, namely that of a university text-book.

HUGH DALTON.

London, England.

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# NATURAL AND RATIONAL SELECTION.

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IN 1893 Thomas Huxley delivered the Romanes lecture at Oxford on "Evolution and Ethics." In that lecture he contrasted organic and human evolution in language that caused a shock of surprise to the more 'orthodox' scientists of his time. He repudiated the idea that "because on the whole animals and plants have advanced in perfection of organization by means of the struggle for existence and the consequent survival of the fittest that therefore men in society, men as ethical beings, must look to the same process to help them towards perfection." On the contrary he affirmed that "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and a substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process."

Notwithstanding these plain unequivocal statements, there are not a few scientific students who imagine that they are following the lead of Huxley when they profess to find the key to human history in the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. One is driven to assume either that the statements here quoted are in conflict with the general tendency of Huxley's teaching or (as frequently happens in the interpretation of a master) one aspect of his teaching has been emphasized at the expense of another. Be this as it may, it would be safe to affirm on the evidence of the Romanes lec-



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ture in 1893 that, in the opinion of Thomas Huxley, the cosmic process in the organic world was one thing, and the social or ethical process in the human another and a very different thing: so different that there was a continual struggle going on in human life to substitute the one for the other.

It is very tempting to those who believe that the world is one, to apply the theory that holds good in their own branch of knowledge to the whole tree. If that could be done with safety, our problems would be very much simplified. But it cannot be done with safety; for in passing from organic to human evolution we encounter a new factor of stupendous importance called self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is the technical expression used by philosophers to indicate the power of self-examination which human beings have, but animals and plants have not. In plain language it means that human beings look before and after, and animals and plants do not; that human beings have the power of reflecting on their own impulses, and pronouncing them morally good or bad, but animals and plants have not; that human beings have the power of conceiving ends and constructing ideals and determining their lives by constant reference to those ends or ideals, animals and plants have not.

These are some of the characteristics that distinguish man as a self-conscious being, and the possession of them places human beings in a relation to nature and natural law essentially different from that of the animals. It may be a natural law that water will find its own level; but man can make it flow up hill. He can do so because he has the power to invent and control means which enable him to fight and overcome the natural process. So in like manner Natural Selection may be the principle of progress in the organic world; but in human history or evolution, the process of Rational Selection is continually in conflict with it, and is gradually being substituted for it. To try to explain human history by Natural Selection without reference to Ra-

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tional Selection is, in my opinion, a most perilous enterprise foredoomed to failure, and I hope to make this clear by explaining and contrasting the two processes.

On the east coast of New South Wales, in any of the bays or harbors removed from the more densely populated cities, the process of natural selection involving the relentless struggle for existence may be observed at almost any time of the year. These harbors abound with fish, and all the characteristics of natural selection may be detected in their mode of life. The bream, squire, whiting, and flounder pursue the shrimps and smaller fish; tailer pursue and devour the whiting and the mullet; jewfish pursue and devour the tailer as well as the smaller fish; and sharks pursue and devour the jewfish. But it is not only that one species attacks and devours another: I have seen the sharks gather round a wounded shark waiting for the moment to strike and tear him to pieces. Here we have an illustration of the struggle for existence in the organic world. The chief characteristics of that struggle may be stated as follows:

It is not only a struggle between individuals of different species, but also a struggle between members of the same species, and this struggle is the more severe because the food they seek is the same, and the amount of that food is limited.

It is a struggle involving the extinction of the less fit. Victory means life, failure means death. There are no half measures about it; the struggle is downright, decisive, final.

Success in the battle or in the struggle is for the strongest, the swiftest, and the most cunning, because strength, swiftness, and cunning are the qualities that enable individuals to survive.

But murder is not the last word on the subject. Dark as is the web of organic struggle, a silver thread runs through it. The creatures that do survive have some characteristic more perfectly adapted to the conditions under which they live than those that fail, and by the

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law of inheritance that characteristic is transmitted. In this way the struggle makes for perfection of form,—of form so nearly perfect and so exquisitely beautiful as an eye. This is the 'beneficent' aspect of this otherwise "slow, blundering, wasteful, murderous process of nature."

But it is precisely at this point that we need to lay a careful finger on another prevailing characteristic of organic evolution. This perfection of form is not attained by conscious discrimination or selection on the part of the creatures involved. It is the end of which intelligent beings may become conscious, but of which the creatures themselves know nothing either explicitly or implicitly. For them the process is blind and mechanical, not open-eyed and intelligent. Darwin was, of course, fully aware of this. "The young pointer," he says in his "Origin of Species," "can no more know that he points to aid his master than the white butterfly knows why she lays her eggs on the leaf of a cabbage." There is no foresight, no conscious purpose. Design plays no part in the theory of natural selection.

We must lay hold of this fact with no uncertain grip, and, therefore, it would be best to explain more carefully how the fittest do survive undesignedly and inevitably.

What happens is this. In some way, inscrutable even to scientists, variations appear at birth. Offspring resemble their parents; but there is always some difference between the offspring and the parents, and between the offspring themselves. In the struggle to maintain life, some variations will give the individuals who are fortunate enough to inherit them an advantage over others, and because of that advantage those individuals will survive in the struggle for existence, while the others who have less favorable variations will drop out of existence. It ought to be clear that this is a process altogether different in kind from any rational process by which an intelligent man strives to attain an end or

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purpose. Survival is the result of a blind mechanical process, and for this reason the expression 'natural selection' is a somewhat unfortunate one because the word 'selection' conveys the idea of intelligent discrimination and definite design. It is clear from Darwin's letters that when he contemplated the universe as a whole, he could not get away from the conviction of design; but that is a different matter. What was clear to him was that the survival of the fittest by the struggle for existence needed no immediate knowledge or design or purpose to explain it. The breeder has a purpose or design when he selects suitable varieties. But in the organic world the survival of the fittest happens, and it happens just because the struggle for existence is always going on. It was for this reason that Darwin preferred Spencer's expression, the 'survival of the fittest,' to his own. In later life, he would have liked to substitute 'natural preservation' for 'natural selection'; but by that time 'natural selection' had passed into current speech, and so he allowed it to remain with a careful reminder in the latest edition of his works that the expression was metaphorical. How many mistakes made in the application of biological law to human evolution could have been avoided if that reminder had not been so often overlooked!

Here, then, are the characteristics of the cosmic process. It is a struggle for existence between members of the same and of different species. It is a struggle that involves the extinction of the unfit as well as the survival of the fittest. It is beneficent in that it makes for progress in the greater perfection of form. But it is a blind, mechanical process doing very much the same kind of work as a sieve.

It is not to be denied that such a process must be reckoned with to some extent in the history of man. The very fact that Darwin and Wallace made their great discovery simultaneously after reading the essay by Malthus on "Population" is sufficient to show that human

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and organic evolution have something in common. But to say that they have much in common is very different from the assertion that the theory of evolution which holds good in the one furnishes an adequate explanation of the process in the other. To argue that the history of our race, even in primitive times, can be adequately explained by such a process is to fly in the face of strong contradictory evidence; to say that the evolution of human life in our own and recent times, even among the individuals of the submerged tenth, has been dominated by it is, in my opinion, a most unwarrantable statement. I believe it is not too much to say that in every self-governing part of the British Empire to-day all parties have identified themselves with policies that are emphatic protests against the domination of such a process; that they are fighting that process step by step in the hope of substituting for it an ethical or social process that is more consistent with the dignity of rational beings. And, further, that even in the relations between one nation and another, where barbarous practices die hard, and we are haunted by a continual dread of war, this so-called cosmic process is being subordinated more and more to a rational process by the substitution of arbitration for war in the settlements of international disputes. This can be shown by reference to the earliest of our records, the "Germania" of Tacitus, where the institutions suggest an organized attempt to restrain if not to eliminate the struggle for existence within the group. It can be shown much more clearly by reference to the history of the administration of justice from the ordeal, through compurgation and the jury system to the modern professional judgment which marks the triumph of rational over natural selection. The administration of justice is by no means perfect; but the judicial world has become a place in which the true or the honest man has a much better chance of surviving than the man whose cause is weak, even though he be physically strong and cunning as a fox. And it

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has become so not by a process of natural selection, but by consciously striving through the centuries toward a fuller realization of the ends of justice.

The laisser-faire theory of government in England was supposed to illustrate the operation of the law of the survival of the fittest, and it dominated the policy of the Liberal party and the Manchester School for more than a quarter of a century; but from 1872 onwards, the conservative party became identified with social and industrial legislation. After 1886, the Liberal party itself drifted away from the laisser-faire policy, and from that year it may be said that both parties in England adopted a policy of state interference in the interests of individual freedom as well as of general reform. But that meant that the application of the theory of natural selection to human progress had been superseded by rational selection. For, instead of trusting to the operation of blind forces, statesmen of both parties had made up their minds that there was a definite goal to reach,—improvement in the condition of the people of England,—and that they must choose from time to time, in various ways, the means by which that end was to be attained. In other words, they substituted the social or ethical process for the cosmic or natural process. England had come to realize in practice, if not yet in theory, that liberty was not simply the absence of restraint or interference, and that social, industrial, and political progress depended not so much on the beneficent operations of blind forces as on the practical realization of a policy deliberately adopted in order to attain a desirable end.

That was the state of the political mind of England when Huxley delivered his famous Romanes lecture at Oxford on "Evolution and Ethics" in 1893. In contrasting the cosmic and the social or ethical process; in repudiating the application of the cosmic process to human history; in placing reliance on "a fund of energy operating intelligently" within man instead of the opera-

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tion of a blind, mechanical process, he was only putting into scientific language the statement of a truth which the facts of history had already been demonstrating with more than ordinary persistency in the preceding twenty years.

The gradual substitution of rational for natural selection can be clearly detected in the history of international affairs, and has been proceeding at an unusually rapid rate in the last fifty years. In civilized countries law will prevent individuals from settling their differences by fighting: duelling has been discouraged where it is not actually suppressed. But there is no law at present to prevent nations going to war if they are determined to fight. The Balkan crisis proves this. It has been said that in their relations with one another the nations of Europe have made little advance on the 'state of nature.' That is an exaggeration, but there is some truth in it. If there is not actually a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, we still live in a time when even European nations bear considerable resemblance to armed camps; when war is an ever-present possibility; and when even the most advanced nations like England and Germany are straining their resources to the utmost in order to repel a possible invasion. Most people would agree with Sir Edward Grey in his statement that the annual expenditure of Europe on engines of destruction, after nearly two thousand years of Christianity, is a great blot on our civilization; but it would be a mistake to look at the blot and shut our eyes to the brighter part of the page. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, much has been done in Europe toward the substitution of rational methods of settling national disputes for the more brutal and violent methods of war which remind us so forcibly of the struggle for existence in the organic world.

The idea of maintaining 'the balance of power in Europe' was a step in the right direction, and for that Cardinal Wolsey deserves great credit. When two or more nations enter into an alliance or understanding to

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preserve the balance of power, it makes those who are inclined to take the aggressive pause because of the strength of the forces that are likely to be concentrated against them. In that delay there is some hope for the evolution of a better state of things: people have time to think and weigh the risks, financial and otherwise.

A much more important step in the direction of rational selection was the substitution of arbitration for war in the settlement of international disputes in recent years, and to England and the United States belong no small share of the credit. From the latter part of the nineteenth century disputes about the Canadian boundary and Behring Sea fisheries were settled by arbitration, and statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic began to talk about an Anglo-American Council for the settlement of disputes between England and the United States. That council has not yet come into existence, and it is probably a long way off; but a treaty between these two great countries has already been seriously discussed for the settlement of all disputes between them involving consideration of money, territory, and even of national honor by arbitration. Whether the terms of such a treaty could be made effective in the present stage of our civilization may be doubted, but the fact that two responsible statesmen like President Taft and Sir Edward Grey have striven to negotiate that treaty is in itself an indication of considerable advance in the history of the world's peace. It has been said that Japan and France have expressed a desire to participate in such a treaty. It only needs a sufficient number of strong and peaceably disposed nations to sign a treaty of this kind in order to make it practically impossible for warlike nations to take the aggressive.

It is in developments such as these that we detect a process going on more especially in recent history toward the substitution of rational for natural selection; and anyone who has read the reports of the debates at the conference of premiers in London in 1911 will have

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realized that this process is being watched, guided, and directed by statesmen in positions of great responsibility.

It is true, then, that we live in an age of wars and dread of wars, but it is also true that for the past four centuries, and especially during the last fifty years, considerable progress has been made toward the substitution of an ethical for a cosmic process. Progress has been and is being made toward the establishment of an international court of arbitration with sufficient power to enforce its decisions. When that court arrives, civilization will have entered upon a new and more settled era of its development.

We are now in a position to explain some of the more important characteristics of rational selection. Natural selection, as we have seen, is a blind, mechanical process; rational selection, on the contrary, is open-eyed and purposive. This does not mean, of course, that human life is free from mechanism; on the contrary, there is plenty of machinery and routine in both individual and organized life. What it means is that human beings are dimly or clearly conscious of the ends which they are striving to attain; and as self-conscious beings, endowed with reason, they have the power of choosing the most suitable means for attaining their ends. Now, in this distinction between blind and purposive evolution, we have the fundamental difference between organic and human evolution, and several consequences of the highest importance follow from it.

In the first place, human progress may be very much more rapid than the progress of animals or plants, especially when by much education or scientific inquiry the intellectual faculties have been quickened and sharpened. The history of scientific progress in the nineteenth century proves this beyond all doubt. We have only to think of the progress in intercommunication to realize it. In the second place, while the process of natural selection is cruel and murderous, the process of rational

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selection may be humane. Under rational selection, the struggle for existence may take the form of a struggle between ideas and policies, not necessarily involving a life and death struggle between men at all. Survival of one idea may involve the extinction of a competitive idea, but both individuals and nations who are content to submit their differences to judgment or arbitration may survive. Persuasion does the work in the one that is done by brute force in the other.

Those who argue that the cosmic struggle is inevitable among human beings forget how far the efforts of nature are supplemented by human efforts. The life and death struggle goes on in the organic world, as we have seen, because the food supply is limited. When we think of the number of eggs in a fish's roe, or the number of seeds produced by a single plant, we realize that by her unaided efforts nature could not support even a modest proportion of them if they came to maturity. But the conditions are essentially different when we remember that human beings do not increase at anything like the same rate (to say nothing of prudential restraints), and that, because of the application of scientific methods to agriculture, the food supply of the world is capable of almost indefinite increase. A small island like Java supports thirty millions. How many people could Australia or America support if our farmers, orchardists, and gardeners availed themselves of the latest improvements? So long as these countries were inhabited by aboriginals only, they were capable of supporting only a few scattered tribes; but that was because the aboriginals had not advanced much beyond the hunting stage of human existence. How many people are these countries capable of supporting now that we have not only agriculture but intensive agriculture? now that we have a knowledge that enables us to fight and keep down pests? now that we can analyze the soil and supply the elements in which it is deficient? now that we understand how production can be enormously increased by organization and

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the division of labor? It is not only that we have these scientific appliances, but also that there are vast tracts of unoccupied land in different parts of the world waiting for the application of labor and scientific invention to contribute to the food supply. And the end of scientific invention is not yet.

Where the struggle for existence in human life resembles the life and death struggle in the organic world, the resemblance may much more safely be attributed to the ignorance and rapacity of men than to anything that is inevitable. I do not believe that there will ever be more people on this earth than the earth is able to support, provided our farmers, orchardists, and gardeners turn available scientific knowledge to practical account, and provided also that we attain to something like an equitable system in the distribution of wealth. What nature cannot do by her unaided efforts, men can help her to do through the progress of science and of art.

A third important difference is this, that where men are conscious of a purpose or an ideal, they can enter into a combination or organization in order to attain that purpose or ideal. This is a matter of far-reaching importance; because these human organizations afford the means of continuous development for which we have no parallel in the organic world. In the history of human affairs there is a formal as well as a natural continuity.

Whether acquired characteristics are transmitted or not in the organic world, there can be no doubt whatever that acquired ideas, methods, policies, and achievements are transmitted from one generation of human beings to another, and transmitted consciously through the medium of human organizations. The individual may die, but the society, the corporation, and the nation of which he is a member have continuous life, and records of their proceedings are taken and preserved. Those who come after enter consciously into the work of their predecessors, develop it and transmit the results in their own time. The continuity of organic life is preserved by

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nature, but the continuity of human life is preserved by conventional as well as by natural means; and that conventional continuity is vastly important in the history of human affairs. There have been thousands, tens of thousands, and even millions of these organizations in history, every one of them seeking the realization of some conscious end. It is not only that favorable variations acquired in one generation are handed down to the next, but that these variations are actually invented and modified by conscious effort in order to attain a conscious end. Nothing of any value need be lost, everything can be recorded; and so the evolution of human affairs becomes continuous in a way it can never be in the organic world. Ants and bees have a wonderful organization, but it is not the kind of organization that we are now discussing. Their organization is natural, not conventional: they keep no records, there is no reflection on previous achievements of the hive, and no consciousness of any end toward which the successive hives may direct their attention. The bees will act just as their progenitors acted, unless by the inheritance of some favorable variations they are constrained to act in a manner slightly different. But this is action of instinct and not of conscious purpose. Conventional continuity is possible only to self-conscious beings, and how much of the history of the world would be lost if this conventional continuity were neglected or dropped out! A little reflection will enable us to see that it is also because of this conventional continuity that the evolution of human affairs proceeds much more rapidly than organic evolution.

Here, then, are the essential differences between natural selection in the organic world and rational selection in the human world. Natural selection is blind and mechanical; rational selection is open-eyed and intelligent; natural selection is and must be slow; rational may be, and often is, incalculably more rapid; natural selection is a murderous process involving the extinction of the

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less fit; rational selection may be and often is a humane process,—a struggle for existence between ideas, not between men; acquired characteristics may or may not be transmitted in the process of natural selection, and if they are, they are not so important as the characteristics that are inborn; but in the process of rational selection, acquired information, ideas, policies, and methods may be transmitted because rational beings can organize for a definite purpose, and those organizations live long and die hard. From this contrast it ought to be quite clear that rational selection is a process more worthy of the dignity of human life than natural selection.

But because rational selection is the more worthy, it does not follow by any means that we can venture to neglect the qualities fostered by the struggle for existence, or that we can safely break with the past in order to attain a higher civilization. Having said so much about the superiority of rational selection, the obligation is all the stronger to sound a warning by a careful reminder that the world is not yet done with brute force. In the present juncture of the world's affairs, great issues between nations may have to be decided by natural rather than by rational methods; and, this being so, the qualities of strength and swiftness fostered by the struggle for existence must still be jealously safeguarded. Reason is better than force, but force is more ultimate than reason, and, in the absence of an international court of arbitration with power to enforce its decisions, one nation that is determined on aggression may make an appeal to force inevitable. In the contest that ensues, a nation without strength, however high its ideals, will have little chance of survival against a nation that is backed by force. It were little good, therefore, for England and America to raise the standard of international peace unless they had power enough behind them to keep that standard erect in case of conflict, and that is the reason why England, the center of peace at the present

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time, has never had to make greater preparations for war.

It is impossible to overlook the fact that one nation in shaping its policy must be guided to a considerable extent by what another nation may do. Not once but often in the history of the world, the more civilized nation or race has succumbed to the attack of barbarians. It happened in the conflicts between Turk and Saracen, Roman and Goth; and there is no reason in the nature of things why history should not repeat itself. The time may come when an international court of arbitration will be established on a firm basis, because the nations that favor arbitration and are really determined to enforce it are numerous enough and strong enough to make aggressive warfare hopeless. But they will need to be strong and numerous if their decisions are to be respected.

The dwarf need not fear the Titan in a court of law if his cause is just and commends itself to the judges, because he knows that behind the law is a strength stronger than that of the Titan. So it must be in regard to conflicts of nations. But that time is not yet, and until it does arrive those nations that are to do most for the world's peace must also be nations that can give a good account of themselves in the struggle for existence. Great Britain can do far more to maintain the world's peace than Turkey, and so can Germany. The reason is too obvious to be stated.

Rational selection is undoubtedly a more humane process than natural selection; but in striving to obtain the former, we dare not forget that at any time we may be involved in the latter; and then it is not simply a struggle for survival between this idea or that, but a life and death struggle between human beings themselves. There is no real inconsistency in the policy of Great Britain to-day. Sir Edward Grey wants peace, and is striving earnestly for it; nevertheless, the government of which he is a member spends forty millions a year on the navy, and seventy millions on defense;



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and they cannot afford to spend less. The people of Australia would prefer peace to war almost to a man; nevertheless, the government of the commonwealth has decided to spend an amount on defense that will be about the same per head as that paid by the British taxpayer. Englishmen and Australians feel constrained to do this because the argument of expediency makes any other course too dangerous.

But there are not wanting those who go further and argue that, in the present stage of human development, an occasional return to the methods of the cosmic process is unavoidable and even essential to moral health. They do not doubt that rational selection is a process more worthy of human beings than natural selection. They contend, however, that civilization has its own attendant evils, and that its condition does at times become desperate, and those are the times when a desperate remedy such as war is the only effective way of eradicating the disease. In making such a statement, the assumption is that, while war is a dreadful experience, there are worse things in human life than war. In his "Origin of Species," Darwin has pointed out that where individuals are deficient in strength, they may still survive in the struggle for existence by means of trickery and cunning. There are tricks in the human world, and many more tricks than are possible in the organic world because of that very self-consciousness which makes the gap between the organic and the human. Where the struggle for existence takes this form, it sometimes happens that individuals, societies, and even nations sink into a condition of depravity in which trickery takes the place of candor, deceitfulness of honesty, and corruption of simplicity. In such cases, the moral atmosphere becomes stagnant, stifling, and electric. That is a condition so desperate that analagous conditions in the physical world would seem to suggest the only remedy: a storm is needed to clear the atmosphere and make it sweet and bracing once again.

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But the condition of civilization need not be as desperate as that before danger is encountered through the pursuit of the higher interests of civilization. It would appear from a review of history that, in the pursuit of refinement, strength and vitality have often declined. Nobody would accuse Schiller of want of sympathy for refinement, culture, and rational method of procedure; yet it must be clear to anyone who has read his letters on "The Æsthetical Education of Man" that, in his opinion, no amount of refinement and culture can make up for the loss of those heroic qualities of the soul which are undoubtedly fostered by the struggle for existence, and on the preservation of which the sanity and integrity of human life so much depend.

In reviewing the objections usually urged against culture, he does not shrink from stating the most searching of them in language that is both forceful and incisive: that dangerous incline leading the soul to neglect all reality, and to sacrifice truth and morality to an attractive envelope; that state of mind in which activity becomes enfeebled, while virtues that give an agreeable appearance prevail; in which excesses and vices that can be reconciled with an agreeable appearance are permitted or palliated; in which strength of character declines as it did in Greece, where the beautiful found sway on the ruins of heroic virtues. "And yet," he says, "this strength of character which is commonly sacrificed to establish æsthetic culture is the most powerful spring of all that is great and excellent in man, and no other advantage, however great, can make up for it."

We must be careful to note, of course, that Schiller does not say that æsthetic culture necessarily weakens fiber. On the contrary, he would argue that, properly safeguarded and rightly sought, it would be a means of strengthening character. His avowed object, indeed, in writing this series of letters on "The Æsthetical Education of Man" was to suggest a remedy not only for the coarseness and brutality of the lower element of so-

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ciety, but also for the lethargy and depravity that had overtaken a section of the upper classes in the pursuit of a one-sided culture. The trouble is that culture, as one form of advanced civilized life, often has been attained at the expense of the heroic qualities of the soul. In such cases there need be no doubt about Schiller's position: "At the risk of being hard and coarse," he says, "it would seem preferable to dispense with this dissolving force of the beautiful rather than see human nature a prey to its enervating influence, notwithstanding all its refining advantages."

These observations have an important bearing on the subject immediately under discussion, for unless rational idealism is properly understood and carefully safeguarded, the same disastrous results may ensue as in the case of æsthetic development. History leaves no doubt, indeed, that disastrous results have ensued. Nobody will doubt for a moment that the civilization of the Romans in the fifth century, with its far-reaching ecclesiastical organization, its great system of jurisprudence, and its municipal organizations, was far more enlightened, rational, and humane than the civilization of the Goths, but it was a civilization based upon weakness, not upon strength.

Instead of fighting their own battles, the Romans had for long employed others to fight for them. The body-guard of Augustus was composed for the most part of mercenaries; after Constantine, the levies from outside the empire formed the majority of the troops; and after Theodosius, in 395, a Roman was the exception. It was in the year 410, just fifteen years after the death of Theodosius, that Alaric sacked and captured the immortal city. The moral has been drawn so often that it is only necessary here to show how aptly it illustrates this part of our argument. There is no doubt that the qualities of strength and swiftness are developed by the struggle for existence, as we find it going on in the organic world; and if these qualities are imperilled by

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an enfeebled or corrupt civilization, it would seem better to revert to that struggle for a time, in the hope of recovering them, than to run the risk of losing them altogether. The cosmic process is cruel and murderous; war is a catastrophe dreadful to contemplate; but the most dreadful of all tragedies is the ruin of a great soul, and that ruin may overtake men and nations in the decline of strength and candor.

It may be that the keen competition in business, the discipline of organized sport, and other forms of activity will strengthen the will, and preserve the qualities of strength and endurance as war has done in the past. If so, the sooner we dispense with war the better on moral as well as on other grounds. But we must not forget that men are men and not angels, and that our speculations in these matters must be regulated and restrained by circumstances of human life as we find them. If war is to be abolished, we cannot dispense with the qualities that war has helped to foster. The higher our ideals, the more jealously must we safeguard the strength and vigor that is necessary to maintain them. *Corruptio optimi pessima* is a maxim that finds plenty of application in the history of human life. Among the religious orders of the Middle Ages, none cherished ideals so high as the Franciscans, yet the Franciscans became corrupt in a shorter time than any other of the orders, and great was their fall in the fourteenth century.

The moral of it all would appear to be that idealism must be based upon strength, not upon weakness, and this is true of rational as well as æsthetic and religious idealism. There is no reason why we should not go on confidently and cheerfully with the substitution of rational for natural selection, provided we do not sacrifice, either as individuals or as nations, those qualities that are necessary alike for the maintenance of rational ideals and moral fiber.

But it is one thing to argue that an occasional return to the struggle for existence may be inevitable or even

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desirable in the present state of our development, quite another to say that the struggle, such as we find in the organic world, is the key to the development of human life. The one may be true, the other is false. Inasmuch as there is a considerable amount of mechanism and routine inseparable from human life, the mechanistic interpretation of evolution will not be without some application in human history. Inasmuch as the structure of our bodies bears a close resemblance to that of the animals, we must expect that the organic theory of evolution will also contribute something to the theory of human development. But inasmuch as man is super-organic, endowed with intellectual, spiritual, and artistic faculties over and above the qualities of animal life, the purposive interpretation of human history becomes imperative, and the higher we go in the scale of being the more imperative it is.

It ought to be clear, then, that any comprehensive theory of evolution must explain the gaps between the organic and super-organic worlds, and reconcile the differences in the theories of evolution applicable to each. It must not be assumed that the theory which holds good in the one is sufficient to explain evolution in the other. The main object of this paper has been to prove this. There has been in the past a tendency to apply the organic theory of evolution to human development too readily; and in some cases by eminent scientists whose researches into the problems of organic life have been both extensive and thorough, but whose knowledge of human history is very scant indeed. This has led to confusion and error, and historical students themselves must bear some responsibility for the mistakes that have been made. When we consider how much time has been spent in historical research in the last half century, it is strange that so little should have been done to show how that research affects evolutionary thought since Darwin's time.

There is no doubt that evolution applies to human as

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well as other forms of life; but a theory of evolution that is to explain organic and human life will need to be much more comprehensive than the one with which we are familiar at present; and for those who believe that evolution must be read backwards as well as forwards, the importance of a study of history or the evolution of human affairs as a means of contributing to that more comprehensive theory, is not likely to be challenged.

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## ETHICAL PESSIMISM IN BERGSON.

J. W. SCOTT.

THE ethical pessimism referred to in the title of this paper is primarily an impression which arises in the mind after reading one of M. Bergson's early works, the essay on laughter. The aim of the discussion is to point out the impression, and to raise the question whether there is any reason for it in the account of the comic, from which it arises.

An essay on laughter hardly seems an appropriate place in which to practise ethical diagnosis. And it almost savors of banality to begin to ask of this particular essay what sort of moral spirit animates it. The only spirit that is in it, in a sense, is that of the artist; or of the great author who chances upon an innocent, little noticed psychic phenomenon which he can proceed to dissect and anatomize for the behoof solely of such as delight in such things. Bergson has no didactic purpose to serve in this book; nor has he any taste for coarse effects. He administers no moral shock to his reader. He upsets no prejudices. He has no interest, in fact, but to cut open the thing he is handling and let light in. His central question is the simple one, what is it that we

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laugh at when we laugh? And he proceeds to examine specimens and see. And if in the process of examination, his analytic scalpel occasionally passes uncomfortably close to something morally vital,—well, we hardly notice it, or we forget; it is all so naturally done, and with so deft a touch. Yet the book leaves an idea in our minds, an edged idea, so to call it, which penetrates right into life's moral center and leaves an impression there. It is impossible, of course, to put the central idea of Bergson's essay in a word. But put in as adequate a single phrase as one can borrow from the work itself, the idea is that the comical in human life is the 'unadaptable,' and the 'unadaptable' is the 'rigid.' To expand it a little: wherever there appears in human life the 'inflexible' spirit; the type of man who, in the midst of an environment which invites him to adapt himself to it, does not do so, but pursues his own course, deaf to its calls; the man who thus presents a fixed front to life and has not the necessary 'suppleness' or 'elasticity' to yield gracefully to its infinitely subtle and varying demands; such a character has always something comical about him. It requires all Bergson's development of this idea to exhibit to the full its power and its *prima facie* convincingness. But so developed, its plausibility wins upon the mind, as it is dwelt upon. For the comical side of the man who stops his ears when he has set his course,—whether it be Don Quixote tilting at his windmills or any other equally unpractical type of idealist,—becomes more and more easy to see once we consent to look for it. And seeing that this resolute type of character, with all his limitations, gives tone to so much of what is best in life, we end with a sense of disillusion; with the impression, to put it frankly, that life itself is more of a comedy than we had quite thought. Of course, the discovery that there is more of comedy in life's 'earnest' than most serious people suspect, is one which other works than Bergson's have enabled men to make. But the point is that in Bergson's case the

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discovery comes as a disillusion. The reason, if we may anticipate so far as to say so, is that with him the comic is only comical. The idea of comedy does not emerge from his hands dignified, as it did, for example, from Meredith. This is because, beginning his investigation at the lower limit, so to speak, of the comic, he leaves the impression of having resolved the comic as a whole into its lowest terms. Hence, in showing how far the comic penetrates life, he seems but to show how much of life is ridiculous. And so much of it is so, that the whole loses in ultimate value. Laughter seems to have impregnated life with a tinge of genuine pessimism.

Such is the impression. The only way to test the justice of it is to ask what conception of the good life underlies the view of the comic here presented to us. That some moral view is implicated in the theory is acknowledged by the author. It appears in the anti-social tendency which is said to characterize all laughable conduct. The life of human society on the author's view requires of its members a certain 'tension,' an alertness of response to very varied stimuli. A certain degree of this alertness is necessary to the human individual if he is even to live. But after it has been sufficiently created in him to ensure his survival, it is expedient that the power should be kept alive in him by further and more delicate exercise, by adaptations to conditions not exactly essential to existence. It is by these further adjustments that society refines itself and attains to its best life. Now society's instrument for securing from the individual adaptation to these social conventions, manners and subtler conditions of 'good' life generally, is laughter. Laughter is thus a socializing instrument. It is always, as Bergson points out, the laughter of a group. It *is*, at bottom, a group of human beings laughing at one of their number who has fallen short of some adaptation which was expected of him,—a "form of social castigation," perhaps the gentlest way which nature anywhere adopts of eliminating the unfit. This gives

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the analysis of laughter at once a moral interest. In marking out what society does not want, laughter shows by implication what it does want. It sketches society's ideal. Our question here is, what sort of ideal is thus sketched, and whether it be not one to attain which some of life's absolutely valuable aspects have to be sacrificed.

One fundamental and doubtless sound assumption of the treatise is that it is really society which laughs. And if we are to find in this fact an account of society's ideal, we must determine two further points, what exactly it laughs at and why. To the former question, which is the important one, Bergson's answer is that society laughs at the 'mechanical' in life and conduct, at that in life which is fixed or rigid when it should have been supple, subtle, sinuous. Our view is that Bergson, in saying so, indicates quite rightly the general direction in which we must look for the comic; but without describing very accurately what is found there.

That the general locus of the comic is to be found, in *some* sense, in the 'mechanical' appears from the wide and ready applicability which Bergson can show this formula to have. When a man rushing along the street, for instance, is suddenly brought to a stop by falling over a stick, the 'laughable aspect' of the situation (if it has one) is said to be that a human being should have thus gone straight forward like an automaton when he might have gracefully threaded his way amongst the obstacles. And it does indeed quite seem so. Moreover, it is the same failure to negotiate the obstacle which makes a man comical who dips his pen into an empty inkwell or sits down on a bottomless chair or otherwise falls into the traps of the practical joker. He does not see what is awaiting him; and instead of adapting himself to the circumstances he goes straight on, as he has been in the habit of doing. Again, what else is the absent-minded person,—that veritable fountain of comedy,—than one chronically unable to change his path from its habitual direction and bend it as required by the world

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about him? Even that highly refined comic character the dreamer,—the Don Quixote,—answers the same description. Here we not only see the actual world to which the absent-minded person should be adapting himself; we also see the unreal world itself, to which his absent mind is present. We even see that fanciful world in the making, and thus understand how the day-dreamer colors and distorts the realities he meets. We know what Don Quixote *thinks* his windmills are, and see the logic of it. The laughable always implies this fundamental absent-mindedness. The comical person is one who lets himself be moved by the momentum of his own habit of mind instead of actively responding to the calls of his present environment. In this sense, the comical is the 'mechanical.' And society laughs at it because society wants its members not to be automata, but to adapt themselves finely to the circumstances around them.

But is the thing at which society laughs properly the mechanical? If that term must be used, we hold, at least, that there is something in this sort of mechanism which Bergson's treatment of it tends to obscure. When he is treating the lower forms of the comic,—a comical face or gesture, for instance,—he is, of course, seeking to express the spirit behind the laughter, the subtle movement of imagination which provokes it. When he likens the object to a mechanism, it is for imagination that the 'mechanism' exists. And the feature of all such objects which he neglects is to be found only by approaching them in the light of his own interpretations.

What construction, then, does Bergson put upon the object of the imagination in those simpler examples of the ludicrous? Taking the instance of such physical deformities as are laughable, he points out, first, that they are seen as human. A comical deformity is "one which a normally built person could successfully imitate." But this is not his only or his main characterization. Such a deformity is also one which can appear as though it were something fixed upon the possessor, a fixed habit

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contracted by him, and perpetuating itself. A hunchback at whom we laugh is one who appears to have become puckered up, so to speak, permanently. "By a kind of physical obstinacy, by *rigidity,* in a word, his back persists in the habit it has contracted." A comical physiognomy is a face screwed up, as it were, and staying so; something fixed and mechanical 'encrusted' upon the native mobility of life.

We are said to laugh, then, at a kind of fixity. On closer analysis, however, this interpretation seems clearly to point beyond itself. Confronted by the fact that there is at least one familiar type of fixity at which we do not laugh, namely, the set in the countenance of a man of character or refinement, Bergson points out that this countenance is implicitly mobile. "It maintains in the midst of its fixity a certain indecision in which are obscurely portrayed all possible shades of the state of mind" within. But what is this mobility? It is plainly not actual changes of expression, for we see it when the face is still. It must consist, then, in suggested changes. Other expressions, variations of the one before us, gather round this one, as it were, making what Professor James would call its 'fringe'; and scatter in it their various lights and shadows. Nor do we seem to err in interpreting it so. For all such centralizing of variations around their type is indeed activity; it is the tension of a principle sustaining itself amidst its expressions. And we cannot, in the long run, find mobility to be anything else. But if so, the phenomenon is strangely ubiquitous. It invades the comical form too. Why should not the grimace exercise the same tension over a periphery of variations which shade off from it? True, as a face it is not really typical. It is an extreme, a marginal variety of its class. But it is not, therefore, abandoned by its class,—alone, and so dead. It is still a face. The same delicate imagination which saw the infinite varieties shadowed in the face of character and thus saw it mobile, sees *some* variations assembled around this one too,

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shading off from it in coarser degrees. Which means that this face too is active, by suggestion.

And, surely, it is indeed in its *activity* that the comic spirit luxuriates. When we laugh at a distorted face, we do not surely laugh at the twist, as a thing by itself, fixed and laid on the mobility of life. We laugh at the man screwing up his face. When we laugh at a crumpled back, it is truly at "something which a normally built person could successfully imitate." But this means that we laugh at the man crumpling his back, not at the hump, as a dead thing attached to his living body and hindering it. What is comical is not a rigidity encrusted upon life, then. It is a movement of life itself.

To take one more example. The mechanically repeated gestures of a speaker may become comical. The reason alleged by Bergson for this is that they give the man the appearance of being a mere moving apparatus. Mere gesture, it is explained, is too indelicate to convey a complex meaning. Only the resources of a competent vocabulary suffice for that. Yet gesture tries it; and this mechanism simulating life is the laughable thing. To quote Bergson's words: "Gesture here vies with speech. Jealous of the latter, gesture closely dogs the speaker's steps, it, too, offering to act as interpreter. . . . Well and good; but then it must pledge itself to follow thought through all phases of its development. An idea is something that grows, buds, blossoms and ripens from beginning to end of a speech. It never repeats itself. . . . Then let gesture adopt the fundamental law of life, which is a complete absence of repetition. But one finds that a certain movement, perhaps of head or arm, a movement always the same, seems to return at regular intervals. . . . This is no longer life. It is automatism establishing itself in life and imitating it. It belongs to the comic." But surely gestures convey something. Those of the histrionic artist do. Those of a competent speaker also do. What gestures do, or attempt, is to block out certain situations which the words are describ-

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ing, in a crude and rough outline. They sketch the framework, so to speak, within which the verbal representation falls. So far as they are effective, they bind the representation together, they keep it in hand, and so do not merely mark time mechanically behind the movements of life, but live themselves. And to however low an ebb the life of gesture may fall, it never goes quite out. Reduce it to nothing but a mechanical swaying of the body or swinging of awkward arms; it is yet expressive. The speaker is in point of fact working at a task, and it is the task which he started. His 'idea' may have blossomed under his treatment or become mutilated; it is still in some sense the same idea. He entered upon his present theme, at any rate; or at the very least, began this present speech. And the sustained repetitions of a 'movement always the same' are simply his way of making visible, despite any possible contrary appearances, the fact that he is still at it. The movements express a unity and a unity which is there. It is not the mechanical swing of the arms that is amusing. We could get that from the pendulum of a clock. It is the man laboriously doing it. The laughable is a certain movement of the living man himself, as contrasted with a mechanical movement attached to him and hindering him. In a word, we laugh at him, and not at his arms.

As a representation of the comic, then, Bergson's account obscures something. Not the simple fact that the human aspect is present, but the fact that it predominates,—that it is the source of the effect. That it is the human aspect which does predominate, however, should become conclusively clear from the simple fact that it comes more and more into prominence as comic effect heightens,—that is, as we rise in the scale from cruder comedy to higher. If life were really comical in so far as it reminded us of mechanism, it ought to become the more comical the better it presented mechanism to us. Now in a certain sense of 'more,' and up to a certain point, this is true. Bergson, for instance, describes one

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form of theatrical or pantomimic entertainment to which he seems to attach importance as an example of the principle of the comic, in which the effect is obtained by attaining to an appearance of mechanism gradually. The troop of performers on the stage are increased in number from moment to moment, and their movements simultaneously increased in rapidity and in degree of likeness to mechanical things until, in the climax, the human performers almost become mechanical objects, rolling balls, jointed puppets, and so forth. Here the laughter does presumably grow louder as the mechanical is more approached. And no doubt there is a sense in which the fact indicates that the comic effect is being heightened. But it is not being made higher comedy, certainly; and even as a device, as a means of causing vociferous laughter, there is a plain limit to its success,—the point, namely, when the simulation is so well done that the performers simply become mechanical objects and so cease to appeal to the jaded eye as any more comical than actual balls and staves themselves would be. If the comic effect is to survive even on this level, not only must the human side remain present. It must enwrap, and visibly enwrap, the other side in it. These living beings must be imposing mechanism on themselves, not suffering from it. And if the effect, in any spiritual sense of the word, is to *heighten,* the human factor must come more and more to the front. It would not be by becoming more mechanical that a common fool would become a Jaques or a Falstaff, but by becoming less mechanical and more vastly human.

When Bergson himself is asking how advance is made from those simple comic effects which provide him with the clue to the nature of the comic in general, toward higher effects, his language betrays a consciousness of the fact that it is the human which must come out. The forms in which he puts the question seem to imply that it is a question precisely of how the 'mechanical' character becomes submerged. The comic element in the

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lower forms is described as 'accidental.' When the runner trips, the fall is brought about by an 'external circumstance.' And the question raised is how the comic may cease to be thus 'in superficial contact' with the person; how it may 'penetrate within.' Implying, apparently, that the higher comic is more inward, more personal. And surely it is by becoming thus more human and lifelike that a comic character approaches greatness.

The fact upon which we have so far insisted is that even in the cruder forms of the comic, and increasingly as we ascend toward the higher levels of comedy, it is of the essence of the comical to express life itself rather than a hindrance of life by something different in principle from it. The importance of the fact lies in this: that while the comical is always a behavior of this sort on the part of life, not all behavior of this sort on the part of a living being appears to be comical. Whatever other distinguishable worlds of human experience may be characterized by the principle here found at the root of the comic, the world of *morality* does appear to be so characterized. If life were deprived of the liberty of imposing this 'mechanical' form upon its activity, it would indeed cease to be comical. But there would disappear from it also the major portion of what we commonly call its moral function.

There is no need to go into detail to establish the *general* affinity between the comical as described by Bergson and the moral as we know it. It is the source of the impression mentioned at the beginning of the paper, and it lies on the surface of all Bergson's prominent examples. It is comical to act according to fixed habit; but in all that is moral there is an aspect of habit. It is comical to be like another mind; but every man who takes another mind as an example to follow is so far like him. It is comical to repeat and insist; but moral practice is the sustained insistence and repetition, in season and out of season, of principles which are universal and depend for their validity on neither place nor cir-

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cumstance. It is comical for a man having set his course to rush straight for his objective, roughriding circumstance and deaf to the calls of the world; but that is also moral; it is what the runner does who bumps against an obstacle, but it is also what Bunyan's "Christian" does fleeing from the city of destruction. The highest reach of the comical is an absent-mindedness of character; the presence of the mind to another world than the present one; an attempt to shape surroundings in accordance with that world, instead of making it accord with them; a yielding of obedience to the impulse of one's own fixed and formed character and will instead of bending these to the ways of the world. But that is an accurate description of how a man dies for a cause.

In fact, the comic and the moral spirit lie so close to each other that the appearance of affinity can hardly escape notice. And Bergson has not left it unnoticed. He has discussed how far it is real,—the conditions under which the moral can become comical, and the vicious, too, become comical, and what distinguishes both from the comic. He does distinguish them, and his distinction turns on his fundamental account of the difference between the comic and the serious. Of this distinction he really gives two accounts closely dependent on each other.

His more immediate but less satisfactory way of distinguishing the comic and the serious lies open to all readers in the first pages of the essay. One of the most conspicuous features of laughter is said to be the calm indifference and *absence of feeling* which accompanies it.

"Try for a moment to become interested in everything that is being said and done; act, in imagination, with those who act, and feel with those who feel; in a word, give your sympathy its widest expansion; as though at the touch of a fairy wand you will see the flimsiest of objects assume importance, and a gloomy hue pass over everything. Now step aside, look upon life as a disinterested spectator; many a drama will turn into comedy. It is enough for us to stop our ears to the music in a room where dancing is going on, for the dancers at once to appear ridiculous. How many human actions would stand a similar test? Should we not see



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many of them turn suddenly from grave to gay, on isolating them from the accompanying music of sentiment? To produce the whole of its effect, then, the comic demands something like a momentary anæsthesia of the heart. Its appeal is to intelligence pure and simple."[1]

The distinction between the comical and the moral is easily inferred. Nothing is comical which appeals to our feelings; and it is part of the comic poet's function to contrive to effect a deadening of sentiment and emotion in the spectator. "There is an art of lulling sensibility to sleep,—providing it with dreams as happens in the case of a mesmerized person. And there is also an art of throwing a wet blanket over sympathy at the very moment it might arise, the result being that the situation, though a serious one, is not taken seriously."[2] But the moral appeals to feeling and thus cannot be comic: we have shut our eyes to the moral before we open them on the comic.

We have here one of the ways in which Bergson effects the distinction. We have called it unsatisfactory because it borders so closely on tautology. What does it mean to say that a situation is comical only when seen without sentiment, except simply that it cannot be comical if it is taken seriously? The fact is, in order to reach Bergson's true distinction, we must look past these statements to the context from which we have taken them. We must see how this art of lulling sensibility asleep sets to work, and see what exactly it reveals. All along we have been trying to interpret the comic imagination, that is, to see how the world looks to it. And we cannot fall back on the statement that the comic spirit is unemotional and unsympathetic unless we can translate these terms into a description of the object seen. We know that an object looks differently when looked at sentimentally from what it appears when looked at from an indifferent standpoint. But the question is in what do the two differ?

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[1] "Laughter," pp. 4, 5. [2] "Laughter," p. 140.

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When Bergson comes to round up his conclusions into a comprehensive picture of the comic world,—the world as it appears to comic imagination,—he points out three fundamental features of it which are the reverse of the three fundamental features of life. Normally, life should never turn backwards, never repeat itself and never allow any of its elements to become transposable, *i. e.*, capable of occupying any other place or context than the one they occupy. But when we find in comedy a character like Orgon in Molière's "Tartuffe," for instance, unable to listen to important news, without breaking in upon the speaker at every pause of the conversation with questions regarding the one trivial subject of which his own mind is full, we perceive a travesty of the laws of life; a piece of living human intercourse, or what should have been such, broken into every now and then by a mechanical repetition. Similarly, life may find itself thwarted along the others of its lines of action. A man may be caught in his own trap, or a particular act or word of some one may be placed by a listener into a wholly different context from that to which it really belongs. Whenever life is made thus to repeat itself, turn back upon itself, or submit to mechanical disintegration so that its parts may be detached from it and transposed, it becomes comical.

But we can make nothing of this as a picture applicable to the world of comedy distinctively, without the empty proviso that this picture of inverted life must not touch our feelings. Surely there is a tragic repetition of words. Othello's exclamation, "the handkerchief," breaks in upon Iago's conversation exactly as the "Et Tartuffe?" of Orgon does upon the conversation of the serving maid. The turning back movement,—the theme of the robber robbed and the biter bit,—is surely possible in tragedy too. And to say that the same element could not be transposed, and enter equally well into two contexts or 'series,' except in comedy, would be to say that in tragedy there were no misunderstandings. We

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cannot get at Bergson's real conception until we come to close quarters with the manner in which the comic poet is supposed to prune our sympathies and regulate them to the due pitch.

How, then, do our sympathies become alienated, our feelings atrophied to the degree required for comic perception? The poet follows two main methods; he presents us with a person within whose soul the various elements of character are isolated; secondly, he allows the person to gesticulate rather than to act. It is only when we examine the change which comes over the picture of the world when these operations are performed on it, that we get the distinction we are seeking. And if we look closely into it, we shall find that the real effect of these things is to *substitute abrupt transitions for what are supposed to be life's fine gradations.*

A miser whose avarice can be felt spreading itself inch by inch across his soul, until it has interlocked itself with every human interest the man has, and entwined itself into every thread and fiber of his being, could never be comical. It spreads in such a way that every successive advance is graded into the next, and as we watch the whole growing to its own inward music, the emotion rises. But if a vice remains something detached, subsisting along with other interests in the soul, jostling them but not uniting with them, so that its manifestations are abrupt explosions and do not develop themselves or advance upon one another in fine grades, then it may be comical. It will then possess the man partly and intermittently, not wholly or permanently. Thus such scenes are possible as the surprise meeting of Harpagon and his son in Molière's "l'Avare," where the father is distracted between love of his son and of his purse, the two sentiments taking possession of him by turns, keeping him acting now in the one character and now in the other. "Here we should be in the thick of drama," says Bergson, "if only greed and fatherly affection, conflicting with each other in the soul of Har-

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pagon, had effected a more or less original combination." The comical value of gesture lies quite similarly in the way in which it divides the character. Gesture is unintentional. It springs out unawares, often, despite a contrary intention. It thus reveals an abruptness in the transitions from one thing which the person is doing to the next. It reveals a cleft in the character, and leaves the two halves working alternately. Behind the ostensible character which the person wishes to keep up, there is another one; and the latter is always springing into evidence in gesture. In both cases there is transition perpetually going on, as there must be in any developing life, from act to act and word to word and deed to deed. But the transitions are not made finely. In the tragic character they are.

Now if we are to express this difference between the serious and the comic in a satisfactory way, we shall have to express it as a difference of the degree to which means are sacrificed to end. The abrupt transition is such a sacrifice. In the tragic movement the sacrifice is not felt.

In the tragic repetition of words, the words repeated do not simply jump into prominence repeatedly like a spring which is released when the conversation pauses and is repressed when it flows on again. The words when they are repeated are meant to be thrown into prominence, and even abruptly. But if they seem to be simply 'sprung upon' the rest of the conversation, externally, it is only for a moment. Really they are most powerfully relevant. By an infinitude of subtle links, they are connected with the entire context. This means that they do not attain their prominence by doing violence to the process by which their context was developing; or, if you like, by doing violence to the attention that was engrossed in the other things; but by developing the context and so winning the attention through infinitely finely graded steps. To make the matter clearer by an example: Orgon's repetition of his phrase has

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really the same end in view as Othello's repetition of his. It only reaches its end by a sacrifice of means,—of intermediate steps,—unknown in the other. In both cases the end is to make the repeated thoughts prominent,—or better, central. They are both efforts to centralize. Othello's mind is transfixed by the idea of Desdemona's guilt. He has to listen to a whole deluge of suggestions meant to explain it away, but really powerless to do so; and by repeating the words 'the handkerchief' he is forever roping in the scattering attention, forcing it back, as it were, to the one centrally interesting point. And that centralization is precisely what Orgon is practising in the scene with Dorine. Only, the sacrifice of fineness of graded intermediate step is in his case inevitable. Because the point around which he would centralize everything is not really central. He does not behave like the character he is supposed to be,—the head of a house returning home after an absence and receiving news of his household. Instead of beginning with first things first, and overtaking the other items of news as they shaded off from it in an approximately true order of importance, he must spring straightway to the one trivial matter which happens to be interesting him. He must behave as though the one impudent being whom his roof shelters were the only person of consequence there, and speak of him and pity him, and when told that the wife of his bosom is gravely ill, fail to hear. Tartuffe, of course, existed; and lived amongst the others. And there doubtless was a graceful way of reaching him, had Orgon overtaken first the matters which naturally lay between. But he makes straight to his point. He lays rough hands on the attention which is occupied in a natural way with the whole subject-matter of the household and its affairs, and wrests it, so to speak, at a leap to the very outmost boundary of its picture.

Here, then, we have the net meaning of Bergson's proviso that the comically inverted life, if it is to be

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comical, shall be perceived 'without emotion.' It means that abrupt transitions take the place of sinuous gliding movements of the soul. It means that in that movement which is life, the end is seen and reached straight from the immediate, without the possible intermediate steps being delicately perceived and considered and made the means. It means, if we may venture to put it in the language of Bergson's general philosophy, that the juxtaposition of things in space is substituted for the interpenetration of events in time. Hence, the moral is not comical so long as it is in this sense delicate. But it will become so whenever that abruptness appears in it.

But does not the moral very often bear this character? Is this character not often a necessary condition of its remaining true to itself and to the moral law? In all its conformity to law, however passive that may appear,—even if it be unalterable habit,—does there not lie hidden a certain potential violence, the power to mutilate the perhaps fair proportions of its own individual life or bend circumstances towards a point to which their own development would never have led them? We do not suggest but that if the moral man were great enough, he could so master all circumstances, even in a very imperfect world, as to lead them always through fine gradations towards his moral ends. Doubtless the ultimate good is, as Plato thought, the consummation of grace and beauty as well as of righteousness. But, certainly, its perfect wholeness lies beyond the reach of anyone of us. The common man cannot complete its broken arcs into the perfect round. And we are all common men. The most he can do, with his imperfect and fitful visions of the perfect, is to shape his life very roughly according to its boldest outlines. To be just he must often refuse to be kind, however well he knows that there is a justice which is kinder than his, and perhaps juster too. To be true he must often fail to be graceful, even though the highest grace be also the truest truth.

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Nay, if any man were great enough never to do violence to the perfect orb of life in his own soul and in the world of affairs, would we call him moral unless he were prepared to lose good, as common men have to do, did he happen to be clad in their common garb,—to stand, if need were, amid all temptations and opportunities, a solid, unbending, highly 'absent-minded' figure, without even the consolation of conscious greatness, with no refuge at all, except the unverified conviction of being strong in being right? We incline to think the answer negative; that no man is morally great unless we can say of him that he would still be moral though he were not great. And to say so is to identify all morality with the very principle which Bergson finds in the comic. Deprive life of the liberty to impose this 'mechanical' form upon its own action, wipe out from life all that contains this awkwardness and abruptness, and you cut away all the morality which is only strong and straight, without being refined or clever. And if this be the principle whose expressions society rejects and castigates, then society is committed to an ideal which is false, in the sense that it is one which society can only reach by squandering the very values by which it subsists.

The pessimism of this does not need to be labored. To rule out the mechanical, the rigid, from the life which society wants is plainly to withdraw the good from out of the reach of common men and make it the aristocratic privilege of a few. But it is also to lose sight of what, definitely, the good can be, even for the few. It is to coquette with a doctrine of moral relativity. The good life implies no longer the remaining firm, "through thick and thin," to a fixed law, trusting to the unseen future to fill in and soften its rude outlines. It implies rather the movement of the *élan de vie,* succeeding by its sinuosity, worming its way *between* the obstacles, forever altering its own course, and even shedding part of its own being to reach its ends. The good is simply the keeping alert and responsive, the making life a series

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of delicate adjustments to varying circumstances. The moral imperative in the end is deprived of its absolute and positive character. It says no longer be 'just,' or 'courageous,' or 'sincere.' It does not even say 'be good.' It only says 'be adaptable.' The good life is transmuted into a piece of high art; or into a game of skill, in which the winners are they who have the gifts and have cultivated the skill. When Kant declared that the only thing in the world or out of it which was good without qualification was the good will, he courted another sort of pessimism,—that of thinking that gifts and graces went for nothing, and that the labor of education and the progress of institutions brought man no nearer heaven. But he at least preached a gospel to the poor, and saw with Christianity that in some sense the race could not be to the swift nor the battle to the strong.

If the human aspect of that 'mechanization' of life in which Bergson finds the comical were given its value, it would, we have admitted, bring the comic and the moral together on the basis of a certain community of principle. We end, therefore, with a problem,—with the question of the results of this affinity between things so disparate. And certain familiar facts lend a sinister look to the conclusion. We are perplexed often by this very affinity, by the thinness of the line which separates the hero we worship from the mere eccentric at whom we only smile, the noble charity which believeth all things from the 'imbecility' which, so far as one can see, 'believeth all things' too. And it is true that the two spheres border closely,—that the scenes are many in life where we "know not whether to laugh or weep." But this *needs* be no abortive union of the highest and the lowest, unless you take the crudest laugh, the guffaw which points with the finger, or the smile of derision, as typical of laughter. If, on the other hand, a smile is not always a disguised frown, if society may laugh without laughing to scorn, if there be such a thing as a smile which conveys appreciation and does not merely seem to,

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then it is possible that a scene which is humorous may not only seem worthy, but be so, despite its exquisite imperfections. Nor shall we need to deaden our human senses to the worth, in order to appreciate the humor. And surely these are not extravagant assumptions. If it were only by shutting our minds to the reality of what is taking place in life, that we could see the comic in it, comic perception would be a commoner thing than it is. A group of savages will laugh outrageously at a black brother drowning in the sea, if he does it somewhat funnily. And we all know the people who support a reputation for humor on their ability to see a funny side in everything. There is a long stretch between either of these types, and Carlyle's Deity, who laughed when he saw two of his 'little mannikins' trying to 'explode' each other fighting a duel,—'the little spit-fires'! And is there a better way of expressing the difference than precisely to say that the one scene was comical through exclusion of its significant features for lack of sympathy and fine perception, while the other became comical by being taken so wholly in. The fact remains, of course, that a laugh is not always thus laden with a discerning sympathy; and the construction of it as society's appreciation of a form of good has to face the fact that it can be derisive and mocking. And the question, which of these betrays its fundamental nature, may be difficult. But there remains this other fact, that no human being can place another's interests wholly outside of his own. If it is as a member of society that he laughs, it is no less as a member of the same society that the other man is laughed at. And so long as all laughter is thus society's laugh at itself, we have good reason to assume that the nature of the highest humor is latent in it all. So far as Bergson's investigation has brought the comic spirit into kinship with the moral on the basis of a common character, then, it was just,—whatever we may say of the justice of entitling that character mechanism. But he gives to both together a false place, exactly in

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so far as he fails to regard this 'mechanism' which is their principle, as a constituent of the ideal towards which society aspires.

This attempt to extrude from the true movement of life all abruptness, harshness, recklessness of environment seems to take us very far away from that conception by which Bergson has elsewhere explained the course of evolution, the conception of a vast and irresistible *élan de vie* crashing through all obstacles towards its goal, shedding even parts of its own being rather than be stopped in its course. But only at first sight. The very characteristic of the *élan* is that it has nothing mechanical about its movement. It is not meant to be parallel to the movement of the runner who comes to grief by not minding his path. Its character is to succeed, not to fail. And it succeeds by its sinuosity, its variability, its graduated changes. The reason it must sacrifice its own being during its course is just its inability to admit mechanism or space or, generally, negation, into itself. That is why the stream of life bifurcates into narrower and narrower channels which progressively become lost to each other. If the gaps which the intellect sees could have made part of the reality of life, if the abruptness of mechanical transitions could have been taken up by it into itself and made part of itself, in a word, if it could have accommodated negation within its own being, then the sacrifice would still be made. But it would not be final. Life would still have to submit to the necessity of differentiating itself if it were ever to reach the human level. A man would not be an animal, nor an animal a plant. But life would not have lost itself in the process. In man it could still preserve the essentials of its whole nature. As his understanding it could embrace the lower forms and conserve their value. But within the being of reality, on Bergson's construction, there is no room for negation. And so the sacrifice is final.

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# THE ETHICS OF THE VEDANTA.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

A SYSTEM of philosophy is generally tested by its ethical doctrine. Though a criticism of life, philosophy is judged by its capacity to improve life. Let us, therefore, ask how far the Vedanta philosophy satisfies the demands of the moral consciousness. Like dress and other things, advanced thought has its own fashions, and it has become a philosophic fashion of the present day to consider the Vedanta system a non-ethical one. But the careful observer will notice that this doctrine is instinct with ethical interest. Max Müller says: "The Vedanta philosophy has not neglected the important sphere of ethics; but, on the contrary, we find ethics in the beginning, ethics in the middle, and ethics in the end, to say nothing of the fact that minds, so engrossed with divine things as the Vedanta philosophers, are not likely to fall victims to the ordinary temptations of the world, the flesh, and other powers." It is true, the Vedanta does not contain an articulate code of morality derived from an acknowledged ethical ideal. Though the problems of modern ethics are not *explicitly* raised in the Vedanta writings, the answers to them can be gathered from suggestions contained in the Vedanta texts. It is for the critical student of the Vedanta to bring together the scattered elements and present them in a whole.

The ethics of the Vedanta is dependent on its metaphysics. According to the Vedanta metaphysics, the Brahman is the sole reality, and the individuals are only modifications of it. The Vedanta postulates the absolute oneness of all things. "In a Brahmana endowed with wisdom and humility, in a cow, in an elephant, as also in a dog and a dog-eater, the wise see the same" ("Bhagavadgita," Chap. V, 18). This metaphysical

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monism requires us to look upon all creation as one, upon all thinking beings and the objects of all thought as non-different. In morals, the individual is enjoined to cultivate a spirit of *abheda,* or non-difference. Thus, the metaphysics of the Vedanta naturally leads to the ethics of love and brotherhood. Every other individual is to be regarded as your coequal, and treated as an end and not a means. In the Mahabharata, Parasara says to Janaka: "Let no man, however unhappy his lot, despise himself; man as such, though a chandala, is a noble creature in every way." The Vedanta requires us to respect human dignity and demands the recognition of man as man. To a Vendantin nothing human is alien. The whole universe is one country, all creation the family of God. No man has a right to isolate himself from the life of the whole. The individual's life is not a means to the satisfaction of his personal desires, but is a trust for humanity. This Vedantic ideal of love, fellowship, and self-sacrifice is not the vain fancy of a dreaming poet sighing after an impossible Utopia, but is the logical outcome of a rational reflection upon man's place in the cosmos.

But if the individual is already an expression of the Infinite, why should he strive? Where is the necessity for work and effort? The Vedanta answers that, though the individual is lit with the divine spark, he is not wholly divine. His divinity is not an actuality, but a potentiality, a prophecy and not a fulfillment. Man is a part of God aspiring to be the whole. As he is, he is dust and deity, God and brute crossed. It is the task of the moral life to eliminate the non-divine element, not by destroying it, but by suffusing it with the divine spirit.

Let us next see what kind of life would enable the individual to make his whole nature divine. It cannot be a life of mere existence and growth, for even plants possess that; nor can it be a life of mere feeling and sensation, for even animals share this. It should be a life of reason. Without reason, man is on a level with the

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grass that withers and the beasts that perish. Life according to nature is, for man, life according to reason. What are the general features of a rational life? First, it will be a life of unselfish devotion to the highest ideals of humanity. Though the other parts of human nature lead to distinction and individuality, the touch of reason makes the whole world kin. Anything rational will be acceptable to all. Reason makes us act on a feeling of the unity of the whole human race. The ideals of reason will be the ideals of justice, humanity, and righteousness. The rational life will thus be an unselfish life. Secondly, it will be a life in which the senses are controlled by reason. This is plain from the Bhagavadgita. We find it there stated that Arjuna comes to the battlefield of Kurukshetra to fight the enemy. He is fully convinced of the righteousness of the cause for which he stands. But it is action that tries. At the psychological moment, when he has to put the hand to the deed, Arjuna's strength fails. He is overcome with pity and grief. He hesitates, doubts, falters, and at last declines to fight. Tossed hither and thither in his distress, with a mind divided by doubt and torn asunder by conflicting apprehensions, he approaches his spiritual leader. Sri Krishna explains to him the metaphysics of the relation of the Eternal Spirit to the finite, points out how the kingdom of God may be planted on earth by every man performing his assigned task, describes to him the work of the warrior which he has to do, and concludes by exhorting him to make a stand and fight. The lesson of the Bhagavadgita is to displace ignorance by knowledge, selfishness by love of duty. Inclinations must be overcome or else they drag us on without resistance. The mere push and pull of desire must yield place to the calm and quiet of reason. The divine element of reason should leaven the whole nature of man. Rational life is, then, the life in which the senses are curbed and confined within their proper limits. It is wrong to think that the Vedanta demands the total aboli-

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tion of the senses. In the opinion of the present writer, the Vedanta asks us to beware of them. The senses are not bad in themselves; they are bad when uncontrolled and indulged under unlawful conditions. The senses are to be disciplined and not crushed. The following passages show that the Vedanta, while recognizing the dangerous nature of the senses, asks us to keep them in good trim and under bridle.

3. Know the self to be sitting in the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer, and the mind the reins.

4. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When He (the highest Self) is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.

5. He who has no understanding and whose mind (the reins) is never firmly held, his senses are unmanageable like vicious horses of a charioteer.

6. But he who has understanding and whose mind is always firmly held, his senses are under control like good horses of a charioteer. (Katha Upanishad, 3rd valli, verses 3 to 6.) The dangerous senses, O son of Kunti, forcibly carry away the mind of a wise man, even while striving to control them. Restraining them all, a man should remain steadfast, intent on Me. His knowledge is steady whose senses are under control (The Bhagavadgita, Ch. II, pp. 60, 61).

The senses are, of course, dangerous. In the normal state, they ought to be dependent on reason, while we generally find them asserting their authority and claiming independence, fighting with and resisting reason. This dangerous character of the senses might have betrayed the Vedanta writers into the extravagance of advocating the total destruction of the senses. But it is only an extravagance inconsistent with the general spirit of the Vedanta. A rational life is not a life of no desire, but a life of regulated desires. By making our senses serve our higher ends we can elevate ourselves.[1] Besides the two features of unselfishness and rational control of the senses, the rational life will be marked by unity and consistency. The different parts of human life will be in order and make manifest the one supreme ideal. If instead of reason, our senses

[1] See Bhagavadgita, Ch. VI, verses 5, 6.

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guide us, our life will be a mirror of passing passions and temporary inclinations. He who leads such a life will have to be written down, like Dogberry, an ass. His life, which will be a series of disconnected and scattered episodes, will have no purpose to take, no work to carry out, no end to realize. In a rational life, every course of action, before it is adopted, is brought before the bar of reason, and its capacity to serve the highest end is tested and, if found suitable, adopted by the individual. The Vedanta ethics requires us to think before we act.

Sometimes, this exercise of reason or thought descends into a scrupulosity that fights shy of action. We have such a character in Shakespeare's Hamlet. Arjuna at the opening of the war resembles Hamlet. The Vedanta is criticized as encouraging quietism and inactivity, since it demands an undue amount of deliberation and contemplation. In this difficulty the Bhagavadgita again helps us. No doubt, contemplation is proclaimed as the highest good by the Vedanta. If reason is the peculiar privilege of man, distinguishing him from the other species of the creation, then an exercise of reason, pure and simple, ought to be considered a good in itslf. The Vedanta recognizes the importance of this energizing of thought. It is that which enables us to see the oneness of things, that gives us the power to recognize the brotherhood of all, and points out the necessity of merging the individual will in the collective will. Knowledge is an organic part of the spiritual good of humanity. But when the Vedanta speaks of knowledge, it does not mean a study of the technical disciplines of the schools or systems of philosophy, or abstract analyses of thought, but the knowledge that is power, the knowledge that enables us to take a right view of things and our place in the world. The criticism points out the danger incident to a conception of life which lays stress on thought-activity. The Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita come after the Vedas, and their

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spirit is a revolt against the depressingly utilitarian spirit of the Vedas, which advocated the mere observance of the ritual for the sake of rewards and punishments. They pointed out that the outward conformity to law was not so important as the inner spirit. An action is good, not because of its external consequences, but on account of its inner will. Virtue is a mode of being and not of doing. It is not something to be found, but a function or an exercise of the will. This lesson of the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita should be retold at the present day. To bend the knee to and worship a deity is not religion if the principles of morality are ignored. Many believe that to be religious is to perform sacrifices, visit the sacred places, and feed a number of people on special occasions required by the sacred scriptures. Brigands rob and kill while considering themselves quite religious if on fixed days they allot a certain proportion of their funds to pacify the wrath of gods, as if piety could remain intact without character. If piety is the telling of beads and the tramping of pilgrimages, it can exist without morality. But religion is a matter of the heart and is nothing if not inclusive of morality. Without the moral spirit, which in the main is identical with the religious, the Vedic culture and the observance of the Vedic ritual bear no fruit. The Vedas declared that the way to salvation was through the performance of sacrifices and the observance of elaborate ritual. The Upanishads explained the significance of sacrifices by holding out that the greatest sacrifice is unselfish devotion to the general good at the sacrifice of the individual self. A Vedanta text says: "And of the sacrifice performed by the master who has understood these truths, the soul is the performer; the heart, the seat of the sacrificial fire; sensual desires, the ghee; anger, the sacrificial lamb; contemplation, fire; the period of sacrifice as long as life lasts; whatever is eaten is sacrificial rice; whatever is drunk is the soma drink; and death is the sacred bath conclud-



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ing the ceremony." Thus, while the Vedas lay stress on the external conformity to the law, later Vedanta writings bring out that this outer conformity without the right spirit is good for nothing. Action generally produces a reaction. So from mere action without the underlying spirit, mere spirit without the act became emphasized. Sri Krishna argues in the Bhagavadgita that life and action are deeper than logical processes. He advises Arjuna not to fritter away his life in scruples, tremors, and hesitations, but asks him wholeheartedly to perform his duty. The highest knowledge cannot be got by turning our attention inward, but only by conducting ourselves in our external relations, fully imbued with the spirit of the all-presence of the divine. The Vedanta ethics does not ask us to sit with folded hands or, like the mystic, look down on earth or up to heaven, at nothing in particular. In the world here and now, the individual inspired by the vision beatific must do his level best to make his small corner of the world happier, nobler, and better. It is not the mystic in his cell or the philosopher in his retreat who is held up as a model, but the warrior fighting with righteous indignation the battle against the forces of evil and wickedness. Life is a battle of good against evil. By ceaseless striving and activity, man must conquer the opposition between the two. He must work out his spiritual destiny by struggle and effort.

The motive with which all acts should be performed ought not to be selfish. No act should be done with a selfish interest or for the gratification of inclinations. Reason tells us that the highest ideal is service of humanity, and reason must be exercised in the ascertainment of our duty in any particular crisis. If our conscience tells us that something is right, we must follow it, thoroughly prepared to meet fortune in all its moods. We must act disinterestedly. The Bhagavadgita says: "Then treating alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, success or defeat, prepare for the battle and thus wilt

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thou not incur sin" (II, 38). This ideal of disinterested action is misconceived when it is confused with motiveless action. A rational being cannot act without motives, but can and ought to act disinterestedly. The Vedanta says, let not your selfish satisfaction be your motive. Anything you do, do because it is a necessary means of promoting the general welfare. Let not self-love be the motive, but let it be the love of soul to soul, love of the whole race of mankind. Only that love abideth. The highest form of self-realization consists in living for others. The Vedanta law of morality does not ask us to act without motives, but asks us to serve humanity, without any selfish desires or petty interests, without envy or jealousy, regardless of party or personality.

It is also urged, as a charge against the Vedanta, that it encourages reckless action. It asks us to perform acts irrespective of consequences. If we recognize a particular line of action to be right, we are asked to proceed with it in order and gravity, even though the powers that be do not sanction it. But it ought to be remembered that the Vedanta ethics is emphasizing the essence of all moral life, conscientiousness, in pointing out that one must put into practice what one feels to be right. The limitations of this principle the Vedanta is aware of. It anticipates that if every individual forces on others what he considers to be right, it will give rise to lawlessness. That is why the Vedanta demands careful consideration before coming to a decision. We must not judge lightly. We know as a matter of fact that the most pitiable thing in the world is to be a well-intentioned but misguided person. Visionary idealism which lacks focus and intelligent direction is ineffective and mischievous. The Vedanta requires careful consideration of the course we wish to adopt. It knows that if private interest is allowed full license, the chances are the society will be disrupted, and recognizes the necessity of supplying some foundation for the exercise of the individual's private judgment. A man cannot stop

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and debate within himself at every point as to what his duty is. Hindu scriptures have laid down certain duties corresponding to the different orders. "Therefore the scripture is thy authority in deciding as to what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. Now thou oughtest to know and perform thy duty laid down in the scriptural law" (Bhagavadgita, Ch. XVI, verse 24). Certain regulations are laid down as binding on members of the four different classes into which men are divided. We are not here holding up the caste system as a model for imitation or as an institution free from blame, but only indicate that the individual's private judgment is limited by an objective system of right. The Vedanta criterion of morality may well be expressed in the famous formula made familiar to the philosophic world by the Hegelian school of ethics: "my station and its duties." The Vedanta, no doubt, asks us to act according to our conscience, but at the same time it guides the conscience so far as a general ethical system can do this. The Vedanta recognizes that loyalty to humanity at large does not mean, what it meant to the Cynics of ancient Greece, disloyalty to the narrower conceptions of family and city. It declares that the highest ideals can be realized only through loyalty to the smaller ideals of family, country, and so forth. The world we live in will be made better if each individual does well the small task assigned to him. There is no use talking about reforming the world without caring for the pressing problems of the moment. The immediate crisis, the task that lies ready to hand, must engage the individual's attention, and if he does it well, he will indirectly help the betterment of the world. Every man has a certain station to occupy and a certain function to fulfill in the social economy. The Vedanta does not stop with pointing out that the ideal is social service, for in that case it would be airy, abstract, and unsubstantial, but it provides us with a code of ethics calculated to realize that ideal. It recognizes that, however good private judg-

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ment may be, it has to work under limitations. Free play to the individual's private judgment would bring about an ethical atomism destructive of the supreme ideal of social solidarity. We see that the anarchic conception of man *versus* the State is alien to the spirit of the Vedanta philosophy. This does not mean that the principle of private judgment is sacrificed at the altar of social convention. By emphasizing the aspect of knowledge, the Vedanta points out the necessity of thinking obedience to its laws. Blind conservatism is not of much use. The different social rules and conventions are means of expressing the ideal. To the ideal we must hold fast, and if the institutions on account of changing conditions are not true to the ideal, they may be modified. The Vedantin does not ask the individual to be absorbed in the society, but presses home the organic nature of society which would do justice to both individual independence and social solidarity. The ideal thus makes for both moral order and progress.

Let us consider the ambiguity of the phrase 'duty for duty's sake' as applied to the Vedanta criterion of morality. It is true that the Vedanta ethics asks us to do what we feel to be our duty, simply because it is our duty. This view, we have already seen, is a protest against the Vedic spirit which troubled itself much about the external effects of action. But if it is argued that the Vedanta considers the different duties universally valid and exceptionless, then it is open to criticism. First, there are not many moralists who will condemn the physician for giving deceptive answers to the questions of his patients, an honest man for misdirecting a murderer in search of his victim. To respect the principle of veracity to its very letter would be in these instances to expedite the patients' death and promote the satanic misdeed out of mere love for consistency. To be consistent, sometimes, is to be dead to the generous impulse of the human heart. Secondly, we have what are

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called conflicts between duties. There arise situations in which it is difficult to find out what we should do. We seem sometimes to be caught in the horns of a dilemma. Scott, in the "Heart of Midlothian," represents Jeannie Deans as tempted to give false evidence to save the life of her sister whom she knows to be innocent. The Bhagavadgita opens with a conflict between the two duties of fighting in the battle and respecting human life. How does the Vedanta ethics help us in this difficulty? The Vedanta does not regard the different rules as exceptionless and universally valid. It holds that there can only be one Absolute in morality as in metaphysics. Moral life is an organism in which every part contributes to the life of the whole. Every rule is justified by its relation to the other rules and its place in the system of morality. Unless there is one supreme end to which all the other rules are subordinate, our moral life will become a 'thing of shreds and patches.' If there is any one end that is universally binding and that can be called a categorical imperative, it is, according to the Vedanta, the rule relating to the highest end. The ideal of unselfish service of humanity is the only absolute moral rule which ought never to be broken. This ideal of social service can generally be attained by the practice of the virtues of veracity, justice, benevolence, and the like. But to hold that these rules cannot be broken at any time, that they are all equally categorical imperatives, is to land us in moral anarchy, in view of the all too obvious conflicts between duties. The laws merely represent the mechanism by which the ideal of service can be realized. But man has no call to act in blind unthinking obedience to them. The end, according to the Vedanta, is not conformity to all these rules, but conformity to the law of reason. It is obedience to reason and its ideal of service and sacrifice that is the one supreme law, and all others are subordinate to it. When the rules come into conflict, we must fall back on the supreme commandment, and ask ourselves which is the

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course most conducive to the realization of reason in the world. Our whole moral life must be a rational unity. The different acts must be expressive of one central purpose. This consistency, which is the concern of great souls as opposed to 'little minds,' is consistency with the supreme ideal and not merely outward consistency with the external law.[2]

Let us next consider the charge that the Vedanta ethics is ascetic in its nature and does not positively support the conception of an active life. The metaphysical doctrine of Maya resolves the facts of this world into pure illusions. If the world of our knowledge is purely illusion, then morality becomes an appearance. Life, with its distinctions of subject and object, good and evil, is reduced to a fiction of the mind. The best thing for man would be to withdraw from this Maya world, turn his attention inward and see if there is anything there that is not a mere appearance. The whole criticism rests on a misunderstanding. The world of knowledge and life is not an appearance or a shadow, but is reality partially understood. The different parts are real in so far as they are parts of one whole. They do not have a self-dependent reality. This does not mean that the facts of life are all illusory. There are, of course, passages in Sankara which might be taken to mean that the world of science, art, and morality is illusory. Sankara, when confronted with the difficulty that such a conception does not do justice to the moral life, says the world of morality is illusory *sub specie æternitatis*. But here, from the platform of empirical knowl-

[2] There is the obvious danger in all such theories that if we allow a loophole for breaking the laws, we do not know where it will all end. Every man will try to excuse himself for violating the laws on account of his peculiar circumstances. But before we think of violating the well-recognized rules of morality, we should make sure that the one supreme end is promoted by our violation. Secondly, we should also take into account the remote effects of this violation on the society.

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edge, *sub specie temporis,* the world is as real as anything can possibly be.[3]

Another argument for the quietistic interpretation of the Vedanta doctrine of ethics is derived from the doctrine of karma. 'Karma' is a hypothesis devised by the later Vedanta writers as an explanation of the inequalities of this life and a solution of the problem of future life. It says we are not the sport of a cruel chance or the victims of a blind destiny. There is a principle governing the universe. We reap what we sow. The accidents of birth and fortune in this world are but the rewards and penalties of our deeds in the past life. The conception of karma has a great positive value. The good and evil we do not only affect society, but ourselves and our lives. Suffering in this universe is regarded as the wages of sin, which ought to be borne in meek resignation and in the belief that it is the reward of our own wrongdoings. Personal responsibility is given its due importance. As a solution of the problem of future life, the doctrine of karma holds that there is conservation of value in the economy of nature. The values of spirit and reason are not wasted. This life is the beginning of another into which we carry with us what we are and do here. The new starts just where the old life left off. The law of karma is the law of spiritual continuity. The Chandogya Upanishad says: "Now man is formed out of will. According to what his will is, in this world, so will he be when he has departed. Let man then seek the good will" (III, 14).

[3] He says: "The entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered true so long as the knowledge of Brahman, as the Self of all, has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered true until the sleeper awakes. When a person has not reached the true knowledge of the Unity of the Self, it does not enter his mind that the world of effects, with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions, is untrue; rather, in consequence of his ignorance, he looks on mere effects as forming part of and belonging to his self, forgetful that Brahman is in reality the Self of all. Hence, so long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not go on undisturbed."

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But this doctrine of karma is sometimes interpreted in a way that makes impossible individual initiative, so that the proper attitude for the individual is to bow to what happens in the belief that it is the inevitable. Let us, therefore, inquire into the relation of karma to human freedom. If karma means that all our acts, including the complex details, are completely predetermined, human freedom, without which moral life loses its integrity, becomes a fiction. Then the doctrine of karma brushes aside the consciousness of freedom as a palpable illusion of the intellect, destined to disappear with a more adequate knowledge of the world. But does the doctrine of karma say that all our acts are predestined by our past deeds? No. It only says that man's past deeds are continued into this life in the form of tendencies or predispositions. But character is not the product of karma. Though character has to do with inherited endowment, it is not the inherited endowment. Character, which is the habit of will, is not determined but self-created. Certain dispositions are given to us, but they are not motives or self-conscious desires. The rational self must consent to the disposition before it becomes a desire. Man is not bound down to the natural endowment. Reason enables him to transcend it. The independence of reason asks him not to accept the given nature as his natural destiny, but requires him to control the given and shape it conformably to the ends of spirit and reason. In rationalizing the given, or in forming character on the basis of the given material, we are free. The Vedanta ethics recognizes the limitations under which our human freedom has to work. We do not have the universal field of possibilities or ourselves to choose from. Natural forces, heredity, and environment limit our freedom. These external conditions may thwart the free passage of an idea into an act, but this cannot materially affect the human soul any more than poverty can debase or riches elevate it. Our duty is to stand for the right and fight for it. It does not matter

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whether we succeed or not. We must *do* the right whether the right is *done* or not. Thus we see that the karma doctrine is not opposed to an active life of exertion. We are not asked to sit idle in the belief that everything will follow the impulse of karma, but are asked to do our very best, through the exercise of reason to overcome the force of karma. There is a famous saying which asks us to "destroy fate by force of exertion."

Is the Vedanta ethics asceticism? The Vedantic principles of the energizing of the soul and the rational control of the senses are regarded as countenancing a life of inactivity. We pointed out that the Vedanta requires the due control and not the destruction of the senses. The Vedanta recognizes that the end-all and be-all of life is not the satisfaction of the senses. Life is more than animal enjoyment. If asceticism consists in the recognition of a higher principle than the animal, and in the call to sacrifice our lower interests for the sake of higher ends, then the Vedanta ethics is a type of asceticism. If the sacrifice of selfish desires, love of ease, and other sugar-plums in the cause of the right, is a feature of asceticism, then the Vedanta ethics is an ascetic code. But why say it supports a life of inactivity? The Vedantin knows that such a life is not possible, if desirable; not desirable, if possible. Arjuna at the beginning of the battle, in a fit of weakness, proposed to give up the warrior's career and assume the life of an ascetic. Sri Krishna protested against this resolve and advised him to do his duty unselfishly. The Vedanta philosophy teaches us that our lives are not ours. They belong to humanity, which ought not to be deprived of its possessions. Render unto humanity what belongs to humanity. "Not by abstaining from works does a man reach the actionless state; not by merely renouncing works does he attain perfection" (Bhagavadgita, III, 4).

There is absolutely no doubt that this lesson must be brought home to the drugged conscience of the average Hindu mind. Political apathy, lack of organization, ab-

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sence of the civic virtues, and a spirit of the exaggerated importance of relaxation and rest led to that great country's fall. The sad story of India's fall should teach every individual the utility of practical energy, efficiency, strength of character, and unity. Unless India recovers from her stupor, there is no chance for her. She must meet death from without. But if she takes to heart the lessons of her great religion and ethics, which bid her neither sit, nor stand, but go, she will have victory from within. It is a great pity that the Hindu religion and philosophy have been so interpreted in the past as to give color to a quietistic and unpractical code of duties, quite in accord with the introspective turn of the Hindu's mind. The whole spirit of the Bhagavadgita is a protest against this quietistic spirit. The highest religious philosophy of the Hindus requires each man to enter into the strife of the world and wholeheartedly to perform his duty. "Devoted each in his own work, man attains perfection" (Bhagavadgita, 18-45). Every man, according to the ethics of the Vedanta, is required to contribute to the national strength his quota of earnest work. It is by the adoption of this gospel of work that the nation can grow.

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## SWIFT AND WHITMAN AS EXPONENTS OF HUMAN NATURE.

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FOR our present purpose, we may consider three attitudes taken towards human nature, æsthetically considered as a complex made up of what common experience understands to be the material and the non-material. First, there is the attitude of the ordinary person, the natural man occupied with the business of living.

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He regards himself as made up of body and soul, an inseparable compound so far as this world is concerned. The soul he looks upon as nobler than the body. The body as a whole he accepts as a fact not particularly noble in itself, and yet also as a whole not ignoble either. But it has its ignoble aspects, its ignoble even if indispensable parts, which his training from childhood up has taught him to ignore, or, on all ordinary occasions, to make a decent pretence of ignoring. He does not allow his mind to dwell much on these unpleasant matters. But he takes it for granted that they are in the very nature of things unpleasant, a humiliating order of facts which for some reason have been made inseparably attendant circumstances of man's life in the world. These aspects are not for him the whole of human nature, however, nor even its most significant or characteristic part. They do not symbolize it for him, to the exclusion of what he regards as the nobler intellectual and spiritual sides of life.

The other two attitudes, here to be considered, are very different from this. They are also very different from one another; but they have this in common, that they are marked by the simplicity and absoluteness of fundamental æsthetic doctrine. One is the attitude of Jonathan Swift; the other, that of Walt Whitman.

The mind of Swift, as revealed in his formal literary work and in his published correspondence, is one of the most fascinating subjects that have ever engaged the attention of students. Indeed, it has had the fascination of an enigma which, if not insoluble, has at any rate not proved easy of solution. But so far as the *character* of his views on the subject here under discussion is concerned, it must be said that there is nothing enigmatical about them; the most straightforward and lucid style in all English prose literature has made it very difficult for even pedantry, laboriously searching for what is not there, to misunderstand Swift's meaning at any point. How he came to hold such views, and, situated as he was,

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to want to give them such expression as would probably cause the world to connect them forever with his name, and even make them synonyms of his name,—this is indeed an enigma; but it is not our enigma.

"But principally I hate and detest that animal called man," are the terrible and famous words found in Swift's letter to Pope dated September 29, 1725; perhaps, indeed, the most terrible words in English literature, when we remember that it was the author of "Gulliver's Travels" who wrote them, and certainly among the most famous. Their interest for us, and their significance for our purpose, are not in the slightest degree affected by the almost sentimentally charitable words which complete the sentence, "although I heartily love John, Peter, Thomas, and so forth." For it is in the words first quoted that Swift's deliberate judgment about essential human nature is recorded; the words that follow are only a confession of that human weakness of intellect and will which causes a man to let himself be temporarily browbeaten out of what he believes to be the truth, when he stands in the presence of the plausible concrete fact that has somehow managed to get a hold on his sentimental nature. For to Swift man was, unavoidably, when you considered him without bias, what the words quoted proclaim him: an animal, and, as such, hateful and detestable even to man himself.

It is hardly necessary to go into a minute examination of the evidence contained in Swift's works showing his belief in the essential and incurable animality of man. It is well known that part four of "Gulliver's Travels" is little more than a detailed presentation of this idea; it is perhaps less widely known that certain of his poems afford what is in some ways even better evidence of Swift's attitude in this matter; better because entirely void of the fictional element, nakedly and malignantly descriptive of what Swift considered the literal fact; nakedly and malignantly, but with a malignance of that entirely unimpassioned sort of which no

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one who has ever written, perhaps, was so great a master as Swift.

The mistake must not be made at this point of supposing that the works of Swift here alluded to are significant for our purpose, merely because they are what would, from the ordinary point of view, be regarded as decidedly nasty. Nasty they are; but their nastiness is not of the sort that has its roots in the joyous animality, for example, found frequently in Chaucer, or in mere coarseness of taste such as has always characterized a good deal of the jesting and story-telling practised in strictly men's company of certain grades and types. Nor yet is the attitude that of cynicism, mockery, bitter wit. It is something far more significant than either animal delight in the gross, or the spirit of the cynic and the mocker. For he who takes a genuine satisfaction in gross stories and obscene allusions, and indulges this taste whenever opportunity affords, merely shows thereby that these things are not, in his way of thinking, real evils at all, though that highly conventional creature, respectable society, may play at so regarding them. Man's animal nature, in other words, is not, in any of its aspects, a necessarily offensive thing to him, though for social purposes, and perhaps also out of regard for popular Christianity with its perpetually iterated opposition to the material side of life, it may be practically impossible to avoid acting most of the time on the assumption that it is.

The spirit of the cynic, the mocker, on the other hand, is a spirit which in the very act of utterance confesses itself to be indulging in the artificiality of literary expression, the exaggeration of hyperbole, the tricks of metaphor. But Swift's insistence on what common thinking considers the nastily animal incidents of human life is always calm, prosaic, literal. The hideous things he describes, he does so because, as he means you to understand, they are actually and literally there, and he does not want you, fine sir or madam, to forget them, as

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your ridiculously conceited bearing shows that you do constantly forget them. You can never feel, as you read in Swift some passage that dwells insistently upon what the writer clearly regards as loathsome or otherwise hateful in human nature, that you have here the work of a man who is temporarily seeing things out of proportion, by reason, possibly, of some recent unpleasant experience, and that if you read what he may write tomorrow or next week, you may find him taking you into much sunnier regions. On the contrary, you are always well aware that in no temper of mind possible to him could Swift ever approach the matter with which he is here dealing and see it essentially otherwise than as he here presents it.

It is sometimes said of Swift, as it is often said of other writers who deal with certain physical incidents of life which most writers are careful to avoid even suggesting, that he revels in nastiness. Of some writers about whom this statement is made it is undeniably true. Of Swift it is never true. In mere nastiness he takes no pleasure at all. But human nature is nasty, deeply and essentially so, as he sees it; and his sense of this fact is so insistent, his incapacity to tolerate conventional concealment and fine pretence so grim, that for him to refrain from all discussion of this bottom fact, and even all mention of it, is impossible. It is, again, sometimes maintained, and sometimes taken for granted, that Swift's tendency to dwell upon the physically offensive is due to the fact that the mind of the writer was diseased. This idea is made to look somewhat plausible when one remembers that in Swift's later years his mind did give way, and that it at last became an utter wreck. Nevertheless, the notion is not really defensible. It has its root in the perilous habit of accounting, in an offhand way, for anything in human conduct that one doesn't like by the assertion that the conduct objected to is the expression of a diseased mind. In all of Swift's work in which his abhorrence of what we may call the

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physical basis of life and its incidents appears, there is an unfailing lucidity which shows that the writer is always perfectly aware what he is about, and means something to the point. That being the case, it is surely unprofitable, for it leads nowhere, to say that Swift's attitude in this matter is the result of disease or insanity rather than of perfectly normal, however mistaken, thinking.

It is significant that the famous sentence already quoted as setting forth Swift's deliberate estimate of humanity in its ultimate and essential nature, is found in the letter to Pope in which he alludes repeatedly, always in the same vein, to "Gulliver's Travels," then soon to be published. Clearly, for Swift, the central feature of his book was not the adventures there recorded, nor even the satire on the institutions and practices of the time, that seemed to him ridiculous. For Swift, the essence of "Gulliver" was in part four. What was most valued by the author was the concrete presentation, in great detail, of the judgment through which, in his remark to Pope, he proclaimed man a hated and detested animal.

But it may be said that the Yahoos are not men, but only animals in human form, and particularly nasty animals at that. Now, it is quite open to any reader of "Gulliver" to say that this is in fact what the Yahoos are, animals, all but lacking rationality, and untouched by any of the refinements of social life. But that is not at all what Swift means by his presentation. In the Yahoos he has simply attempted to remove all the externalities and concealments from human nature, in order that we may the more clearly and surely see what we of necessity are. "Thou art the thing itself," he seems to say, far more terribly than Lear, because he says it without excitement, and means literally what he says.

It must be admitted that, in one important respect, Swift's treatment of the aspects of human nature here under consideration fails to be completely self-consistent. The virtuous and admirable Houyhnhnms are, of

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course, animals, in the biological sense; and therefore their bodies are of necessity the scene of all the physiological processes which go on in man's body, and which in that connection Swift finds so hideously offensive. Yet Swift simply does not allow us to think of these matters in connection with the Houyhnhnms at all. They are horses, but they are not animals; they are embodied rationality and virtue.

Perhaps the simplest way in which to formulate Swift's conception of human nature is to say that it was dualistic in character, but that this dualism was of a peculiar kind, in that all the emphasis in Swift's presentation of the case fell on the side of evil, and that so powerfully that the total effect is not that of dualism at all, but rather that of a monism of animality, of evil. Perhaps, indeed, there is a certain impropriety in applying the terminology of metaphysics to any work of Swift's, the life-long contemner of metaphysics, the rude mocker at all speculative thinking. But is there in all literature any better example than Swift of the self-destroying folly displayed in all denunciation of metaphysics not merely in particular, but in the abstract? Swift's doctrine of human nature is itself a metaphysical doctrine, for it concedes the possibility of no exceptions, it allows no limitations upon its finality either by the processes of history or the revelations of a more searching analysis. Man is, has been, and will be an animal of animals, nay, the animal of all animals which man himself, when he faces the matter squarely, is obliged to confess repels him most, the brutal beast which above all others he detests.

Now, we know that this doctrine of human nature is not a doctrine by which any man lives or can live. Swift himself, of course, did not live by it. He had friends whom he loved, and whose images in his mind, we must believe, were ordinarily not colored by disgust, were ordinarily not suggestive of the repellently animal, or even of the animal at all. The most analytical of minds



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is not continuously analytical in its intercourse with the world; and the depressing consciousness of the animal aspects of human nature is always the result of a process of analysis, and of oblivion, at least for the moment, of other aspects. But in ordinary consciousness it is the other aspects that are in the foreground or wholly in possession, it is the disagreeably animal aspects that are in oblivion. Swift was like other men in this respect; though perhaps oblivion of the disagreeable was never so usual or so long continued in his case as it probably is with most men. But Swift differed from the ordinary man in believing this oblivion to be unwarranted; he felt that those enemies of all common sense and honesty, sentimentalism, and human vanity and conceit, could only be kept within bounds by men's perpetually reminding themselves of the ugly facts. Such a reminder of these facts as literature could give he sought to bestow upon mankind in "A Voyage to the Houyhnhnms," for its author, as we have seen, the vital part of "Gulliver's Travels."

Something less than three quarters of a century after the death of Swift, in a happier land than seventeenth century Ireland, was born the man who was to be the eloquent mouthpiece of a view of human nature the direct opposite of Swift's; and in spite of the fact that his presentation of this view was to be made in language infinitely more decorous than Swift's, this man was to give far more offense by what he said than Swift's brutally plain speaking had given.

Whitman's view was as thoroughgoing and absolute as Swift's; and, as is the case with all such views on fundamental matters, which necessarily run counter at many points to that haphazard product of chance, instinct, rationality, and prejudice, that we call current practice, Whitman's ideas were as incapable of being lived out, so to speak, by their author, as Swift's had been, though for a very different reason. Swift could not put his ideas into practice, or, more properly, could

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not in his personal conduct act as if he thoroughly and at all times believed in the view he announced, because in his personal make-up, in spite of his bitter philosophy and his temper, he was a pronouncedly sociable person. Needing intercourse with his fellows perhaps as much as any man that ever lived, he naturally shaped his conduct, in the main, by his feeling for the individuals with whom he came in contact, some at least of whom he 'loved,' as he said, rather than by the hostility rooted in the general judgment that he passed upon their kind, —and his own. Whitman could not put his view perfectly into practice, because to have done so would have been to defy convention, and to defy it in ways that constitute very much the most perilous forms of daring upon which a human being can venture.

It is very difficult, indeed, to state Whitman's view without doing it injustice in the minds of most decent people, even to this day; an indication that it is really much further from the conventional view than Swift's is, though most persons who have thought only a little about the matter would probably at first dispute this. That Whitman himself found it difficult to state his views without giving offense, is perhaps sufficiently well known. Indeed, his early experiences, following his first publication, in 1855, of his "Leaves of Grass," would have constituted one of the great tragedies in the history of thought and of literature, had not the author been a person of truly philosophic mind and temper, to a degree equaled by very few indeed, if any, among the great poets of the world who have had what they believed to be a noble and life-giving message to communicate to men. Simple, sweet-minded, patient, and not so much forgiving as incapable of conceiving that there was any occasion of forgiveness on his part for the treatment accorded him, Whitman long stood in the popular mind for obscenity unexampled in modern literature at least, if even approached by the literature of any period in the world's history. That he is now somewhat generally

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known as the Good Gray Poet, has by no means made full amends to his memory; there are probably plenty of excellent people still alive to whom Walt Whitman is an abhorrent name.

And what is Whitman's view? One might briefly describe it by saying that it is in almost every respect the precise opposite of Swift's. This view pervades "Leaves of Grass," perhaps the majority of the poems in that volume giving more or less definite expression to it; but the rather long poem entitled "I Sing the Body Electric" may be said to have for its sole æsthetic purpose the enthusiastic utterance of Whitman's doctrine of human nature. The essence of that doctrine is implied in two questions at the end of section one:

> And if the body does not do fully as much as the soul?
> And if the body were not the soul, what is the soul?

This implied identification of body and soul represents, of course, a monistic conception of human nature, as opposed to the conventional view, and also to the one held by Swift. Swift's dualism, however, as it will be remembered we noted, was of this peculiar sort, that in his formulation of it the emphasis all fell on the side of the body, the animal side; the other side, inconsiderable and unimportant, serving hardly any other office than that of enabling us, by contrast, to appreciate to the full the hideousness of this animal side!

But if Swift's dualism is somewhat imperfect, from the viewpoint of logical consistency, Whitman's monism is equally so. "Was it doubted that those who corrupt their own bodies conceal themselves?" says Whitman in the first section of the poem already quoted. For Whitman, therefore, as surely as for Swift, what is evil may find a place in human nature. However, good and evil represent no metaphysical conceptions with Whitman, nor any doctrine as to the necessary nature, from the moral point of view, of any ultimate constituent of human nature. Whitman's conception of evil, indeed, is

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a purely utilitarian one. Only that is evil, and therefore to be avoided by one's self and disapproved in others, which interferes with the normal processes of life. For life is essentially a good and admirable thing; though it is in some degree capable of being conducted unwisely, that is, in disregard of some of the conditions prescribed, by its nature and environment, for its healthy continuance.

The whole group of poems called "The Children of Adam," of which "I Sing the Body Electric" is the longest, is a celebration in terms sometimes almost rapturous, of the glory of the animal body, and of the worthiness and beauty of all its parts, functions, and relations, when not marred by some abnormality. But it is very unfair to Whitman to forget, as most readers, probably, do constantly forget, that 'the animal' for him connotes something very different from what it connotes for our ordinary thought; something very different, yet not at all profound, 'metaphysical,' or difficult of apprehension, unless one tries to apprehend what simply is not there, as many, perhaps most, of us often do in abstract matters. The fact is, our common everyday thinking appears to be incurably dualistic. For it, man is a complex of body and mind, two facts so completely different that they have no common measure. For Whitman, this is simply not true; soul and body are literally one fact, not two ultimately different bodies of fact. The merely animal no more exists, therefore, than the merely spiritual; there is only the human, if we must have any 'merely' in the matter.

The beauty of the waist, and thence of the hips, and thence downward
toward the knees,
The thin red jellies within you or within me, the bones and the marrow
in the bones,
The exquisite realization of health;
O I say these are not the parts and poems of the body only, but of the
soul,
O I say now these are the soul!

This language, the final lines in "I Sing the Body Electric," might perhaps at first thought be interpreted

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as declaring that the soul is the ultimate reality. But that is not at all Whitman's meaning. If it were, we should have to say that Whitman's philosophy of human nature is merely one particular expression of what is commonly called idealism. But it is in fact impossible to read much of Whitman's poetry and come away from it with the feeling that one has here been in communication with what one ordinarily means by the term idealism. It is possible, no doubt, by the use of a good deal of speculative ingenuity, to offer a very plausible defense of Whitman's right to a place among the idealists. But it is only as the result of a resolute search for evidence looking in that direction, one may venture to say, that one arrives at that conclusion; it is not the spontaneous impression with which the impartial reader, the reader who is not preparing to defend a thesis, puts down "Leaves of Grass." Indeed, it would be much easier to make out a plausible defense for the assertion that Whitman's doctrine is the doctrine of pure materialism. That it is such a doctrine is probably the impression which the majority of Whitman's readers carry away with them; and it is easy to see why this should be so.

What we call the intellectual interests, the intellectual side of human nature, receives very little consideration at Whitman's hands. Contrary to the impression one might get from the character and source of the admiration that Whitman's work has called forth,—Whitman's ardent admirers, as is well known, while not numerous, have yet included some of the most famous English men of letters and thinkers of the last fifty years,—Whitman is not at all rich in ideas. Few writers, in fact, who have so strongly impressed intelligent readers with their originality and power, have come so near to the artistic sin of monotony in ideas as Whitman. It is, indeed, his *ideas* that he emphasizes in his poetry, not concrete pictures of particular fact; but these ideas are few in number. Nowhere in all English literature, however, can be

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found an equal body of non-narrative poetry that so impresses the reader with its extraordinary concreteness; or possibly physicality and sensuousness will give the meaning here better than concreteness. Probably the first thing the ordinary reader notes about Whitman's poetry, aside from the absence of meter and rime, is the frequency with which he employs long lists of terms, most of them naming or describing physical facts, such as make up the bulk of section nine, for example, of "I Sing the Body Electric."

Yet Whitman is not a materialist, any more than he is an idealist or a spiritualist. Perhaps the fittest term to apply to him is the term naturalist. A naturalist, indeed, he may with perhaps more propriety be called than any other of the great writers and thinkers who have laid claim to the designation, or who have been branded with it by critics who have liked neither them nor the word, nor any conceivable form of the doctrine it labels. For the ordinary realist either ignores outright those features and incidents of human nature which are conventionally regarded as non-respectable and even ignoble, or else so dwells upon these matters as to leave the reader with the impression that interest in the physically disagreeable, the offensive, is of the very essence of realism, if it does not even go so far as to imply that the real is the foul, and the foul is the real. But Whitman is continually talking about these things, never obscenely, never with any hint of the leering jest, never with any suggestion of disgust, but always with what any reader who lays claim to the smallest literary discernment ought to be able to see proceeds from a mind that is absolutely clean, and incapable of understanding how offense can reasonably come from the contemplation of these matters. He respects them, he even rejoices in them, not at all because he identifies them with the soul, nor even because he looks upon them as necessary attendants on the life of the soul in this world; he respects them, he rejoices in them, because they are a

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part of the nature of man, and because in that nature he sees no hierarchy of parts ranging from the toplofty heights of spirituality to the lowest depths of animal nastiness.

We have already noted Whitman's concession that evil may get into human nature,—that, for example, the fool may corrupt his body. "Have you seen the fool that corrupted his own live body? or the fool that corrupted her own live body?" he says at the end of section eight of "I Sing the Body Electric." Here is implied the doctrine of normality and abnormality; and it must be admitted that here Whitman's monism suffers what looks like a lapse into dualism. At first one feels disposed to wonder at this. It seems odd to find that Whitman, who among conventional and respectable persons is looked upon as a pure pagan, nay, more, as one who is simply disregardful of all moral considerations, has apparently at bottom a good deal of the old Puritan about him. Here, one may at first feel disposed to say, is evidence that in spite of its occasional affectations of continental looseness or freedom, as one chooses to phrase it, in spite of the most extreme of its poses and vagaries, American literature is at its basis incurably Puritanic.

But when one has put it so, one must then almost instantly see that, so far as Whitman is concerned, this is a mistake; and that one's first feeling about Whitman is the right one: the feeling, namely, that impassable gulfs yawn between Puritanism and Whitmanism. It is a common view of the matter that Whitmanism is merely Emersonism, perhaps Emersonism queerly expressed, and a good deal vulgarized, but still Emersonism. The view is an entirely indefensible one. If one were writing the natural history of Whitmanism, so to speak, one might perhaps argue that acquaintance with Emerson's thought was a germinal fact in the growth of Whitman's mind. But that is a very different thing from arguing that the views of the two men on fundamental matters

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are essentially the same. The two bodies of thinking that we may label Emersonism and Whitmanism are not in reality any more nearly alike than the two men are seen to be when one studies their lives and personalities. Emerson is the Puritan New Englander, conventional and ultra-respectable, in spite of all his somewhat vague and intangible radicalism, less obviously Puritanic, no doubt, in his writings than in his personal tastes and the habits of his life; but still essentially Puritanic; while no one, certainly, would ever dream of labeling Whitman a Puritan, unless one arrived at that notion by the mistaken road taken by those who pronounce Whitmanism to be merely a sort of vulgarized and yawping Emersonism. But whatever be the relation between Emersonism and Whitmanism, the distance between Whitman's view of the world, and particularly of human nature, and Puritan dualism, is wide indeed. For in the Puritan view, the schism in human nature between the good and the bad, the noble and the ignoble, the earthly and the spiritual, is deep and irremovable, the most conspicuous and important fact, by far, in the entire world order. But surely it is not too much to say that one rises from a reading of "Leaves of Grass" either entirely oblivious of abnormality as a possibility in human nature,—and abnormality and mistaken opinion are the only forms of evil that Whitman's conception of human nature finds any place for,—or else feeling it to be a fact so comparatively infrequent and inconsiderable as to constitute hardly so much as a flaw in the crystal perfection of the cosmos.

In truth, the presence of evil in man's nature, in the form of abnormality and mistaken opinions, is hardly more stressed in Whitman's poetry than in the very nature of things it must be in the utterance of any doctrine in the truth and importance of which its propounder deeply believes. Behind the utterance of every doctrine, however cheerful, there is the implication that there are in the world false ideas which work harm and which must

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be destroyed; there is implied, in other words, the existence of a certain measure of evil. He who proclaims what he regards as a true philosophy hopes thereby to work the most important of all transformations in human opinion, and therefore in human life: he hopes to make error on fundamental matters give way to truth. Even the optimist, by the very act of announcing his belief that the world in which he lives is the best of all possible worlds, advertises the fact that by means of this announcement he hopes to transform it into a better one.

It is, at any rate, impossible to doubt the absolute sincerity of Whitman's belief that natural human nature, if we may be allowed the term, is through and through decent, worthy, admirable, noble. His doctrine was not a pose, it did not represent mere ill-tempered dislike of the conventions of life because these conventions are the expression of the humdrum and average mind trying to shield itself from itself, it was not a mere literary novelty worked for all it was worth by a man eager above all things for literary fame, or at least for a literary hearing. It was the honestly held belief of a sweet and simple nature, of a man naturally temperate, in the proper sense of the word, clean-minded, courageously but never defiantly and rudely unconventional in his conduct, but withal, shrewd and sensible in his advocacy of thoroughgoing naturalism, and therefore duly regardful of the fact that radical alterations in men's ways of living, if they are not to result in more harm than good, must always wait on changes in men's ideas, and in the general level of sentiment and feeling.

Is it necessary to point out that during the last hundred years the western world has moved in Whitman's direction, rather than in Swift's? We are not so shocked as our grandfathers and our grandmothers were at the thought that whatever else we are, we are at any rate animals. Possibly by reason of our recognition of that fact we think better than they did of all that is animal; so far, at least, as it is merely animal, and not connected

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with disease or involving hostility to the physical well-being of men. One who reads much in the serious periodical literature of the day would probably admit that the indignant denial of the idea that man is no better than an animal, so common in such literature even so late as thirty years ago, is now hardly to be found, unless in some belated utterance of a last survivor from that old day. This is not because we think less well of ourselves and our kind than did those magazine writers who thirty or forty years ago assailed the early advocates of the idea that man is a latest step in a process of change from the lowest forms of animal life. In accepting this change as one of the facts of nature, man has not so much suffered degradation in his own eyes by reason of his admission of his kinship with the animals, as he has felt himself compelled to revise his notions of the 'merely animal.' The 'merely animal' is for us now the fundamentally and profoundly remarkable, the potentiality of all thought, all art, all history, all experience, not merely a name for some homely and even offensive processes completely understood, vulgarized by familiarity even when not offensive, and temporarily housed in a body subject to all the hateful processes of decay, and therefore itself hateful.

The western world has moved in Whitman's direction rather than in Swift's. Swift, indeed, discussed offensive subjects because he wanted to offend; Whitman, because he thought that they should not be considered offensive. The number of subjects that it is now looked upon as offensive to discuss publicly, under any circumstances, grows smaller year by year. The insistence, during some time past, in many respectable quarters, on the advisability, even the imperative necessity, of the State's providing instruction to the young in sex hygiene, has many of the earmarks of a fad. But this agitation is probably not all fad; and in any case, even as a fad, it would have been impossible in any earlier day. It is not many years since all respectable periodicals intended

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for general circulation took care so far as possible to omit all reference to the fact of sex, aside from the mention of it in certain set phrases whose office it was lightly to allude to a conventionally recognized distinction in human beings; a distinction which it was pretended nobody thought of as having any but social and habilimental implications. Above all things, such periodicals never would have allowed that open recognition of the physiological implications involved in the abundant use of the phrase 'sex hygiene' with which the news of the day, as recorded in journals of all sorts, has recently made us familiar.

It would be foolish to argue that this particular change, and the general change of which it is but one evidence, is due to the influence of Whitman's work. Some influence, no doubt, Whitman's advocacy of the idea that the body is a wholly decent thing, has had. But there is little doubt that if one were to inquire into the matter carefully, one would find that in the main Whitman is merely one representative of a tendency that has a deeper origin than the mind of any single person, even so extraordinary a one as Whitman. Without pretending that the formula explains this tendency, we may describe it as a steadily progressing conquest of naturalism in life and thought. This, however, is not saying that Whitman has not gone far beyond that tendency in this particular matter. Perhaps he has gone much further than naturalism will ever follow him. It is possible that naturalism, as it expresses itself in the works of men of science, will, even when it takes final form, if it ever does that, find itself unable to disregard, as of purely social and conventional origin, the aversions that human beings feel for certain physical aspects and features of human life. It may therefore never be able to admit that these aversions are themselves mere abnormalities, of which human society as well as human thinking must rid itself absolutely if human life is ever to be perfectly healthy, clean, and sweet. It may, for practical reasons, and

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especially in the interest of the public health, do the best that it can to conceal the gulf that yawns between the two parts of human nature, the decent part and the part that must be veiled; but it may conclude that this gulf is as real, if it is not so deep, as most men tacitly assume it to be.

That belief was not Whitman's. So long as there are in the world people who, whatever common sense and the instinct of conformity may lead them to do, find a satisfaction, and a deeper common sense, in thinking of the human nature that they share as through and through a wholesome thing, so long Whitman's courageous utterance of his doctrine will find admiring listeners. Possibly "Leaves of Grass" will be a force perpetually operative to prevent at least fairly educated men and women from ever yielding wholly to that odd instinct which prompts human nature to defame itself to its own imagination by insisting that certain parts of itself are inescapably shameful and abhorrent; an instinct which has found its most conspicuous expression, among English-speaking people, at least, in the ever memorable and unloved writings of Jonathan Swift.

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## THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY.

WILSON D. WALLIS.

THE problem of personality is frequently approached from the point of view of introspection, by which means, it is supposed, the individual will most readily fathom the intimacies of self-hood. Then, by inference, he may hope to learn something about other personalities, using his own introspective experience as a guide. It seems clear that introspection has distinct advantages and that there are some ways in which we are better

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equipped to study our own personality than the personality of any other. This advantage is found in the more detailed information which we have with respect to our own minds and conduct, giving us both a broader grasp as well as a more intimate knowledge of the things which make or characterize personality. We are, for example, because of this more intimate knowledge of our own history, better able to single out the causal or formative influences from among the complexity of antecedents. It is not easy to determine in the case of another what has been the influence or group of influences which should induce us to anticipate a certain type of character as embodied in conduct, since we may never know as intimately as the individual in question what these several groups of experiences were. Nor is it so easy to determine the component elements of the psychic complex of this individual at the time he reacts upon these experiences; yet the character of the whole psychic complex determines the outcome as much as the nature of the particular experience which precipitates action. In every case, the nature of the reaction as well as the mere apprehension of the influence must vary with the nature of the whole psychic complex.

In so far, then, as introspection gives more detailed and complete knowledge of the history of individual psychology with its accompanying behavior, it possesses a substantial advantage over other methods of estimating personality. But if introspection has distinct advantages, it has no less its own limitations. (1) It presupposes the culture of a certain social group and will itself be influenced by the contact which the individual applying it has had with other individuals. (2) Moreover, it is sufficiently problematic whether the individual can always determine efficient influences in his own case, treated as a unique experience, with more exactness than he can determine them in the case of others whom he studies under various conditions. In his own case, the conviction that a certain experience would induce an-

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other anticipated particular experience, might be the element which makes condition A, including this conviction, sufficient to induce condition B. Only with great difficulty could he make the proper examination of himself with a view to determining the effect of this conviction, whereas a broader examination, including other individuals, might readily correct such a false induction. (3) The experience of the individual being unique, does not supply in itself means whereby the trivial can be separated from the important, since in his own experience they may have been associated in constant intimacy. (4) Again, he will have to observe his own behavior as another would observe it, in order both to check up and to give meaning to his introspective analysis. (5) His own case will not furnish more than individual history, whereas a higher purpose asks for tendencies of development, or forms of behavior which include individuals of various types. There are times when a man does not know himself as others know him; there are times when he cannot appreciate the meaning in his own life of tendencies in behavior except by looking to other biographies or autobiographies for the solution,—or at least for a suggestion of it.

So long as we can introspect after the manner of traditional psychology, we might look for personality in the character of the experiences, and much more in the way in which the several experiences are attended to, unified, and arranged in the individual's hierarchy of values. This consciousness, the psychologists tell us, must be something more than a stream of thought which simply flows, having more than a vague disparate cognizance of the various phases of its life. It implies a taint of consciousness in which all its states are somehow united, severally modifying the whole personality of which they are a part, and by virtue of which they receive a significance and an interpretation which makes into intelligible unity what otherwise would be meaningless disparity.

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If we had a superior power of introspection and introjection which would enable us to understand in detail the human psychic existence about us, all their subjectivities becoming objective for us, it is, *a priori,* conceivable that they would exhibit an endless array of similarities and common content which, apart from the individualizing element, would present an array of monotony defying, in the absence of differences, any comparison. There might be no more variety among all these consciousnesses than among the books run off successively from the same type; or, they might differ as much among themselves as do the books on the shelves of any well-selected library,—a difference extending not only to form, color, and massiveness, but much more to emphasis, unity, value. Just as two books may deal with the same material in different combinations, and so, inferentially, if not expressly, assign different relative values, so two minds may present remarkable similarity when viewed in their subjective disparity, that is, when viewed in sections or in portions, whereas the relative values given these by the individualizing of them may exhibit significant contrast or even opposition. Hence, subjective states, which to our superior penetrating intelligence are similar in their component elements, may eventuate in, or may present in their wholeness and in their hierarchy of values, results which are dissimilar. The cross-currents of moral resolutions which disturb my stream of consciousness may, individually, not be different from those which penetrate yours. Yet your resolves may come to the surface in time of need and at the opportune moment for effectual discharge, while mine may desert me at those very times when they could direct thought or influence action. When we say that in consciousness it is not amount or variety but quality which gives significance to life and enables us to draw the distinctions which lie deepest, we mean no more than that similar subjective states are individualized in those different ways which do actually and of themselves make

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all the difference in the world. The value of experience is not in knowing much, but in being able to judge wisely.

This test of personality we should apply in every instance where application is possible, irrespective of whatever additional tests may be adduced. It may be called fundamental in the sense that it gives us a better understanding of personality, in so far as it can actually be applied, than does any other approach. We have already mentioned some of the difficulties of application, and they are serious.

How then shall we learn of personality? "Wherever subjective attitudes stir us up and ask for agreement or disagreement," says Münsterberg, "there we appreciate personalities." How subjective attitudes, so long as they remain subjective attitudes, *can* stir us up is, however, the central mystery within whose inner recesses Münsterberg has not ventured. We fear it must ever remain a mystery unless these subjective states manifest themselves in modes of behavior. So far as this behavior is observable, it can be made the object of a particular study, and we can learn of personality with such limitations and possibilities as are attendant upon the pursuit of the method selected. The method may scarcely admit, because of our limitations in observing human behavior, of catching the 'fleeting spirit' or of penetrating to the 'core of self-hood.' We may, however, to a certain extent determine the unification of experience and the different ways of evaluating, in so far as the individual acts, and furnishes in his behavior something which we can observe and deal with in a systematic way.

By applying an objective test we can make a comparative study of personalities, in so far as they can be reduced to a common denominator. If first results be crude and unsatisfactory, we may still hope that the improvement of our methods of observation, as the essential problems become clearer, will eventually give us new and valuable insights into personality, insights which the



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limitations inherent in other methods could never afford us.

We cannot, of course, study the behavior of an individual as an isolated thing. So far as his behavior tends to become an isolated thing, it becomes meaningless. The behavior of an idiot may have an internal consistency equal to that manifested in the behavior of an oyster, but the idiocy will remain so long as individual consciousness fails to relate itself or its meaning to social mind. Without some active, rational coöperation with the social group, the individual will not possess personality. Indeed, in any attempt to arrive at personality, we shall have to relate the individual mind to social mind.[1]

We are prepared to venture this definition: Personality is the successful correlation of one's individual

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[1] Thus our problem will be seen to be distinct from the problem of individuality and again from that of the ego. From among these individualities and these egos we must single out the characteristics that entitle one to be called a personality. In view of the above objections, we cannot accept Dr. Rashdall's solution (see his essay entitled "Personality: Human and Divine," in "Personal Idealism," p. 383) to the effect that, "what a person is for himself is entirely unaffected by what he is for any other, so long as he does not know what he is for that other. No knowledge of that person by another, however intimate, can ever efface the distinction between the mind as it is for itself and the mind as it is for another. The essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself. It is there that his *principium individuationis* is to be found,—in what he is, when looked at from the inside." This test will not distinguish between personality and the illusion of personality, between achievement and the illusion of it. By Dr. Rashdall's test the decision as to whether a man is a lunatic, as society and the experts adjudge him to be, or whether he is actually the reigning king of England, as he believes himself to be, must be determined by consulting the individual in question rather than by consulting some more inclusive standard.

Mr. Bernard Bosanquet also would seem to reject our principle of explanation, his own theory of the value of experience being not unlike that of Dr. Rashdall. In "The Principle of Individuality and Value" (Macmillan, 1912), p. 188, he says: "I confess that the primary subjectivist argument seems to me to be simpler than introjectionism, and to apply to one's private experience without consideration of the relation to others. . . . It is, I believe, an error in fundamental principle to try and obtain any conclusion from comparison with others' experience which cannot be got from comparison with our own at different times."

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program with the program of the group. The lowest type is that which merely adapts individual program to group program; the higher type is that in which the individual adapts the program of the group to his own programmatic ideals or demands. The former we may call adaptive or lower personalities, the latter, compelling or higher personalities. The correlation of programs will be expressed in the correlation of types of behavior. This behavior may be immediate and actual or future and potential, depending upon whether the behavior is now observable or only inferable,—that is, potentially observable. Intelligent imitation may stand for one type; securing acceptance of one's own reform measure will stand for the other. The correlation may, of course, be brought about rapidly, so that the adaptation is made actual in the lifetime of the individual, or it may not be complete until long after the personality has ceased to exist in the corporeal individual with whom it was identified. Thus, Plato's personality is assured whether or not he did as a matter of fact adapt the program of Athenian society to his own programmatic ideals, since he has at least made this adaptation in the case of later social groups. Such a method of arriving at personality may be difficult, because it is difficult to trace back from complicated conditions a persistent influence which has passed from a given individual to a group through the medium of many generations, which, in transmitting it, must themselves have been influenced by Plato. The fact that this influence works through varied media is no more an objection to accrediting the influence to the individual from whom it emanated, than the fact that a lightning bolt produces its effects only through atmospheric media, is an objection to attributing to it the particular effects which we lay at its door.

Such a conception is of necessity not without an implication of historical sequence. Personality must be viewed, if at all, through a time perspective. The time element, however, is merely incidental, and centuries do

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not furnish a condition different in kind from the moments of individual life which are required for the construction of any individual plan or the realization of any idea. The individual does not become a personality solely through his own efforts, for no agency is able to achieve its influence save through a coöperation of other agencies none of which can be wholly passive, that is, can be nonentities. Be the limitations and conditions of the two types of personality what they may, "the one is the effort of such consciousness to take the world into itself, the other its effort to carry itself out into the world." The one may be the receptive center of the culture and influence of the past; the other

> to his native center fast,
> Shall into Future fuse the Past
> And the world's flowing fates in his own mould recast.

If, as Matthew Arnold writes,

> Most men eddy about
> Here and there,—eat and drink,
> Chatter and love and hate,
> Gather and squander, are raised
> Aloft, are hurled in the dust,
> Striving blindly, achieving
> Nothing; and then they die,—
> Perish,—and no one asks
> Who or what they have been,
> More than he asks what waves
> In the moonlit solitudes mild
> Of the midmost ocean have swell'd,
> Foam'd for a moment, and gone,—

then most men have notoriously failed to achieve personality. The influence which leaves but a temporary disturbance in social behavior, inculcating no new element in the rational purposes of the group, is not a personality-making influence.

The time element qualifies the social and the individual program in much the same way. In the struggle of group program with individual program, the efforts of the group do not become ineffectual upon the individ-

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ual's program after the short period of the individual's life, if his post-mortem existence has any meaning for the group; conversely, the struggle of the individual program may persist through a long span of years limited only by the life of the group in which it is being realized. Plato still affects and is affected by the program of society so far as Plato stands for a concept whose meaning can be realized. It may be objected that society will not now modify Plato's program; but it will be admitted that it may modify it in so far as Plato's program is a meaningful concept or a felt force in society. It may, indeed, read into it interpretations which, the insight of higher minds may agree, are false. It no doubt does so continually. Accordingly, it will, perhaps, be always possible to infer that a progressive change of program on the part of society is being effected by Plato, while Plato, in turn, is not free from the compulsions of the social regime.

Two possible objections to this conception of personality may be anticipated. May not a personality such as Plato be equally an achievement even though,—perhaps by some misfortune,—he has never given his thoughts to society? Isn't it defining Plato in terms of what happens outside of Plato? This does seem something of a paradox, but if paradox it be, it is born of necessity. We estimate the strength of the battery in terms of what happens outside of it, we estimate the energy in a body by the behavior of those bodies outside it with which it comes into contact. The paradox can make little claim to novelty.

It seems incumbent upon us, if we would estimate Plato at all, to estimate him in terms of something outside of Plato's 'real self' in the traditional psychological sense, in terms of something affected, which is to say effected, by him. Just now we are not concerned about a Plato who could not be estimated. The supposed objection suggests a question of our own: Would not Plato have had equally a claim to personality if it had so hap-

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pened that only early death in a good cause precluded him from reaching solutions to the problems which he had set himself? There seems no way to estimate personality except in terms of achievement made objective, and if Plato alone has profited by his achievements, he has himself alone to blame for society's lack of response and recognition. Even the most subtle influence, if it cannot be expressed in terms of observable achievement, —not necessarily observed achievement,—has no meaning. Moreover, granting the possibility, an achievement of personality that involved no wider social achievement would merely have the unenviable completion of turning back into itself without leaving so much as a record of its existence. No life in itself can achieve much; progress is forever thwarted unless it can be embodied in a social program. For descriptive purposes, the possibilities of purely individual advance are negligible,— they would not make a respectable foot-note in the history of culture. Short and small is the life of "the man who seeks to assert himself, to realize himself, to show what he has in him to be, in achievements which may make the world wonder, but which in their social effects are such that the human spirit, according to the law of its being, which is a law of development in society, is not advanced but hindered by them in the realization of its capabilities." The 'spirit operative in men' is possible only in a social program that gives expression to, while it countenances, the realization of certain ideals that the individual seeks to realize. If the individual cannot escape from the 'grip of the musty past,' it is because social program is of such vital importance in the realization of any individual program. "Social life is to personality what language is to thought."

Again, it may be objected that our definition of personality in terms of correlation of programs is purely descriptive, implying no real distinction between lower and higher. The forceful Schopenhauer, whose pessimistic philosophy induces his whole group to make way

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with their lives, would be ranked as a personality equally with a no less forceful Alexander, who emphasizes the social life, extends the state bounds, gives new impetus to the social development and adjustment. Should we not introduce some ethical test, or at least a social or cultural test,—survival, for example? We certainly do not attempt to flee from ethical implications. Neither do we feel called upon to confront them now. Personalities are as amenable to ethical evaluations as are any other individuals; certainly an attempt to point them out cannot be considered an attempt to equalize or to shield them from further discrimination. As to survival, although it is, of course, no evidence in itself, yet almost invariably the survival of a group is one of the necessary conditions for the working out of its higher ideals. Plato would have enhanced his personality, in so far as he had given to the Greeks that greater opportunity to survive which was the *sine qua non* of the realization of that higher cultural status which he wished to be realized in future social achievement.

The vague concept of comparative cultural value should not be treated lightly though briefly. This much may be ventured as to what appears to be its inevitable relativity: It will embody a certain,—indeterminate because constantly fluctuating,—balance of intellect and emotion that will vary with each cultural group; it will not be possible to estimate it save in terms of the whole group life. That is to say, there is no cultural value independent of a group life, and there is no non-socially prejudiced way of estimating a value which transcends our group prejudices. We are as unfitted as is the savage to estimate the comparative worth of our distinct cultural values. You would have to be born, bred, and aged in Bushman society in order to appreciate the value of that culture, thus unfitting yourself for estimating any other. Such values exist because of our peculiar accommodation to peculiar circumstances of tradition and habit, and there is no common meeting-ground for

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the ideals and satisfactions of various cultural groups. Remove the historical conditions and, for the psychologist of comparative culture, these values exist just because they do. The very nature and dependence of these values precludes any standard for impartially estimating them. So far as this is true, judgments upon cultural values must be relative; hence, to a certain extent, any hierarchy of personalities would have to be relative, and no standard for estimating them would be applicable to all cultural groups alike. It seems to us that the description of personality which we have given will be equally applicable, and our definition equally justifiable, whatever arrangement these personalities and the cultures they reflect may receive in a hierarchy of ethical values and whatever position may be assigned them by the philosopher in an all-inclusive *Kulturgeschichte*.

In conclusion, let us consider the application of social psychology to the problem of personality. In our definition of personality we seem to have opposed the individual to the group. The question now arises whether we are to explain personality in terms of individual psychology or in terms of social psychology. The distinction seems to be essentially one of point of view, the preference depending in the last event upon the decision as to which method of approach is better suited to our purposes. The problem will, perhaps, be clearer if we take for consideration a small but self-sufficient and well-organized tribe at a low scale of culture where we are without the complex relations of civilized life. From one point of view, the tribal group may be conceived as embodying certain beliefs and activities common to all the individuals which compose the tribe, or, as may be, centered in one or more of the group activities which, working in coördination, express the tribal life. The psychology of the tribe or of the component group considered as so many units, we may call social psychology; and we may apply the same term to the psychology of the individual members of any group so far as we study

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them either collectively or severally as component elements of the group. Viewed from the perspective of social psychology, each so-called individual action or activity can be explained as in some way the outcome of the group-life, and will fall within some one of the categories which social psychology supplies or may find it necessary to invent in order to serve its purposes. It is as justifiable to class individuals in this way as to class them in categories of weight, height, or color; moreover, the classification is desirable in so far as it serves our immediate purposes and does not conflict with higher purposes. If, however, we suppose that this, because wholly true, is the whole truth, we mistake aspect for wholeness. The facts of social life will just as well answer to an analytic individual psychology, which will fully account for the phenomenon of individuals acting in a more or less definite and ascertainable coördination, as they do when we find them associated in one common group life; their own nature and tendency to react under various social stimuli making that group life possible. For this reason, we may approach the problem either after the manner of Ross and Durkheim by studying group activities, or, after the manner of McDougall, reach the social psychology through the psychic make-up of the individual members of the group. Since the concepts of social psychology are indispensable to our present purpose, we shall, in the main, approach the problem from this point of view.

Social psychology should supply us with at least two kinds of information, the possession of which is a requisite in any attempt to estimate personality. That information should be, first, with regard to the range of action and thought or of behavior, actual and potential, which the socio-psychological *milieu* offers. Such information can be had only by a detailed study of the whole culture to which the individual belongs, and obviously, will differ with every social group. Hence, the indications of personality cannot be found in any defi-

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nite type or types of behavior, but is wholly relative and must be estimated in terms which vary with every cultural group.

In any social group, whether of civilized or of primitive peoples, as social psychologists we should be able to predict the behavior under certain various circumstances of the individuals belonging to that group. In some cases we should not be able to predict because of inadequate understanding of the conditions; in some we should find our prediction failing because, inevitably, certain individuals constantly show themselves to be apparent exceptions to the law which applies to the great mass. So long as the social psychologist is consistent with his initial conception, he will explain this latter case as he would explain the former, *viz.*, as a misunderstanding due to insufficient grasp of the situation. Even though he should never be able to get intimate and detailed information sufficient to satisfy his demands, he would no more admit these apparently spontaneous activities to be without the laws of social psychology, than the physicist would admit 'chance' in the physical world to be independent of the physical laws which apply rigidly in the world of matter.

Even so, be it admitted that this is merely remaining consistent with a chosen point of view labeled a 'conception,' without involving the necessity of supposing that it will answer all our needs in striving to arrive at an appreciation of human nature. Moreover, as that which defeats the expectations of social psychology is merely an expression of the limitations of that science in making its inductions, and does not signify a program with false presuppositions, it may be objected that we can scarcely find in these apparent exceptions the quality of personality which we seek. It is true that these exceptions include lunatics as well as geniuses, criminals as well as reformers, and as exceptions furnish no test for discrimination. The criminologists and the social psychologists tell us that to a certain extent such

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things as suicide, crime, insanity, can be anticipated in number and locality, if not in the family circle itself. A knowledge and consideration of such exceptions is not without its value, for it seems both to give information as to the fixity or variability of the social type and to show the comparative uniformity or complexity of the various influences to which the individual is subject.

In the range of action and thought, or of behavior, actual and potential, may be included the whole range of imagination as shown in the ethical ideals,—however glaringly discrepant with actual behavior,—in literature, in laws, in social forces, in myths and traditions. When we attempt some solution of the problem of personality in primitive society, where the comparative simplicity makes possible a many-sided approach and a grasp of all the vital aspects of their culture at once, this range of imagination, as we find it in myths and in social and ethical ideals, will give us a distingushing psychic atmosphere that is indispensable for comparative purposes. It supplies the range of suggestions which may act through the individual upon the group in a more definite and pronounced way, giving new trend to the group's development and assuring increased progress along certain particular lines. Thus, working wholly within the realm of social psychology, the adaptive may become the compelling personality, since the inspiration is social rather than individual, objective rather than subjective. In a word, our concept of personality seems most adequate for comparative purposes; interpreted in terms of social psychology, it enables us to see the extent to which the *rôle* of personality corresponds to conscious or unconscious changes in the group activities. It does not proclaim nor prejudice any ultimate interpretation of these phenomena.

We possess personality in so far as we deflect the social program, be the society a small one or an all-inclusive one; in so far as we achieve personality, our petty lives become living parts of infinite mundane progress.

University of Pennsylvania. Wilson D. Wallis.

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## BOOK REVIEWS.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION: ITS ORIGIN, FUNCTION AND FUTURE. By James H. Leuba. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912. Pp. x, 371.

Professor Leuba's valuable book is made up of four quite distinct discussions. The first is an attempt to define the "nature" of religion, and to discriminate it from other types of human reaction upon experience; the second is an inquiry,—based chiefly upon anthropological data, with some supplementation from child-psychology,—into the origin of religion and its relation to other phases of primitive belief and practice; the third is a refutation of "empirical apologetics," *i. e.*, of the attempt to base religious beliefs purely upon "the testimony of inner experience"; and the fourth is in the prophetic vein, offering an outline of a "religion of the future" which seems to the author, on the one hand, not to be in conflict with modern knowledge, nor, on the other hand, to be incapable of performing the characteristic functions of a religion. The third and fourth of these topics are the ones most pertinent to the province of this JOURNAL; and it is upon them, also, that Professor Leuba has the most significant things to say. It seems best, therefore, to consider chiefly these.

The author's examination of "empirical apologetics" has (if I may, perhaps somewhat unfairly, take advantage of the tardiness of this review to remark the fact) been curiously misunderstood by certain of his critics. Some even seem to suppose that he proposes to derive from psychology a proof of the non-existence of God! Yet his argument, though somewhat diffusely expressed, seems clear enough. Characteristic, he observes, of much recent theology, has been the attempt to secure a change of venue from the court of philosophical argument and that of scientific or historical evidences, by an appeal to the "immediate certitude of religious experience." This experience is declared to offer positive proof of certain objective realities, external to the consciousness of those possessing it; it is even held by Principal Forsyth to have some bearing upon such a question of history as the resurrection of Jesus. The logical futility of

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this sort of apologetics has often before been clearly pointed out;[1] Leuba's criticism of it is not novel in principle, though it is especially full and thorough. The effect of the change of venue, he notes, is merely to transfer the case to the bar of psychology. The apologist's plea in this court may take any one of three forms. He may contend that religious experience includes phenomena so anomalous that no categories and no laws which have been, or ever can be, recognized by psychology can account for their causation; and that therefore they must be ascribed to "supernatural" agencies. The burden of establishing this negative is clearly upon the apologist; it is a burden which he has not as yet sustained; and he could only sustain it by adopting the rigorous analytical methods of the psychologist. He may, however, contend that the subject of the religious experience knows himself, *in that experience,* to be directly acquainted with such objective entities as a personal God, or a risen Christ. The psychologist's answer to this is evident. The education of the subject, the mythology in which he has been bred, determines the imagery or the ideational content accompanying certain natural experiences primarily affective in their determining conditions. He feels a sense of helplessness or of sin, and subsequently escapes from it; if he has been religiously reared, this will probably take the form of a representation of an anthropomorphic being from whom he is at first estranged but to whom he is finally reconciled. And the intensity of the emotional experience will give a vivid "sense of reality" to the representations associated with it. But whether those representations are of Varuna, or Yahweh, or a patron saint, or the historic Christ, or the Transcendental Ego, will depend upon whether the subject of the experience is an Aryan hymn-writer or a Hebrew psalmist or a Roman Catholic or an evangelical Protestant or a neo-Kantian philosopher. But the empirical apologist may, thirdly, give his argument a pseudo-pragmatic turn, and contend that the often profound moral efficacy of certain religious beliefs is a proof of the existence of the objects believed in. On this Leuba truly though brusquely remarks that "the superficial way in which the new theology uses the pragmatic conception of truth makes that conception appear ridiculous."

[1] Notably by Coe, *Hibbert Journal,* January, 1908.

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The destructive effect of this criticism of the ordinary argument from subjective religious experiences to objective theological entities cannot, it seems to me, be denied by any serious and honest reasoner,—unless it be by a neo-realistic epistemologist, whose doctrine implies that *all* that subjectively appears objectively is. Yet this result must not be understood to mean,—nor does it, apparently, mean for the author,—that the experiences of the inner moral life have no philosophical significance, no ontological implications. Not, indeed, that the moral life is dependent for its source or sustenance upon any metaphysical or religious doctrine. But it *suggests* such a doctrine. For it compels us to ask what is implied by the fact that "the world is so constituted as to produce the moral experience." And the answer to this question which the author seemingly regards as legitimate and probable, is no mere 'naturalism.' "No system of philosophy is less firmly established than Naturalism." There is nothing which forbids man to regard his moral endeavors as part of a vaster process, and as a canon for interpreting the meaning and prevailing tendency of that process. "A religion in agreement with the accepted body of scientific knowledge, and centered about Humanity conceived as the manifestation of a Force tending to the creation of an ideal Society,"—such is Professor Leuba's "religion of the future." One is left at the end, it must be said, not quite certain whether the author means to be the prophet or only the predictor of this religion.

Of the two remaining parts of the book there is no space to speak adequately here. I may, however, be pardoned for seizing this opportunity to correct a somewhat misleading reference, in the discussion of primitive beliefs, to an hypothesis of my own on the subject. Speaking of the now marked tendency among anthropologists to recognize a non-animistic,—which probably, but not demonstrably, was also a pre-animistic,—phase of early belief, Leuba rightly notes that the first important expression of this general view,—which, however, at the same time was being independently forced upon many students by accumulating ethnographic evidence,—was in a paper of Marett's in 1900. In this paper, however, Marett made the essence of this "pre-animistic religion" consist in "the apprehension of the supernatural or supernormal," and therefore named the belief "teratism." Leuba proceeds to quote from me a few sentences in criticism of Marett's view on this point, and expresses dis-

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sent from these (p. 13). The reader would naturally gather that Leuba's view and mine on this matter are at variance. In fact, the theory which he accepts as to the origin and content of the primitive "idea of impersonal power" is essentially that which I advanced in the paper[2] with which he has the air of disagreeing; while with the substance of my dissent from Marett he is in accord. That early "conception of nature," which Leuba calls by the already too diversely denotative name of "dynamism," is precisely the conception which I proposed to call "primitive energetics," or, after the most familiar Indian word for the concept, "manitouism,"—and the wide diffusion and importance of which I tried to make evident, chiefly by an examination of the mode of use of the principal native terms expressing the idea. I cannot but think the author a little infelicitous in conveying the impression of a purely critical attitude toward what was, in fact, the original formulation of an hypothesis (and of the principal evidence for it) of which he himself makes great use. At all events, he and his present reviewer differ about "dynamism" only with respect to the most convenient way of naming it, and with respect to one minor question, which could be shown to arise chiefly through a confusion about terms. Leuba, however, seems to me to make far less use of the hypothesis than the facts would justify. The idea of *mana* or *manitou* profoundly interpenetrates other elements of early belief, and affects the development of religion in many significant ways of which he takes no account.

The value of the book as a whole is somewhat diminished by two characteristics of the author's procedure. The first is a lack of continuity. Having begun a psychological interpretation of the history of religion, the author carries this no farther than the supposed primitive stage. What one naturally would expect would be a continuation of the same historico-psychological study through the higher phases of religious evolution. Through the lack of this, even the discussion of origins seems truncated, cut off from the developments in which much of its interest and value would consist. And, in the second place, such attempts as Leuba makes to reach general conclusions about religion in all its phases are,—like most similar attempts,—vitiated by an odd

[2] "The Fundamental Concept of the Primitive Philosophy," *The Monist*, 1906.

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neglect of a point of elementary logic. He hedges his inquiry about from the outset with a careful 'definition' of religion; but he is often not quite clear whether his definition is (a) merely a statement of what he prefers to designate by that name, or (b) a statement of the common elements in all the enormously diverse historic applications of the term, or (c) an analytical description of certain complex observable phenomena occurring at various phases of individual and racial development. What we desiderate is the last; but when Leuba tells us that religion "is" this or "is not" that, he is often reasoning merely in a circle; his exclusion of certain elements from the nature of religion, and inclusion of others, frequently means no more than that these elements do not fall within his own definition, or within that suggested by prevailing usage. At certain critical points the argument is singularly confused by this error. I suspect that it would have been better if Professor Leuba had, at least at the beginning, altogether dispensed with a definition of religion.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

The Johns Hopkins University.

THE POSITIVE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION: ITS MORAL AND SOCIAL REACTION. By Frederic Harrison, D.C.L. London: Heinemann, 1913. Pp. xx, 267.

This series of public discourses contains a summary estimate, from the Positivist point of view, of the successive phases of religion from Nature-worship to the Religion of Humanity; the larger part being devoted to discussion of the present claims made by the various forms of Christian orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The last chapter is an estimate of Comte, delivered on the occasion of his Jubilee (1907).

It is with this last that I find myself most completely in sympathy. Comte was really the type of philosophic hero he is said to have been; and it is hardly possible to exaggerate the greatness of his mind or of his actual achievement. Of course, Mr. Harrison does not try to represent him as faultless, or propose such an exceptional life as a model for general imitation; and in deprecating the usual strictures on Comte's perversities of intellect, he merely observes, with perfect truth, that "the history of philosophy is marked by astounding blunders and enor-

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mous absurdities, many of them committed by the greatest philosophers of all." Again he says: "For my part I am not at all convinced that it belongs to any single intellect whatever . . . to group and coördinate all human science in one whole, complete and accurate in all its parts." Substituting for "not at all convinced, etc.," "convinced that it does not belong," I can accept nearly all that his most enthusiastic disciples say of Comte's immense synthesis. I would add that, of all the great philosophers of the nineteenth century he remains the one of whom first-hand knowledge is still the most enlarging and stimulating.

To enable humanity to make the right use of this synthesis, however, considerable readjustments may be needed, some of them even revolutionary. The great scheme of social and spiritual reorganization having been once propounded, its modification, of course, needs powers much less than those of the founder; and to a certain extent they can be effected by going back and taking up omitted elements from other philosophers. For some of these, though only one or two are comparable in grasp of knowledge as a whole, were in the specialized and traditional sense more distinctively philosophers. This means for me that the taboo on metaphysics and on the more speculative kinds of science must be removed. I cannot admit that "to devote serious labor to" problems such as occupied Kant or Mill or Darwin or Clifford "is the mark of an immature, untrained brain" (p. 13).

This no doubt is a commonplace in the criticism of Comte. Another such commonplace refers to his historic estimate of Catholicism. Here I must point out that Mr. Harrison follows him in his unfairness to Protestantism and Deism. He says, for example (p. 38): "We may look forward to the time when the collapse of Biblical Inspiration will force many honest Protestants to take shelter in the vague pretensions of the Catholic Church"; and again (pp. 180, 181): "The Catholic Church . . . has never planted itself on a Book." As a matter of fact, the Roman Catholic Church is by recent decisions more deeply committed to the inspiration of the Scriptures than any Protestant Church. In criticizing pure Theism, again, it is distinctly unfair to say that "God is made in the likeness of each individual Theist" (p. 219, *cf*, p. 64). Classical Theism, ancient or modern, is really not in this sense "idiomorphic." It



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would be quite untrue to say that Cicero or Voltaire thought of the universe as governed by a being something like his individual self but more powerful. This could be said much more truly of the typical Catholic or Calvinist divines. While on this task of criticism, I must also note that Neoplatonism is wrongly said (pp. 193, 194) to have ended with Hypatia. The greatest of its later teachers, Proclus, came afterwards; and the interval between the murder of Hypatia and the closing of the Neoplatonic Academy by Justinian is precisely a year longer than the interval (to compare events on a larger scale in the annals of triumphant Catholicity) between the Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

If I were not afraid to lengthen this review beyond reasonable limits, I could find much more to comment on in this strain; as also I could quote many pointed expressions with which I exactly agree. This citation of points of agreement and disagreement is, however, especially inappropriate in discussing a thinker like Comte, with his predominant looking to the whole. He is much too great for his attitude to Catholicism to be explained merely by personal prejudice, or even by the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth. There is, I believe, an explanation of a deeper kind. Just as Plato,—to whom in his aims he has far more resemblance than to Aristotle,—was so powerfully impressed by the organization of the ancient East with its appeal to the synoptic spirit[1] that he took it for his political model; so Comte took Catholic organization, remotely derived from this and making a similar appeal, for the permanent type of order in the whole future of the human race. Alike for the ancient and the modern thinker, the highest caste or class, selected for intellectual and moral qualities, was to give the direction from clear rational insight, and not from the traditional principles of a customary order; and so far they belong preëminently to the philosophic succession of Europe. Yet both alike, in view of the apparent anarchy of the newer world, failed to recognize fully that it has an organic tradition of its own, differing from the old. It is true that both perfectly well knew that they themselves had sprung out of this 'anarchy'

[1] I note, in passing, the special stress that Dr. Merz, in the philosophical section of his "History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century," lays on this aspect of thought, and the importance he assigns to Comte's phrase, *'esprit d'ensemble.'*

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to which they wished to put an end. The Socrates of Plato acknowledges that nowhere but at Athens would his own kind of questioning and searching activity have been permitted so long; and Comte is quite aware that he himself belongs, as much as Voltaire or Rousseau, to the "revolutionary transition." What was somehow concealed from Plato and Comte and revealed to the mere average 'liberal thinker,' is that henceforth even the form of the old hierarchical order must be to Europe an alien thing. Thus, the reimposition of it, by Cæsar and Constantine and their successors, meant a reversion; it cannot be understood simply as a phase in an ascending series. As regards doctrine, no doubt Comte admitted this. He does not fail to see how the whole system of Catholic Europe was relatively dehumanized by its doctrine of 'exclusive salvation.' Even with this allowance, however, it still seems to me that a change of perspective is needed in his sketch of universal history. Wonderful as it is, the first scientific outline on that scale was not likely to be at all points right even in principle. But I must say that the Positivists, as a school and in their practical activity, do not seem at all more liable than other progressive minds to retrograde moods. All that is needed is that they should recognize a little more explicitly that even on some major points Comte's system may not be final.

THOMAS WHITTAKER.

London.

THE PRESENT RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION. By the Rev. Prof. T. G. Bonney, Sc.D., F.R.S. London: Robert Scott, 1913. Pp. xi, 212.

If there are any who regard Christian apologetics as necessarily worthless, this book, by a comparatively liberal dignitary of the Church, who has also held a professorship of science, is not likely to alter their opinion. The book begins with some information, generally sound if rather scrappy, on recent science, from which the transition is made to a defense of theism and then of Christianity as a revealed religion, with inclusion of the miraculous element. Some of the history even of science might be better. The conservation of energy, for example, is said to have been established mainly by Lord Kelvin (p. 25), not a word being said of Mayer or Joule. Of course, Lord Kel-

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vin's work had much to do with giving exactitude to the statement of the principle; but his name is more distinctively associated with the second law of thermodynamics, the dissipation or degradation of energy. Metaphysical questions, the author tells us, never attracted him (Preface, p. ix); and certainly his knowledge of the history of philosophy contrasts unfavorably with his knowledge of the history of science. The position of Epicurus and Lucretius was, he says, "that, though the Deities had called the universe into being, they had then left it to its fate" (p. 93); and, on the next page, Aristotle among other philosophers is said to have taught that "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Different as the two systems were, neither that of Aristotle nor that of Epicurus included a creative deity or deities.

From the chapter on "The Credibility of Christianity" I quote a sentence in which some words I italicize make very pointed a difference of attitude between author and critic that renders argument hopeless. "There was, in almost all creeds, *however rudimentary in character and debased by superstitions,* an expectation of 'signs and wonders'" (p. 143). To me the surprising thing would be if in the kind of religions described in the italicized clause, there had not been this belief in the miraculous. I note some later argumentation worthy of a Church Father. The Virgin Birth Professor Bonney tries to support by the fact of parthenogenesis (pp. 161, 162), though, as his science is more recent than that of Origen, he limits his citation of evidence to the invertebrata. For the Trinity he tries to find analogies in minerals different in physical properties and geometrical relations while chemically identical (p. 177). Professor Bonney's relative liberalism appears in the admission that the story of the Church's efforts, "in medieval and later times, to stifle scientific inquiry and to persecute those who were seekers after truth, is neither a pleasant nor a creditable one" (pp. 183, 184). Yet the degree of tolerance implied is not great; as appears when he deprecates the policy of certain clerical extremists because a formal declaration of war against science would have been "a fertile source of infidelity" (p. 192). This means, we are to be free to think and speak as we like on geology and biology, provided we call ourselves Christians. No more now than in any former age will Christianity consent to exist in an atmosphere of discussion as one of many possible

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philosophical views. Those who openly reject it are to have affixed to them the stigma of a term in intention opprobrious.

Quite rightly, as I think, the author insists that if the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection, and the Ascension are no longer to be accepted as miraculous events, Christianity must go. Of course, no one now regards these stories as deliberate falsehoods, least of all the most radical critics, who find their substratum to be mythical; but it is impossible to agree with the reason given for not regarding them as such. "That the story [of the Resurrection] should be a deliberate falsehood is most unlikely, because the leaders of [the infant] Church, though they might not be infallible, were obviously men who would have scorned anything of that kind" (p. 195). Of the leaders of the infant Church we know nothing historically; but that the leaders of the Christian Church as known to history would have scorned falsehood cannot be admitted. Deliberate falsehood, in the shape of forged Sibylline oracles, forged dispatches of Pontius Pilate to Tiberius, etc., was a regular part of the early Christian propaganda; and the most lenient way of putting the case as regards the leaders is that they simply did not care about truth, but only about securing the acceptance of a certain dogma, forgeries being rejected only when they were doctrinally suspect. No heathen opponent of Christianity failed to make the point that the Christians were indifferent to truth.

London, England. T. WHITTAKER.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by James Hastings, M.A., D.D. Vol. V: Dravidians—Fichte. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913. Pp. xvi, 908.

The fifth volume of this Encyclopædia will sustain the reputation made by its predecessors as a treasure-house of learning of all kinds bearing in any way upon the history of ethical and religious origins and development. As usual, the anthropological articles are exceptionally full and valuable, and have the great merit of not expounding the doubtful conjectures of any one man or school as though they were established fact. Specially interesting are the articles on Dress, Drinks (both by the Rev. A. E. Crawley), Education (a composite treatise by several well-known authors), Egyptian Religion (Prof. Flinders Petrie), Eschatology (Canon J. A. MacCulloch, who also disposes ad-

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mirably of many absurd ideas which may still be found haunting the work of some who ought to know better, in a briefer article on Druidism), Ethics, Ethics and Morality (this latter virtually an anthropological treatise in itself), Etruscan Religion, Eucharist, Fairy (Canon MacCulloch), Family (another great composite anthropological monograph), and, to my mind, at least, in view of certain tendencies of our own times, that on the Female Principle by Dr. Starbuck. Space precludes mention of the many briefer articles (*e. g.,* that by Professor Kirsopp Lake on Epiphany), which will probably attract the special attention of students primarily interested in Church History. (See also the articles, Ebionites, Elkesaites, Essenes, Expiation and Atonement.) In the composite article on Dreams it was perhaps an oversight on the part of the present writer to pass by the theories of Freud which seem to be 'catching on' everywhere at the present moment. He can only plead that he is not convinced that, so far as the dreams of a normal man are concerned, the hypotheses of Freud really contain much more truth than is expressed in the article in question by the remark that "the cue for the interpretation of our dream-sensations is given by our emotional interests." Among the articles on History of Philosophy may be noted that on Empedocles and that on Epicureans by R. D. Hicks. The former should have pointed out the importance of Empedocles for the early development of Greek medical theory. In the latter it is a pity that no attempt is made to allow for the Academy and Aristotle as influences which have left their mark both on Epicurean Physics and on Epicurean Hedonism. Epicurus's very definition of pleasure is from an Academic source, and his most characteristic position (the theory that pleasure reaches its acme as soon as "uneasiness" is expelled) is hardly explicable except as a deliberate attempt to challenge the pleasure-pain theory of the *Philebus.* It is surely wrong, also, to see in a contemptuous reference to the "Fate of the physicists" a "pointed allusion" to the long-deceased atomists, Leucippus and Democritus. The allusion is made clear by the scornful observation of Epicurus about "astronomers and the fools who admire them." He is thinking of his standing enemies, the Academic men of science, who, in their turn, used their astronomy (as in the *Axiochus*) as a basis for the kind of theology to which Epicurus objected.

The University, St. Andrews. A. E. Taylor.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAITH. By Bertram Brewster. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. Pp. 201.

Mr. Brewster's purpose is to vindicate the reasonableness of moral and religious beliefs higher than those pronounced reasonable by the application of the methods of natural science. In the Introduction and the chapter on Truth he argues against rigid adherence to the 'agnostic principle' as enunciated by 'rationalist' writers like Huxley, Clifford, Leslie Stephen, and Romanes. There are a number of beliefs outside the field of natural science altogether, which are of fundamental importance to the welfare of the individual and of the human race. Such beliefs may be cultivated, or weakened and lost, and it is our duty, other things being equal, to hold to beliefs which are morally more valuable. "Men do not sufficiently realize that they have a responsibility in regard to the government of assent." It is true that such considerations as these cannot produce immediately particular convictions on matters of theology. One cannot directly coerce one's own beliefs: a man's explicitly formulated belief that it would be good for himself and for others to believe that God exists, will not of itself enable him to believe that God exists. The business of a philosophy of faith "is primarily, not to create new convictions, but to provide a *rationale* for those already entertained, or, if need be, to demonstrate their irrationality." Nevertheless, the appreciation of the legitimacy of such 'extra-beliefs' as that in the moral government of the world may do much to free the mind from the depressing effect of a vague scepticism which is inimical to the higher interests of the soul.

With this one may be disposed to agree. What one feels disposed to object to is the way in which, having vindicated the general reasonableness of moral and religious beliefs as against a rigid application of Huxley's 'agnostic principle,' Mr. Brewster proceeds, without further ado, to assume particular items of orthodox theism. Thus at the end of the Introduction we are told that "either we must suppose reason itself to be a product of blind forces in their nature and origin destitute of reason, or we must believe that there is a Providence which concerns itself in some wise in the making of human intellect, and why not, therefore, with our further spiritual development?" There are surely many 'extra-beliefs' which stop short of a be-

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lief in a wise Providence. So, also, at the end of the first chapter (on Truth), Mr. Brewster says: "That the real nature of things is neither hostile nor indifferent to spiritual interests we are bound to believe; and the very existence of knowledge is but the first of many intimations which point clearly to this." It may be reasonable to hold other beliefs than those yielded by natural science, but this is merely to clear the ground for a discussion of such other beliefs each on its own merits, and with a due regard to the kind of evidence which is appropriate to such beliefs. Moreover, in several passages Mr. Brewster appears to assume without question not merely that the course of organic evolution is such as must lead inevitably and invariably to the survival of higher and higher forms of life, as a biologist would understand the term 'higher,' but also that "nature is perpetually striving through cosmic and secular forces for the renovation and betterment of mankind, her chosen ones, often in spite of themselves." It is not at all obvious that the conditions of survival are such as to necessitate progress in biological evolution, still less that nature may be trusted to insure the triumph of good over evil. Such optimism is not necessary to a theistic position and does much to discount the real fervor and eloquence with which Mr. Brewster argues for theism in the later chapters. Of a piece with his optimism is the subjectivism of Mr. Brewster's theory of knowledge. On page 191 he says, "In order to know anything, truly and certainly, it is necessary to be that thing, or to comprise it within one's subjective consciousness." On page 165 he argues that "all consciousness is properly consciousness of self, in the wider sense, that is, of the contents of one's own consciousness. To deny this is self-contradictory." It is self-contradictory to deny this statement, because this statement is a tautology, meaning no more than that I am conscious only of things of which I am conscious. On the other hand, if the statement is anything more than a tautology, it may be argued for, but it is by no means self-evident.

Birmingham, England. E. H. STRANGE.

L'UNITÉ MORALE DES RELIGIONS. Par Gaston Bonet-Maury. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913. Pp. 214.

The motto of this book, taken from M. Sabatier, indicates its maim thesis: "A mesure que les hommes approfondissent leur

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être et descendent dans l'intimité de leur nature spirituelle, ils découvrent le même autel, récitent la même prière, aspirent à la même fin." In other words, amid all the variety of dogma and ritual, the moral basis of all religions is held to be in its main outlines the same. This condition is supported by an examination of the moral system of the principal religions of Europe, Asia, and Northern Africa; but the omission of all reference to the religion of savage tribes seriously detracts from the value of the book. The author has no difficulty in producing a great deal of evidence in support of his theory; but it would be equally easy, by dwelling on differences rather than on resemblances, and by taking a survey which included the whole world, to defend a precisely opposite view. The evidence of the International Congresses of Religion, to which the author devotes a chapter, is not worth much, for those who attend such congresses are generally biased in favor of the "moral unity" view. The book is an able piece of special pleading, but a more exhaustive, and above all, a wider survey is necessary for the substantiation of the author's conclusion.

London, England. J. B. PAYNE.

THE ETHICAL APPROACH TO THEISM. By G. F. Barbour, D.Phil. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1913. Pp. vi, 115.

Dr. Barbour's book is concise and clear, and contains as much as many larger apologies. On the other hand, there is no attempt to work out the metaphysics underlying his argument. He rejects any pantheism, and also agrees with Hume's attack on the common theistic arguments from the world as effect to God as cause. But he avails himself of Mr. Bradley's doctrine of degrees of reality, to select attributes for the chief reality: in morality we are acquainted with a high degree of reality in such a way that we can say that the innermost being of the world is good.

Unfortunately, Dr. Barbour gives no metaphysical justification for this use of Mr. Bradley as a theistic coöperator,—nothing to show that this conception is possible apart from an Absolutist position, no hint as to what he means by 'reality.' Nor does he make an attempt at all to meet the usual and very obvious objections to any ethical metaphysics. Lastly, how the conclusion that the innermost being of the world is good, leads

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to a unique personal God, and then to Christianity, is left altogether untouched.

The second half of the book treats of "Aristotle and Christian Theism," and will be of interest to believers in that religion.

Trinity College, Cambridge, England. R. SMITH.

THE CONCEPT OF SIN. By F. R. Tennant, D. D., B.Sc. Cambridge University Press, 1912. Pp. ii, 282.

This book seems just an exercise in "Christian Ethics," and has little interest for the pure philosopher. There is a discussion (Ch. III) in which Dr. Tennant holds that the term 'ethical' should be restricted to voluntary action, and that any wider appreciation is 'æsthetic': there is certainly need here for a much fuller analysis, and recent work on value is quite ignored. The psychological part of the book (Ch. V chiefly) is traditional: indeed Dr. Tennant,—and many will agree with him,—seemingly regards certain philosophers, whom he quotes constantly, as being of equal authority with the Bible.

Chapter VI touches on the Freedom of the Will. Dr. Tennant discards determinism, and declares for a 'self-determination' which will save the future from being as fixed as the past. He holds that all determinists, perhaps, should be associationists. Here, again, there seems to be too meager an analysis, and an inadequate recognition of certain important positions in philosophy.

In one of his appendices (Note B), Dr. Tennant discusses the "Explanation of Sin," taking in principle what may be called a commonsense position. But the real problem of evil which must occur in any theism, is left well alone: a solitary sentence, it is true, tells us that God is responsible for the possibility of sin, man for its actuality, a remark plainly leaving untouched any difficulty in principle.

Trinity College, Cambridge, England. R. SMITH.

EVOLUTION AND THE NEED OF ATONEMENT. By Stewart A. McDowall, M.A. Cambridge University Press, 1912. Pp. xvi, 155.

This book is written to ease the difficulty of aligning the central tenet of Christianity with the belief in evolution. First

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Mr. McDowall establishes the existence of God: the environment "which calls out spiritual phenomena . . . must be of a nature that demands spirituality" (p. 16). Again, only a transcendent mind, which includes, and therefore is, the total environment of the whole world, can be the continuous cause of all phenomena (Ch. I). The fundamental cause in evolution is "a vital impulse," "an unconscious refusal to accept the present as the end" (Ch. II). This evolution proceeds by the inserting of some indetermination into matter; for in detail it is unforeseeable even by God, and so it is free (p. 40). We know we are free (p. 46). To be free is to be purposive (p. 48), as a *result* of the vital impulse. Sin is voluntary opposition to this impulse (p. 65); a self-alienation from the world-plan. (It is the free checking of freedom, we might say.) Now God alone cannot reunite man to himself, for that would make man unfree, and man cannot do it, as he is imperfect. Hence the Atonement. But I cannot see that Mr. McDowall connects it in principle with the difficulties he has raised.

In any case, even accepting the validity of his method of proving God to exist, we may complain that Mr. McDowall's account of evolution is incoherent. How can both God and the vital impulse be the cause of all? In what sense is what is free a result of anything? Why should God not interfere with a being who having sinned, is so far not free, *or* in what sense is he unable to do this? Again, how can we call the indeterminate a "plan," and argue from it as "result" to any particular agent? If we know what God is to do, he is determinate; if he is not, we cannot know what he will do. It is not a solution to call the Bible "that wonderful text-book of Evolution" (p. 136), although as such it is doubtless *very* wonderful. The great defect in such work as this, and in that of M. Bergson, is a lack of precise analysis of such notions as 'determination,' 'causality,' 'law,' and the like. But Mr. McDowall's book is an interesting example of the sort of pluralistic reasoning which is becoming so current, and it contains a good deal of purely theological matter on which I have not touched.

R. SMITH.

Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

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HEREDITY AND MEMORY. By James Ward, Sc.D. Cambridge: The University Press, 1913. Pp. 56.

The mnemic or psychological theory of heredity has the fascination belonging to all explanations which say that something apparently mysterious is really a case of something so familiar that we never feel it to be mysterious; once an illumination of this kind has burst upon the human mind, there seems no limit to the amount of paradox we can swallow. When Samuel Butler, that *mauvais sujet* of science, caught up Hering's memory theory as a stick to beat Darwin, and showed us, with all the charm of his wit, the chick pecking its way through the shell because it remembered the lessons accumulated by millions of ancestors in the course of evolution, we joined in the sport and almost felt that there might be 'something in it'; but in the heavier hands of Professor Ward the fun falls rather flat.

The theory is roughly as follows. In acquiring some accomplishment,—say playing the piano,—I begin by moving my fingers in the proper way by the help of memory. With practice, intellectual effort ceases, and the desired movements become 'secondary automatic,' my accomplishment becoming more perfect, the greater the *rôle* played by reflex action and the less the *rôle* played by conscious direction. In fact we cannot be said really to know how to do something until we can do it without thinking. Everyone knows how 'function perfects structure' in this way, constant repetition creating a system of nervous and muscular machinery which works of itself. And everyone knows how necessary the formation of such habits is to a man's successful development. Why not, then, regard the production of a successful species as taking place in the same kind of way as the production of a successful individual? The relation of inheritance which holds between descendants and ancestors will then appear in a new and intelligible light: it will be the same as the relation between the later and earlier phases of an individual. The many repetitions required before I can build up, on the basis of habit, the structure which will enable me to play the piano, have their analogue in the infinite repetitions necessary to the development of a new organ in the course of evolution; and the precision with which I can play the piano, once the habit is formed, is represented by the rapidity of embryonic

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growth, the cell which grows into an animal traversing in a short time nearly all the stages of life from the highest to the lowest. The cell is able to go, in a few months, through a process which, in the case of the race, required æons of geological time, because, with the perfection that comes with habit and habit alone, it remembers how to do it. Such is the mnemic theory of heredity. Its attraction is that it seems to offer a way of escape from that drab mechanical view which would account for the development of the higher forms of life by natural selection working on chance variation, and that it implies a conscious purpose in evolution.

On the other hand, it has one great drawback: it implies that acquired characters are to some extent transmitted; and this, as Professor Ward admits, 'the majority of biologists' now deny. He urges, indeed, reasons why we should not accept this verdict as final, but it is to be observed that his contention, even if correct, does not by itself afford evidence for the mnemic theory. Even if acquired characters are transmitted, it does not follow that the mnemic theory is true. And he gives no positive reasons for supposing it true, except those drawn from the above rather vague analogy. But surely, when we reflect on what is meant by saying that memory operates in forming habits, the analogy breaks down. The cause of my present automatic actions when I play the piano is the fact that I performed certain acts of memory in the past; if, then, we are to explain heredity in terms of memory and habit, we must find some entity which performed the necessary acts of memory in the past. But what entity?

Professor Ward sees this difficulty. He says that it is "meaningless to talk of memory unless we are prepared to refer it to a subject that remembers" (p. 55). But in this lecture he does not tell us what that subject is. All he tells us is that the mnemic theory cannot be true, unless we hold with Leibniz and Spinoza that "all individual things are animated" (p. 56); and such reasons as he gives here for thinking that it cannot be true both that there are some inanimate things in the universe, and that the inheritance of organic things from one another is a kind of memory, do not seem very conclusive.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England,

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PERSONALITY. By F. B. Jevons, Litt.D. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1913. Pp. viii, 171.

This book is the result of four lectures given by Dr. Jevons at Oxford, in the Vacation Term of Biblical study. In the first chapter, Dr. Jevons points out that physical and psychical science may conveniently ignore personality: he might lead a lay reader to think that *no* psychologist believed in an Ego. In Chapter II he attacks the views of Hume and James, and Chapter III presents a similar attack upon the doctrine of M. Bergson. This task is accomplished with considerable skill, and Dr. Jevons treats a difficult subject in a pleasant and readable manner. His argument is possibly invalid in part, but the point is too involved to be discussed here. The question is not only whether there is a thinker or not, but if there is,—what is its nature: we must not conclude that it is that of the popular soul. However, so far the book will repay popular perusal.

The fourth chapter, on the other hand, seems quite confused and vague: I mention some of the points in it merely because some readers may wish to be guided to such philosophy. Dr. Jevons opposes the 'rational' to the 'mechanical' as that which moves upwards and onwards: this may be a definition, but more likely it is a play upon words. Terms such as 'unity' and 'coherence' are used without any explanation. Persons are actually taken as 'members of one another'; otherwise, thinks Dr. Jevons, they would be unrelated. The relation between them is also one of love: this is taken as alone making it possible for one self to know another, in whatever way it is possible. Love, again, is the principle of logic: this is proved by a pun on 'self-contradiction.' And a variety of theism is, of course, introduced, and the doctrine of the Trinity made as clear as the relations between ordinary persons.

R. SMITH.

Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

THE CROWNING PHASE OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. A Study in Kant's Critique of Judgment. By R. A. C. Macmillan, M.A., D.Phil. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xxv, 347.

This book gives an exhaustive account and criticism of Kant's "Critique of Judgment" with a view to showing its importance in

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relation to the rest of Kant's philosophy. It begins with a very clear statement of Kant's epistemology. This is, of course, written uncritically, from the Kantian point of view, and presupposes some previous acquaintance with that line of thought. For so brief a statement, it is, however, very lucid, and succeeds in showing the importance of the "Critique of Judgment" as the outcome of Kant's previous work.

The main part of the book deals with Kant's theory of æsthetics and its relation to teleology. Professor Macmillan has three aims: to state what Kant believed to be the fundamental principle in æsthetics, to justify him as to the connection which he makes between æsthetics and teleology, and to show the important modifications which he believes both these questions made in Kant's own theory of knowledge. This undertaking has certainly a good deal of metaphysical interest, but to a reader primarily interested in æsthetics the perpetual reference which the argument makes to Kant's metaphysical position would be somewhat exasperating. Some of Professor Macmillan's own views, which he now and then allows to appear, seem more interesting than those of Kant, and one would almost wish that he had not kept so strictly to his task of exposition.

The real purpose and value of the book, however, lies, not in its theory of æsthetics, but in the attempt which it makes to add something to the traditional view of Kant's philosophy. Professor Macmillan hopes to prove that in the "Critique of Judgment" Kant modified his theory of knowledge, owing to the connection which he there established between æsthetics and teleology. On page 280 he says: "Our main contention throughout this study may be put in the form of a question: why should the "Critique of Judgment" have been written if Teleology is to gain nothing from Æsthetics?" What he really believes is that there is ground for supposing that Kant came to hold finally that his intuitions of reason were not merely regulative principles, but had objective reality. Professor Macmillan, as he tells us in his preface, had arrived at his interpretation of Kant before he read M. Bergson's works. His line of thought is, as a matter of fact, very closely allied to that of M. Bergson, and I cannot help feeling that he has read into Kant modern ideas which Kant himself did not anticipate. The vitally important difference between the philosophies of Kant and Bergson has been held to be that for the latter, though our

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knowledge of external reality is held to be symbolical and to depend upon the practical bias of our intellect and the discrete nature of our faculties of perception, yet we have immediate knowledge of reality in our intuition of our own selves; whereas for Kant all knowledge without exception is merely phenomenal, and we *never* get any direct knowledge of anything in itself. What Professor Macmillan would like to show is that in his proof of the existence of God, the Soul, and Immortality, Kant really based his argument on a belief in the noumenal validity of our intuition of our own nature, upon which he claims that these intuitions of reason are based. Whether Professor Macmillan can really establish this claim the reader will judge for himself. In any case, the book is likely to be of much interest to students of Kant's philosophy.

KARIN COSTELLOE.

London, England.

EDUCATION AND ETHICS. By Emile Boutroux. Authorized translation by Fred Rothwell. London: Williams & Norgate, 1913. Pp. xliv, 236.

This attractive volume of addresses is not, as the title might suggest, merely a treatise on the vexed question of moral education. The author has evidently not much faith in the value of direct theoretic instruction in ethics, the treatment of morals as a school subject, a lesson to be learned. On the other hand, he evidently holds that any subject may be so taught as to be an instrument of moral education, and that the school is pre-eminently a place in which to form those habits of mind and will which make the good life possible. As he says in the preface, in giving these lectures he had in mind "a certain idea of education." And this idea is expressed in Pascal's words: "The very principle of ethics lies in the effort to think well," if we understand by thought all that participation of the intellect in "choice discernment, delicacy, lofty ideas and character" which morality implies. This point of view which is central for M. Boutroux, is especially illustrated in the latter part of the book. In the earlier, he gives first a survey of "the leading types of ethics involved in our civilization." The reason for this is clearly the sound belief that intending teachers (to whom the lectures were addressed) ought to be familiar with the

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great moral systems. Surely this higher moral instruction, as it might be termed, should be recognized as an essential part of the teacher's equipment, since moral training is the concern of all, and as M. Boutroux well says, "the philosophic systems are but the reflections of great minds on the moral notions by which we live." Thus the chapters on Hellenic, Christian, and modern scientific ethics may be regarded as "typical lectures to students in training." They concern the "spirit of teaching."

The classification of theories adopted is, perhaps, convenient, but a method which brings into one group as 'scientific,' systems so unlike in their ethical spirit as those of Kant and of modern naturalism has some weakness from the practical as well as the theoretic point of view. Morally at least, Kant is much more Christian than 'scientific.' The interpretation of Greek ethics, though charming in its lucidity, suffers from the determination to present Greek moralists as aiming at making of human life an 'image of reason.' This leads the author to exaggerate the rationality of their practical ideal. And the account of Stoicism seems to us to ignore the peculiar evolution of that philosophy under the influence of Roman character and history, as the notion of 'duty' comes to take the place of that of 'good,' in the foreground. The contrast between the spirit of Greek and that of Christian ethics in the light of their respective origins is interesting. Yet is it not a hasty judgment too often made that the Greeks "were troubled by no sense of the infinite?" Again, in the survey of Christian ethics, we suspect some sacrifice of the more elusive truths to the delight in clear contrasts. For instance, that the spiritual interpretation of the 'Kingdom,' was not, as is here implied, wholly new in the teaching of Christ, but had appeared amongst the Jews after the exile, has been demonstrated by modern scholars. Nor was the gospel of love unknown amongst the later Stoics. M. Boutroux truly observes that the problem of Christianity was, how a pure idea should become incarnate in the world; but he is surely too optimistic in his conclusion that Christianity "solves all the problems that arise," ignoring the immense compromise and sacrifice of the purity of the idea necessitated by its apparent conquest of the world. The account of scientific ethics reviews brilliantly the chief forms, and concludes by noting the truth that under the purely scientific treatment,



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ethics proper disappears. The serious treatment of 'pessimism' is due perhaps to the development of this outlook in modern France. M. Boutroux' conclusion, philosophically the most interesting part of the book, is that we can only escape pessimism by means of the spiritual interpretation of nature. Since nature has produced in man will and intelligence, natural forces must themselves be in some way informed with powers akin to the human. We note with satisfaction the rejection of the 'will-to-believe' refutation of pessimism.

Through the more strictly educational part of the book may be traced the dominant view referred to above, of the relation of ideas to real life, thought to right action. The truth that lies in the modern suspicion of all abstract theoretic methods, especially in the sphere of moral education, is, however, clearly brought out. Is it indeed possible to avoid the paradox that "everywhere and in all times the school produces scholasticism?" Is not the difficulty inherent in the very principle of education? In order to educate, we must systematize, but the system has in it the poison which is always tending to destroy the spirit, the one thing needful. Yet if in reaction we eliminate all didacticism, we go wrong. To M. Boutroux' conclusion that the notion of training to "practice by practice alone, represents mere animal routine," we can whole-heartedly subscribe. Not only habit but 'right reason' is needed, as Aristotle insisted. Abstractions are not merely impediments, to the rational creature ideas are not powerless. The educational pragmatists are but substituting for one system another which will in turn grow artificial. All systems, indeed, will be dry bones unless used as instruments by those personalities of whom happily there are many amongst our teachers. In France as in England, no doubt, the danger is lest the too potent influence of system may do much to stifle this precious source of energy, except in the rare cases in which it is of irresistible strength.

On motives of study M. Boutroux has much that is excellent to say. We agree that curiosity and interest in knowledge are "in the morning of our days" more deeply rooted and universal instincts than is generally recognized, and would have more valuable results if not interfered with by too exclusive insistence on the extrinsic motives, ambition, emulation, etc. But he hardly seems to recognize sufficiently the importance of giving the child the opportunity of developing the power to do difficult things,

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to go on though joy in the task fail. This, as is on many sides being discovered, is one great desideratum of modern education. If the school is to grow nearer life, it will not be by assuming that only those tasks need be attempted in which delight lures us on. It may be noted that M. Boutroux explains his ideal as more Greek than Roman.

The chapter on "Reading Aloud" will be best understood by the French teacher, but English and American educationalists might well lay it to heart. The voice of the reader should convey much that the author cannot force through the narrow portal of the word, the process of thought, the undertones, the living spirit. In his observations on Interrogation, also, M. Boutroux gives acute and practical counsel, and here he clearly reveals his conception of all education as truly moral. "Our object is to make men, that is to say, persons who have within them the principles and conditions of their own actions." Thus in endeavoring to awaken and steady the intelligence, we strengthen the moral being. And so we return to the pervading thought of the book, and we would only add that something of the Roman emphasis on learning to endure hardness might well be allowed a place beside the Greek idea of following that which naturally attracts, if the person thus formed is to be strong to hold securely to the principles of his own action.

We commend to teachers and students a book which stimulates reflection in a refreshing way. The translation appears to be well done.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

London, England.

SUCCESS: A COURSE IN MORAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE HIGH SCHOOL. Frank Chapman Sharp. Second Edition. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin, 1913. Pp. 244.

This second edition of Professor Sharp's book, of which the first edition appeared in 1909, is much enlarged. With its carefully planned questions, its well-selected passages from classic essays, its suggestive discussions, and its references for further reading it now provides a valuable handbook for a course in the art of living. It will always be true that, in such a course, more will depend upon the teacher than in courses where technique can be reduced to a system; but no teacher

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could fail to profit by the well-chosen material brought together here from a wide range of sources, and by the questions set. Doubtless these last would in practice be supplemented by other questions and problems adapted to local situations, or to introduce aspects of conduct, which for any reason seem particularly significant. For, the method of the course assumes that an attitude of thoughtful consideration, rather than an acquiring of definite information, is the goal chiefly in view.

It will be recalled by readers of the first edition that the main topic, Success, is considered in two parts, The Conditions of Success, and The Nature of Success. The former includes such rubrics as Attention, Memory, Physical Vigor, Habit, Self-control, Veracity, Integrity, and Interest in Others. The latter, after discussing Some Popular Misconceptions of Happiness, finds the sources of genuine success or happiness in Health, Work, Play (Reading, as a form of æsthetic pleasure, is selected for study under this head), Friendship, and Service of Others.

There is, of course, a certain challenge implied in electing to guide the young along the path marked 'To Success' rather than along those headed 'Right' or 'Duty' or 'Loyalty.' Success is no doubt, as Professor Sumner has said, the ideal of present *mores*. It is, therefore, the path which young,—as well as old,—wish to travel. Its chart makes direct appeal. The important question for ethical theory and moral guidance is, however, Whither does it lead? Professor Sharp believes that it leads nearly if not absolutely to the same goal with the other paths. "In my opinion, for the most part, the path of the most deeply and permanently satisfying individual success and of the strictest duty turn out upon careful scrutiny to be identical." This, it may be said in reply, depends, as Plato saw, on whether we accept the 'philosopher' as our expert in deciding what is "deeply satisfying"; and a Kantian might add that to take reason as the test in measuring happiness is in essence what he contends for in urging that one ought ultimately to find true happiness if one proceeds by the path marked 'Duty,' but will not find Duty if one looks only for signs marked Happiness.

As a matter of fact, there is an ambiguity in Success according as we oppose it to Failure, or to some other ideal. Taken in its contrast with failure, no one would hesitate to use it in counseling his son or his pupil. One says without scruple, "I want you to make a true success of your life." The point to be

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guarded is that if success is taken as a goal, it almost always tends to be measured in terms of established values. It does not invite the enlistment in a forlorn hope, or a doubtful cause. Hence what may be called the paradox of success: the very greatest successes are usually regarded at the time as failures, and probably would not have been achieved if success had been the primary consideration. They are the greatest of all successes just in that they substitute a different standard for the one previously accepted. This I believe to be the strength of Kant's doctrine, that moral commands are synthetic. This aspect is not ignored in Professor Sharp's last chapter, but many will think that it might well be made more prominent. The young are notoriously open to the appeal of the heroic; they furnish the enthusiasm which is the needed counterpart to the more cautious reflection of age. Disasters like the Titanic do not occur often, but everyday life is not lacking in opportunities for pushing forward our standards where we cannot in advance foresee happiness.

But this is perhaps a marginal point. It is not likely to be disputed that Health, Work, Books, Friendship, and Service of Others are values to be chosen; more important, that to think about life's values and to plan for them is necessary for the best life.

JAMES H. TUFTS.

University of Chicago.

MORAL INSTRUCTION: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE. By F. J. Gould. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. Pp. x, 196.

Mr. Gould is well known as a trained and skillful teacher possessed of one idea,—the importance of moral precept. Fortunately, moral instruction is important, for it is well known that a good teacher can make children learn verbally anything he likes, and it would be waste of a good man if Mr. Gould were journeying from town to town urging the importance of nuts as food or chewing for digestion.

In this book he gives a clear account of the reasons for such teaching, and, in the second part, there is a series of 'specimen' lessons. Whatever we think of moral teaching, we all deplore 'model' lessons; consequently, teachers may approve these specimens, but certainly not copy.

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Briefly, Mr. Gould's theory comes to this: he believes that of all panaceas for the evils in a modern State moral instruction is the best. Like the leaders of the Salvation Army, who saw no reason why the devil should have all the best tunes, he sees no reason why the non-moral literary people should have all the best stories: he, therefore, takes them from every conceivable source and adapts them to the purpose in hand. He frankly discusses with his class the behavior of the hero, uses all his skill in illustrations, questioning, etc., to make the children get his point, and leaves the actual moral unmentioned. On which omission we congratulate him. What kind of moral training is the result of Mr. Gould's method it is hard to say, unless we have records of the life histories of the children thus taught. But personal knowledge of children suggests that in early years morality comes not by way of precept, but by way of good habits acquired in a good environment; a child must be made courageous, for courage is the root of most virtue, and in his adolescence he will ponder on it. Of course, he will delight in all stories, since he is hungry for experience, of which narrative is a fruitful source. Undoubtedly, he must have stories; undoubtedly, he must discuss them, if the spirit moves him; for all this will be grist for his mill when he begins to make æsthetic and moral theory for himself. But he will probably, in spite of the humane and excellent teaching of Mr. Gould, spend his early years as an a-moral creature with, let us hope, good habits.

NANCY CATTY.

London, England.

THE EVOLUTION OF STATES: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICS. By J. H. Robertson. London: Watts & Co., 1912. Pp. ix, 486.

Too often, when reading history, one has a sense of moving in a world of mythology. Vague principles, embodied sometimes in the shape of races, sometimes in the persons of princes and eminent men, contend with one another and raise states to greatness or sweep them into decadence. Mr. Robertson's book is an attempt to give substance to this battle of shadows, by bringing to light "the ruling forces in all political life, ancient and modern alike." His ideal is to make history completely rational,

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to show that all events can be explained in terms of natural causation. This is, of course, not a new ideal: Mr. Robertson is only following his master Buckle, whose attempt to trace the destinies of nations to the operation of physical and economic causes was epoch-making in spite of its defects. But, while bringing out the importance of the economic factors in political development, Mr. Robertson differs from most writers of this school in the place he assigns to purely ethical factors, and it is the interest of his ethical views which induces me to draw the attention of readers of this JOURNAL to his book.

Assuming that all energy divides into forces of attraction and repulsion, he aims at showing how political progress consists in the gradual purification of these forces which, in early stages of civilization, consist almost entirely of animal passions fortified by irrational beliefs. Civilization advances in proportion as the animal passions become ineffective and false beliefs are replaced by knowledge as to what causes produce what effects. If in the past people had not thought certain things desirable,—*e. g.*, the suppression of those who differed in religion, the acquisition of slaves, the annexation and conquest of neighbors, or, within a community, the subjection of one class to another,—civilization would have made much more rapid progress than it has done. With the growth of the scientific spirit, the pernicious consequences of such actions are more generally understood, and, as men obey reason more and more, politics becomes a constructive art, and the world goes on indefinitely improving, the conflicting forces being diverted from war and oppression to the production of literature, art and virtue. Thus, for Mr. Robertson, history, once rationalized, becomes useful by teaching a definite lesson. He discusses, first, the evolution, both political and economic, of Rome and the Greek states. After summing up the causes of the decay of ancient civilization, he examines the case of the Italian republics, and then passes to the minor European states,—Scandinavia, the Hansa, Holland, Switzerland and Portugal,—and concludes with a section on English history up to the reign of Anne. Everywhere he finds the same writing on the wall: States have flourished or decayed solely according as they were sound or unsound economically and ethically.

This thesis is worked out with immense industry and learning. Mr. Robertson, who is Parliamentary Secretary to the

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Board of Trade, is an active politician, and while we wonder how he can find time for so much writing (he has more than thirty books to his credit, many of them on literary and religious subjects), we feel that the present book might have been improved by condensation and a keener sense of proportion. As it is, it is indigestible, though brilliant in parts, especially on the negative side. Whenever he has to expose the irrationality of the various beliefs that have retarded progress, it is a joy to watch him dealing havoc among cherished prejudices. Many of these beliefs are the common stock-in-trade of historians,—for instance, the myth about racial characteristics, which he tracks in all its ramifications of absurdity through the pages of the most respected writers. We are all of us ridden by the notion that different races have different innate aptitudes,—Romans and English for Empire, Semites for being inartistic and overreaching, Orientals for stagnation, Teutons for morality, Celts for political ineptitude, English for parliamentary government, and so on. Mr. Robertson urges with force that this is all imagination; what nations have done or failed to do is an affair not of natural aptitude, but of conditions. And not to see this is to clog the wheels of progress, since these delusions are bound up with such reactionary forces as race-pride, hatred of the foreigner, and the 'vertigo of the higher dunghill.'

On the positive side Mr. Robertson is less convincing. Although now and then in history the voice of reason has undoubtedly been followed with excellent results, may not this be merely an abnormal accident? He seems to assume that the growth of the scientific spirit means that the empire of reason as a directing force not only is more potent now than it has been in the past, but that it probably will increase. But growth of knowledge does not necessarily involve growth of tendency towards right action; it might be argued that states never have acted wisely unless it happened to be in the interest, real or fancied, of the dominant classes to do so, and that, in this world of mixed passions, rational persuasion, however generally recognized as rational, must always be impotent unless it happens to coincide with the desires of the strong. Armaments are a case in point; the almost universal recognition of them as irrational seems to bring their abolition no nearer. There seems, again, to be some vagueness in Mr. Robertson's conception of the relation between economics and ethics. He often implies, as for instance in his

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excellent analysis of the "vast economic simulacrum" that the Roman Empire was, that ethical soundness and economic soundness are identical, or at any rate that they imply one another. I see no necessity for this. It seems possible that a state which was ethically a hell should be perfectly sound economically.

London, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LIBERALISM. By W. Lyon Blease. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913. Pp. 374.

At a time when the party system is falling into not undeserved discredit, it is well to be reminded that such labels as 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' did originally stand for a genuine set of principles. Such recent works as those of Professor Hobhouse and Lord Hugh Cecil have done something to remind us of this, and the present book is quite worthy to take its place along with them. Mr. Blease, who is a prominent Suffragist and was formerly on the staff of the *Manchester Guardian*, traces the history of Liberalism in British politics during the last hundred and fifty years. Writing as a strong Liberal, he will naturally appear to his opponents to be biased and partial; but he is far fairer to his opponents than the average politician, and, appealing as he always does to fundamental principles, his book has a philosophical value which raises it above the ordinary party manifesto. He starts by defining the essential nature of Liberalism, and in doing so insists that its opposite is not Conservatism, but Toryism. The history of the last ten years would seem to justify him. In the fiscal question Toryism has been the active and changing force, and the true Conservative has allied himself with the Liberals. That which Liberalism combats is not the desire to preserve existing institutions, but rather the habit of mind which refuses to regard individuals as ends in themselves and as entitled to perfect liberty of self-expression. Mr. Blease puts it rather too strongly when he says: "The Liberal says, 'The State is made for man, and not man for the State.' The Tory reverses the dogma, and even when he pursues the good of individuals, he pursues it rather in order to make them better soldiers or workers, that is to say, better servants of the State, than to make them better in themselves." This statement needs a good deal of modification. The Liberal cannot, any more than the Tory, regard man in isolation from the

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State, and the service of the State is part of that self-expression for which Liberalism desires to give everyone the opportunity. Mr. Blease, in fact, though far from an extreme Individualist, is still tinged with the ideas of the Manchester School. It is unnecessary to follow him into his history of the events of the last hundred and fifty years. He has a definite set of principles which he applies as a touchstone to all the acts of the Liberal party, sometimes approving, sometimes condemning; and, whether we agree with him or not, we cannot but admire his consistency, and, on the whole, his fairness.

J. B. PAYNE.

London, England.

GOLD AND PRICES. By Professor W. J. Ashley. Pp. 32. ENVIRONMENT AND EFFICIENCY. By Miss M. H. Thomson. Pp. vii, 100. THE SOCIAL POLICY OF BISMARCK. By Miss Annie Ashley. Pp. vii, 95. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912.

These three booklets emanate from Birmingham University. The first consists of a series of short articles reprinted from the *Pall Mall Gazette* of March, 1912. Professor Ashley arrives at four "provisional conclusions," namely, that a considerable rise in general prices has occurred during the last fifteen years, though less markedly in England than in most foreign countries; that this rise is mainly caused by the large and rapid increase in the world's output of gold; that the effects of the rise are "both good and bad"; and that "the present upward movement will soon come to an end." Of these conclusions, the first three are now common ground among economists, but concerning the fourth some doubt must be entertained. For, apart from causes other than gold which operate on the general level of prices, two facts stand out clearly. First, the rapid development now proceeding in several new countries which are known to contain large supplies of unworked gold, and, second, the recent discovery of new processes by which the cost of production of gold has been much diminished. As to the method by which new gold affects prices, Professor Ashley takes the usual view that, in countries with highly developed banking systems, most of the gold goes in the first instance to swell bank reserves, and subsequently, by increasing the willingness of banks to lend, stimulates enterprise and creates "new waves of demand." Pro-

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fessor Ashley's treatment of the whole subject is clear and popular, though unoriginal.

Miss Thomson has carried out an interesting inquiry into the subsequent careers of certain children of criminal and drunken parents, who have been passed through Emigration Societies and Industrial Schools into improved surroundings. She claims that her results show "the overwhelming part played by environment in the building up of human efficiency." In so far as so large a conclusion can be derived from so small an array of facts,—which is not far,—her claim is justified. But her facts, so far as they go, are very encouraging and, together with much other evidence, go to support the view that environment is a far stronger and less transitory force than many modern biologists recognize. "Environments," as Professor Pigou well observes, "no less than persons, have children."

Miss Ashley's study opens with a number of commonplaces concerning Socialism and ends with a number of commonplaces concerning Insurance. Nearly half her booklet is thus occupied. She finds room, however, for a brief discussion of Bismarck's life and character, and for some account of his Insurance Laws. Professor Schmoller writes an introductory note.

London, England. HUGH DALTON.

THE TRUTH ABOUT WOMAN. By C. Gasquoine Hartley (Mrs. Walter M. Gallichan). London: Eveleigh Nash, 1913. Pp. xiv, 404.

Books on the woman question are of increasing popularity; we have the guarded treatise of the scientist, the outspoken utterance of the feminist and the anti-feminist, and a few contributions from humane and normal men and women who recognize that sex-antagonism is essentially unnatural and even ridiculous. Mrs. Gallichan's book belongs to the last class, and for this reason, if for no other, large numbers of men and women will read and approve. Here is a writer who, insisting on women's right to work out their own salvation both in and out of the home, nevertheless declares that any solution is doomed to fail which ignores the fact that woman's first duty is to love intensely and to bear children. Passion and the bearing of children are the two most beautiful aspects of life; hence

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a civilization which produces "sexually frigid" women is as much to be deplored as one in which men mistake lust for passion. That, briefly, is the note of the book.

The first part, assuming that "there can be no upward change which is not in accord with the laws of Nature," attempts to prove from history and biology that "woman is not a mere accessory to the male." "If the female really started and had always remained secondary to the male, necessary to continue life but otherwise unimportant, in such a position she must be content to stay. . . . Well it is for women that there need be no such fear; . . . women's position and advancement is sure because it is founded with its deepest roots in the organic scheme of life." This is Mrs. Gallichan's conclusion, and most of her readers will be willing to accept it, though at the same time her methods of investigation and proof are open to criticism. It is not science to go to biology and history with the intention of finding proofs for a theory. Scientifically one can only treat the woman movement as one treats any other natural phenomenon; one can observe, experiment when possible, and leave generalizations to come as they will. Even as a holiday-maker fears work, so should the observer fear the striking example that proves his theory. To the more cautious readers of her book Mrs. Gallichan's first part will therefore be useless; not so much because they question her heroic regiment of facts,—that task would require a biologist who was also a historian,—but because they disapprove of her method. Probably, an anti-feminist, going to the same sources, could prove woman but a child-bearing appendage to man.

The second part will undoubtedly be more widely read and discussed, for, with much sincere frankness and humane wisdom, it treats of the problem of the modern man's sexual relations with his wife and with other women. Here the writer is at her best, as she bases her conclusions on first-hand knowledge collected during many years of intimate friendship with all sorts of men and women. Such friendships prevent hasty generalizations and send one's fixed ideas to the corners of the earth, thus leaving room for the quite safe conclusion that in nothing are men and women so individualized as in their emotions. This is Mrs. Gallichan's attitude toward the question, and on the whole throughout this part she confines herself to statements of her experience and refrains from awarding praise

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or blame. In one case only does her disapproval become apparent,—in that of the modern woman who prefers independence, though she may have to pay the price of abnormal emotional life. As Mrs. Gallichan is catholic enough to forgive some men's sexual practices because the State gives no scope for "sex orgies," one can fairly ask that women who forego sex should be forgiven on the ground that the State gives married women practically no scope for independence.

However, certain practices exist in a modern State, and it is their causes that are interesting, and not the praise or blame attached to them. Mrs. Gallichan's explanations are most interesting. She suggests, for example, that prostitution exists because of the "sexual coldness of the modern woman." She accounts for this coldness by the long training that generations of women have had in that form of self-restraint called "chastity or virtue." This explanation is open to two objections. In the first place, it is doubtful whether the acquired restraint of grandmothers and mother has any effect on a woman when under the influence of a great emotion. In the second place, it is noteworthy that sexual coldness is found in the one of the pair who must most seriously reckon with results. Now, psychologically the best deterrent from a strong emotion is a second strong emotion. Is not fear often the stronger emotion which defeats a woman's passion? Let the modern State face the divorce of passion and child-bearing, let women feel safe, and we shall hear far less of sexual coldness.

We have no theory to put forward in this review, and much less do we wish to suggest remedies. But if the following account of a man's attitude toward women of his own class is correct, surely a remedy should be found. "There are many men, I believe, who find it a relief just to talk with a prostitute, —a woman with whom they have no need to be on their guard. The prostitute fulfills that need . . . for woman in herself, not women with the thousand and one tricks and whimsies of wives, mothers, and daughters." If Mrs. Gallichan is correct in her diagnosis, it will seem to many readers that it is even more important to change this attitude of men toward women than to reform sexual practices; all of a man's life is not dominated by sexual emotion, but in all relations with women of his own class he will fail to be frank if he is constantly on his guard. Surely, if he is guarded, it is because women are unknown to

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him. From boyhood he has lived a life apart from his womenfolk, and, as Thomas Hardy asserts, men and women can only learn to know each other by working together. Here, then, is one great argument for women's place in the outside world: women have to learn men, men women; and, as we learn, fear will go, and with fear insincerity.

London, England. NANCY CATTY.

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


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# WHAT IS RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE? *

C. DELISLE BURNS.

KNOWLEDGE which seems vital to us has been in the past called religious. The vast majority of those who are interested in other things than filling their pocket and going to sleep in the intervals, go to the churches; and there they are supposed to be given a view of the world and of life which is fundamental, as opposed to the less profound knowledge which they need for their business. Thus it is implied that arithmetic may be useful for the merchant, or chemistry for the physician; but that as men and women we need, for the whole of life, a knowledge which is more comprehensive. Further, it may be said that science, history, and philosophy give knowledge of the ordinary world, but that they do not give that glamor which we need for making life endurable: they do not seem to give that interest and importance to the individual action which has been and may still be derived from religious creed. It would follow that there must be two kinds of knowledge: one, that of philosophy and science, which refers to the ordinary world of every day, and another, religious knowledge, which, referring also to the exceptional or more intense experience, gives to life its value and its interest. And thus we may be sup-

* An address delivered before the Ethical Society of Philadelphia, February 15, 1913.



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posed to find in modern knowledge statements about the world and life which are true as far as they go, but are utterly inadequate for the deeper needs of men.

I propose to show that the supposed contrast does not in fact exist,—which will be a platitude to most thinkers, —and that only one kind of knowledge is possible. This means that there is no such thing as 'religious,' as opposed to scientific or philosophical knowledge. But, further, I propose to trace the origin of the mistake, and to show why it became possible for anyone to suppose that there were two kinds of knowledge, religious and scientific. And, lastly, the final dissolution of the mistake will be shown to have come from the discovery of *history*.

First, then, let us consider what religious knowledge is supposed to do. It is to infuse something of interest and importance into what seems to be a trivial succession of monotonous days. We need some kind of relief from the burdensome detail of ordinary business; and many go to the old creeds and hear the old sermons in order to supply that need. At first sight, we may be supposed to have from modern science, history, and philosophy such gain as may be counted in the terms of good ventilation, electric light, or new social institutions. Material gains without number may be counted to the credit of modern knowledge.

On the other hand, we may have to put to the credit of the ancient creeds the cathedrals of Europe and the poetry of a Dante or a Milton. And how, it may be asked, dare we compare the supply of material needs with the more splendid effects of religious creed? Are the material resources of the twentieth century more valuable than the spiritual resources of the thirteenth? A difference in effect argues a distinction in the cause, and religious knowledge is commonly treated as the cause, or at least one among many causes, of the splendor of medieval art. This, then, is in the mind of all who oppose the two kinds of knowledge. Of what value is the supposed proof? First, it is clear that, even if we count to the

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credit of ancient creeds the architecture or poetry of other days, we cannot well decide which creed is the better. If I am to believe in the Trinity in order to produce a medieval cathedral, why may I not believe in Athena in order to produce the Parthenon? If we are to accept a creed because of its emotional or artistic value, we should never be able to choose at all between creeds that are absolutely contradictory; for the architecture and poetry of the Greeks are just as valuable as those of the Middle Ages.

Clearly, then, even if the creeds were causes of the art of the past (a very doubtful proposition), we should not be able to accept any one creed: for that would be to exclude the others. It does not follow, because we find, in the past, a great poetry and a theological creed and, in the present, a less great art and a scientific view of the world, that the creed gives glamor to life and science does not.

But the origin of the supposed contrast is more important than the present statement of the mistake. The position in which we find ourselves is the result of fairly recent changes. Fifty or sixty years ago, the contrast between these two types of truth was not supposed to exist. There was then, and in popular language there had been for centuries, only one truth about the nature of the world and human history, and this was what is now called the religious truth of the creeds. Theologians, like Ockham, and a few mystics may have long maintained the existence of two kinds of truth, one, that of theology, and the other, that of philosophy; but the contrast never became popular and was always condemned by authorities as leading to the disintegration of the Church.

The creed was not regarded as having religious value, in the sense in which this is contrasted with scientific accuracy. All truths about life and the world were of one kind, and these were ultimate. Religious knowledge meant knowledge about certain subjects, and about those subjects it was the only truth. If there was more than one kind of truth, the difference was due to a difference of

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subject-matter. Such was the popular view. The theological philosophers of the Middle Ages, who indeed formed what is called 'revealed religion' in so far as it is a connected system, were more subtle. They knew that there was a possibility of knowledge about the subject-matter dealt with in the creed, which knowledge was 'scientific.' They were puzzled by the existence of Plato and Aristotle. And, therefore, they supposed that the nature of God might in part be 'scientifically' shown; yet even here the subject-matter could not be *quite* exhausted by 'reason.' Thus it remained possible for a special kind of subject-matter, and that the most important, to be dealt with only in creeds. It was the most important because it concerned the number of things we are to call 'real' and the standards we are to adopt of right and wrong. Thus far, then, the only ultimate truth about the universe was to be found in theological statements.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, a new belief became gradually popular with respect to the structure of the world. What we call the evolutionary hypothesis was in the air. It was not that the majority of men understood science, but simply that, with respect to our view of the world, the atmosphere was changed. Up to this time the statements about creation, the development of human history from decadence in original sin up to the birth of Christ,—all this would have been accepted as practically the only real knowledge with respect to the world and human life. And, in the changed atmosphere, theologians for a time maintained that the new views were false. This was a perfectly reasonable position, and the theologians were correct in regarding the two views as incompatible. But now there is hardly anyone who says that the new scientific view of development is altogether false; and the result of this unreasonable moderation has been the mistaken idea that there can be two kinds of truth, one religious and the other scientific, one to supply our emotional and the other our intellectual needs. It was found necessary to allow that science and history

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do contain true statements, but it was still hoped that the older statements of the creed could be maintained, for their moral effect or their emotional value. The conflict or contrast in its present form is, therefore, comparatively new. It is not a repetition of the old medieval contrast between theology and philosophy. The partial and grudging acceptance of science and philosophy, as absolutely true, was made by 'liberal' theologians; but the old creeds were still supposed to have a religious value which the new beliefs had not. This, however, was a transition soon passed over, and step by step the theologians gave place as regards the ultimate truth about the universe.

I now come to the new situation, in which it appears that there cannot be any contrast between the religious truth and the truth of science, history, or philosophy, except that which depends on the difference between truth and falsehood. It became obvious, soon after the Evolutionary Theory had been made public property, that the new truth would corrode the old. And this revolution was wrought not by science, but by history. The discovery of history really produced a change of mental atmosphere such as cannot be paralleled even in the change due to Darwinian science; and we are, as yet, at the very beginning of the revolution. It was history, and not science or philosophy, which most effectually showed the existence of only one kind of truth. History made the compromise of 'liberal' theologians impossible: when the creed and the Bible could be regarded as historical growths, the division between 'religious' and other truths could no longer be held.

First, it was found that the language of the creed or the Bible, with respect to world-history or such facts as the Incarnation, was precisely the same as the language of science at the date at which the creed appeared. It had been implied before this that the statements of the creed were 'divine' and the statements of modern science were 'human'; but that distinction disappeared. A new

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distinction appeared, not between divine and human, but between human in the eighth and human in the twentieth century. The language of the creeds was seen to be not the language of God, but of our ancestors. It followed that as far, at any rate, as the language was a guide, what was ordinarily called 'religious' truth was simply the scientific or philosophic truth of a former age. The distinction was one of date, not of subject-matter or of kind. The creed could no longer be analyzed as it stood, and as though it were a universal or timeless expression of ideas, but it fell into a place in the general development of human thought. And to some, indeed, this implied a removal of anything 'divine' from the creeds of men; but clearly, if the contrast of divine and human will not hold, and the eighth century philosophy of the Apostles' Creed is just as human as the nineteenth century Darwinian hypothesis, we may also say truly that the creed of each century is 'divine' in the same sense as the creed of the other. The argument which proves all truths to be 'scientific' or philosophical would equally well prove all truths to be 'religious.' Thus the compromise of liberal theologians was unnecessary, as much because there was nothing profane or irreligious in new statements as because there was nothing peculiarly sacred in old statements. And if it is granted that there is no distinction of kind between scientific and religious truth, religion had nothing to lose in the defeat of theology.

Secondly, it was seen that the statements of the creeds in former ages had been continually changing. The heterodoxy of one generation was the orthodoxy of the next. And it was obvious that the selection of the creed of any one date as correct was either arbitrary or it was due to an idea of truth *not derived from the creed.* Hitherto, again, theologians had spoken as though, for example, the Apostles' Creed had always contained the same statements or as though the Bible had always been in its present form; and it was customary to compare the precision and unchangeableness of dogma with the fluctuations of

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scientific hypothesis. But now the historians discovered the gradual and quite experimental growth of creed and Bible. I need not go into the development of Higher Criticism and the History of Dogma. Nearly everyone knows how, step by step, sometimes through exaggerations afterwards corrected, but always steadily forward, the historians of the nineteenth century worked, unconsciously perhaps, toward a disintegration of the old views. And the result on the intellectual atmosphere surrounding 'religion' is obvious. Educated men could no longer believe in the existence of a kind of statement which was absolved from the tentativeness and continual correction of science, history, and philosophy. Once again, therefore, all statements about life or the world were seen to be of one kind, and there was no distinction of kind between religious and other truth.

It is clear, however, that there might still remain a vague feeling in favor of the old creeds, though they may be no longer maintained as true in the same sense as science is true. There would still remain some sort of contrast between what is given by the creeds and what is given by science, history, and philosophy. And, for my part, I think we must admit this. What is derived by 'religious' men from their creed is not ordinarily derived from modern views of the world by those to whom the old creeds are useless.

The question now is: How does the psychological effect of creed differ from the psychological effect of modern science or philosophy, if both address themselves to the intelligence? The evidence is, of course, in part personal. One must have experienced the effect of creed, ungrudgingly believed, and one must also have experienced the effect of modern views, unhesitatingly accepted; but there is evidence also in autobiographical literature by which we may judge of the diverse effect of creed and of modern views. There are two points in which psychologically the old creeds came to have the advantage, that is to say, in which they are more effective as influencing character.

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In this sense they are spoken of as more vital or as giving more glamor to life.

1. First, the creed is a systematized expression of the world-view of one completed period in civilization, whereas modern knowledge is only a name for an unsystematized collection of statements about the universe, being gradually changed in a changing social environment. The effect of one fairly consistent system of beliefs is certainly greater than that of disconnected formulas, when we refer to our widest interests as men. The advantage that modern views may have in business or in the detail of life is lost when they come to be applied to the problem of life as a whole. And their disconnectedness is, therefore, what is referred to by all who suppose that they are not 'vital' or do not give life any 'glamor.'

But this disconnectedness is not essential to modern knowledge and, in a sense, is only due to a state of transition. It is not sufficient to make of modern knowledge a system of statements *different in kind* from those of the creeds; and it follows that the new knowledge cannot be contrasted with any other kind called 'religious' except in so far as it is unsystematized. We have, indeed, proof that the beginnings of system in modern knowledge do produce psychologically the same sort of effect as the old creeds did. For, those who follow the details of science and history into what they imply as to the whole of life, find a glamor or a vital importance in modern knowledge at least as great as any that came from creeds. To them human history appears as a long effort upwards from the blind forces which made us, from the ape and tiger barbarism which still clutches at us, toward a future yet unexplored and unimagined. And if human life is more than a trivial episode in an unconscious universe, the earth also is glorious. No longer the center of the heavenly spheres, it swings in the void upon an infinite but determined path. The universe is more various and complex than it was once imagined to be. And, surely, it is not possible, the whole being thus

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grasped, to find more 'vital' importance in a statement of creation and final conflagration of a world in which a simple division of good and evil, God and Devil, is the ultimate meaning of the human drama. But the whole must be grasped, for without that there is no possibility of regarding modern knowledge as 'religious,' in so far as 'religious' means 'vital' and universal in its interests. In school and university, we still go, for example, from French to German, and there seems to be no reason for passing from one subject in the curriculum to another. The connection is incidental. Human life itself is not definitely viewed as a whole, and our knowledge of the world depends upon a jumble of disconnected 'subjects.' An unsystematized education leads to an unsystematic and disconnected succession of views: and true education should give not 'views,' but a point-of-view. We require, therefore, of modern knowledge that it should result in a consistent and connected view of life and the world: and until we have this, it must be ineffective for many minds if compared with ancient creeds; for there are not many who are able or have opportunity to work out for themselves the implications of the fragmentary science or history they are taught at school.

2. In the second place, the creed combines poetry with science. Its statements are practically effective sometimes, even when scientifically untrue. But in modern science or philosophy we have often so exact and *unimaginative* a formula that, in common language, we may speak of 'barren' science or 'bare' facts of history. Knowledge in science, history, or philosophy may have become dry and lifeless; for at least to the many, even among those who reject the ancient creeds, it seems to have no vital meaning.

Now, the poetic value of some statements in the creeds have been an embarrassment to apologists. They have often tried to prove as scientifically true what is only effective as poetry; and their efforts have been as obviously foolish as would be the attempt to show that

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Shelley's statement about a skylark,—"Hail to thee, blithe spirit: Bird thou never wert,"—is good ornithology. A statement may be effective as poetry and false as science: but, on the other hand, a statement *need* not be false as science in order to be effective as poetry. And if this is so, the modern view of the world may be made as practically effective as any ancient view. We may be able to state our knowledge with the enthusiasm of the poet and not only with the exactness of the scientist.

But, here again, it follows that modern knowledge is not essentially different in kind from what used to be called religious knowledge. The difference is due to an unessential deficiency in the rendering of the new view of the world. Knowledge has often been compared to food, and in a sense we may suppose that modern knowledge, in its present forms, has all the best qualities of food, but it is tasteless, unpalatable, and not easily digestible. For that reason it is often said to lack 'vital' importance, since the food which abstractly may be the best for the needs of the moment may be almost useless to the patient with a weak digestion.

Once again we have evidence that, when poetically apprehended, modern knowledge supplies just that glamor and 'vital' interest which is expected of religious knowledge. But that only appears when a genius in literary expression clothes the dry bones of science and history and raises to life the dust of philosophy. The trite comparison of Darwin and Huxley shows this contrast between the effectiveness of literary expression as against the 'barren' argument of perhaps a greater man. Thus, if poetic expression will eliminate the distinction in psychological effects between creed and science, it follows that science and philosophy may be 'religious' in the same sense as the older creed is. They will affect character, give glamor to life, and become what is usually called 'vital.'

3. If, however, in systematization and poetic quality, the ancient creeds have an advantage, we cannot allow

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them credit for another peculiarity which is often praised. I mean the conclusiveness of their statements where there is not evidence enough to warrant a conclusion. It may be said that there is evidence for a conclusion as to immortality or preëxistence and such issues; and if the statements of the creed are regarded as based on evidence, then I have no objection to them, although I may regard them as false. But it is sometimes said that their value consists in supplying certainty in default of evidence, and this is a deficiency, not an advantage in creeds. In the past, men praised that courage which accepts a statement without any evidence. We are now convinced that a finer courage refuses to accept any conclusion until there is evidence; for it requires courage as well as honesty to be content to wait and to admit our ignorance if we have no evidence which warrants a conclusion. And although knowledge of what occurs at death or birth may be most important, we may have to act without such knowledge. It is no advantage to create a certainty where none rationally can be proved, if for no other reason, for this at least that the lack of foundation may be discovered and so the unfounded statement may bring doubt upon other quite reasonable statements. The unsettlement and even the destruction of moral standards by reasoning among the half-educated is often due to the fact that the same amount of certainty has been assigned, in the creeds they once believed, to unfounded and to reasonable statements. The strength of a system of belief is the strength of the weakest proposition which goes to the make of it. The whole building totters because of a few substitutes for real stone. But if the weaker substitute be recognized for what it is, we may be on the watch to change it when it endangers the building. Thus, we may accept many hypotheses, still unproved in our view of the world, but we must be prepared to reject them when the evidence changes.

It may be that very few are able to derive from modern views, even if systematized and poetic, that 'vital' inter-

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est which has come from ancient creeds. Many are still unable to do without dogma even after they have seen the falsehood of old dogmas. That is to say, they do not really understand the nature of modern knowledge, and they suppose it to be as certain as the ancient dogmatic teaching was supposed to be. Therefore they attempt to make a new system of belief certain in the same way as the ancient creed. But if what I have said is true, scientific dogma is a contradiction in terms. Neither science, nor history, nor philosophy offers us any certainty which does not depend on evidence, and the evidence is always changing. Scientific dogmatism has even less excuse for existence than the old ecclesiastical dogmatism; and if anyone cannot do without absolute certainty of the ancient kind, he must do without modern knowledge. The bare acceptance of new conclusions does not really constitute a change of attitude. Hence, many institutions which claim to take the place of the churches simply add other churches to the list. They attempt to supply religious knowledge in the old sense, even though every article of the new creed is different from those in the orthodox creeds. They give dogmatic certainty because dogmatic certainty is wanted; and their directors are blind to the distinction between what the people want and what they need.

It is clearly implied in what has been said that there never *has* been any knowledge which was not based on evidence, and that in all creeds, whether recognized or not, there has been a difference of value in different statements. The lack of certainty in some of the hypotheses of modern knowledge is precisely the same as it was in some ancient dogmas which may not be absolutely untrue. Therefore I have spoken of the certainty which was *supposed* to belong to the old creeds, and the supposition, I have implied, was a mistake. If in modern knowledge we have to do without certainty about what happens at death, the believers in the old creeds have no advantage; since although they may have been certain of

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immortality, they *should* not have been so unless the evidence was conclusive. The advantage of having certainty, where not justifiable, is only the advantage of blindness. We think we see what we do not, and it may be an advantage to fall over a cliff under the impression that we see solid earth where there is nothing. I do not know. Some, however, prefer to know the worst before they come upon it.

I have attempted to show, then, that religious knowledge is not different in kind from scientific knowledge, but that it is scientific or philosophical knowledge (1) systematized and (2) poetically expressed. And I have further pointed out that the dogmatic certainty derived equally from all articles of the ancient creed cannot be found in any form of modern knowledge. If we are still to speak of religious knowledge, that element in its older form must be omitted, and its place is supplied by the courage which dares to acknowledge ignorance.

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## ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.

CHARLES W. SUPER.

MOST young men who were students in an American college before the last third of the nineteenth century can recall that the terms *ethics* and *psychology* were not often used as titles of text-books. The subjects now dealt with under these heads were known as Mental and Moral Science. Among the most popular manuals were Francis Wayland's "Elements of Moral Science," which first appeared in 1835, and his "Elements of Intellectual Philosophy," published about twenty years later. The same may be said of Noah Porter's "Human Intellect," published in 1868, and of his "Elements of Moral Science," which was given to the public in 1868. The term

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'psychology' is not in Johnson's dictionary issued in Philadelphia in 1819, although this edition is probably a reprint of that of 1773. Dr. Campbell, in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric," says: "Under the general term (physiology) I also comprehend natural theology and psychology, which, in my opinion, have been most unnaturally disjoined by philosophers." Here we see that psychology is not yet recognized as a distinct branch of knowledge. Sir William Hamilton says, in his lectures, that "Psychology, or the Philosophy of the Human Mind, strictly so denominated, is the science conversant about the phenomena, or modifications, or States of the Mind, or Conscious-Subject, or Soul, or Spirit, or Ego." When we speak of mental or moral science, it is not necessary to define the subject, or to vindicate for it admission to the hierarchy of the sciences: that is a postulate. We are here, however, chiefly concerned with moral science, and purpose to examine its claim to an equal rank with any other science, except mathematics. There are so many definitions of 'science' that everybody may be assumed to be familiar with one or more of them. It can be said that every department of human knowledge may be made *a* science if its data and phenomena are capable of being coördinated and their relation to one another formulated as cause and effect. Some sciences are mainly retrospective; others chiefly prospective; others, again, are both. Geology, for example, is almost wholly a retrospective science because its phenomena took place mainly in the past. So far as we have the means of knowing, changes like those that have occurred in bygone ages will never recur, or at least not in conceivable time. On the other hand, the mental and moral sciences, if it be permissible to separate them, will be more and more developed as the laws of the human psyche are better understood. Feeble beginnings were made by the Greek thinkers, but after them no progress was made for more than two millenniums.

It is proposed here to examine what claims ethics has

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to be regarded as a science and to note some of the facts and data with which it has to operate. Incidentally, it will appear whether the term *moral science* is founded in the nature of the human mind. During the present century, the intimate connection between morals and science has been insisted on by M. Lévy-Bruhl in his "Ethics and Moral Science," and by the late Gustav Ratzenhofer in his illuminating work "Positive Ethik." Says the former on the last page of Elizabeth Lee's translation: "Thus we must always come back to the idea of knowledge which frees. But do not let us imagine that the enfranchisement is produced of itself, nor that a sort of beneficent necessity assures in advance the progress of the sciences. The spectacle afforded by the history of humanity is quite different: we see scarcely anything except societies arrested in their development, stagnating or perishing or subject to conditions which have not permitted a decisive progression in the positive knowledge of nature. Greece alone was a striking exception, and we still live by her spirit. However, we shall only truly live by it if it is active in us, that is, if we pursue the methodical conquest of the whole of the real by science."

It is not easy to see how anyone can deny the existence of innate ethical ideas. Of course, in their beginnings they are feeble, and their development proceeds by an evolutionary force. But how can they be developed if they do not exist in embryo? Even those anthropologists who maintain the existence of moral germs in the lower animals do not affirm that they can be developed or strengthened. If they exist at all, they are the same in each successive generation. Nor do the germs exist in any of the lower animals except in those that have been associated with man. There is no progress from generation. On the contrary, in every community of men, no matter how low they may stand on the inclined plane of progress, there are at least a few who recognize the binding force of an obligation under favorable conditions. Many persons are familiar with the story of the two



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natives of 'darkest Africa' who transported David Livingstone's dead body more than a thousand miles to the coast, in spite of almost insuperable difficulties, in fulfillment of a promise made to their master while he was yet alive. Assuming that they expected a reward, it could mean little to men living in such a primitive condition. It is well known that the influence of Europeans upon natives is everywhere paramount so long as they keep their word and deal justly with them. Unfortunately, such has not always been the case. It has often been said that no Quaker was ever killed by an Indian. Yet the Indians, in general, did not put much confidence in the whites, because so many did not deserve confidence. When they proved treacherous, they merely repaid their enemies in their own coin. The well-known speech of Logan, the Mingo chief, exhibits the Red Man at his best and in no wise ethically inferior to the Pale Face. The wildest Bedawee will fight to the death to protect the guest to whom he has pledged his word. The man who keeps faith acts scientifically because he acts truthfully.

The earliest Hebrew prophets were as vehement preachers of righteousness as the later. So strong was their conviction that justice will prevail in the end that they proclaimed this truth often at the risk of their lives. Hosea declares: "I desire mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings." "Who is wise, and he shall understand these things? prudent and he shall know them? for the ways of the Lord are right and the just shall walk in them; but transgressors shall fall in them." Readers of Froude's notable essay on the Book of Job must have been deeply impressed with the high moral sentiments expressed by this non-Israelite patriarch, if the Book itself did not appeal strongly to them. Hosea's older contemporary, Amos the shepherd, is equally vehement in his denunciation of vice and wrong-doing. He is firmly convinced that God is not appeased or conciliated by ceremonies. He will help only those whose conduct is right and whose

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actions are just. The prophets do not argue. They are not all clear as to the source of their convictions. But they have a very strong instinctive feeling, an intuition, that the prosperity of a people depends upon their observance of the moral law. They are like the child that knows lying and stealing to be wrong, yet is unable to tell why, unless it be that they are forbidden by God. These prophets may have been no more than the center of a coterie of men whose convictions coincided with their own. But they had a profound spiritual insight, an intuition, the correctness of which was confirmed by their limited experience.

We find similar sentiments in Hesiod's "Works and Days," which is a sort of compendium of practical morality. The poet of Askra was the victim of personal wrongs, it is true, but the justness of his conclusions is not invalidated by this fact. Rural life is more conducive to reflection than the city with its bustle and hurry. The shepherd and the tiller of the soil cannot hasten the growth of the crops, and only to a limited extent has he the power to increase his flocks. His condition is different from that of the merchant and the tradesman who gains with almost every transaction; if he loses in one, he expects to recoup himself in the next. We need not wonder that posterity came in time to take the prophets at their word and to accept their vaticinations as inspired. Their ethical tone was far above the practice of mankind. Under a rigid monotheism, God alone could be the source of their intuitions. I have long been of the opinion that the divine voice which Socrates was wont to hear was exactly the same voice which prompted the Hebrew prophets. But under a polytheistic system, such a voice could not be other than that of a special divinity. Socrates was in doubt about a matter that was perfectly clear to the Hebrew prophets. The Jews are indebted for some features of their ethical code to the Mesopotamians and the Egyptians. But it contains a good deal that is original with them. Darmes-

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teter is probably right in assigning to his correligionists the two leading ideas of modern times: that of the unity of all forces and that of interminable progress. The first of these was dimly discerned by a few of the Greek thinkers; but the latter found no place in the thought of any of them. Salomom Reinach affirms with much confidence that "C'est la Bible, et non la philosophie un peu hautaine des Grecs, qui a été la première éducatrice de l'Europe, qui l'a préparée à s'imprégner d'hellénisme depuis la Renaissance et qui, en lui ouvrant perspectives plus larges, l'a peu à peu mise en état de se passer d'elle" ("Orpheus," p. 256).

It is wonderful with what persistence the Hebrew prophets proclaimed fundamental moral principles age after age. Most of their doctrines were transferred to the New Testament, but its eschatology led the Christians to lay undue stress on a preparation for the future life and to neglect the life that now is. It is true that their position in the Roman empire, for a long time, afforded them few opportunities for influencing the course of events. Nevertheless, for centuries after the conversion of Constantine, many Christians looked for a millennial era, a transformation of all things to be brought about suddenly and miraculously. The doctrine of the second advent of Christ still has a large number of adherents. It is a logical corollary to the belief in a righteous God as the avenger of unrighteousness among men. Conversely, the Jews of the Diaspora clung to this faith with the greater tenacity, after they had ceased to believe in the coming of a visible Messiah who should establish an earthly kingdom. This intuitive belief is very mysterious and was certainly not apprehended scientifically. Eventually, however, both Jews and Christians came to perceive that the kingdom of righteousness must be established by scientific means, and that the process is slow and difficult. The dignity of man, the solidarity of the human race, love to one's neighbor, the equality of men before God, are as much postulates of

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Judaism as of Christianity. It is worth noting, in this connection, that some of the most eminent living anthropologists believe in the unity of the human race, a doctrine proclaimed by Saint Paul on Mars Hill, and which must have seemed rank foolishness to the Greeks among his auditors. In like manner, the division of the various languages of the earth into three or four unconnected branches is no longer held to be scientific by many philologists. The doctrine that one Jew is as good as another seems to have prevailed pretty generally among them before the Christian era, and as despicable as another, in the eyes of the Gentiles. It has long been an axiom among them, but only a theory among Christians. Roman Catholics do not, officially at least, regard Protestants as Christians.

The scientific or rational State, in other words, the State as conceived by modern political philosophers, differs radically from all that existed in antiquity, and from most of those that existed until comparatively recent times. The modern State functions as if it were destined to be perpetual. The Egyptian pyramids, the Babylonian palaces, the Greek and Roman temples, served an individual or a religious purpose. They had no interest for the average citizen except perhaps a sentimental one. Rome was to some extent an exception. Some of its material structures benefited the public. But this benefit was incidental; their primary object was to serve the government, which was far less of and for the whole people than most of those of recent date. It existed for and was conducted by the optimates. Every reader of ancient history knows that the *Kultur* of the Mesopotamians, the Egyptians, the Cretans, and even of the Canaanites, was far more advanced than that of the Israelites long after they undertook the conquest of Palestine. But so far as we have information, no moral reformers arose among any of these peoples. Even if there were not more than two or three preachers of righteousness among the Jews in a century, a con-

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siderable portion of the people must have listened to them and treasured up their sayings. For several centuries the prophetic voices were never wholly silent. The author of the twenty-ninth chapter of Proverbs recognizes their value when he writes: "Where there is no vision, the people cast off restraint;" or, as Luther translates more accurately: "*Wo keine Weissagung ist.*" The late Professor James evidently had something of this kind in his thought when he said, in his first Manchester College lecture: "One may be true without being a philosopher, true by guesswork or by revelation. What distinguishes a philosopher's truth is that it is *reasoned.* Argument, not supposition, must have put it in his possession." The prophets were not merely foretellers of future events; they were also exhorters to right living and denouncers of wickedness. In the Bible, prophecy means a good deal more than prediction. It is no wonder that modern writers light here upon an enigma which they find hard to solve. The case is without parallel, and history does not illuminate it by analogies, which are often valuable in enabling us to comprehend conditions at some particular epoch. But there was no organized activity and, therefore, no perceptible betterment. Society could not pass beyond a certain point and probably advanced little, if at all, until the rise of modern science. In order to restore a patient to health, it is not enough to know what ails him, or even to know a remedy that will effect a cure. He must also be willing to apply it. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in Henri Bergson's philosophy, intuition alone can interpret the real life-impulse. He insists that "the *whole* of the life-process eludes the scientists: that the limitations of science are fixed by the limitations of the intellect: that the life-process as an entirety transcends and escapes our reason, both in theory and in practice, and compels us to make room for Intuition, which gets closer to life itself and to the secret of life." To many this may seem a backward step. But it is not; it is

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merely a return to fundamental principles, to universally accepted moral maxims. Life as a whole and in its widest acceptation must be governed by moral principles if it is to yield all that it is competent to yield. The more we have learned about the operation of evolutionary forces in the past, both of those that are beneficial and of those that are destructive, the more we have been able to promote the former and to restrain the latter. The diseases of civilization are as much the product of evolution as the remedies against them. Many instinctive processes have become conscious. But even processes more or less conscious may be harmful, and it is the scientist alone who is in position to discriminate wisely. Enthusiasm may accomplish a great deal, but unless it can eventually be guided by reason, its work is neither permanent nor continuously progressive. The rise and spread of Mohammedanism are striking examples of the truth of this assertion.

With the organization of Christian communities, there was begun a regular system of moral instruction, and various means were employed to induce converts to lead moral lives on the principles laid down in the Sacred Writings. This instruction was continued by the minor clergy through the Middle Age; it is still carried on by the same class in some of the countries where the Romish church has been deprived of all political power. Very different was the course of the higher clergy, as is well known, especially after the rise of the Jesuits. In the Mysteries, Miracle Plays, and Moralities, virtue is generally rewarded and vice punished. This must have had an influence on the masses, few of whom could read. In the early years of the eighteenth century, a class of periodicals like the *Spectator* came into existence, in which the vices and follies and foibles of men are mildly ridiculed or satirized. Nearly two hundred publications of this kind appeared in Germany and Switzerland alone, in less than so many years. In Grimm's "Mærchen," unsophisticated, intuitive goodness is generally trium-

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phant over the best laid schemes of vice. Most of the dissenting sects that arose after the outbreak of the religious revolution in the sixteenth century attached more importance to a moral life than the established churches, whether Catholic or Protestant. Calvinism, however, took strong ground against every form of carnal gratification, even when of the sort now regarded as morally innocuous.

Yet, in spite of these agencies, poverty and the immorality that usually goes with it continued to be the most perplexing problem with which governments had to deal. The failure was almost wholly due to the unscientific measures adopted for repressing or preventing them. We see herein the persistent and always futile effort to cure symptoms without removing the cause of the disease. How thoroughly our era is pervaded by the scientific spirit is strikingly exemplified in the most recent organization for combating vice,—the Salvation Army. Science has been called to the aid of men's moral instincts. Almost every government, and almost every intra-governmental organization, has learned to deal with poverty and crime by methods that were hardly dreamed of by the community at large a century ago. Penology has been raised to the rank of a science. It no longer operates with punishments alone or even chiefly, but in a much larger measure with preventives. It is far more concerned with causes than with symptoms. The domain of the penologist is being more and more circumscribed by that of the educator and the social reformer than used to be thought possible. The body politic is becoming more and more alive to the fact that it is cheaper to pay for turning the possible criminal from his evil ways than to punish him after he has started on his downward career. Social reformers have learned that moral lapses, especially those that are due to sexual passion, are caused more frequently by weakness than by wickedness. This conclusion has been arrived at by strictly inductive methods of investigation.

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The course of human affairs has made the necessary experiments; scientists have collected and correlated the results. Every student of sexual morality knows that it was at a very low ebb all over Europe until far along in the nineteenth century. In fact the history of European morals is so gross that it cannot be exhaustively dealt with in English books. In every age, there were religious teachers who exhorted their converts to a better life. That they did much good will as little be denied as that their influence was limited. For ages the criminal law, based upon that of ancient Rome, was a monster of atrocity. It was framed on the assumption that, in order to discourage crime, it must be punished with death. Notwithstanding the almost daily experience that little was accomplished in this way, many men, among them not a few of the clergy, were clamorous for more executions. In England, with the growth of humanitarian sentiments, juries refused to convict for minor infractions of the law and often returned verdicts that were contrary to both law and evidence; but on the continent, where the administration of the law was in the hands of judges, amelioration was slow until after the French Revolution. In fact, trial by jury was one of the demands of the revolutionists. The story of the execution of Ravaillac is such a chapter of horrors that one can hardly read it after a lapse of three centuries without a shudder. The abolition of slavery, the stronghold of sexual vice and the dancing-plot of cruelty, was opposed with the utmost rancor. But when humanitarian sentiments began to be supported by the experience that slavery is unprofitable, it had to go. The civil authorities were everywhere aided by the ecclesiastical powers in their harsh treatment of criminals. And by including heresy among crimes, the number of punishable offenses was greatly increased. It is a signal tribute to the triumph of intuitive or poetic justice that, three centuries after the death of Bruno by fire, his countrymen erected a monument to his memory on the place of his execution.

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In those dark days, the people, harassed by the ecclesiastical as well as by the civil authorities, were constantly in a veritable earthly hell, although, to their good fortune, they were not aware of it because they knew no better. The history of witchcraft also makes a lurid episode in the general history of the world. It was science that eventually undermined the belief in demoniac possession.

Experience aided by careful observation has proved that morality, by and large, is greatly dependent upon economic conditions. When these conditions began to be studied scientifically and the results correlated in a scientific manner, their influence upon morals was demonstrated. Not all persons who are the victims of unfavorable economic conditions are immoral; but because these are by far the most numerous, the effect upon the body politic is extremely disastrous. Here, too, science has been greatly instrumental in bringing about improvements.

A striking example of the aid afforded by science in dealing with a moral problem is shown in the so-called temperance movement, which has assumed such surprising proportions in almost every Germanic country. From time immemorial there have been total abstainers, most of them actuated by religious motives. Yet the temperance propaganda made hardly any progress until it was demonstrated by science that alcohol is never a food, that it is in no case a necessity of the human organism, and that no one is ever the worse for abstaining from it. Dr. Benjamin Rush is generally believed to have been the first man to advance this doctrine on scientific grounds. But so long as it was an almost universal belief that alcohol is a benefit, it was impossible to dissuade men from its use, especially as long as and where an appetite for it existed. In European countries, but especially on the Continent, the use of alcoholic beverages is opposed almost wholly on scientific grounds. And it is only since the scientist has come to the aid of the senti-

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mental prohibitionist that the cause of total abstinence has made notable progress.

In the domain of warfare, science has done much to promote morality, if the term can properly be used in such a connection. The fate of the vanquished was almost as deplorable in the eighteenth century as in the time of Saul and David, or in ancient Greece and Rome. It always meant *Væ victis*. Armies were usually made up of men who were little better than tramps: they took whatever they could lay their hands on. Often the camp followers, consisting largely of lewd women, were almost as numerous as the fighting force. There was no respect for property, nor for life, nor for female virtue. The officers who recruited the rank and file received or were promised a fixed sum per month out of which they paid their men, and these added to their wage what they could by plunder. There is much in Xenophon's "Anabasis" that reminds the reader of the military history of western Europe in the seventeenth century. Now it is recognized as a standing article in the code of all civilized nations that non-combatants must be protected and all damage to private property compounded. We hear a good deal about the ethics of war; and there is no doubt that military men have their code of honor. It is somewhat peculiar, but it embodies some genuine moral principles. The change must be attributed to science, and to nothing else. It is a noteworthy sign of the times that, when a few years ago, the editor of a popular French periodical requested his subscribers to vote for the half dozen of their most distinguished countrymen, Pasteur the scientist was placed first, and Napoleon the warrior fourth on the list.

The craving for justice is probably universal among men. It is a sort of blind groping for something that ought to be realized and is not. It finds frequent expression in the rustic poetry of Hesiod and in the aristocratic verses of Homer. When Hector has slain Patroklos, his friend Achilles sacrifices twelve young countrymen of

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the victor upon the magnificent pyre which he has built for the corpse. Achilles takes the life of Hector, but by so doing seals his own doom. Kreon, in the exercise of his tyrannical power, entombs Antigone alive, but by his blind folly causes the death of his only son. Agamemnon sacrifices his own daughter to gratify personal ambition and is in turn assassinated by her mother, who, also, eventually falls into the hands of the avenger. Here we have the blood feud and the vendetta. It goes on and on until there are no more victims. Well does Schiller exclaim:

> "Das eben ist der Fluch der bösen Tat,
> Dass sie fortzeugend immer Böses muss gebären."

We find the same sentiment twice expressed by Æschylus in the "Agamemnon," and Saxo-Grammaticus says in his story of Hamlet: "This is verily the curse of guilt that it must always bear within itself the incitement and the occasion of fresh guilt." The justice or injustice, the right or wrong, between two combatants was never demonstrated by a duel, nor between two nations by a war. One will sue for peace when its resources are exhausted, but no nation ever sued for peace by admitting that it was in the wrong. Socrates clearly apprehended the folly of always insisting upon having the last word in a controversy when he declared that it is never wise or just or even expedient to do wrong, and that the reasons men are wont to put forward in justification of a deed which is intrinsically evil, will not hold before an impartial tribunal. Saint Paul exhorts his Roman converts not to avenge themselves, and cites a passage from Genesis in support of his contention. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews cites the same passage and adds a similar exhortation. It is a strange and inexplicable phenomenon that so rude a people should have recognized so fundamental a truth, one that every government on the face of the earth recognizes and validates, except in times of unusual excitement. The modern State, in

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its corporate capacity, has taken the place of God in the theocratic commonwealth.

Although it is somewhat difficult for the State to carry on experiments looking toward the promotion of public morality,—in fact not many decades ago it would have been considered impossible,—a good deal has been done in the matter during the last half century. Besides, history has been making experiments, to employ a phrase of Comte's, for a much longer time. It is now regarded as an axiom that a State cannot only compel its citizens to act morally, but can also persuade them to shape their conduct by moral principles. A beginning was made in this direction by John Howard; and prison reformers generally regard him as their pioneer. His investigations, however, did more to call attention to the demoralizing influence of prison life than for its amelioration. But experiments made in recent years, both with youths and adults, have demonstrated that even the so-called incorrigibles are rarely altogether devoid of moral sense. It has been found that hardly one in fifty will break his word of honor. Hence, prisoners have been set to tilling the soil, to constructing highways, and to other outdoor employments. Until within recent years, almost everybody believed that a criminal is inherently vicious, ignoring the fact that there is no scientific definition of *criminal* possible. It is now admitted that the criminal is oftener weak than wicked, and, in the words of Socrates, more in need of enlightenment than of punishment, of protection against temptation than of incarceration after he has yielded.

Every science is built upon two principles: observation and experimentation. Observation depends upon experience, from which even brutes learn something. Men living on the lowest rung of civilization cannot help making some observations. But they almost always fail to trace effects to their causes and are continually discovering the influence of supernatural beings in the affairs of men. It seems incredible to us that the men of

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Homer could be so purblind in this regard. It is probable that science in its relation to physical man owes more to Hippocrates and his school than to any other Greek thinker. (It is, doubtless, not a mere chance that Aristotle's father was a physician.) This school recorded many observations and raised medical practice to a height beyond which it passed, little if at all, for many centuries. But its progress was checked by its failure to make experiments except in a very limited way. Science only becomes worthy of the name when it enters fully upon the experimental stage. Phenomena must be artificially produced in order to make their occurrence explicable in nature. But in the case of some subjects like economics, sociology, and ethics, it is difficult to produce the desired phenomena, for the reason that the will is a constantly disturbing factor. Whether free or not, the forces that control it are too recondite for cognition. Yet, even here, men are coming to profit more and more by observation in domains that are out of the reach of experimentation.

It will be argued by some that if ethics were put upon an entirely scientific basis, it would deprive the noblest act of self-sacrifice of all merit. The question, however, should not be, in this case nor in any other, What would happen if something else were to occur? but, What is? Moreover, so far as the individual is concerned, we can rarely fathom the motive that prompts an altruistic deed. But we can study the means by which the community in every civilized land, that is, in every land governed by a written law, endeavors to constrain its citizens to act morally and unselfishly. Law-makers are not often scientists, but many of them are careful observers. We are encompassed by a veritable host of inspectors whose business it is to see to it that we live truthfully, honestly, chastely, and so on. These inspectors are in turn under the observation of other inspectors. Whether the motive that governs us in any particular case be the desire to stand well with our peers, or to yield obedience to what

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is commonly called conscience, or to the efforts to conform to the demand of the categorical imperative, or to the quest for the highest good, or to what we consider the chief good, or in order to promote the greatest good of the largest number, or to submission to an unconscious transcendental will, does not concern men in the mass. They are concerned with results, not with motives, and results that can be attained only by the employment of scientific agencies such as governments alone are powerful enough to put in force and to practice. Science is dynamic; moral intuitions are kinetic. The scientist points the way; the moral reformer walks in it and induces others to follow him. The measure of mutual friendliness with which they coöperate is the measure of social and ethical progress.[1]

CHARLES W. SUPER.

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[1] I was much gratified to find, after the above was written, in a review of Professor Nordtij's inaugural address, delivered before the University of Utrecht, in September, 1912, the assertion that the monotheism of the Israelites has thus far baffled all students of ancient history. He concedes that a sort of henotheism was developed among the higher classes in the nations bordering on Israel, such as was the case among the later Greeks; but he is convinced that it had no influence upon the common people and hardly any upon those who professed it. Professor N. affirms that as yet no parallel has been found to the belief in the unity and spirituality of God as held by the Hebrews. For them it was a psychic force of such potency that it eventually overcame all opposition. Until far along in the nineteenth century it was customary among theists to explain this force as divine inspiration or revelation. Then came a reaction, and the rationalists, who for a time occupied the stage, saw no mystery in it. Within recent years there has been a return to the earlier position; or rather, the younger men would be considered more nearly orthodox than their fathers. But the term 'inspiration,' if used at all, is given a different meaning. It is now treated as an innate faculty for discerning moral truths which it is impossible to analyze further.

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# INTUITION.

A. BARRATT BROWN.

A FORM of knowledge that transcends our ordinary thinking and yields a completer grasp of a fuller and more real object is the ideal of philosophy, as it is the confident claim of religious mysticism. Such a grasp of reality seems to imply a closer and more direct relation between the thinker and his object than ordinary experience and ordinary reflection on experience can effect. Hence, the professed or would-be possessor of such vision tends to disparage the lower levels of experience and thinking, and even to oppose their methods and results to those which he himself can claim.

It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to show how such an ideal form of apprehension may be not only not antagonistic to the more ordinary work of thought, but even in some degree implied and presupposed in the prior stages of experience and thinking. The actual claims to possess the full measure of such ideal experience I have not attempted to submit to examination. The language of mystics and seers in which they report their vision does not, indeed, readily admit of either refutation or corroboration by the student of the theory of knowledge. Their testimonies to such experience are full of vivid and suggestive symbolism, rich in metaphor and poetry; but their attempted analysis of the same is vague and clumsy, and largely limited to negatives that contrast its character with that of inferior levels of thought. So they speak of an 'immediate,' an 'infinite' or 'untrammeled,' or even an 'ineffable' experience, as theirs. Let us turn instead to the ideal of knowledge that is suggested in the works of philosophers, and recall four expressions of the same,—two in ancient and two in modern philosophy.

1. Let me first instance Plato's discussion (at the close

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of Book VI of the "Republic" and in the "Philebus") of the ascending levels of apprehension that correspond to ascending levels of reality. He takes, as we remember, a continuous line, divided into four sections, to represent the stages of intelligence leading up to perfect knowledge. The two main divisions of the line are into δόξα, on the one hand, and ἐπιστήμη, on the other; and δόξα, again, is divided into εἰκασία and πίστις, and ἐπιστήμη into διάνοια and νόησις. It is irrelevant to our present purpose to analyze the conceptions of εἰκασία and πίστις, the lower grades of apprehension confined more or less to dealings with the visible and external world of appearance. But the upper half of the two main sections, ἐπιστήμη, is divided into two orders of experience; one, that of διάνοια, or the understanding, and the other, that of νόησις, or ἐπιστήμη proper, which is, avowedly, an ideal of knowledge.

There comes a stage in the development of thought when the first certitude (πίστις) of *prima facie* experience, —reliance, for example, on the evidence of the senses,— is broken down by the obvious contradictions engendered. διάνοια corresponds to the scientific attitude which begins to seek for laws and governing principles which may serve to render more orderly and intelligible this world of our first experience. But διάνοια still uses the sensible objects as symbols, and, moreover, assumes as ultimate and self-evident certain ὑποθέσεις or ἀρχαί (first principles) as starting-points of demonstration. Each of the sciences will start from such supposed independent ἀρχαί, arithmetic from number, geometry from space, and so forth. But we cannot remain in these separate departments of thinking. The demand for unity urges us on to a more coherent and synthetic account of the whole reality as an ordered system or κόσμος. This is the ideal of νόησις, which would see everything in the light of its relation to the whole system, or as related to what Plato would call "the Form of the Good." The means by which we may gain this unified vision Plato calls διαλεκτική, by which he also names later the ideal of knowledge it-



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self. And the man who is progressively exercising such a method, coördinating more and more the whole range of his experience, is called συνοπτικός.

2. I would turn next to the last section of Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics,"—to a passage that is admittedly obscure, but which I think suggests an interesting parallel to Plato's famous account of the ascent of knowledge.[1] Aristotle has been examining the nature and methods of ἐπιστήμη, or demonstrative science. Such ἐπιστήμη, he pointed out at the beginning, is based on certain ultimate first principles, or ἀρχαί, which are assumed at the start by each branch of inquiry, and which he calls immediate (ἄμεσα) and undemonstrable (ἀναπόδεικτα).

But then the question presents itself: How are these known to us? And his answer is that they are known to us in virtue of a certain δύναμις which represents the urge or *nisus* toward the unity of knowledge. This yields us at every stage in the scale of experience a gradual order of universals. Even the earliest animal αἴσθησις yields a primary sort of universal (ὅλον τι). But αἴσθησις gives rise to memory, and memory to ἐμπειρία, which becomes more and more ordered as we advance. And that in virtue of a necessary principle of order (νοῦς) which is a power of universalizing and coördinating our experience. (*Cf.* Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception.")

This belongs essentially to the nature of mind or soul. Aristotle illustrates his meaning by the figure of a rout during a battle, in which first one man comes to a stand, and then another, until the first order of arrangement is reached. So, he says, it is with the gradual reduction to order of the chaos of experience, from the first fixing of the universals of the particular sense-objects to the final attainment of the ultimate universal or undivided whole, the true individual. Clearly, then, he adds, we can only come to know the primary truths of science by

[1] My interpretation of the passage is largely indebted to notes of a lecture by Mr. Sidney Ball.

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induction (ἐπαγωγή). And complementary to such induction is the process of demonstration or deduction (ἀπόδειξις or ἐπιστήμη) that goes back over the whole range of experience and shows the universal operating throughout. And, as Aristotle says, in the last words of the book, "the whole state of the mind (including both νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη) corresponds to the whole fact."

I would briefly add to these two ancient theories two more modern statements of the advance of knowledge.

3. Spinoza in his treatise "De Intellectus Emendatione," and more fully in Part II of the "Ethica," develops a gradation of knowledge from the less to the more adequate. The lowest grade is represented by opinion and imagination,—corresponding to vague experience and hearsay. But there are two higher grades that give a greater measure of truth. Of these he calls the first *ratio* and the second *scientia intuitiva. Ratio* corrects and completes ordinary casual perception,—arrives at an understanding of the laws of things,—and so achieves a relatedness that may be said to be a knowledge of things *sub quadam specie æternitatis.* But *scientia intuitiva* corrects and completes the work of *ratio,* and yields a more unified and concrete apprehension. It is no longer the "idea of the body," nor even of the laws of things, but the idea or intuitive apprehension of God himself, and of all things in God,— *sub specie æternitatis.* And this at its fullest is the *amor intellectualis Dei.*

4. Finally, let me recall Hegel's development of the process of thought from primitive picture-thinking (*Vorstellung*) to the rigid classification of the understanding (*Verstand*), and from this again by the action of dialectic to the rational Notion,—the speculative grasp or *Begriff.* This he also calls Speculative or Positive Reason (*Vernunft*) and compares with the *intuitio intellectualis* of the mystics. But the highest reach of apprehension is so far from being contrasted with the ordinary activity of thought that it is its very ideal and comple-

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tion. Moreover, it is an ideal grasp that is only attained by long experience and hard thinking on experience.

It is here that Hegel came to deal severe criticism to the claims of Intuition made by Schelling,—criticism that is concentrated in that famous preface to the "Phänomenologie des Geistes," in which he ridicules the proud pretensions of genius with its high flashes of thought,—"These rockets are not the empyrean, . . ."—and contrasts the fine sentiments and deliverances of such Intuition striding its royal road in its high priestly vestments with the laborious and patient process of plain hard thinking in its dressing-gown.

Along with which we may set the passage in the "Logik"[2] in which Hegel distinguishes the first harmony of the naïve and primitive experience of childhood from the "second harmony" which "must spring from the labor and culture of the mind." "It is a mistake to regard the natural and immediate harmony as the right state (to rest in). The mind is not mere instinct: on the contrary, it essentially involves the tendency to reasoning and meditation. Childlike innocence undoubtedly has in it much that is sweet and attractive, but only because it reminds us of what the mind must win for itself. The harmonious existence of childhood is a gift from the hand of nature: the second harmony must spring from the labor and culture of the mind."

At this point I would like to traverse certain recent tendencies which would seem to introduce a dangerous confusion between the ideal of knowledge of which we have been speaking and that first immediacy which belongs to the lowest levels of experience. The late Professor James understood the arguments of M. Bergson to imply an appeal to "dive back into the flux" of sensible experience,—"to turn our faces toward sensation." (*Hibbert Journal,* April, 1909.) And many less distinguished followers of M. Bergson have been asking us to

[2] Wallace's translation, p. 55.

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repudiate the traditional methods of thinking, and return to the primitive, unthinking experience of the child. A kindred movement in art seeks to regain, in one of the post-impressionist phrases, "the synthetic outlook of childhood." One is reminded of Bacon's comparison of the conditions of entering the kingdom of knowledge with those of entering the kingdom of Heaven,—"whereinto none may enter except as a little child." But, as Hegel remarks in the passage of the "Logik" quoted just now, "the words 'except ye *become* as little children' . . . are very far from telling us that we must *remain* children."

It is necessary, indeed, at the start to *become* as a child, in the sense of unlearning our sophisticated prejudgments, but we cannot stay in the first unthinking and inarticulate experience of childhood,—where, as Professor James himself admits, "the world is one big, buzzing, blooming confusion." Into that confusion of primitive and puerile experience,—of crude sensation,—we have by hard thinking to introduce order, as into the ranks of that routed army of Aristotle's figure.

But the futility of the labors of our thought is proclaimed to us on every hand in the present-day *flair* for the irrational. We are asked to repudiate the indirect and discursive methods of mediate thinking in favor of a sort of 'direct action,' such as in the political sphere the Syndicalist would substitute for the (to him) circuitous and futile methods of legislation. And what is the alternative mode of apprehension that is put before us? By an effort of 'intellectual sympathy' we are to project ourselves into the 'very life of things,'— to 'install ourselves in that which is moving.' Those are the actual phrases of M. Bergson's "Introduction to Metaphysics," and they are easily perverted into a crude sensationalism.

For, literally to follow this method would be to commit intellectual suicide and to find ourselves stultified at the start. We cannot,—if we would,—return to the primi-

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tive and blurred immediacy of the child and the savage. Or if we make the attempt, we must be content to be inarticulate. Neither can we attain greater clarity of vision and comprehension by a futile effort to install ourselves in the life of our surroundings. "How few of us know what it would be like to be a triangle!" Nettleship is said to have once exclaimed, and the humorous suggestion may serve as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the plea that we have been examining.

But we cannot suppose that M. Bergson means us to take his words quite so literally, though his own followers are among the first to do so. What, then, does he mean by this effort of 'intellectual sympathy,' which he terms *Intuition?* It is by no means clearer when he explains that it is "instinct that has become self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object, and of enlarging it definitely,"—a vague and meaningless if not misleading analogy which has to add to the known character of instinct precisely that of which it is least capable.

But we are not surprised to find that this 'intuition' requires arduous effort. That, indeed, we had been ready to surmise of any ideal approach to reality,—as was in fact suggested in Hegel's treatment of the Notion and the 'second harmony.' M. Bergson speaks, then, of "a laborious, even painful, effort to remount the slope of the work of thought, in order to place oneself directly, by a kind of intellectual expansion, within the thing studied: in short a passage from reality to concepts, and no longer from concepts to reality." We are, it seems, "to remount,"—we are to "invert the habitual direction of the work of thought." To which we may reply, that we agree that premature syntheses are fatally frequent, but that we consider that the fault derives not from the intrinsic character of our concepts as so far developed, but from the incompleteness of their development.

It is, however, natural to disparage and discount the lower stages of the thinking process. Hegel himself deals some hard blows to the understanding, which is

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yet a "dead self" by which we rise to higher things. But surely, it is only by an abstraction that we can speak of a purely analytic and discursive and mediate process. Mr. Bradley, following Hegel, has sufficiently established the interdependence of analysis and synthesis in all judgment. Similarly, it is an abstraction to speak of 'mediate' as opposed to 'immediate' experience. We know everything by means and in the light of something else. Experience does not come to us pure and direct,—it takes the shape and color of the time and place and temper of the subject

> "like the dyer's hand
> Subdu'd to what it works in."

Immediate knowledge, then, is as much an abstraction as purely mediate knowledge. "What is true," says Hegel, "is their unity, an immediate knowledge which is likewise mediated, something mediated which is likewise simple in itself, which is immediate reference to itself." ("Philosophy of Religion," Eng. trans., I, 58.) We may compare the conclusion of a syllogism, which is essentially mediated, but which is grasped in itself and as a whole,—*uno intuitu*,—and forms what Professor Bosanquet calls "an immediate apprehension which is the totality of a mediate discourse."[3]

Now, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent with this in the process which M. Bergson describes in his final illustration of his meaning in the "Introduction:"[4]

> In conclusion, we may remark that there is nothing mysterious in this faculty. Every one of us has had occasion to exercise it to a certain extent. Any one of us, for instance, who has attempted literary composition, knows that when the subject has been studied at length, the materials all collected, and the notes all made, something more is needed in order to set about the work of composition itself, and that is an often very painful effort to place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject, and to seek as deeply as possible an impulse, after which we need only let ourselves go. This impulse, once received, starts the mind on a path where it rediscovers

[3] "Principle of Individuality and Value," I., p. 65.
[4] "Introduction to Metaphysics," tr. T. E. Hulme, pp. 76, 77.

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all the information it had collected, and a thousand other details besides; it develops and analyzes itself into terms which could be enumerated indefinitely. The farther we go, the more terms we discover; we shall never say all that could be said, and yet, if we turn back suddenly upon the impulse that we feel behind us, and try to seize it, it is gone; for it was not a thing, but the direction of a movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is infinitely simple. Metaphysical intuition seems to be something of the same kind. What corresponds here to the documents and notes of literary composition is the sum of observations and experience gathered together by positive science. For we do not obtain an intuition from reality,—that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it,—unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations.

Mr. Lindsay, in commenting on this illustration,[5] compares the famous passage in Plato's Seventh Letter,—on the inadequacy of written treatises. I should like to quote the earlier part of the passage to which Mr. Lindsay refers. Plato is explaining that knowledge demands time and practice (τριβή).[6]

It is only in consequence of a reciprocal friction of them all,—names, discourses (λόγοι-definitions), visual and other perceptions (diagrams, etc.) with one another, and the testing of them by kindly examination and question and answer (dialectic), practised in no spirit of vainglory (like eristic),—that the light of sound judgment (φρόνησις) and comprehension (νοῦς) flashes out on the various problems with all the intensity permitted to human nature.

It is only from a long-continued personal association in the business and a common life that suddenly, as it were, the fire leaps up and kindles a spiritual flame which thenceforth feeds itself.

Here we have full emphasis laid on the mediation of experience and the mutual give-and-take of dialectic fellowship which seems to me to correct the Bergsonian assumption that the clearest and surest knowledge is that of our own personality. Rather, as Aristotle says, we have a clearer vision of our neighbors than we can attain of ourselves, and at any rate we can only understand ourselves by understanding others. Similarly, we must guard against the idea that the 'intellectual sym-

[5] A. D. Lindsay, "Philosophy of Bergson," p. 239.

[6] See article by A. E. Taylor, *Mind*, July, 1912.

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pathy,' which M. Bergson desiderates, is to be attained by complete immersion in the object. Not so, surely, can any knowledge make advance. We speak of identifying ourselves with the thing or person that we come to know and love, but such identification is not complete absorption.

A truer view of such a sympathy seems to me to be suggested in Professor Bosanquet's treatment of the "penetrative imagination" and in the illuminating account of "Interest," to which he himself refers us in the "Remains" of R. L. Nettleship. Nettleship describes that increasing intimacy of experience which produces a literal 'interest' or 'being in' the object, and which yet maintains the distinction of the knower and the known. Equally suggestive is his remark on the growth of our experience. "Growth of experience," he says, "its becoming more, may thus be represented as growth of structure, or a process in which we come to be more 'constructive,' to put more together, to find more in things, to get more out of them."[7]

Now, some such growth and expansion of thought and knowledge is what this paper has endeavored to suggest as being not a break with our ordinary thought and account of experience,—not an inversion of rational procedure,—but an expansion and completion of the labor of the intellect. Such a grasp or comprehension is that of the συνοπτικός, who sees things as a whole. And the grasp itself may well be called σύνοψις, or, if I may coin the word, *contuition*. It is, indeed, what M. Bergson terms "integral experience." Of course, it is the ideal rather than the actual attainment of our knowledge, but it is, as I suggested, foreshadowed and implied in the most elementary procedure of thought. M. Bergson himself is more careful than some of his followers to show how hard and distant its attainment must be,—at any rate,

[7] "Philosophical Remains," p. 16. What we call 'putting two and two together' is the gist of a certain grasp of a situation as a whole which is often termed 'intuition.'

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as a secured possession of more than an instant's glimpse, and, in fact, his suggestion of its perfected scope in the "Evolution créatrice" is "a consummation devoutly to be wished," but which "the imagination boggles at." "Intuition," he says, "if it could be prolonged beyond a few instants, would not only make the philosopher agree with his own thought, but also all philosophers with each other."[8]

The intuition, indeed, that comes and goes on the instant is rather the vague forefeeling of the grasp that we have spoken of,—and it is, I would suggest, such a vague forefeeling to which most people give the name. We might instance the feeling of the whole that we experience throughout the hearing of a drama, a sonata, or a poem,—or the feeling of unity in the acquaintance of friendship or religion. And all such experiences we speak of as fulfilling their own logic,—the logical spirit being, as Professor Bosanquet suggests, always the spirit of totality.[9]

This, then, is the earnest and presumption in our own limited experience of that ideal of absolute knowledge which I have called *contuition,* and which is no less implied in our ordinary thought because it is fully unattainable as yet. Our own knowledge is admittedly "in part,"—"through a glass, darkly." But our knowledge of the parts is conditioned by and grows along with our progressive knowledge of the whole, and the increase of our understanding of the "flower in the crannied wall" is the measure of the increase of our understanding of God and man. Complete knowledge would, indeed, be a knowledge of all things in God—Spinoza's *amor intellectualis Dei.* "Interest at its highest power," says Nettleship,[10] "is love, and if we could take an interest in all things, we should be on the way to love all things; and this means to 'be in' all things or make all things our

[8] "Creative Evolution," Engl. tr., p. 252.

[9] "Principle of Individuality and Value," I., p. 23. *Cf.* Aristotle's νοῦς.

[10] "Philosophical Remains," p. 17.

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own, which is God." In so far as we see things no longer partially, but in the light of their relation to the whole, so far we may be said to grasp the whole,—to possess the σύνοψις which is *Intuition.*

A. Barratt Brown.

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## THE DOCTRINE OF CONSEQUENCES IN ETHICS.

C. D. BROAD.

THE opinion that the rightness of an act is in some way connected with the goodness or badness of its consequences is, I suppose, held by everyone in practice and by most moralists in theory. If we only listen to what people *say* instead of also noticing how they act and judge, we might be inclined to underrate the amount of agreement on this point. Nothing is commoner than such phrases as 'you must never do evil that good may come,' which, if they mean anything, imply that some acts are wrong, however good their consequences. Yet, in practice, people who quote this maxim and also believe that pain is an evil do not, as they ought to do, shun their dentists as moral lepers. Again, there is no doubt that commonsense thinks motives important as well as consequences, but it would reject the Kantian view that they are all-important, and that only one kind of motive is morally valuable.

But at this point agreement ceases. Are consequences the sole relevant factor in judging the rightness of an act; or do other factors enter, and, in particular, are some acts right and some wrong, whatever their consequences? Again, is it the actual or the probable consequences that are ethically relevant? And further, if you decide to include motives in judging the rightness of an act, is the question whether the act is the immediate response of a good nature or results only as the consequence of a moral struggle, of ethical importance? The

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first two of these questions have been discussed with considerable fulness in recent years by Mr. Russell in his "Philosophical Essays," and by Mr. Moore in his little book on "Ethics." The names of these two philosophers are a sufficient guarantee for the ingenuity and subtlety of their arguments; but, since they disagree, one must be wrong, and of course both may be. It will, therefore, be of some interest to take their views as a text for the discussion of the subject of this paper.

I will begin with the points on which Moore and Russell are at one. Both seem to hold that you can only talk of right actions, and not of good ones. "What is called good conduct," Mr. Russell says, "is conduct that is good as a means to other things that are good on their own account." If this be the whole of what is meant by good conduct, it is no doubt well to do as Mr. Russell proposes and call it 'right' and its consequences alone 'good,' because otherwise 'good' is used in two different senses when we speak of 'good conduct' and of 'good consequences.' Now I cannot help thinking that neither of our authors has given enough attention to the possibility that there may be *good* conduct in their sense of good, as well as right conduct in their sense of right, and that the two need not coincide. This possibility arises in two different ways. In the first place, if other states of mind be intrinsically good or bad, I do not see why volitions should not have intrinsic goodness or badness. I should suppose that most people think that they have, and the question is at least worth discussion. Moore and Russell scarcely touch on this point, but I conclude that their opinion is that they are intrinsically indifferent. Mr. Moore says ("Ethics," p. 185): "It is contrary to our view that motives can be intrinsically good or bad. But, if it is true, it makes no difference to the rightness or wrongness of an action, but only to the goodness of a total state of affairs." The latter part of the statement is unquestionably true on Mr. Moore's definition of rightness, because that explicitly only refers to con-

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sequences and therefore does not include the motive or volition that precedes them, so that the intrinsic value of the latter does not enter into consideration. But this only shows that Moore is consistent with his own definition, not that he means by rightness what other people mean when they understand themselves. But this, I suppose, is what he is trying to show.

We have seen then that it is at least possible that some volition may be intrinsically good, and therefore, since an act is certainly not identical with its own consequences, there may be good acts as well as right ones. But even if Moore be right in thinking that no motive is intrinsically good, it will not by any means follow that the intrinsic value of the consequences X + the volition A will be the same as that of the consequences X + the volition B. For to assert that because A and B are intrinsically indifferent, therefore A X and B X must necessarily have the same intrinsic value would be to forget the Principle of Organic Unities. I do not suppose that Moore or Russell would really deny anything that I have been saying; all that I suggest is that it is of some importance and seems to have been overlooked by them. I do not quite know whether Mr. Russell thinks that anything but consequences are good, for he makes the curious statement ("Philosophical Essays," p. 31): "I do not wish to deny that right conduct is among the things that are good on their own account, but, if so, it depends for its intrinsic goodness upon the goodness of those other things which it aims at producing." As it stands, this is surely contradictory; a thing cannot depend for its *intrinsic* goodness on anything else. What I suppose Russell must mean is that it is *not* intrinsically good, but, when added to its consequences, may produce a whole whose intrinsic value differs from that of the whole formed by the consequences only.

So much then for the agreement between Moore and Russell. As some good *consequences* are certainly states of mind, we shall be inclined to suppose that the states

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of mind that result in consequences may also have intrinsic value; and, even if they have not, the Principle of Organic Unities forbids us to deny the possibility of good conduct differing from right conduct in Moore's sense of the word. I shall return to this question at a much later stage of the paper.

Let us now consider the differences between the two writers. They differ about rightness. Russell has a complicated theory which introduces the probable consequences of actions. Moore's theory is simpler, and, at first sight, much more paradoxical since it makes rightness depend wholly on the actual results of our actions. It further makes much use of the notions of justifiable praise and blame. As a matter of fact, we shall see that really both theories have to introduce probability, and that Russell's view when worked out is much less plausible than it seems at first sight. I will begin by sketching and criticising Russell's theory.

That act which has as good consequences[1] as any that is open to the agent is called by Russell 'a most fortunate act,' and by Moore a 'right act.' But Russell will not admit that a most fortunate act is necessarily a right one. He grants that there is an objective and a subjective sense of right, but holds that even the objective sense is partly subjective, whilst what is most fortunate is quite independent of our knowledge and belief. If the evidence be against an actually most fortunate act being most fortunate, it is objectively wrong to go against the evidence. An objectively right act is what he calls a 'wisest act,' *i. e.*, one which is probably a most fortunate act. This theory, he says, has the advantage that it makes unforeseen factors irrelevant to rightness and wrongness. Now objectively, of course, a man ought to

[1] Russell says '*the* best consequences,' and speaks of '*the* most fortunate act'; but Moore rightly points out that two possible acts may have equally good consequences, and that they will then both be right if the consequences are better than those of any possible alternative. I have altered Russell's language to meet this objection.

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do what is objectively right; but there is another sense of ought, Russell holds, in which we must say that he sometimes ought to do what is objectively wrong. This second sense of ought, of course, involves another sense of right. A man acts rightly in this sense (or conscientiously, as we may call it) if he does what he judges to be objectively right, after he has reflected with a view to finding out the truth on this point, and not merely with a view to proving one course right. If the act be unimportant, and if it would need much reflection to come to any decision about its objective rightness, it is morally indifferent.

We may admit that this is an ingenious and plausible theory which seems to cover most of the obvious facts. But I think we shall find that it is not nearly so simple as it looks. It is not explicitly remarked by either Moore or Russell that there is a very close analogy between the three meanings of ought in ethics which between them they use, and three meanings of ought in logic. I believe it will be helpful to develop this analogy a little. When I ask: 'What ought I to believe?' one answer certainly would seem to be: 'What is true.' Now, 'what is true' corresponds here to a most fortunate act in ethics in its complete independence of anyone's knowledge or belief. So this answer corresponds to that which Moore makes to the question: 'What ought I to do?' But there certainly seem to be plenty of cases where in a sense I ought to believe what is actually false. If I believe that all M is P and that all S is M, there is certainly a sense in which I ought to believe that all S is P (or, at any rate, ought not to believe that some S is not P). Yet if one of the first two beliefs be false, it may very well be the case that what I ought to believe about the relation of S and P is false, and what I ought not to believe is true. Nor is it relevant to answer: You ought not to have believed, *e. g.*, that all M is P, since that is false. Even if this be so (and to assert it is to beg the question as to whether there are not several meanings of ought in logic),

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yet we must still ask: What ought I to believe, granted that as a matter of fact I have this belief, which, of course, I do not know to be false so long as I have it? The answer: You ought to believe, or perhaps I should rather say, you ought not to disbelieve what logically follows from what you do believe, corresponds rather closely with Russell's objective sense of ought and right. Then, finally, it might be suggested that you ought to believe what you *think* logically follows from what you do believe. If you really think that A propositions can be simply converted and believe that all S is P, then you ought not to believe that some P is not S. This seems to correspond to subjective rightness in ethics.

I think, then, we may fairly suggest that Russell's theory of the different meanings of right in ethics can probably be reduced to considerations involving the different meanings of ought in logic + what seems to be a purely ethical meaning of ought which appears equally in both his senses. The ethical common meaning is involved in the statement: I ought ethically always to do that action which I ought logically to judge a most fortunate action of those possible to me. Russell's two meanings of ought are syntheses of this common third ethical meaning with the two logical senses of the word. Russell's qualification about reflecting with a view to finding out what is objectively right is involved in the logical sense of ought; for you have no right in any logical sense to believe what is not self-evident and what you have not investigated with a desire to reach the truth, whatever it may prove to be.

What is objectively right, then, on this theory is what, on my information, has probably at least as good consequences as any other action open to me. The mixture of the objective and subjective here is nothing specially ethical, but is what is involved in all applications of probability. The point is simply this. Any proposition, whether about goodness or anything else, is either true or false. But, relative to various selections of other

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propositions, this proposition will have different degrees of probability. So far, all is perfectly objective; the probability of one proposition, relative to any definite selection of others, is as independent of anyone's knowledge or belief about it as its truth or falsehood. When the individual mind enters, it is simply as a selective agent. Any particular mind believes some proposition and not others; and is acquainted with some and not with others; and relative to those which it believes, any given proposition has a certain probability, whether this particular mind or any other knows its value or not. It is necessary to add, however, that, whilst there is no ambiguity, and nothing subjective, in the probability of a proposition relative to any definite selection of others, there is some vagueness as to what Russell supposes to be included in the selection involved in his theory of objective rightness. This is really an important matter. Does objective rightness depend on the probability of the consequences relative to all the propositions that the agent believes; or to all those that he believes and the contradictories of those that he disbelieves; or to all the true propositions that he believes and the contradictories of all the false ones that he disbelieves; or what precisely is the principle of selection? It seems to me that Russell has talked cheerfully about *the* probabilities of propositions without remembering that all probabilities are relative to selections of propositions, and that it is vital to state what selection he considers relevant in defining rightness. When this fact is taken into account, the distinction between objective and subjective rightness on Russell's theory becomes a somewhat subtle one, though I grant that it remains. My doubt is whether it corresponds to any distinction involved in the various ethical judgments of commonsense which led Russell to his theory of objective rightness. Let me elaborate this point a little.

On Russell's theory it is clear that of precisely similar acts performed by A and B, under circumstances agree-



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ing in all respects but in the knowledge or beliefs of the agents, one can be *objectively* right and the other objectively wrong. For, since the probability of the consequences is relative to different selections of propositions in the two cases, it will in general be different. Now, of course, we all admit that difference of knowledge may alter the *subjective* rightness of acts performed under otherwise precisely similar circumstances; but I do very much doubt whether any judgment of common sense implies that what is *objectively* right for A can be objectively wrong for B. Still I do not wish dogmatically to assert that there is not an ethical sense of right and ought different from what Russell calls subjectively right and from what he calls most fortunate. My lingering doubt in his favor is due to the fact that there does seem to me to be such an intermediate meaning of right and ought in the logical sense, and that Russell's objective rightness seems, as I have said, to correspond to this.

I said that the logical sense of ought that corresponds to Russell's objective rightness is that you ought to believe or at least not to disbelieve what logically follows from what you do believe and from the contradictories of what you disbelieve. It is clear that this does not imply that what you believe is true, or what you disbelieve false; for otherwise this kind of logical rightness would not be (as it certainly is) compatible with its being right to believe what is false, and to disbelieve what is true. Now the probability of one proposition relative to others seems to me to be as much a matter of pure logic as its being implied by them. Hence, we must include in this logical sense of right that it is right to attribute to any proposition that degree of probability that it actually has, relative to the propositions that you believe and to the contradictories of those that you disbelieve. If my analogy between this logical sense of ought and Russell's objective rightness be accepted, we have now made a beginning of answering the question,—which, as

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we saw, he left unanswered,—as to what precisely is supposed to be the selection of propositions; relative to which the probability involved in objective rightness is to be reckoned. The relevant propositions are roughly those which the agent believes and the contradictories of those which he disbelieves, irrespective of whether what he believes is true or what he disbelieves is false. But some modification must be made in this.

The distinction between the use of a proposition as a premise and as a principle is familiar to logicians. When I argue in accordance with Barbara and justify my procedure by pointing this out, I do not use Barbara as a premise, but as a principle. Now, for logical rightness we must qualify what I have already said by adding that it is only the truth or falsity of a man's beliefs in propositions which he uses as premises that is irrelevant to his logical rightness; we must assume that his beliefs in all propositions that he uses as principles are actually true. This is, of course, simple enough when we are dealing with certain inference; but it is less easy to see what is a premise and what a principle when we come to deal with probability. In the first place, it is clear that the purely formal laws connecting the probability of a complex proposition, conjunctive or disjunctive, with that of its separate elements must be taken as principles and not as premises. I must also never count among the premises, relative to which I reckon the probability of a proposition, propositions about its probability relative to the other premises. Such propositions are principles not premises, and my belief in them must be true if I am to be logically right. For, otherwise, the true probability of anything relative to my state of information, would depend on my belief about the true probability, and this would make the whole notion purely subjective, which it is not. And this is supported by the analogy with certain inference, since to be logically right there, I must not have false beliefs as to whether one proposition implies another or not, and the case of im-

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plication is one where the probability of what is implied relative to what implies it is 1.

We now see what is the logical sense of rightness that we take to correspond with Russell's objective ethical rightness. Does his ethical objective rightness involve anything further than that it is objectively right to do what it is logically right to believe to be a most fortunate action? There are great difficulties and ambiguities in the notion of a probably most fortunate action which I will deal with later, but at present the question is where precisely the ethical element enters, and whether it introduces any new question of principle. It is, of course, clear that to reach judgments, about the probable goodness of anything, there must be some premises about values believed, as well as premises about facts. Can these ethical premises be treated as precisely on a level with the factual ones or not; *i. e.*, is it only the question whether we believe or disbelieve the ethical premises that is relevant to objective rightness, or is the truth or falsehood of our beliefs and disbeliefs here of importance? I am inclined to think that there is a difference between the two kinds of premises in this respect.

Suppose, for instance, that a person is an ethical hedonist, *i. e.*, that he believes as one of his ethical premises that the goodness of any state of affairs is directly proportional to the amount of pleasure in it and to that alone. Relative to this proposition, an act that will probably produce more pleasure on the whole will probably have better consequences than one that will probably produce less pleasure. But, supposing that ethical hedonism is false, are we to say that the man's act is objectively right, if he is right about the probability of its pleasurable consequences? If, for example, one is logically justified by one's factual premises in holding that pushpin will probably give more pleasure on the whole than poetry, and if one is logically justified on one's ethical premises in holding that more pleasurable states are always better than less pleasurable ones,

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is it objectively right to prefer pushpin to poetry, even though your ethical belief be false? I do not think this can be maintained, and therefore there must be an important distinction between the positions of ethical and of factual beliefs in the matter of objective rightness. Let us, then, sum up the results of our attempts to clarify Russell's notion of objective rightness, as far as they have yet appeared. An act is objectively right if it is probably a most fortunate act relative to (a) the propositions about matters of fact which the agent believes, and the contradictories of those which he disbelieves, independently of whether they be true or false; (b) to true ethical premises, whether he believes them or not; and (c) to true principles of inference and probability, whether he believes them or not. Subjective rightness depends wholly on what people believe or disbelieve, and not at all on what is true, while Russell's objective rightness depends, partly, on what people believe, whether it be true or not, and, partly, on what is true, whether people believe it or not.

But we are by no means at the end of our difficulties. Russell does not seem to have remarked that the notion of a probably most fortunate act remains ambiguous even after you have defined the selection of propositions, relative to which its probability and that of alternative acts are to be reckoned. The fact is that the question of probability enters twice, and Russell has not distinguished its two appearances. It is not clear whether the objective rightness of an act depends on the actual value of its probable consequences, or the probable value of its actual consequences, or the probable value of its probable consequences. All that we are told is that it does not depend on the actual value of its actual consequences. I submit that *until* the theory that objective rightness depends on probable consequences decides between these three alternatives, it cannot be satisfactory, and that *when* it is faced by them, it loses some of its original plausibility.

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We must devote a moment to the consideration of these alternatives. So far as I can see, the most plausible view for Russell to take would be that rightness depends on the probable value of probable consequences. For if either the actual goodness or the actual consequences be relevant, it is difficult to see why both should not be; and this he denies. If, however, we work out the implications of this theory, we shall see that it is less simple than it looks. Suppose that an agent has two actions, X and Y, open to him. Suppose, further, that relative to the propositions that the agent believes and disbelieves, the most probable consequences of X are A, and that their probability is p. Let the most probable consequences of Y be B, and let their probability be q. Further, let the most probable measure of the goodness of A be x, and the most probable measure of the goodness of B be y. Now suppose that $p < q$ and $x > y$. What then is objectively right? Ought the man to choose the act whose most probable consequences are less probable, but most probably more good, or the one whose most probable consequence is more probable, but most probably less good? It is useless to say that the question is merely academic, since the calculations cannot be made, for it is quite irrelevant to objective rightness whether anyone actually makes the calculations or not. The difficulty is one of principle, and, unless the theory can remove it, it has not produced an unambiguous definition of what it means by obejctive rightness.

Of the two remaining alternatives, it seems to me that it is more plausible to suggest that objective rightness depends on the actual value of probable consequences than on the probable value of actual consequences. It is, in fact, clear that the latter is not what Russell means, since he congratulates his theory on making objective rightness independent of unforeseeable circumstances, *i. e.*, of true propositions about matters of fact which are not included in the selection believed by the agent at the time of decision. Let us, then, take the view that an

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act is objectively right whose most probable consequences would be actually at least as good as the most probable consequences of any other act open to the agent. Unfortunately, there is much the same ambiguity here as we noticed above. If I can perform either X or Y, and the most probable consequence of X is A and of Y is B, it will not, in general, be true that the probability of X being followed by A is the same as that of Y being followed by B. If the probability of the most probable consequence of X be p, and that of the most probable consequence of Y be q, when $p > q$, whilst the value A is x and that of B is y where $x < y$, which act is objectively right? We could only avoid this ambiguity by introducing the notion of expectation, *i. e.*, the product of the probability of an event by the actual or most probable measure of its goodness if it takes place. We might then say that an act is objectively right if the expectation of goodness is, relative to the selection of propositions already defined, at least as great as the expectation of goodness of any other act possible to the agent. But does this really seem plausible? I think it is open to two objections: (1) I see no reason to think that the notion of mathematical expectation is really a measure of anything in the world. Suppose it is true that there is something called 'logical expectation,' and that it is a function of the probability of an event and of the most probable measure of its goodness, is there the slightest ground for thinking that this function is the product of the two? Is it not merely another case of that unjustifiable simplification which in the Hedonic Calculus assumes: (a) that there is such a thing as quantity of pleasure, and (b) that it must be measured by the time integral of the intensity of a pleasure? (2) Is the definition of objective rightness which we have reached as a matter of fact what anyone means by rightness? I quite agree with Mr. Russell that all ethical phrases are used ambiguously by common sense, and, therefore, whenever we try to give a strict meaning to them, we shall meet

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with verbal paradoxes. Still, we must not get entirely away from common sense, but try to be clear as to the various separate concepts which it verbally confuses. It is because of certain judgments of common sense that Russell introduced his theory of objective rightness, and it is a real objection to it that it is not only infected with all the doubt and vagueness that attach to the notion of expectation, but also seems hardly to correspond to any of the senses of rightness which common sense vaguely recognizes. If, then, any plausible alternative can be offered, I should be inclined to prefer it.

Let us then leave Russell's theory about objective rightness and consider Moore's. This theory makes objective rightness turn solely on the actual goodness of actual consequences, whether they are probable relative to the agent's information or not. It has then to deal with the apparent paradox that, whilst unforeseen circumstances may cause the actual consequences of an act to be utterly different from what could have been expected, we do not blame a man because what he has done, on the logically justifiable expectation of its having good results, turns out to have bad ones. Moore's answer is that the paradox arises from confusing what is right to do with what is right to praise, or holding that it is only right to praise right actions and only right to blame wrong actions. This supposition is not necessarily true. A's praise or blame of B's act is a second act. and, like all others, its rightness or wrongness must be judged by its own consequences and not by those of B's act. It will be right for A to praise B's act if the consequences of doing so are at least as good as those of blaming it or saying nothing, no matter what the consequences of B's act may prove to be.

This theory seems to me very plausible, and I think Moore is right in saying that much of the paradox is merely apparent. It is, therefore, worth while to consider the question of praise and blame more closely. The words praise and blame are somewhat ambiguous, and

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it is important to distinguish three elements: (1) the judgment that an act is right or wrong, (2) certain peculiar feelings of approbation and disapprobation, and (3) the expression of such judgments and feelings. This ambiguity leads to an ambiguity in the question: Am I right in praising some acts that are really wrong, and blaming some that are really right? This may mean: (1) Ought I to believe that some wrong actions are right, and that some right actions are wrong? (2) Ought I ever to have the feeling of approbation to a wrong action, and that of disapprobation to a right one? and (3) Ought I to assert what I believe, and state what I feel in such cases? In my opinion, 'ought' has a different meaning in each of these questions. The first means: Am I ever logically justified in holding that an action is probably wrong when it is actually right, or probably right when it is actually wrong? The answer is clearly in the affirmative. I ought logically to believe probable on my information what actually is probable, but this may be the opposite of what is actually true.

It is perfectly clear that in the second question 'ought' cannot have this meaning. I am under no *logical* obligation to have any particular kind of feeling in given circumstances. But it is also clear that it cannot simply have the meaning that it is right for me to have such and such a feeling in Moore's sense of right. In the first place, for an act to be right in Moore's sense, it must be voluntary, whilst, whether I have a certain feeling under certain circumstances, is largely independent of my will. Further, rightness for Moore depends on goodness of consequences. Now my unexpressed feelings (using expression in a sense wide enough to include a frown and a philippic) have few consequences outside myself. I admit that they may be important; but what I want to suggest is that there is undoubtedly a sense of rightness in which it may be said that a certain feeling is the right one to have, under certain circumstances, no matter what the consequences may be. Take, for instance, the emo-

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tion of sorrow on the death of a friend. It is not a voluntary product, and therefore not right or wrong in Moore's sense. But if it could be right or wrong in this sense, it would almost certainly be wrong, for it is difficult to see what good consequences can come from sorrow at what cannot be altered. Nevertheless, there is a perfectly definite sense in which we should say that sorrow is the right, and hilarity the wrong emotion under the circumstances. And this is a new use of right and wrong. Sorrow is not good, nor are its consequences as a rule good, but it may be right. There is, of course, a connection between this sense of right and wrong and goodness and badness. What is called right or wrong here is a feeling in connection with a situation. I think this sense of right might be defined as follows: The feeling x is right in the situation y, when the complex xy is intrinsically better than x alone, and at least as intrinsically good as the complex formed by y and any other feeling that can be directed toward it. *Can* is not used here in the sense of 'can if one will.' In certain circumstances I ought to have certain feelings, whether I could have them by willing or not.

Our second question, then, comes to this: Is the feeling of approbation ever the right feeling ( in this new sense) to have toward acts that are wrong in Moore's sense, and that of disapprobation the right feeling to have toward one that is right in his sense? Here again the answer is in the affirmative, but needs some qualification. The sort of feelings that are right or wrong are those directed to an object, as, for instance, sorrow is always sorrow *for* something, and approbation approbation *of* something. And feeling can only be directed to objects as they are known or believed to be by the person who has the feeling, not to aspects of the objects about which he knows nothing or is misinformed. Thus, the right feeling toward an act may very well alter as time goes on and more is known about its consequences; there is, of course, nothing paradoxical about this, because at each different stage of knowledge and belief the

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feeling is really directed to something different. Further, in practice, our feelings are never toward an act alone, but we have a total feeling that depends on two factors: (1) on our belief in its rightness in Moore's sense, and (2) on the moral qualities of the agent which we infer from the act. As far as I can see, the right feeling toward any act that exhibits conscientiousness is *pro tanto* approbation, though we may believe that the results of the act will be so bad that our total feeling ought to be condemnatory. The following, then, seems to be the answer to our present question: An act which is wrong in Mr. Moore's sense ought to meet with feelings of approbation by anyone who believes that the intrinsic value of the whole, formed by the consequences and the moral qualities which the choice of the act exhibits in the agent, is at least as great as that of the whole formed by any alternative act + the moral qualities that it would have exhibited. It may thus be right for us to feel approbation for an act that is not merely wrong in Moore's sense, but is believed to be wrong by us. The moral quality that seems most to add to the values of such wholes is conscientiousness, so that it is often right to approve an act that is wrong and is believed to be wrong, because it has been conscientiously performed. Of course, it is open to anyone to say that here we really have two different feelings, one directed to what we believe to be the rightness or wrongness of the act, and the other to what we believe to be the moral qualities that it exhibits in the agent. I somewhat doubt personally whether, when two objects are so closely connected as an act and the volition that produces it, you can analyze the total feeling directed toward them into two feelings, one directed to each object; but the point is not of great importance for the present purpose.

Finally, we come to the third meaning of 'ought' involved in Moore's theory in the question: Ought I to assert what I believe and state what I feel about the rightness of acts? Here, of course, the meaning of ought

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corresponds to Moore's general meaning of right. The question is: Will the consequences of stating my belief that an act is right, and showing my approbation of it, have at least as good consequences as any alternative action even when as a matter of fact my belief is false? The answer, of course, is that it probably is sometimes objectively right to praise an objectively wrong act, and *vice versa*. But if Moore means to offer as a definition of subjectively right acts that they are those which it is objectively right to praise, the definition will hardly do. In the first place, it will clearly follow that the extreme doubt that attaches, on his theory, to whether any particular act is objectively right will now equally infect the question whether it is subjectively right, since the subjective rightness of *all* acts will depend on the objective rightness of a certain class of acts. Moreover, it is easy to imagine acts which it is almost certainly objectively right to praise, and almost certainly subjectively wrong to do. If my friend and I were in the hands of a cruel despot with a taste for flattery, it might very well be objectively right for me to praise his wicked acts in order to save myself and my friend from his cruelty; but this would not make his wicked acts even subjectively right if he believed he was doing wrong.

Let us, then, go a little further into the question of praise and blame for ourselves, since neither Moore nor Russell have descended to detail. Before we go any further it will be well to compare Moore's and Russell's views about probable goodness for a moment; for it is becoming evident that Moore's view is going to introduce probability as well as Russell's, though in a different way. The difference is this: On Russell's view, a probably most fortunate act is an actually right one; on Moore's view, a probably most fortunate act is a probably right one. And this, being quite general, applies, of course, to acts of praise and blame. Now, I think there is some risk of the inconsistency of using Russell's definition of rightness for acts of praise and blame, and

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Moore's for other acts, and defining subjective rightness by a mixture of the two. This inconsistency must, of course, be avoided if we want to find the real consequences of both views. The consequences of applying Russell's definition are somewhat complicated. We will consider them first.

It might seem at first sight that, on Russell's definition, it will always be right for me to praise what it is right for me to do. For to say that the act X is right for A to do is to say that it is a probably most fortunate act on his information. Now, praise of such acts will certainly tend to make other people perform them, and it seems as if it must be right for A to make other people cause results which it would be right for him to cause himself. But this does not by any means follow. X may be that action which, on A's information, is probably the most fortunate of any that are open to him, but it does not follow that it is probably the most fortunate of any that are open to B; for B may have alternatives open to him which A has not. Hence A's praise of what it would be right for himself to do may cause B to choose an alternative which, on A's information, is not the probably most fortunate one open to B. There is, too, another consequence that is worth mentioning. Suppose that B has only the same alternatives open to him as A, but different information from A; then, on B's information, X may not be the probably most fortunate act open to him, though it is on A's information. Hence A's praise of what it would be right for himself to do may cause B to do what is wrong for him to do.

Let us now apply Moore's theory of rightness to the question of praise and blame. I do not see how we can dispense with the notion that there is a definite sense in which it is right to do what we believe to be objectively right, by means of any considerations about praise and blame. I take it that Moore is trying to make us believe that the notion of subjective rightness can be resolved into that of objective praiseworthiness. This might

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mean one of two things. It might mean that the two notions are really identical, that the second is an analysis of what people mean by the first; or that, whilst they are genuinely different notions, they have precisely the same extension. The first alternative, of course, implies the latter part of the second. It seems to me that inspection shows that the first alternative is false; if we can further prove that the second is wrong, we shall have an additional refutation of the first. It seems to me that when I have done my best to determine which alternatives open to me are objectively right, I can well admit that I may be mistaken, and yet be certain that it is right for me to do one of these alternatives. And I certainly do not seem to mean by this that it will always be objectively right for me to praise myself or for other people to praise me. For one thing, I do not generally think about praise or blame at all when I think about rightness; and for another, I can no more be certain about the effects of praise and blame than about those of any other action. Further, the sense of rightness which we are trying to analyze is, I think, essentially connected with conscientiousness. Now, I grant that on Moore's theory it is probably objectively right for me to praise what it is probably objectively right for me to do, because I shall thus tend to cause actions that are probably right. But the probable rightness of my praise is independent of the motives of the actions praised, since it merely depends on the probable goodness of their consequences, and this is unconnected with their motives. Thus, the probable rightness of praising an action has no immediate connection with its motive. On the other hand, whilst I should call an action subjectively right that was done conscientiously, it is not clear that it would ever be probably right for me to praise it on this ground. By praising it I might promote conscientiousness; but if it is probably an objectively wrong action, I should also probably be praising objectively wrong acts. I could avoid this difficulty, of course, by praising the motive and blaming

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the action; but it is not at all clear to me that, on Mr. Moore's theory, it is ever probably right to praise conscientiousness. If it be probably right to praise conscientiousness, it must be because that quality is either good in itself, or adds to the goodness of other wholes, or is likely to have good results. Now, I understand Moore to hold that motives have no intrinsic value, which cuts out the first alternative. As far as I know, he has not expressed any opinion about the second alternative. Finally, I do not see the least reason to suppose that conscientiousness is more likely to produce objectively right acts, on his theory, than any other motive. No doubt, it involves that you have done your best to find out what is right and are going to act on your conclusions; but, since the rightness of your action is at the mercy of all that is going to happen in the universe throughout all future time, there is no reason to expect better results from conscientious acts than from the most stupid and biased ones. I conclude, then, that, since the notion of subjective rightness is essentially bound up with conscientiousness, whilst the rightness of praise and blame is directly connected with consequences and not with motives, and further since there is no ground for supposing that it is ever probably right to praise conscientiousness rather than other motives, the notions of subjective rightness and of objective praiseworthiness cannot coincide either in meaning or in extension.

It remains for me, after these criticisms, to see whether anything positive can be said. I agree with Russell that it is neither important nor possible that the terms which we use should always exactly coincide in extension with those used by common sense. All that is important is to recognize clearly every different notion that is involved in the judgments of common sense; to give separate names to them and use them consistently; and, where possible, to analyze them and determine their mutual relations. It may also be necessary for us to recognize notions which common sense does not, and to determine

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their relations to those which it does. Let us then consider the notions with which we have to deal.

In the first place, Moore's notion of rightness, which is the same as Russell's 'most fortunateness,' is a perfectly definite concept which anyone is at liberty to use. My only objection to it is that it involves a somewhat arbitrary cut out of a wider notion, a cut which, I think, is made at a different point from any at which common sense makes one. What I mean by the wider notion is the intrinsic value of the whole universe, past, present, and future. Moore and Russell cut this in two at a voluntary decision between alternatives, and consider that rightness is only concerned with the states of the universe, after this decision. They then further cut the total state of the universe, after the decision, into the part that is and the part that is not a consequence of the decision, and they connect rightness only with the former of these two fractions. We are not told precisely how this second decision is made; but I think the consequences of an act are taken to be everything in the universe that would not be the same, whether the act had been done or not. There is some ambiguity in this, however. Do you mean the same in fact or in value? If you mean in value, you cannot safely take in less than the total future state of the universe as the consequence of any act, because its value will be different according as the act is done or not, provided that the doing or withholding of the act makes a difference to any part of it. This is evidently not what is meant. What is involved is only those facts that would have been different as facts if the action had not been done, and the value of the whole thus formed.

From each of these two ways of cutting up the universe there follows a result that has not, I think, been noticed. It is that a most fortunate act may make the total state of the universe worse than a less fortunate one. If I do x, I may make the total future state of the universe better than if I do y; but the Principle of Organic Unities

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precludes us from asserting that, because the state of the universe, after a moment t, is intrinsically better if I do x than if I do y, therefore its total state, before and after t, is better. For, if two wholes consist of a common part and two different parts, it does not follow that that which has the better part is as good as that which has the worse one. So much for the results of the cut in time. But it follows for similar reasons that the cut in the future states of the universe makes it possible that the total future state itself may be worse through a right act than through a wrong one. The consequences of x may be better than those of y; but the whole made by the consequences of x and the rest of the future states of the universe may be worse than the whole made by the consequences of y and the other future states of the universe. These possibilities will equally arise wherever you make the cut. Since it seems paradoxical to say that a most fortunate act may make the total state of the universe worse than a less fortunate one, I shall define a most fortunate act as one such that, if it be performed, the total state of the universe will be at least as good as if any other act open to the agent were performed. It follows that motives will be relevant to the question whether an act is most fortunate, for they are parts of the universe that precede the act and make their contribution to the total value. I think, further, that it has considerably more claim to be called a right act than what Moore calls a right act. By this I simply mean that, whilst it shares with Moore's meaning of right the objection (if it be an objection) that rightness and wrongness then depend on unforeseeable circumstances, yet it is closer to one part of what common sense means by rightness than Moore's definition. Suppose we put aside the question of unforeseeable circumstances by considering the acts of an omniscient God, a conception familiar enough to common sense. Common sense would say that all God's acts are right and that they all produce the greatest possible good on the whole, and it would hold that the two statements



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are necessarily connected. But with Moore's definition we have seen that there is no necessary connection between them, and the question could arise whether God ought to do what is right or what makes the total state of the universe as good as possible. Since it seems clear that he ought to do both, it looks as if the two notions must coincide in the case of an omniscient God at any rate, *i. e.,* when we leave out of account the question of intellectual limitations. I suggest, then, that the places where Moore and Russell make cuts in the total state of the universe are really arbitrary and do not correspond to any distinction involved in the judgments of common sense, nor, so far as I can see, to any that is of ethical importance.

I shall, therefore, define an objectively right action as one such that, if it be done, the total value of the universe will be at least as great as if any other possible alternative had been done by the agent. I have now to consider how far this agrees with, and how far it differs from, the meaning of the word involved in the judgments of common sense. It agrees, as we have seen, entirely when intellectual limitations are set aside. It also allows of agreement in the matter of motives. Common sense attaches a very great weight to motives, though not, I think, an exclusive one. This is quite in accordance with our theory. The fact that an agent does a certain act from a certain motive may be so valuable as to outweigh the badness of its consequences in Moore's and Russell's more restricted sense of that word. The total state of the universe may be much better if I do an action which will have very bad effects from a sense of duty, than if I do an alternative which will have much better effects from a desire to give pain. On the other hand, it is always possible to imagine consequences so bad that no goodness of motive will balance them. This seems to me in complete accord with common sense. Torquemada's actions were almost certainly wrong, in spite of the goodness of his motives, because of the extreme badness of

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their effects in Moore's and Russell's sense; Pitt's action in financing the early stages of the revolutionary war by loans may have been right because of the goodness of his motives, in spite of the considerable badness of the results.

Thus, motives actually enter into objective rightness on our definition, as I think they do for common sense. But I do not maintain that this sense of rightness completely agrees with all usages of the term by common sense, or that it furnishes a complete account of the common-sense attitude toward motives. There may be marginal cases where common sense judges an action to be right even though it thinks it probable that, when both motive and consequences are taken into consideration, the total state of the universe is worse than if the agent had chosen another alternative. In such cases, however, I think it would tend to say, not that the action was right, but that it was right of the agent to do the action. Thus, common sense might well say that Torquemada's actions were wrong in spite of the goodness of his motives, but that it was right for Torquemada to do them. It is not consistent in its use of the terms, but I think it is quite clear what is meant. To say that Torquemada's actions were wrong does not merely mean that the consequences apart from the motive were bad, but that the bad consequences plus the good motive were bad. To say that Torquemada was right to do them is to pass a judgment on Torquemada's motives in abstraction from the total results of his act. As a matter of fact, the two judgments are likely to be made together; they much more often agree than conflict; and they both involve motives, the one partially and the other exclusively. It is not, therefore, surprising that common sense is liable to confuse them.

Common sense calls an action right for the person who does it, when it approves of the motive; and it will be well worth while to consider motives for a moment. In the sense in which I am using the term, we cannot say with Russell that a motive is simply the cause of a de-

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cision. Probably all decisions have causes, but they have not all motives. When I say that I do an action because I judge it to be right, I do no doubt imply that my belief is a part of the cause of the decision; but I am not clear that this is all that I mean by the phrase 'because of' here. Anyhow, motives are a special class of causes of decisions of which the following things can be said: (1) They involve beliefs in the qualities or effects of the act which they cause to be chosen, and (2) the belief has to be quite explicit, and has to be explicitly recognized as in some sense the last and completing factor in the cause of the decision. Now, there is one kind of belief to which common sense attaches very great ethical importance as a motive, *viz.,* the belief in the objective rightness of the action. Common sense considers it a supreme excellence of character when beliefs in the rightness of acts are habitually causes of deciding to do the acts. And it marks its approval by saying that it is always right for a man to act from this motive even though the action be wrong. The excellence of this motive will indeed often make actions done from it *objectively* right, in spite of the badness of their effects; but even when the effects are too bad for the goodness of the motive to counterbalance them, common sense will still say that it was *right for* the man to have acted as he did. And this sense of rightness is peculiarly connected with this kind of motive. Thus, common sense, as distinct from Kant, recognizes that some actions are better when they spring from other motives or from no motive at all; it is better, for instance, other things being equal, to be kind to people because you like to see them happy than because you judge that it is right to make them happy; but, if the act is judged to be objectively wrong in a particular case, it will be said to have been right for the man who did it because he thought it right, and not for the man who did it from a direct desire to give happiness. We rightly prefer the action of a man who spoils his children because he likes to see them happy to that of one who spoils them because he is a conscien-

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tious hedonist; but we should say that the action was right for the second and wrong for the first.

It is clear that this sense of rightness corresponds closely with Russell's subjective rightness. But there is one point where I think Russell makes subjective rightness too subjective. He says that it is subjectively right to do what is conscientiously believed to be objectively right, but that does not imply that to be subjectively right a man must hold Russell's theory as to what is meant by objective rightness. This, I think, is a mistake due to natural modesty. If Russell's theory of objective rightness be true, then a man is not subjectively right if he means something else by objective rightness, and does what he judges to be objectively right on his own definition. In fact, a man is not subjectively right unless he holds true views as to the *meaning* of objective rightness. He may be as mistaken as he likes as to whether an act really has the necessary qualities for making it objectively right, but unless there be agreement as to what these qualities are, there is nothing in common to those beliefs, by agreeing in which men are called subjectively right. You cannot avoid this by saying that it is subjectively right to do that for which you have a feeling of approbation. When feeling of approbation and judgment of objective rightness go together, this is true; but, when they diverge, it is not even subjectively right to act for the feeling and against the judgment. Thus, it is always the judgment that is relevant to subjective rightness; and, therefore, if there is to be a definite common meaning for subjective rightness, there must be a definite common meaning for objective rightness. Thus, Russell ought only to call a man subjectively right in his conscientious actions if the man attaches the same meaning as he himself does to objective rightness.

The upshot of the discussion, then, is as follows: (1) I consider Moore's definition of objective rightness and Russell's definition of a most fortunate act too narrow. They make an arbitrary cut in the whole universe and

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lead to paradoxes which make us think that they cannot be a part of what common sense means by rightness. (2) I do not think that subjective rightness has any very close connection with the objective rightness of praise or blame, but that it is particularly connected with those motives which are called conscientious, taken in abstraction from the rest of the act. (3) But Russell's definition of subjective rightness is too subjective; for any agreement about subjective rightness involves an agreement about the meaning of objective rightness. (4) There is a special sense of rightness which applies to feelings as directed to situations. (5) I doubt whether common sense means by objective rightness what Russell does, and I hold that his account remains obscure, partly because you cannot talk of *the* probability of a proposition, and partly because of the ambiguity of the phrase 'a probably most fortunate act.' (6) My definition of objective rightness agrees with common sense in making motives an actual and important factor in it; and I think that the difficulty about the attitude of common sense to wrong acts done through ignorance of unforeseeable circumstances is met by the view that it is subjectively right for the agent to do what he judges to be most probably objectively right on his information. (7) But finally the existence of three logical senses of right and ought does make it just possible that there is an ethical sense of right corresponding to Russell's objective rightness, though the difficulty as to what precisely is meant by a probably most fortunate act infects this possible meaning with ambiguity.

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# IDEALISM AND THE CONCEPTION OF LAW IN MORALS.

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THE conception of law in morals is the aversion of the Idealist. According to him, it belongs to a lower plane than that of the end; the former belonging to the impersonal, and the latter to the personal. The conception of law, we are told, makes the moral ideal external to us, and makes life a formality, Laws, again we are told, contradict each other if taken singly, and their observance gives rise to casuistry. We should, therefore, be guided by the end and not laws.

There is an element of truth in the Idealist's revolt against law, and therein lie its appeal and its fascination for the human mind. Morality is, above all, life; and we grow in holiness not by reverencing a mere code of laws, but a holy character. In this sense, obedience to law (or legalism, to give the exact word) belongs to a lower plane, that of the impersonal, and all moral progress is a rising out of it into the freedom of the spirit. But in controverting this error, the Idealist has fallen into another error. 'Law,' in the sense of obedience to a statute, is opposed to morals, and to the 'end.' But 'law,' in the sense of what is universal, is of the very heart of morals; and to contrast it, in this sense, with the 'end,' is but to be guilty of a false antithesis.

In relegating laws to a lower plane and representing morality as an outgrowing of it, the Idealist is guilty of two errors: (1) of committing himself to an abstract view of the end, and (2) of making character synonymous with license.

1. There is an abstract conception of the end, just as there is an abstract conception of laws. The Idealist is on firm ground when he points out the latter and its effects:—one law contradicting another; the moral life

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reduced to a formalism; and casuistry at high tide. All these mistakes we associate with legalism. The legalist's mistake, however, is not that he obeys laws, but that he fails to note that they make a system, and considers one law without reference to the rest. The Idealist is right in emphasizing the 'end,' *i. e.*, the principle of unity, in morals. But he is wrong in his interpretation of the 'end.' We have just spoken of a system of laws, and the end is but another name for it. The laws are not a means to the end. They are the end unfolded. To make them the means (in the sense in which 'means' are different from the 'end') would be to put them out of the end, and so to make the latter an abstraction. The end can only be interpreted in terms of laws or not interpreted at all.[1] We may make a passing note, here, of the Idealist's oft repeated criticism that (moral) laws are made for man and not man for (moral) laws. This criticism has point if it means that a law must not be considered out of relation to the system of laws. But it is totally misleading if it suggests the negation of laws (a notion based on the mistaken conception of laws as outside of the end). To anticipate our argument a little, character is not license. We expect the good man to behave in the same way in similar moral situations. In short, we expect consistency, and not contradiction, in the good man's conduct. To give a man only the moral end and then to expect him to act rightly, would be like the Egyptian demand to make "bricks without straw." This is fully realized by Prof. Mackenzie when he says: "This commandment (the fundamental law to realize the rational self) is so broad, and is apt to seem so vague, that it is certainly well that it should be supplemented, for practical purposes, by more practical rules

[1] There is a third alternative: to make character (*i. e.*, the 'end') synonymous with caprice. This is dealt with later on. Strictly speaking, however, there are only the two alternatives above mentioned, for the character which is caprice is no character at all, and we are left with two propositions only: either there is, or there is not, character.

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of conduct." ("Manual," p. 341, the latest ed.) Again, on page 350, he insists that the task of ethics is to furnish something more than the end, to wit: "practical principles."[2] And he regards it to be the business of these rules "to bring the nature of the highest good to clear consciousness, and to indicate the general nature of the means by which this good is to be attained." Their nature, therefore, is to unfold the character of the end; they are in the end (the means and the end being organically connected in ethics).[3]

But when Prof. Mackenzie goes on to say: "But, assuredly, neither ethics nor anything else will tell a man what in particular he is to do," his meaning is not very clear. He cannot be said to argue against the existence of rules, for which he has but now argued himself. What he means, perhaps,—if we understand him aright,—is that rules which rid us of moral responsibility are worse than useless. Such rules indeed come under Prof. Mackenzie's characterization of "copy-book headings for the guidance of life." The existence of rules, as we understand them, do not reduce us to mere automata. The application of them is left to us, after an analysis of the situation for ourselves. Our moral individuality is thus saved. If the bondage of rules is irksome, we should remember that the alternatives before us are: 'bondage of rules' or 'bondage of ignorance,'—the end, as we have seen, being interpreted only through laws.[4]

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[2] Prof. Mackenzie uses 'law,' 'commandment,' 'rule,' and 'principle' as synonymous. See pp. 271, 333, 341, 350.

[3] I am far from suggesting that the above quotations represent Prof. Mackenzie's position. They rather controvert it, and represent unconscious concessions to the opponent's position.

[4] Prof. Mackenzie remarks thus on the present-day aversion to law: "There has been so strong a tendency in former times to lay down an absolute 'ought' in ethics, with a rigid scheme of obligations hanging from it, that now, by a not unnatural reaction, we find a number of our ethical writers treading very gingerly, hesitating to say that there is any such thing as duty, apologizing for the use of the word 'ought,' and mildly conceding that ethics has no practical value. It is the function of the ethical philosopher to *discover* and *define* the *supreme end of life*" (pp.

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2. To come now to the Idealist's second error of relegating law to a lower plane of morals: that it makes character synonymous with license. As we have seen, we expect consistency and not caprice in the good man's conduct. This point is further brought out in our identifying good conduct with good habits. We find, further, in life, that the more developed the character the greater the reverence for moral law. The Idealist reverses the natural order when he assigns law to the plane of the impersonal. As a matter of fact, law is only possible in the personal plane. This is borne out by Christian ethics, which has recovered personality for the world, and therein the conception of law is also the deepest.[5]

The antithesis of 'personal' and 'legal' is a common one with the Idealist. But it rests on a false abstraction. In this connection, what Prof. Denney says in another context (that of the Atonement) is not without its

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349-50). But I am afraid he falls into this very pernicious extreme in the following statement of his: "It may be worth while to note here that the rules of conduct are, in general, valuable for us in proportion as our interest in the concrete matter concerned is small. A man does not want rules for the performance of anything which he has deeply at heart. [But is not the question at issue: Can we have moral living deeply at heart without having this end interpreted in terms of rules?] . . . Christianity abolished the external rules of Judaism, by enjoining upon us an interest in life instead" (pp. 347-48). But see Mackenzie himself, p. 124, on the relation of Christianity and the Commandments, quoted in note 5.

[5] That 'commandment' or 'law' forms the essence of Christian morality has been rightly recognized by Prof. Mackenzie,—alone of his Idealistic brethren,—in the following quotation: "In the case of this line of development (the Jewish), however, it is to be noted that every step takes place, as it were, by a new enactment. The deeper principle is always formulated by the voice of some prophet, speaking more or less definitely in the name of 'the Lord.' The idea of a divine law remains fundamental throughout. Even when the inner principle of Christianity is set against the external rules of the older system, it still appears in the form of a definite enactment, a 'New Commandment,' 'It was said by them of old time, . . . But I say unto you.' The appeal is still to an authoritative law" (p. 124). As to the connection between 'personality' and 'Christianity,' notice Martineau's characterization of the former, as the noblest gain of Christian thought (Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. I, p. XXVIII).

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lessons for us: "Personal is habitually used in a certain contrast with legal, and it is very easy to lapse into the idea that personal relations, because distinct from legal ones, are independent of law; but, to say the least of it, that is an ambiguous and misleading way of describing the facts. The relations of God and man are not lawless, they are not capricious, incalculable, incapable of moral meaning; they are personal, but determined by something of universal import; in other words, they are not merely personal, but ethical. That is ethical which is at once personal and universal. . . . The relations of God to man, therefore, are not capricious though they are personal: they are reflected or expressed in a moral constitution to which all personal beings are equally bound, a moral constitution of eternal and universal validity, which neither God nor man can ultimately treat as anything else than what it is. . . . It ought to be apparent to everyone that even the relation of parent and child, if it is to be a moral relation, must be determined in a way which has universal and final validity. It must be a relation in which,—ethically speaking,—some things are forever obligatory, and some things forever impossible; in other words, it must be a relation determined by law, and law which cannot deny itself. But law in this sense is not 'legal.' It is not 'judicial,' or 'forensic,' or 'statutory.' None the less, it is real and vital, and the whole moral value of the relation depends upon it."[6]

In this connection, the question of casuistry deserves notice. "Casuistry consists," to quote Prof. Mackenzie, "in the effort to interpret the precise meaning of the commandments and to explain which is to give way when a conflict arises." It has been facetiously defined by the same writer as: the devising of rules to break rules. We are not concerned to justify the abuses under its head, and they have been many. But what we are con-

[6] Denney, "The Atonement of the Modern Mind," pp. 67 *ff.*

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cerned to justify is that it should be possible to give a reason for breaking rules, whenever that happens, and, as Prof. Mackenzie says, happen it must sometimes. The alternative to our position is to say, in effect, that Unreason and not Reason governs human actions; that we cannot explain our conduct to others,—for that, in the last analysis, would be an appeal to rules and so make ethical judgment impossible. The Idealist having abjured rules altogether can only point, when a "case of conscience" arises, to the Supreme Commandment,—to realize the rational self (Mackenzie, p. 341). But to tell a man in perplexity, in a case of conscience, to realize the rational self, when this very thing is in question,—*viz.*, what will realize the rational self?—is to give a stone for bread. The Idealist himself has misgivings as to whether his advice to realize the rational self would solve a case of conscience. And so we have Prof. Mackenzie saying: "No doubt, this is a question [*viz.*, whether the course that we think of pursuing is the one that is most conducive to the realization of the rule of reason in the world?] which it will often be difficult to answer"[7] (p. 341). Dr. D'Arcy is still more emphatic. "But it is not to be imagined," he says, "that by means of this (follow the supreme commandment) or any other formula there is hope of settling all cases of perplexity."[8] There is, however, a hope left with the Idealist that it might still be possible to stumble on a course of action somehow. "But, in general," says Prof. Mackenzie," a man who keeps his conscience unclouded, and sets this question fairly before himself, will be able to keep himself practically clear from errors, without resorting to casuistical distinctions" (p. 342). But supposing by a piece of good luck the Idealist stumbles on

[7] Prof. Mackenzie has considerably lightened the difficulty of his position by his manner of stating it. Does not Prof. Mackenzie's question imply the cessation of conflict, and that the mind has decided on a course of action, whereas, in a 'case of conscience' the question of the course of action is still open?

[8] "A Short Study of Ethics."

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the right course, he cannot explain the 'right' either to himself or to others,—for that, as we have said, in the last analysis, would be referring to a rule.

But casuistry points out a real difficulty in our conception of moral laws, and this has to be faced. That moral laws contradict one another is a fact. A way has to be found out of this contradiction if the conception is to be retained at all. The method of removing this contradiction we have already suggested while dealing with the mistake of legalism. There is a system of laws which holds the different parts in harmony. But there is not an end to our difficulties yet. In a system we would expect the relationship between the different parts (*i. e.*, the laws) to continue to be the same. But when we turn to laws, we find their general relationship broken through sometimes. Does this not invalidate the whole conception? A little reflection will show that we are here face to face with the question of exceptions to the intuitively discerned graduated scale of our impulses. For, laws at last fall back for their sanction on the impulses, and are derived from them. This question we have already discussed in this JOURNAL,[9] and can here only repeat our conclusion that the exceptions cannot be escaped on any moral theory, and point to the disorder which marks our present moral life.

The Idealist's objection to law, as we shall presently see, really rises out of his objection to the universal character of morality. Let us hasten to explain what we mean by "the universal character of morality," as everything will turn on the connotation we attach to this expression. By the universal character of morality, or of moral laws, we mean: that moral laws are not the individual's creation, which he can set aside at will; that they apply to others as much as to himself; that there are some things which must forever be, and some which

[9] In the paper, "Dr. Martineau on the Object and Mode of Moral Judgment," October, 1913.

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never can be; that there must be certain dispositions of mind and certain acts which cannot be absent from a good man, and other dispositions and acts which cannot belong to him. In short, our moral laws have a finality about them. To return now to the Idealist. According to the Idealist, 'law' is abstract, while 'life' is concrete, and so the former cannot be a measure of the latter. Have our acts, then, nothing in common? Is each act different from every other, not merely in accidents, but in essentials as well? we might ask. To this Dr. D'Arcy replies: "The good is to be found in the concrete act and is, therefore, in every case individual and singular." Further: "Every man has his own individual life to live, and his own proper place to fill, and, as pointed out above, no abstract statement can define the concrete."

If the good of every act and the good of every individual are different, then can we know the good at all? we might ask. To this there is a very clear answer. "The end," says Dr. D'Arcy, "is incapable of a material definition. The content of the end cannot be defined, because self-realization must be for every man peculiar and unique. The content must be different in every case. It must be perfectly individual."[10]

If this is the truth, then we can have no moral judgment,—for my judgment of another presupposes that our experiences are in essence the same,—and no science of ethics; also, we cannot have habits of any sort, good or bad, for they presuppose similarity in essentials in

[10] This moral agnosticism,—the inability to frame a definition of the moral end,—as we shall see later, is at the root of the Idealistic position. We find Green expressing it in his "Prolegomena" (section 172). Dr. Caird has sought to give an interpretation of Green's position which saves him from moral agnosticism (quoted by Mellone: "Philosophical Criticism and Construction"). But Dr. Mellone seems to be truer to the facts when he says: "In one passage there is an extreme statement which seems to suggest that the Ideal cannot be defined in any degree" (p. 333). No one who believes that the moral ideal can be *apprehended* (not comprehended) will ever think of defining it only in negatives, as Green does: "Of a life of completed development of activity with the end attained, we can only speak or think in negatives" ("Prolegomena").

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the moral situations of an individual's life; and lastly, we cannot have character, for that goes with the going of habits. This protest against law (or legality, to give the exact word) begins, we might note, in the interests of individuality, as we have seen, and ends by making morals atomistic, destroying its organic character. The Idealistic position thus frankly commits us to agnosticism in morals.

If we cannot know the end in morals, then we are but creatures of relativity, and what connection is there between the morals of the different ages? This question has been discussed by Prof. Muirhead in Book V of his "Elements of Ethics," and one has only to turn to his treatment of this question to study the peculiar slipperiness and see-saw character of the Idealistic argument.

Prof. Muirhead begins the discussion with the statement that in order to be absolute, morality must be relative (to the society we live in and to our station and duties). That morality must be relative, in this sense, in order to be absolute, no sane man thinks of denying. But this does not help us to answer the main question with which we are engaged,—the reality of morals. Prof. Muirhead himself feels it, as witness the pages in which he tries to point out the unity in the diversity of moral standards. This is the vital point at issue in discussing the question of the reality of morals: whether our moral conceptions are in a state of constant flux or there is a unity in them. Prof. Muirhead decides for the unity, as against the flux. But the unity is a formal one. This is Prof. Muirhead's first point in the discussion. The content varies, but the form,—the end,—is the same.[11] We have thus a logical unity which subsumes material contradictions under it. The Roman who indulged in gladiatoral fights, and the monk who gave his life to stop them, cannot both be right. We can lump them under one head,—both being guided by an end in their

[11] "The Elements of Ethics," p. 234.

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actions,—only if we take an abstract, logical view, and not a moral view, of the case. Our moral consciousness will refuse to put them on the same level, and feel that if we have no other unity than a formal one, then our moral conceptions are but accidents, incidental to our social stage, and that there is no such thing as a universal moral order.

But notice now the second point which Prof. Muirhead makes in this discussion. After having averred that there is only a formal unity, he goes on to point out that these different moral ideas could be connected, again, by the law of progress.[12] And he goes on to state, and rightly, that progress *is not change,* but development (p. 239). Now this, if anything, means that there is a material unity,—a statement which was flatly denied by Prof. Muirhead's first point. For, progress cannot be in the 'end,'—the 'end' being the same through all changes, as postulated by Prof. Muirhead himself,—but only in the content.

Though inconsistent, Prof. Muirhead is right in pointing out this unity of matter (to use his language); and let us note that this unity of matter alone gives us reality in morals. We may also note that this material unity (or the law of progress) answers the objections against the standard as law, on the score of differing moral conceptions through the ages,—which Prof. Muirhead himself urges in a previous part of the book (p. 85). Prof. Muirhead sums up his arguments under this second head in the following words: "But sufficient has perhaps been said to show that the actual standard at any particular period, while undoubtedly relative to the special circumstances of the time and country, is not on that account an isolated and accidental phenomenon, but takes its place as a stage in the evolution of a universal moral order, from its relation to which in the last resort it derives its significance" (p. 247).

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[12] *Ibid.*, § 97, pp. 242 *ff.*

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As we begin to feel that we are at last led by Prof. Muirhead to solid ground, the ground under our feet is, by a most unexpected *volte face,* cut away by a footnote, and we are plunged again into the seething flux out of which we had fancied, a moment ago, that we had saved our moral conceptions. Prof. Muirhead had used the expression "universal moral order" in the above quotation, and he hastens to recant his heresy by the following interpretation of it: "The universality," he says, "which is thus opposed to the relativity of the standard, must not be misunderstood. After what has been already said, it cannot, of course, mean that morality can ever come to be the same for all; duty is duty just because it is different for all. Nor can it mean the finality of any conceivable moral code. We have already seen sufficient reason to distrust the conception of a final or absolute ethics. It cannot even mean merely the ubiquity of the highest recognized standard, though this is undoubtedly an element in it. The moral order which is being evolved must be conceived of as universal chiefly in the sense that it represents the demands of the universal or rational element in human nature" (footnote, p. 247). So we come back to where we began! The last word of Idealistic ethics on the question of morals lands us in moral agnosticism. If there is no unity but of form,[13] then we cannot verify our moral experience, and moral knowledge is one of phenomena and not of reality.

We should note, in this connection, the improper use of 'evolution' by Idealists. They speak of the evolution

[13] This is what Prof. Muirhead's explanation, in the footnote quoted, comes to. The universality of the moral order consists in the presence, in all voluntary action, of "the universal or rational element in human nature." This element is, as readers of Green know, no other than "the self-objectifying consciousness." Prof. Muirhead, in substance, means that wherever there is a conscious end, we have morality. That is, the only unity of morals is a formal and not a material one. Would not the expression "moral chaos" better characterize such a formal unity than "moral order"?



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of morals, and in the name of it cry down finality in our moral consciousness. But evolution is not change, but growth. Writers who know only a formal unity cannot legitimately use this expression,—which stands for material unity,—without contradicting themselves. Again, the doctrine of evolution is not necessarily antagonistic to finality. There is a point at which there is no further evolution.[14] The extremest statement of the Idealistic school is to be found in the following extract from Prof. Dewey: "No social group could be maintained without 'patriotism' and 'chastity,' but the actual meaning of chastity and patriotism is widely different in contemporary society from what it was in savage tribes *or from what we may expect it to be five hundred years from now.*"[15] It is not very clear what Prof. Dewey means here. Does he mean that moral evolution in the future will render monogamy or the seventh commandment obsolete? Prof. Dewey might shrink with horror from such an interpretation of his words, but there is nothing in his intellectual position, of an indefinite evolution, to guard against such a possibility. Finality, in a very real sense, we cannot avoid, if there is to be moral knowledge; if the end is capable of definition. This does not necessarily mean comprehending the end, but apprehending it; thus making room for finality and progress at the same time. We find this position amply illustrated in Christian morals. Take the law of brotherhood, for instance. Call it 'law' or 'principle,' as you like. But the difference from the Idealistic position comes out in this,—that this 'law' or 'principle' is binding on all alike; it is not self-created; and we cannot outgrow it. The unfolding of this law has gone on in the moral consciousness of man for two thousand years, and we have not yet exhausted all its implications, which proves that

[14] For a fuller treatment of this point see Rashdall's chapter on "Moral Authority and Moral Autonomy" in his "Theory of Good and Evil," Vol. II.

[15] Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," p. 401.

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finality and progress are not necessarily antagonistic to each other.

We should note that the Idealist rejects laws because he rejects finality of moral knowledge. The logical connection between these positions is clearly pointed out in the following words of Prof. Dewey: "Many who strenuously object to all of these schemes of conduct, to everything which hardens it into forms by emphasizing external commands, authority and punishments and rewards, fail to see that such evils are logically connected with any acceptance of the finality of fixed rules" (p. 329). And his rejection of finality in our moral knowledge proceeds from his position that the end cannot be defined. The Idealist's aversion to law will be judged at its right value when we realize that it proceeds from his root-position of moral agnosticism,—the inability to frame a definition of the end. His aversion would seem to proceed not from a desire to conserve morality, to save it from materialism, but from a desire to destroy it and establish the reign of agnosticism in the moral sphere.

One further objection of Idealism against the conception of moral law might be noticed: that it makes the standard external to us. 'Transcendental,' we think, would be a more exact expression. That moral law has a transcendental character is very true; it is of the very essence of law, this imposing of it by one higher than we. But the transcendental character of the moral law has nothing in it to prevent its having, at the same time, the immanental character. Only a philosophy which confines our conception of God to immanence, can take exception to the transcendental character of morality, and speak of law as making the standard external to us. Whether Idealism can justly be said to do so, is a question for itself; we must here content ourselves with the mere assertion that such is the case.

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# AN ETHICAL TEACHER'S AMERICAN TOUR.

F. J. GOULD.

THE longer I work at the enterprise of the moral instruction of children, the more keenly I become aware of the multitude of subsidiary problems that beset the central question, and the more I learn of the forces of criticism and opposition that the advocate of direct moral instruction has to encounter. Nevertheless, I pursue the aim which I established for myself twenty years ago, and it would seem reasonable to suppose that the recent experiences which I am now about to relate will at least have the merit of actuality and breadth. The subject of the ethical training of young citizenhood has created a world-wide interest, as has been attested by the two international moral education congresses of 1908 and 1912. At the invitation of the University of Wisconsin I have paid a second visit to the United States, in order to show, by demonstration-lessons given to children in public, how the theme of personal and civic conduct may be made interesting and stimulating to young minds. Up to the moment of writing (early March, 1914), I have spent more than five months in ten or eleven states, visited about thirty cities and five universities, delivered two hundred and twenty lessons, and met some sixteen thousand people as audiences.[1]

The lessons dealt with entirely plain and straightforward topics, such as self-control, courage, perseverance, kindness, honesty, duty, and service. Language and illustrations appealed to children associated with all forms of social and religious conviction. The American public-school platform, detached from the difficulties engendered by "religious instruction," afforded a very precious opportunity for the presentation of teaching which sought

[1] The tour concludes in April.

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to strike the universal note in ethics. The usual procedure was to place a class of sixteen or twenty girls and boys in front of me and a blackboard, and with backs to the adult audience. A lesson lasted forty or forty-five minutes, and, on the dismissal of the children, points of educational interest were handled in brief addresses or discussion. It may be well to state shortly the chief matters touched upon in these notes and comments at the close of the meetings:

> The necessity for concreteness as against abstractions and dry maxims. The veto on moralizing and preaching is absolute.
>
> There must be constructiveness in the story-telling. The illustrations must be inter-connected. Children love spiritual construction as well as construction with the hands in kindergarten occupations, manual-training classes, and the like.
>
> True stories are preferable to material taken from works of fiction; but the legends consecrated by the affection of ages, and which enshrine moral truth, may be legitimately classed with the true stories of history and biography. The teacher, however, should frankly reveal to the children the nature of the stories thus employed.[2]
>
> Positive qualities should be limned as objects of admiration and love, and the portrayal of vice and folly should be introduced as strictly subordinate. Illustrations should appeal to the sexes equally. The utmost respect should be shown to the children's replies, since they are being invited to express their feelings and thoughts on the most important subject in the world, namely, right conduct.

[2] People who are inclined to purely academic discussion of such points may be surprised to learn that children appreciate dramatically related legends even after being assured that the narratives are not to be accepted as 'true.' I have tested this psychological fact on hundreds of occasions. I suspect that the pleasure in such stories is enhanced by the teacher's candid treatment.

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> The objection that moral instruction is nothing but words, as distinct from the fruitful practice of 'doing,' is met by the simple reminder that we protect children from the influence of bad words, bad stories, and bad books; and, if we have faith in the power of bad words, it would appear rational to have faith in the power of good words.
>
> Normal and 'good' children need moral instruction and conscience-training more than the so-called delinquents and defectives. They are more amenable to ethical suggestion and discipline, just as children of artistic bent more profitably repay artistic training. The future welfare of civilization depends upon the character of the normal children who constitute the vast majority of the young population of the world to-day.

I may say in passing that I am quite familiar with the controversy as to the relative values of direct and indirect moral instruction, that is, the direct method such as I practice myself, and the incidental method which consists in utilizing either the suggestions of geography, history, literature, and art, or the chance happenings of the school room and play time. I never could quite understand why the earnest teacher should not combine these two methods, and save all debate. Moral instruction is not, to my mind, an extra subject. It is the skillful summing up and concentration of the noble elements in the whole round of child-experience and school-instruction, with the addition of social outlooks which neither child-experience nor school-instruction ordinarily provide. The incidental method can never meet the crying need of the young soul for spiritual construction; and he who starves this instinct is guilty of treason toward one of the most vital tendencies of human nature.

The general body of superintendents of schools, teachers, and parents were, to all appearance, genuinely interested in the subject which I endeavored to illustrate.

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Perhaps the principle that excited most attention was the insistence on the positive quality rather than the negative. This again led people to reflect on the corollary that moral instruction, far from being a corrective or penal exercise, should be considered as a joyous and exhilarating study of noble actions and characteristics; and should aim at self-development rather than self-repression. I was half vexed and half amused when a so-called boy burglar,—a precocity, aged six, who had been found carrying firearms,—was brought to one of my lessons in the hope of reforming his vices. More than once it happened that a teacher anxiously requested me to visit her school, and deliver a special lesson designed to counteract some fault which she believed to be rampant in her young charges. Such a conception of moral instruction is, to me, both odious and ludicrous. I often pointed out to an audience that the children who had just left the platform had departed without receiving an atom of good advice from the teacher. The ideal of moral instruction should be to reveal the true, the beautiful, and the good, in history and the moral life, in such a way as to kindle the imagination and stir the will. This is a very different thing from fastening on individual or collective misdemeanors, and turning them to disciplinary account with a sort of pious ingenuity.

I tried to enlist the coöperation of other classes besides teachers, and I was never more pleased than when, at St. Louis, a large meeting of business and professional men allowed me to teach a group of Russian-Jewish children on an improvised platform in the room dedicated to a City Club lunch. Never had I a more attentive class, or more attentive adult listeners. Indeed, some of the gentlemen told me they had great difficulty in preventing themselves from holding up their hands and calling out replies to questions which I addressed to the children; for I had spirited them back to the days of their boyhood. All sorts of people came to the meetings, and I counted it a triumph when, one day, a Lutheran pastor

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and a Lutheran teacher sat on one side of the classroom, and a group of Catholic sisters on the other. A year previously, in another environment, I had given lessons to Hindu, Mohammedan, and Parsi boys in Indian high schools, and I believe I may say that nobody in Bombay, Baroda, or any of the other cities I visited alleged that conscientious feelings had been offended. This is not a mere personal reminiscence. It is an indication of the possibility of realizing a principle of enormous value in education and even statecraft.

As to the children who, after all, were the chief actors in the scenes of my pilgrimage, I can only remark, in general, that they were like all other children,—bright, responsive to the call of whatever is fine, appreciative of humor, and brimful of common sense. Thousands of replies they must have tendered to my questions, yet I am happy to observe that I have no absurd answers to chronicle such as imaginative journalists adorn their comic columns with. I have an invincible faith in the rationality of the majority of children. Treat them respectfully and cheerfully, and they will reciprocate with respect, cheerfulness, and intelligence. Not only did my little pupils pay good heed to my innumerable tales of chivalry, courage, and kindness, but they often (as teachers and parents told me) repeated them in the playground or at home, or acted them with appropriate gestures before admiring companions in the classroom. Of course, I had spared them the burden of committing any moral to reluctant memory. One or two incidents may be worthy of record. In a lesson on honesty, several times repeated, I stopped to ask: "Do you think most traders in the world are honest or dishonest?" And I usually made a half-playful count of the votes indicated by the show of hands. At one city (Milwaukee) the opinion was unanimously in favor of the traders. In most cases, the verdict was,—"Dishonest"; a result which somewhat staggered the City Club at St. Louis. The ordinary teacher of the St. Louis class had the curi-

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osity to ask the children afterwards why they gave their suffrages for the verdict of "Dishonest"; and one of the boys said, "Well, sir, look at the newspapers!" This shrewd remark probably gives the key to the children's judgment. The judgment did not, I am sure, imply a distrust in humanity, but it betrayed the influence of sensational journals and of caustic comments in the household circles. I never argued the point with the children. I simply said that my opinion was otherwise; and I narrated a story which led them to see that trade itself is founded on honest and honorable exchange, in spite of much meanness and cheating. When a class was asked whether a mother superior who (in the spirit of George Herbert's well-known poem on service) scrubbed the stairs of a sisterhood house, was mistress or servant, one of the girls at once replied, "Both"; and it was a beautiful word. Another girl,—a mulatto,—after hearing a series of stories of self-respect, self-control, self-reliance, self-denial, and self-sacrifice, reflected a few moments on the question: "In what way did the last two cases differ from the first three?" and then said, "In the first three, the persons thought of themselves; in the last two they thought of others;" which was precisely and subtly true. But far be it from me to seek to convey the impression that most of the replies were remarkable. They were neither remarkable nor inferior. They were sensible. I freely allow that the children and I often laughed together. It is a poor ethics that cannot laugh. Sometimes the adult audience laughed too soon, as when they tittered at a child's definition of a mummy as "a skeleton in goods" (*i. e.*, dry goods); but the definition is workable and picturesque.

Not many teachers have had such an opportunity of coming to close quarters with so many young souls in varied environments; and I will maintain that none has a more buoyant belief in the willingness of children to hear the message of the ideal, if only the message be uttered in simplicity, and clothed in the guise of parable,

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poetry, and dramatic narration. To no other forms of teaching can I agree that the term moral instruction can be so legitimately applied. Having seen abundant evidences of the children's capacity to accept constructive and direct moral instruction, and of the teachers' readiness to experiment along this road, I have no hesitation in urging all who have influence in American educational fields, to press the enterprise forward, and encourage all attempts to place the training of young citizenhood on a firmer basis. I regard this work, not as a reform, but as a natural development. The tendency all over the civilized world is to improve upon the methods which made intellectual discipline the chief aim of the school. The tendency is now toward the ideal of subordinating all subjects to the one supreme end of the formation of good personal and civic character; in other words, to simplify the present congested curriculum by eliminating all the material that does not more or less count in the making of good men and women. Even as regards intellectual efficiency, I will dare to assert that the education of the sympathies and of the moral judgment is eminently conducive to wholesome quickening of wit. The study of conduct, in the concrete modes suggested, is perhaps the most powerful aid to rational observation, deduction, and insight, and is not second in value to a so-called scientific training. Nor is this problem one that mainly concerns the teacher. It mainly concerns the community and the State, the democracy and the organizers of opinion, industry, and administration. The whole globe is becoming a society, and education must rise to the sublime function of unifier and inspirer of this vast human complex. Moral education should be a practical search for a realization of the universal moral aspiration. While this international sanction is actively utilized in the construction of a sound system of ethical instruction, each national State must treat the training of its young people as an object vital to its own moral and even political existence. Growing in complexity with the advance of

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legislation and administrative regulation, the State now depends entirely upon the intelligent coöperation and integrity of its individual citizens. Whatever the churches do or leave undone, and even if they rose to the full height of their educational opportunities, it is now incumbent upon the State to build up the civic conscience by its own methods, in its own language, and with enthusiasm for its own high destiny. This means that, sooner or later, the schools of the world must establish civic instruction as the indispensable center of their effort.

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## DISCUSSION.

### The Divorce Laws of England and Wales.

My attention has been called to the article on this subject by Mrs. Bosanquet which was published in this Journal in July, 1913. Her treatment of it seems to me highly unsatisfactory. I cannot but think that her remarks show symptoms of the fatigue often noticeable in those who have a reputation for progressiveness to maintain when they tackle a new question. She has not succeeded in understanding this question except through the spectacles of those who signed the Minority Report. For example, she is content to quote their remark: "The great majority of experts on mental diseases were very decidedly opposed to the proposal to make insanity a ground of divorce." This statement is quite erroneous. If Mrs. Bosanquet had carefully read the Minority Report or analyzed the evidence, she would have ascertained that of the answers obtained by Sir George Savage from eighty-two medical officers of asylums, fifty-one were in favor of insanity being a ground of divorce, twenty-nine were against, and two were indifferent. Of the total number of medical men whose opinions were obtained, sixty-three were in favor and only thirty-six against. All these gentlemen possess an expert knowledge of mental diseases. Yet these being the figures, she writes that the recommendation as to insanity is against the evidence! Again relying on the Minority Report, she praises the system of separation orders, apparently without even reading the carefully prepared evidence of the Mother's Union, which entirely and inadvertently gives away the case for separation orders. She writes very confidently of reconciliation without appearing to realize that it is more often than not due to the wife's difficulty in obtaining the maintenance which the order is supposed to secure. She entirely ignores the vast number of irregular unions and crimes due to the system.

This existing difficulty as to obtaining maintenance is alleged as a reason for denying the remedy of divorce to a deserted wife, as if *all* deserted wives were poor or too unattractive to have the opportunity of remarriage. A deserted wife cannot be worse off than she is now; why should she not be given the possibility, and in many cases probability, of a better fate?

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Mrs. Bosanquet argues that the marriage tie should be permanent and indissoluble without reflecting that where one party has broken every single vow which she so deeply venerates, the other party need scarcely feel the vows in question particularly binding. She writes as if marriage in the past had been more permanent than it is to-day, whereas in medieval Europe it was far more uncertain than in the modern world. She would seem not to have heard of the ecclesiastical facilities for annulling Catholic marriage, many gross examples of which are to be found even now in Catholic states where there is no divorce.

We are told that the more sensitive to cruelty we become, "the more we shall live for the pleasure and convenience of the moment." Cruelty, if made a cause for divorce, would certainly be of a graver kind than to-day, when it is,—often collusively,—thrown in with adultery to give an injured wife a case for divorce; nor need a higher standard of civilization destroy the loyalty that distinguishes the affections of those spouses who are not unreasonably and tyrannically chained together.

From a public point of view, marriage is a business contract which can only be carried out by partners who are capable of coöperation. It is their duty to use every effort to coöperate, but coöperation is impossible if, *e. g.*, one of the spouses deserts the other and cannot be found, or makes an attempt on the other spouse's life, or habitually and grossly outrages the other spouse's feelings, or infects the other with a venereal disease and conceals the fact so that it becomes well-nigh incurable. I take merely hackneyed instances of what goes on every day.

Mrs. Bosanquet writes as if a husband can go on being divorced all his life; but even a millionaire cannot afford more than three divorces, having regard to the claims of his past wives for alimony. Why she should seriously quote Mr. Hewlett's evidence to the exclusion of far more important witnesses, I do not know, but I need only refer any readers who may be puzzled by them to some remarks of mine on the subject of "Divorce by Consent," in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1913.

Everyone who is not a lawyer is fond of saying that "Hard cases make bad law"; if *one* hard case can be relieved, it should be relieved, nor is there a single sentence in Mrs. Bosanquet's article to indicate what is the "suffering" to be caused by the legislation recommended by the Majority Report.

In conclusion, Mrs. Bosanquet might do well to explain

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whether she wishes to abolish the existing divorce laws. From her remarks about vows it would seem that she opposes all divorce of any kind whatsoever, and if so, it seems odd that she should concern herself with divorce-law reform.

E. S. P. HAYNES.

London.

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## BOOK REVIEWS.

HIGHER NATIONALITY: A Study in Law and Ethics. An Address delivered before the American Bar Association at Montreal on September 1, 1913. By Viscount Haldane of Cloan, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain. London: John Murray, 1913. Pp. 45.

Towards the close of this elevated and masterly address, Lord Haldane avows, though in no tone of apology, that he is aware that his discourse has led the American Bar Association into regions which might "seem to belong more to ethics than to law." And it is good that, with the printed word before them, the reading world should be in a position to share the gratitude of the lawyers of the United States and Canada for his guidance. Neither short nor easy is the path that leads from what the world is all too prone to dismiss as the arid and unspeculative domain of law courts and legal practice to high discourse on *Sittlichkeit,* General Will, and International Obligation. Whole mountain ranges may seem to lie between. But these are impotent to stop Lord Haldane. With characteristically large outlook and confident step, and by the aid of what philosophers will recognize as sound Hegelian engineering, he travels serenely on his way with so much reasonableness, not unadorned at times by strokes of humor and eloquence, that even the most cut-and-dried of lawyers must have found himself conducted, not perhaps without astonishment, into a country so vastly more spacious than that from which he had set out. We cannot remember an instance in which "a lawyer speaking to lawyers,"—for so the Lord Chancellor styles himself,—has performed so notable an achievement.

It is fitting that "a lawyer speaking to lawyers" should begin with law; and it is with the nature and growth of com-

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mon law and equity that the address opens. We are in the midst of cases, remedies, forms of action, and such like. But it quickly appears that Lord Haldane's object is not to dwell lovingly on cases, but to fasten on the fact that judges and courts, in deciding cases, have all along been building better than they knew, and, indeed, *making* those substantive rules of law which come to recognition and formulation only after many a case has been decided and many a remedy applied. He quotes Sir Henry Maine: "The substantive law has, at first, the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."

Now, this power which lawyers exercise of creating, developing, changing the law, in the ordinary course of professional practice, is obviously of itself a mighty and significant influence. It reveals a process whereby acute and well-trained minds may grope their way, by help of precedents and common sense, from small beginnings on to the construction of a great body of substantive law. But it is not to dwell on this that Lord Haldane adverts to it. It is to suggest, before he has done, that lawyers have a part to play in a similar process in a far wider field. And he leads on to this, by finding in the history of common law and equity,—and this is important for his argument,—a reason why the lawyers of England and America, less cabined and cribbed by codes than their brethren of the Continent of Europe, have not confined their interests within the strict limits of their profession, but, on the contrary, have played their part, with conspicuous effect, in public affairs. They have not been a "segregated profession of interpreters." No indeed! Their vocation has called them, as it continues to call them, into "the very heart of affairs." Clearly, the mutterings, not unknown in our day, that there are too many lawyers in politics, would find short shrift from Lord Haldane. He prefers, and quotes, some words of the President of the United States as to the urgent need for "lawyers who can think in the terms of society itself."

Once this larger vista is opened out, law in the narrower and stricter sense is dropped; and in what follows the profession is invited and exhorted to rise to the full height of its responsibilities as nothing less than an organ of national and international *Sittlichkeit*. Some of the best pages of the address,—one can imagine they were highly enlightening to the audience,—are unquestionably those which deal with this manifestly con-

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genial topic in which Lord Haldane is on familiar ground. Dropping a passing regret that the English language lacks a word to express this important conception, he impresses Rudolph von Jhering, Fichte, and F. H. Bradley into his service, and defines it in words of his own as "the system of habitual or customary conduct, ethical rather than legal, which embraces all those obligations of the citizen which it is 'bad form' or 'not the thing' to disregard;" or, as elsewhere he puts it, "the spirit and habit of life which this organic entirety (*i. e.*, the Nation) inspires and compels." And from *Sittlichkeit,* thus understood, it is an easy step to a plea for the reality of the general will of a people, which in Lord Haldane's hands is so far from being the nebulous and shadowy conception of speculatists that it is set forth by him as the very root of all high patriotic effort and sacrifice. As indeed we may see for ourselves by turning to "the illustrations with which history abounds of the general will rising to heights of which but few of the individual citizens in whom it is embodied have ever before been conscious even in their dreams."

It is *Sittlichkeit* and the general will, as thus understood, that furnish the backbone of the address. For if Lord Haldane leads his legal audience up to these conceptions with a courage which few perhaps could equal, it is not, we may be sure, to leave them there. He is not a philosopher speaking to philosophers: he is "a lawyer speaking to lawyers." And so having made these root ideas plain, he proceeds to certain applications which bring the whole discussion back with much appropriateness to the occasion that evoked it. These applications involve two steps. The first lies in a question: "Can nations form a group or community among themselves within which a habit of looking to common ideals may grow up sufficiently strong to develop a general will, and to make the binding power of these ideals a reliable sanction for their obligations to each other?" And the second step is to appeal to the lawyers of the Anglo-Saxon world, being as they are "the counsellors of our fellow-citizens in public and in private life alike," to rise to the full responsibilities of this vocation and "to work for the general recognition by society of the binding character of international duties and rights as they arise within the Anglo-Saxon group." If they do that, they will not only be furthering a cosmopolitan enterprise: they will be true to the spirit of

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Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. For even as the lawyers of England and America have built up the substantive law of their respective nations tentatively and experientially by the decisions of their courts and judges, so by the wide political and social influence which lawyers are so peculiarly fitted to enjoy, they may play their part in building up towards ever-increasing substantiality that international *Sittlichkeit* which, if only it were realized, would be the strongest of all guarantees,—stronger than treaties or constitutions,—of international peace, concord, and unity. High, indeed, is the enterprise and great the responsibility, and on the note of responsibility the address comes to its close.

It would savor of ingratitude to ask for more than what is thus outlined. The wonder is that Lord Haldane has succeeded in saying so much within the limits of an address. And we may acknowledge that his feet are on firm ground when he plants himself on *Sittlichkeit* and the reality of the general will, as these are to be found in the life of a nation. Nor does the discourse provoke dissent. Rather, it creates a keen desire for its expansion and development; and this in more directions than one.

In the first place, one might wish for a fuller apologia for lawyers as so peculiarly called to stand forth as missionaries of international *Sittlichkeit*. Not that their claims are slight. It is true that their influence, like that of all great professions, goes far beyond their professional practice, and more so across the Atlantic than even in England; it is true that they play an active part in public life; it is true that their own great department of international law brings them even professionally into the larger politics; in a word, it is true that, even now, they think, and may easily come to think more, "in terms of society itself:" and it stands without saying that they possess highly trained capacities for business. And least of all would it become the world to forget the services of the great jurists in expanding the horizon of life. If it did, it might profitably turn to the prayer of Grotius (quoted by Lord Haldane) that God might write the lessons of he "De Jure Belli et Pacis" "on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of Christendom in their hands;" or remember the declaration of Bentham (far though he was from *Sittlichkeit* and the general will) that law holds in its hands the happiness of men and nations. Nor, we



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may add, would it become any reader of this JOURNAL to forget that the author of "The Pathway to Reality" is, in the world of thought no less than the world of weapons, one of the organizing intelligences of his day. All this is much. Yet we must not close our eyes to the counter-suggestion that even this great profession has its infirmities. The mind of a lawyer need not, to be sure, be a legal mind; because, of course, it may be much more, and like the mind of Lord Haldane, "think in the terms of society." But it is none the less incontrovertible that the legality of the legal mind may be still too much with its possessor when he passes into the wider and less cut-and-dried province of *Sittlichkeit*. To feel the constraining influence of that system of obligations, more is needed than forcible, clear-cut, acute, businesslike minds, expert in drawing contracts and negotiating agreements. We must also have the sympathetic and sensitive response to the instinctive and habitual trend of sentiment and aspiration amongst the organized masses of men which constitute a people. Not that the great profession of the law is to be denied these qualities. It would be inexcusable to say so. Lawyers are already, as Lord Haldane claims, "the counsellors of our fellow-citizens in public and in private life alike." All honor to them for that. And in Lord Haldane himself, if one may be allowed to say it, his fellow-countrymen have found a shining example how law and *Sittlichkeit* may join hands in powerful alliance. Rash and presumptuous would it be, therefore, to hold a brief against such a profession, or to doubt that it will stand comparison with any other class, order, or profession in the State. But it is still, perhaps, not unreasonable to wish for some fuller justification of the very peculiarly prominent influence and responsibility which Lord Haldane claims for it. Nor is there anything which, if we are not mistaken, readers of this address would more relish than a further apologia under his own hand for lawyers as the exponents, prophets, and pioneers of the general will alike in intra-national and international relations.

One further point may be noticed. *Sittlichkeit*, the cornerstone of the address, is a system of requirements which, as Lord Haldane is well aware, and says, can only grow up gradually. Custom is of its essence. The sentiments and ideas, the duties and the rights which it comprises must have sunk so deep into the consciousness of a community as to have come

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to be taken for granted; in other and Lord Haldane's words, as obligations which it is "bad form" and "not the thing" to disregard. It has grown with the growth and grown strong with the strength of the organic unity of the national life. This is the secret of its power. It is also, however, the condition of its limitations. For once we pass beyond the close organic unity of the national life and find ourselves in the region of what we hardly know whether to call international relations or international lack of relations, it is no mere whisper of old Nicolo Machiavelli that prompts the suggestion that it exists there, if indeed it exists at all, in so thin and attenuated a form as hardly to be *Sittlichkeit* at all,—a vastly different *Sittlichkeit* at all events from that we know within the organized unity of the nation. Lord Haldane seems to see this. Though he stands forward as a pioneer of international *Sittlichkeit,* he is no visionary. He is far too sane and factual to be unaware that he is presenting an ideal which at best can only be realized after many days. "The prayer of Grotius," he says, "has not yet been fulfilled, nor do recent events point to the fulfillment as being near."

It is, therefore, peculiarly interesting to turn to the considerations in which the address finds some grounds for the hopeful, and indeed optimistic, note on which it terminates. What, in other words, are the organic filaments in which we may discern the beginnings of that vast organic unity which a true international *Sittlichkeit* would involve? Apart from the ideals of men of letters,—of whom Renan, Arnold, and Goethe are cited,—there is "the tendency to seek for a higher standard of ideals in international relations;" there is the claim that "there is to-day little effective challenge of the broad principle that a nation has, as regards its neighbors, duties as well as rights;" there are the treaties between Germany and Austria, between France and Russia; there is the *entente* between France and England; there is the solidarity of the Great Powers in the Balkan troubles; and above all there is the fact, so appropriate to the occasion of the address, that the international group, the United States, Canada, Great Britain, "are coming to a deepening and yet more complete understanding of each other, and to the possession of common ends and ideals, ends and ideals which are common to the Anglo-Saxon group, and to that group alone." In these facts Lord Haldane sees the promise of that

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larger *Sittlichkeit* such as may furnish a sanction for international obligation "which has not hitherto," he adds, "attracted attention in connection with international law."

The case might, perhaps, have been strengthened had the Lord Chancellor felt himself at liberty to refer to the sense of community of life, traditions, and destiny that is growing up so hopefully between the group of nations which constitute the British Empire. And in this connection it might be advantageous to supplement Lord Haldane's address by a perusal of Lord Milner's speeches. Imperial unity is no bad seed-plot for a still more comprehensive *Sittlichkeit*. It might at any rate help to bridge the distance between the non-imperial nation, on the one side, and, on the other, the group of independent nations amongst which ties are still so sadly lacking. To dwell on this, however, would, perhaps, have been somewhat inappropriate to the occasion with which Lord Haldane had to deal. And even leaving it altogether out, it is much to have before us, in exposition so lucid, the grounds which a statesman and a thinker has to offer for his sane vision of a future towards which it is evident he believes the world to be moving. No reader of the address can reasonably deny that it is, at very least, a vision which may well make men think and hope.

JOHN MACCUNN.

Tarbet, Scotland.

A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. By J. B. Bury, M.A., F.B.A. London: Williams & Norgate. (Home University Library Series.) Pp. 256.

This brilliant book is particularly timely at the present moment when, in England at least, there are indications that the tide of rationalism which, in the nineteenth century, seemed likely to overwhelm all the old landmarks of prejudice and superstition, is stagnant at last, if it has not actually begun to ebb. Quite recently we have had a number of prosecutions for blasphemy under a law which, as Professor Bury observes, is never put in motion except against the poor and ignorant. Clerical influence continues to make reform of the cruel and antiquated English divorce law impossible. Public opinion is apathetic in face of all attempts to abolish the censorship which shackles our drama. The churches, in spite of their dissensions,

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and although they have watered down their creeds, show an increasing tendency to interfere in private life, dictating to the humbler classes in such matters as their recreations and their drinks. An unofficial but none the less effective censorship tightens its hold on the book trade, and there are other ominous signs of a general revival of moral taboos. Prof. Bury, though alive to the possibility of a set-back, is inclined to think that "the most important conclusion ever reached by men,"—the conviction, namely, that it is a mistake to repress the free expression of opinion,—is, short of a cataclysm, too firmly established in European civilization to be overthrown, and he argues that the reign of reason, fortified as it is by all the facts discovered by science, is now far more impregnable than it was in classical antiquity. He is perhaps a little too optimistic. No future religious revival, indeed, is likely to destroy the belief that persecution for opinion is wrong, but unfortunately this is a belief which it is easier to serve with the lips than to act upon. No doubt there is a widespread and deep-rooted tendency to act upon it, up to a certain point; but that point fluctuates with fatal ease. The world has become extraordinarily lenient towards all expressions of opinion; whatever a man may say, there is no power to bring him to the stake for his words, nor need he even suffer social persecution for them. But toleration of speech does not necessarily carry with it toleration of actions, and there are many who think that public opinion is developing a kind of tyranny in dealing out moral reprobation for what a man does or omits to do, which may prove the first stage in a general reaction. Take the case of marriage. It is no easier to-day, it is perhaps harder than it was a generation ago, for a man and woman who honestly disapprove of that institution to live openly together without the legal tie. Everyone is free to write or speak against marriage without serious blame, but, if the tendency to require conformity to conventional morals increases, even this freedom may presently be withdrawn.

If it is true that Prof. Bury is shouting before we are fairly out of the wood, it is easy to see what has made him so incautious. The reason is that he is preoccupied with one special department of freedom, namely, freedom of thought in religion, which, he says, "may be taken as the thermometer of freedom of thought in general." That is certainly true of the past, and nothing could be better than his witty, concise review of the

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long struggle of the churches to repress the speculators and men of science. As the iniquitous catalogue, spiced with a raillery which makes denunciation superfluous, unfolds itself in these pages from a great scholar's hand, so simply written yet so suggestive of an arsenal of learning in the background, we almost feel as if the age of Voltaire or of Gibbon had returned. Such performances are rare in these days of accommodation between religion and science, and when they occur in a popular series they are doubly to be welcomed. No one can quarrel with Prof. Bury's thesis that the habit of accepting religious beliefs on authority has impeded progress in the past, and that the abandonment of that habit was the first necessary condition of advance. For, in the first place, the beliefs which it was impious to question included beliefs on questions properly belonging to science, the independent investigation of which paved the way for useful discoveries. And, secondly, the skeptics were forced in self-defense to preach toleration, and the welfare of society depends, as Mill argued, on the extent to which toleration becomes a fixed and universal habit. But it is to be noted that, even if the Bible and the Vatican are permanenly discredited, it by no means follows either that science will advance indefinitely, or that the beneficent habit of toleration is permanently established. Progress and toleration both depend on social conditions, as Prof. Bury notes, reminding us that during some three centuries before the establishment of Christianity, Greek science made no new discoveries, and that there are other subjects besides the mystery of the Trinity or the authority of the Church capable of inspiring men with that fanaticism which turns the mildest into persecutors. It is, therefore, on the whole surprising that he should be so elated by the fact that the most advanced unorthodoxy is nowadays perfectly respectable almost everywhere except at Rome. The quality of his jubilation, as with deadly skill he reviews the mistakes and humiliations of the enemy, makes his every page delightful. But, we anxiously ask as we close the book, are we really safe?

The question is too large to discuss in a review. We can only say that, if all influential men had something of Prof. Bury's temper of mind, there would be no need for misgiving. Since Mill, no one has stated so clearly and forcibly the argument for the supreme social importance of liberty. If in one instance

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he seems to speak with a doubtful voice, it is not from any failure to grasp the true ethical justification for toleration,—that it can never be right to coerce the expression of opinion because, though in particular cases the opinions propagated may do harm, breach of the rule will generally do still more harm in the long run. I do not know whether Prof. Bury would admit any exception to this rule, but it is curious that there is one historical breach of it, the persecution of the Christians by the Roman emperors, which he refrains from testing by the principle of toleration. While he says that the persecutions were wrong because they were unsuccessful, he does not explicitly say that even if they had been successful, they would have been wrong. Another difficult question on which he touches is that as to what beliefs may reasonably be accepted on authority and what not. His remarks on this head are in accordance with common sense, and his advice that the distinction should be impressed upon children as early in life as possible is admirable. It is not easy, indeed, to be sure exactly what the distinction is, but the greater the number of parents that try to be clear about it and to act on Prof. Bury's suggestion, the brighter the hope for the future of civilization will be. "'Children distrust your parents' is the first commandment with promise:" it is inspiriting to find a Regius Professor at one of our ancient universities sounding this note, like a trumpet-call, at the end of a damaging attack on religion.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

PSYCHE'S TASK: A Discourse Concerning the Influence of Superstition on the Growth of Institutions. Second Edition, revised and enlarged, to which is added The Scope of Social Anthropology: An Inaugural Lecture. By J. G. Frazer. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xi, 186.

"Psyche's Task" is to sort out the seeds of good from the seeds of evil. In the course of lectures to which Dr. Frazer has given this title, his object is to pick out the seeds of good in the record of superstition. His "sinister client," he allows, is nevertheless condemned to death, though the sentence will not be executed in our time. The lecture on "The Scope of Social Anthropology," added to the new and enlarged edition, somewhat cor-

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rects the too panegyrical tone of the speech for the defense. Superstitious beliefs have, indeed, had their utility in supporting the fundamental institutions of society; but those institutions cannot permanently rest on them; and the vestiges of them that linger on in our societies, civilized only at the intellectual summits, contain indefinite possibilities of danger. For the oldest and crudest superstitions are the most tenacious of life. "The high gods of Egypt and Babylon, of Greece and Rome, have for ages been totally forgotten by the people and survive only in the books of the learned; yet the peasants, who never even heard of Isis and Osiris, of Apollo and Artemis, of Jupiter and Juno, retain to this day a firm belief in witches and fairies, in ghosts and hobgoblins, those lesser creatures of the mythical fancy in which their fathers believed long before the great deities of the ancient world were ever thought of, and in which, to all appearance, their descendants will continue to believe long after the great deities of the present day shall have gone the way of all their predecessors." This depends on the natural inequality of men. The few lead, but the mass only acquiesces: "in the majority of men, whether they are savages or outwardly civilized beings, intellectual progress is so slow as to be hardly perceptible." Yet, as Dr. Frazer goes on to show, the systems of belief of those that we call savage races, which are retarded varieties of the human species, are dying out so rapidly through intercourse with civilized peoples, that it is now of the highest importance to exhort the universities and the State to do all that is still in their power to preserve the knowledge of them before it is lost forever. For savages, though not absolutely 'primitive,' are primitive relatively to us, and furnish the only means of tracing the institutions of mankind, if not to the very beginnings, yet to a much earlier stage than that in which we are living.

Thus, there is at once a theoretical and a practical interest in the lectures, though Dr. Frazer disclaims the purpose of directing thought in its practical aspect. From the latter point of view, which in spite of the disclaimer is rather prominent in "Psyche's Task," the collection of facts would doubtless have been labeled by Bentham, if he had met with it, "Jug. util." "Jug." [Juggernaut], however, meant for him primarily the great historical religions, and in particular that of Europe, not savage superstitions; in which the scientific in-

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terest (as Dr. Frazer incidentally notes) had in the eighteenth century scarcely begun. It would be interesting to speculate whether, in the war upon "Jug." (*gravis religio*), direct discussion on the relation of "the supernatural sanction" to reason and utility, or the study of its origins, will be in the long run the most efficacious. Up to now, it must be said, the work of the Voltaires and Benthams has had more effect on institutions than that of the evolutionary philosophers and men of science of the nineteenth century, whose sociological work, as we see alike in Spencer and in Dr. Frazer, has tended to impress on them the conviction that the old has a certain relative value, in spite of the dislike they really feel towards it. In further qualification of the panegyrics, I think we may well insist on a certain 'natural selection' point of view, just hinted at in a former notice (INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1913). When varieties of mankind have been evolved that can live without aid from the darker forms of religion or superstition, why need we fear to destroy those forms? Among the rival races, and within each race, ability to 'bear ideas' is, as Professor Carveth Read has put it, a test of survival-value. No doubt, Dr. Frazer agrees with this, but it is a point which he has not brought out.

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

WITHIN OUR LIMITS. By Alice Gardner. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913. Pp. viii, 315.

Nearly all the essays on "questions moral religious and historical" composing this volume were, as Miss Gardner tells us in her modest and pleasant preface, originally delivered as addresses to women students. Regarded as addresses delivered largely to junior fellow-students, they certainly merit high commendation for their quiet thoughtfulness and simple and genial broad church devoutness. In a notice of the book in a prominent quarterly I have seen Miss Gardner spoken of as a disciple of Matthew Arnold, and it is true that her book recalls that scholar both in its vein of 'high seriousness,' and in its insistence on the spiritual value of the Christian scheme of life and Christian forms of devotion even for those who can accept neither the supernatural elements of 'historical Chris-

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tianity' nor the dogmatic theological systems of the churches. But if Miss Gardner seems very often to speak with the voice of Arnold, she retains nothing of the tartness and the curious bad taste which make Arnold's quasi-theological writings things for his best admirers to regard with a certain sorrowful wonderment. It is the spirit of "Rugby Chapel" and the best of the sonnets rather than that of certain too-well-known pages of "Literature and Dogma" which pervades Miss Gardner's essays on the "Worship of Beauty" and "Ritual in Its Historical and Psychological Aspects," or on "Religious Observance." It is in essays like these, and in those in which the author is pleading for her own chosen study, history, as a discipline for the mind, that she is, as I think, seen at her best. Where she essays to deal directly with metaphysics and theology, her success is at least doubtful. I should hardly expect a metaphysician to be satisfied with her cheerful attempt to reconcile determinism with moral responsibility, and I am sure that a theologian, or a man into whose soul the iron had entered at all deeply, would find her view of sin, in the sixth essay, inadequate to the realities of life. What I miss in these essays, as in so many academic pronouncements on these subejcts, is the sense of the deadly poisonousness of the worst forms of moral evil, and even of the insistent hardness of life. Miss Gardner has manifestly learned many gracious lessons from Greek literature; she has, perhaps, not quite learned from Pittacus the ungracious but very real truth that "it is *hard* to be good." In the one essay in which she definitely ventures into the realms of dogmatic theology, she seems to me, if a mere laic's judgment has any weight, to go astray. If Theodoret was a 'fifth-century Arnold' (see the title of Essay X), he resembled his successor in being of more than doubtful orthodoxy, as in other things. It is certainly not correct to regard expressions which ascribe divinity to our Lord as mere pieces of pious rhetoric, nor to distinguish, as Miss Gardner does, between what may be predicated of him as God and what can only be said of him as man. This distinction is, in fact, the very doctrine of the "two persons in Christ" for which Nestorius was condemned, and when Miss Gardner relies on Theodoret for its justification, she surely forgets that her authority was a friend of Nestorius and always under suspicion of sharing Nestorian views. The strictly orthodox theory was and is that, in virtue of the union of the natures

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in the one person, what is predicable of Christ is predicable of him both as God and as man. This is why so much stress was laid on the epithet *Theotokos*. Those who refused it to Christ's mother were held to deny that it can properly be said that "God was born," "God died for us," and the like, and so to be denying the reality of the Incarnation. Hence, as it seems to me, the expression in Watts's well-known hymn, "the death of Christ my God" is, as one would expect, literally and exactly correct from the standpoint of dogmatic orthodoxy. It is Miss Gardner who is technically unorthodox in defending it as devout but inaccurate rhetoric.

If I may make one further critical observation on a book which I have read with much quiet pleasure, I would suggest that Miss Gardner, addressing a public not composed exclusively of specialists in history, should hardly have spoken of "law-givers like Solon and Demonax" without explaining who that not very familiar person Demonax was. That explanation is not superfluous I can testify, for I myself on first reading took the allusion to be to the fairly well-known Cynic moralist admired by Lucian, and caught myself wondering why the writer called him a law-giver. It was only after a little puzzling that I remembered Herodotus's narrative of the troubles of Cyrene and so found the key to the riddle.

A. E. TAYLOR.

St. Andrews, Scotland.

PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM. By William Caldwell, M.A., D.Sc. London: A. & C. Black, 1913. Pp. x, 268.

"What is attempted in this book is an examination of the pragmatist philosophy in its relations to older and newer tendencies in the thought and practice of mankind" (p. v). A statement of the positions of Peirce, James, Schiller, and Dewey, with regard to propagandist pragmatism (Ch. I), is followed by an account of pragmatical tendencies in the works of thinkers, most of whom do not profess the pragmatical faith, or, at least, are not known primarily as pragmatists (Ch. II). Professor Caldwell, in search of adherents to pragmatism, examines briefly some salient characteristics of a very extensive range of literature. After having indicated the widespread favor accorded to pragmatistical principles,—writers mentioned in this

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connection ranging from Sigwart, Harnack, and James Ward, to Jerusalem, M. Faguet, Eleutheropolos, and Harold Begbie,—the author proceeds (1) to enumerate the fundamental characteristics of pragmatism (Ch. III), dealing separately (Ch. IV) with its relations to human activity, and (2) to offer a number of criticisms of this philosophy. (It is questioned on p. 161 whether pragmatism can be called a *philosophy* at all.) In this connection there is a chapter entitled "Pragmatism as Americanism." The author tells us in the preface (p. vi) that this chapter is "offered with some degree of reservation and misgiving," but perhaps it is the most interesting in the book. There is also a chapter on "Pragmatism and Anglo-Hegelian Idealism," which is an analysis and criticism of Professor Bosanquet's first volume of recent Gifford lectures. Finally, there is a discussion of the relations of pragmatism to the philosophy of Bergson.

This brief survey of Professor Caldwell's book is sufficient to indicate that the treatment of pragmatism that is to be found within its pages is of a very general character. In fact, the book is simply a panorama view of much of the thinking world, which the author has been regarding chiefly with the purpose of noting its pragmatistical characteristics. The consequent form of the book constitutes at once its merits and its defects. To the microscopic philosopher, who is bent on the solution of some technical problem, it will bring the suggestion of the comprehensiveness of the interests of thinking humanity; and it will afford him a useful outline of the extent of the advocacy of the contentions with which it deals. Just because it does these things, it fails in detailed analysis and exact appreciation,—which seem at the present day to be what philosophy most needs. Indeed, many of its analyses and criticisms are of so very abstract a character as to render it practically useless, except for beginners. Professor Caldwell's aim, however, was to write something far more important than an "Introduction to Pragmatism."

The character of generality in statement and criticism may be illustrated by reference to what seem, to Professor Caldwell, some of the fundamental features of pragmatism. Such are: (1) All truth is "made" truth, and there is no "objective" or "independent" truth (p. 59); (2) Belief is fundamental to life (p. 64); (3) Philosophy must deal with man in the con-

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crete (p. 68); (4) Man is not merely, nor primarily, an intellectual being (p. 73).

It would be very interesting to know precisely what any one of the above statements means. Yet Professor Caldwell talks about them in a highly abstract manner, and, as a rule, substitutes addition for definition of terms. What, *e. g.,* does pragmatism mean when it asserts, according to Professor Caldwell, that all truth is "made" truth, that there is no "objective" or "independent" truth? Does it mean that, unless there were people who made assertions, there would be no truth, since only an assertion can be true? If it does not mean this, what exactly does it mean? Again, what is meant when it is said that "belief is fundamental to life"? Is it meant that only a strong conviction, which need not be knowledge, is required to support a martyr on the rack? It surely does not mean that no man can live unless he has some particular belief, *e. g.,* that in the existence of a personal God, or that in the objectivity of right and wrong. But what then does it mean? The fact is that the proposition, "Belief is fundamental to life," is as abstract a statement as can well be made. The doctrine thus expressed is, we are told, fundamental in pragmatism. Yet pragmatism is itself continually denouncing abstractions. Professor Caldwell is of opinion that pragmatism is right in its criticism of abstractionism, and urges a similar criticism against Bosanquet and Anglo-Hegelian Idealism. It would therefore have been more consistent with his professions, as well as more useful, if Professor Caldwell had taken some care to reduce his own, and pragmatism's, highly abstract statements on the above points to the concrete. Similar remarks apply to the greater part of Professor Caldwell's book.

In the chapter on "Pragmatism as Americanism," the question discussed is the extent to which pragmatism is an expression of American life and thought. From what we are told, we judge that an American professor gathers his classes by the attractiveness of his subject and method, and that the specially attractive manner in which pragmatism was lectured on by James, accounts, to a considerable extent, for the number of adherents it gained in American colleges (pp. 173-76). Professor Caldwell does not think it an advantage however, that philosophy should compete in universities with other courses of study, as if all subjects were on a level. "Philosophy . . .

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is the universal study that gives to all other studies and pursuits their relative place and value" (p. 187). (This, by the way, is hardly consistent with Professor Caldwell's frequent utterances to the effect that persons and not theories give things their values. For what becomes of this contention if persons are not to be allowed to appreciate the comparative values of courses of study at a university?) Again, Americans are practical, and they are attracted by the concrete; pragmatism, as a protest against abstractionism, thus appealed to them (p. 176). Further, the "complex and amalgam-like character of pragmatism" is supposed to reflect the "thoroughly eclective and composite character of its (America's) general culture and the tone of its public life" (p. 177). "As a juxtaposition, or kind of compound solution, of such a variety of things as the affirmations of religion, the hypothetical method of science, realism, romanticism, idealism, utilitarianism, and so on, it reminds us only too forcibly of the endless number of social groups and traditions, the endless number of interests and activities and projects to be seen and felt in any large American city" (pp. 171 *f.*). Finally, the bent of Americans towards action and accomplishment is expressed in pragmatism's insistence on conduct and efficiency (p. 178). Professor Caldwell thinks, however, that pragmatism is not merely Americanism. The opportunism of pragmatism, it is maintained, seems to be absent from the best American thought, though, at the same time, the American is essentially experimental in ethics.

Apart from the fact that the author's criticisms are very abstract, they appear to be often somewhat arbitrary. There is a decided strain of eclecticism in Professor Caldwell. He is a theistic idealist (p. 199, *note*), and a Kantian (p. 11, *note*). Fundamentally, he is an idealist (*vide passim:* the point of the name of the book appears to be that it gives an idealist's account of pragmatism), and his various criticisms, of pragmatism, of realism, and of other theories, always rest upon some idealistic doctrine, the one most often mentioned being the doctrine that there is no 'object' without a 'subject.' This doctrine is not argued; but it so frequently constitutes the foundation of Professor Caldwell's statements, that, if it were false, these statements would be quite invalid. It is, therefore, worth mentioning that this very doctrine is being more and more questioned at the present day. We would suppose that Pro-

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fessor Caldwell establishes it by the inconceivability argument, though of this we are doubtful, since he never does more than assert the doctrine, and, in addition, he accuses Bosanquet of reaching unjustifiable conclusions by means of "inconceivability" (p. 232). But if the doctrine is not established by the inconceivability argument, it is difficult to see how anyone can be so sure of it as Professor Caldwell seems to be.

The fact that Professor Caldwell is fundamentally an idealist,—whatever be his arguments for the "permanent element of truth in idealism" (p. 226),—makes him somewhat unfair to other theories. He seems utterly incapable of recognizing any truth in realism. He often qualifies a theory as 'realistic,' and apparently thinks that nothing worse could be said of it. This procedure is merely an instance of the aristocratic manner of idealists with other thinkers. They say to them, in effect: "My dear sirs, your theories are crude and superficial; they are not worthy to be called philosophy." Thus we read, *e. g.*, of Stein, that "his tendency . . . is realistic and naturalistic and evolutionistic, and he thinks (for a philosopher) far too much of men like Herbert Spencer and Mach and Ostwald" (p. 39, *note*). Again, we read that 'new realism' is a "doctrine whose unmitigated externalism is the negation of all philosophy" (p. 54, *note*). How can a student of *philosophy* make a remark such as this? A theory other than a philosopher's own may, of course, be *false;* but what possible justification has he for branding it unphilosophic? The tendency to make such qualifications needs to be tempered by that very democratic spirit in philosophy, which Professor Caldwell, elsewhere in his book (p. 185), commended in pragmatism. And after positively forbidding philosophy, on pain of losing its name, to be realistic, it is somewhat inconsistent to quarrel with writers who "debar philosophy from the study of such a practical thing as the Americanism of to-day" (p. 169, 70). For if one point of view is outside the sphere of philosophy, why not several? Yet Mr. Bertrand Russell is hauled over the coals for "the prejudice that philosophy is at its best only when occupied with studies which (like the mathematics of his affections) are as remote as possible from human life" (p. 169, *note*). Professor Caldwell has no logical ground for complaint here, since the position is strictly analogous to his own, namely, that philosophy is at its best only when it is a certain kind of idealism. These

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inconsistencies in criticism savour of a harmful kind of eclecticism.

Throughout the book, perhaps the most frequently stated criticism is that some position or other is 'unintelligible.' It is apparently supposed that if any position is 'unintelligible,' the propositions that are used to state it are false; that any position is refuted if it is shown to be 'unintelligible.' Without denying that this is so, the question is pertinent whether any single philosopher uses 'unintelligible' in any defined sense, and, in particular, what is meant by Professor Caldwell when he states that some theory is 'unintelligible.' Does he mean that that theory is self-contradictory? Does he mean that it is inconceivable, and if so, what is meant by 'inconceivable'? The time seems to have come when we should demand from those who use this form of criticism some strict account of it. Such an account may be forthcoming; but would it not be better to use a less ambiguous term of criticism, one also that has less psychological reference?

BERNARD MUSCIO.

Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, England.

LA PHILOSOPHIE ET LA SOCIOLOGIE D'ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Par Augustin Guyau. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913. Pp. xix, 243.

The brief biography which introduces this volume is written by the widow of the philosopher, while the book itself is a tribute of filial piety. Its author is his grandson and pupil, the son of his more famous pupil Jean-Marie Guyau. Its summary of Fouillée's philosophy is based on extracts and summaries which he had himself prepared for the author's use in study, on conversations with him, and on notes and fragments left among his papers, as well as on his published writings. It may therefore be considered as in a measure an independent source of information concerning its subject.

The work is purely expository. Judgment and criticism are excluded by the purpose of M. Guyau, which was, as he says, to make himself "an echo." He has succeeded admirably in his modest but difficult *rôle*. Fouillée, despite the difficulties of impaired vision and ill health, under which he labored for the greater part of his life, was a voluminous author. The bibliography which closes this volume enumerates thirty-two

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published books, aside from numerous more occasional writings. The synthetic character of his thought, always conciliatory, sensitive to ideas from many different quarters, and anxious to embody their relative truth in its own systematic insight, does not lend itself readily to brief yet clear restatement. M. Guyau deserves high praise for the way in which he has overcome these obstacles. His picture, like that of the camera obscura, seems to sharpen some of the outlines and colors of his larger original, and he even succeeds in conveying to his readers an adequate impression of Fouillée's persuasive eloquence.

This little book is therefore important to all who are interested in modern philosophy and ethics. M. Guyau makes plain that Fouillée, from his own special point of view, anticipated more than one philosophy which has lately enjoyed more attention than his own. "Penser n'est peut-être pas autre chose qu'agir avec le sentiment de cette action et des bornes qu'elle rencontre." Fouillée published this sentence, and others like it, in 1872! The reader will find many more equally striking anticipatory parallels, both of pragmatism and of the positions now identified with the name of M. Bergson. Fouillée himself regarded both pragmatism and Bergsonism as one-sided developments of partial truths, and his last published work (1911) was a criticism of them as anti-intellectualistic theories. His own philosophy never belied its origin in the authentic classical tradition. That ideas (or what Fouillée called ideas) are forces, is a position not foreign to Plato; still less to Aristotle. Fouillée developed his system, it is true, by a dialectic which was psychological rather than logical or ontological. M. Guyau contrasts it with that of Hegel. It has a partial parallel, however, in the little-read *Dialektik* of Schleiermacher. Like Schleiermacher, Fouillée was the scholar of Leibniz and of Plato; his philosophy was one of mediation and synthesis; and its most striking successes were won in the field of ethics. Fouillée's discussions of freedom and determinism, and of the moral end as a persuasive ideal, are among the most notable contributions to ethical theory of the last fifty years; and the directness and precision with which he applied his theory to the solution of contemporary social problems is especially interesting. As a metaphysician, his theory of 'idées-forces,' considered as a synthesis of intellectualism and voluntarism, and also of realism and subjectivism, entitles him to a place of high distinction.



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Of all this, and much more, the reader will find an adequate account in this book, which will probably lead him to read or reread Fouillée himself.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

University of Kansas.

MECHANISM, LIFE, AND PERSONALITY. By J. S. Haldane, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S. London: John Murray, 1913. Pp. vii, 139.

Dr. Haldane has here put together, in a somewhat complete form, the views that have gradually become associated with his name. Those who have had a difficulty in realizing the significance of these views, will welcome this brief account of them; for Dr. Haldane's name occupies so high a place among the names of physiologists, both at home and abroad, that all who are interested in the philosophy of the sciences will be ready to consider with attention anything he has to say on that subject.

Dr. Haldane has two fundamental theses: (1) The mechanical theory of life cannot possibly be applied to certain biological phenomena; (2) the universe is spiritual (or personal). According to Dr. Haldane, these two theses are very closely related, the considerations that prove that life cannot be explained mechanically leading inevitably to the doctrine that the universe is spiritual.

The mechanistic theory of life is discussed at some length, the author stating the argument on both sides, and criticizing, incidentally, with great justness, theories of animistic and vitalistic tendency. After aiding the mechanists to rout the vitalists (Lect. I), he addresses himself to the task of routing the mechanists (Lect. II).

The contention denied by Dr. Haldane is that living phenomena are mechanisms. It is, therefore, somewhat unfortunate that at no place throughout the book are we told, in a perfectly clear and definite manner, precisely what a mechanism is. Toward the latter part of the book, statements occur which give the impression that a mechanism is something that consists of matter and is "self-existent" (*cf.* pp. 81, 91). But the chief question that is discussed in the earlier part is whether or not stimulus and response are identical with "physical or chemical cause and effect." A negative answer is returned to

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this question (*vide* pp. 32-37); and this answer is apparently taken as an essential part, if not the whole, of the proof that living phenomena are not mechanisms.

What is it that is meant, however, by the statement that stimulus and response are not "physical or chemical cause and effect"? If cause be defined as invariable antecedence,—as almost all empirical philosophers define it,—stimulus and response appear to be a case of causation just as much as any physical or chemical phenomenon. Dr. Haldane admits, in anticipation of an obvious objection, that constant responses are obtained from a given stimulus under "normal" conditions (p. 33); but he seems to think that the necessity of introducing "normal" conditions into this statement is evidence that stimulus and response are *not* cause and effect. The casual maxim, however, is, 'Same cause, same effect,' and this requires that very normality of conditions which Dr. Haldane thinks should be absent, if cause and effect are to be discovered.

One gets the impression that by physical or chemical cause and effect, Dr. Haldane understands invariable antecedent and consequent. In denying that living phenomena can be explained mechanically, he therefore appears to be maintaining that invariable sequences do not occur in the sphere of life, which is thus contrasted with the subject-matter of physics and chemistry. This contrast cannot be expressed, however, by saying that causes and effects occur in physics and chemistry, but not in biology. The fact is that it is utterly impossible to discover anything either in physics or chemistry that could be called a cause, or an effect. These sciences seek to establish correlations. What is cause and what effect in the law of expansion of gases? What is cause and what effect in a function that solves a differential equation? Indeed, the greater part of natural science aims at the discovery of correlations. Does biology aim at something other than this? Dr. Haldane maintains that biology attempts to discover organic determinations. But organic determination is surely only a very complicated form of correlation.

The point may possibly be that certain biological phenomena do not consist of chemical and physical matter,—a position that is certainly maintained (*cf.* p. 81). And then the contention seems to amount to this: that the constituents of catalysers are not known chemical substances. The facts do not warrant such

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a contention. The most that can be said is that we are at present ignorant of the chemical composition of enzymes generally. It is unjustifiable to argue from ignorance to non-existence.

We are thus in some doubt as to what Dr. Haldane means by a mechanism, and, consequently, by the theory that living phenomena are not mechanisms. Even if these points were unambiguous, however, the arguments by which Dr. Haldane establishes his contentions are not unexceptionable. Certain mechanistic hypotheses of living phenomena, such as that of Descartes, are shown to have had no basis in fact. But that certain mechanistic hypotheses have been abandoned is no evidence that some adequate mechanistic hypothesis will not one day be elaborated. This is practically admitted; but the author then proceeds to maintain that an adequate mechanistic hypothesis of life is inconceivable (*vide* pp. 43, 51, 53, 54, 56). This consideration is quite valueless as evidence; and, if it is not considered to be evidence, it would more appropriately be given a place in a psychological treatise. The detail of the present physical and chemical hypotheses would have taxed Galileo's scientific imagination to the utmost. The "real difficulty" for the mechanistic theory is stated on p. 58. Dr. Haldane there attempts to develop a contradiction. It is stated that if the mechanistic theory is true, the germ-plasm must be absolutely definite and very complex in structure; whereas, since the germ-plasm can combine with similar "mechanisms" to an extent the limits of which are unknown, the same germ-plasm must be absolutely indefinite [in structure?]. This leads Dr. Haldane to assert that the mechanistic theory of heredity, and therefore of life (*cf.* p. 60), "is not merely unproven, it is impossible" (p. 58).

The difficulty, however, is due to the manner in which the position has been stated. There is no justification for saying that the germ-plasm is capable of combining with similar 'mechanisms' to an absolutely indefinite extent, if 'indefinite' is to mean something opposed to 'definite,' in the sense of 'fixed.' The fact surely is that we do not know the precise extent to which cellular 'mechanisms' can combine. We may, of course, express our ignorance of this by stating that they are capable of combining to an indefinite extent; such a statement expresses, however, nothing beyond our ignorance. But if we use 'indefinite' in this sense, the structure of the germ-plasm

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is absolutely indefinite likewise, and, consequently, no contradiction results. The extent to which a specific germ-plasm may combine with similar mechanisms may be as fixed and definite, although we do not know it, as the structure of the germ-plasm must be (of which we are equally ignorant), on the mechanistic hypothesis. Dr. Haldane appears to argue from ignorance of the precise extent to which the germ-plasm can combine with similar 'mechanisms,' to the absence of any such 'precise extent,'—surely an invalid procedure.

Assuming now that the mechanistic theory of life has been refuted, Dr. Haldane proceeds to consider the character of the theory that is to take its place. The contention is that biologists must give up thinking of their problems in terms of mechanisms, and for mechanisms substitute organisms. An organism is a whole, any part of which bears a definite relation to every other part (*cf.* p. 78 *et passim*). It is maintained that the various apparent mechanisms in an organism, even when these are simple reflexes, can only be 'understood' by reference to the organism as a whole.

The question is raised whether one is justified in regarding biological phenomena as organic. An answer is found in the Kantian and Hegelian metaphysics. This part of the argument must strike a scientist as somewhat odd, for, if living phenomena are organic, we seem justified in treating them as organic, and, if they are not organic, no metaphysics will justify us in treating them as such. Indeed, the metaphysical argument seems entirely irrelevant here, especially as biology is an experimental science. Finally, the development of modern philosophy is traced in a typically idealistic manner from Berkeley and Hume, through Kant, to Hegel; and the conclusion reached is that the universe is spiritual (or personal). The arguments in this part of the book are to be found in most idealistic treatises, and only a few points need be noticed.

It seems strange to maintain that Berkeley and Hume assumed the world to be "self-existent" and outside of us (p. 70). It is also strange to consider the reasonings of Berkeley and Hume perfectly valid, since both reached their conclusions by means of an application of the 'inconceivability argument,' and Dr. Haldane surely does not consider this argument to be valid. Berkeley, of course, kept the argument within a kind of common-sense limit, which Hume transgressed.

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Further, it is not always easy to see the bearing of Dr. Haldane's remarks on the history of philosophy. We read, for example: "To those who imagine that the secrets of our existence are likely to be revealed in, say, the latest discoveries in colloid chemistry, I would commend a careful perusal of Hume's 'Treatise of Human Nature,'" (p. 70). Does this mean that catalysers do not have a chemical constitution? Or that the atomic theory is false? Or does it mean that if we did not exist, there would be no colloids?

Again, it does not seem to follow that, because a "sensation, if it is distinguishable at all, is here and now," "all are parts of one inseparable whole" (pp. 71, 73). And nothing is advanced anywhere throughout the book to justify the assertion that "both the external world of things and the spiritual world of persons have their existence, somehow or other, in only one Supreme Existence" (p. 74).

It is said that the guiding idea of physiology is that of the organic determination of phenomena (p. 88). This appears to be contradicted by the statement that physiology relinquishes all attempt at causal explanation, which is stated a little further on (p. 94). Or is it meant that, where there is organic determination, there are no invariable sequences?

The theory that science is merely a conceptual shorthand seems sometimes to be adopted throughout the book. We are told that the "ideas of matter and energy are nothing but ideas" (p. 95). Does this mean that there are no atoms, but only ideas of atoms?

Two points, in conclusion, are worth notice. The first is that Dr. Haldane makes very far-reaching claims on behalf of biology (*vide* pp. 99, 100). He objects very strongly to the theory that biology is applied physics or chemistry. He seems, however, to have gone to the other extreme, and supposed that physics and chemistry are applied biology. The second is of a somewhat general character. The question of the relation of what we call life and mind to that which we call inanimate matter, is of perennial interest. We seem able to say, at least, that the one is not the other. Whether life and mind have been evolved from matter is still, notwithstanding every idealistic argument, an unresolved question. In these circumstances, it is well to remember that life and mind are chemically and physically conditioned. Remove the oxygen from the air, and we die. Dr.

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Haldane appears to have placed too little importance on this kind of fact throughout his whole argument.

The book should be read in connection with Loeb's "The Mechanistic Conception of Life." One cannot but admire the breadth of view with which Dr. Haldane always argues his contentions.

BERNARD MUSCIO.

Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, England.

ANGLO-INDIAN STUDIES. By S. M. Mitra. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. Pp. xxiv, 525.

Any attempt of the East to interpret itself to the West must command attention. We were never in greater need of light. We have many books about the East written by ourselves, but few in which it has addressed us. Hitherto it has been self-suffering, and only of late years has it cared to appeal to Western readers and to study their prejudices and requirements. A new literature is springing up in which the Oriental who has some knowledge of our ways tries to explain to us his own, and these sixteen miscellaneous essays are examples of it.

Mr. Mitra might seem to be well equipped for such a task. Himself a distinguished Indian gentleman, he has met many notabilities of both races, and has a fair acquaintance with several literatures. He is moderate and courteous; he writes a good English style. Yet one closes his book in bewilderment. So far from explaining anything, he has himself become part of the problem he offered to solve.

To what is this bewilderment due? It is always easier to blame the other party, and this line will be adopted in the following remarks. But there may be,—Indians say that there is,—a deadening lack of response in the Anglo-Saxon mind. "Oh, yes," they say, "you can pick holes in our arguments and dispute our facts. We do not doubt it. But our essential meaning always escapes you. You cannot understand, because you cannot answer." By 'understand' they appear to mean an immediate and emotional response to all that has been said,—a response that no English reader will accord to Mr. Mitra. To our cold hearts he seems illogical, superficial, full of platitudes

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that no one wishes to disprove and of illustrations that prove nothing. He can point out that Bhishma enjoined vigor in warfare thirty centuries before so original an idea occurred to the military expert Clausewitz, and that a battle in which the god Krishna participated "far exceeded the combined massacres of Waterloo and the Crimea." Comparing the Mahabharata with the Decalogue, he can praise it for laying stress on the seventh commandment, and equally for not laying stress on the eighth, in the first case arguing that ancient India was so pure that she always censured impurity, in the second that she was too honest to think of censuring theft. He does not mind which way the sentence turns so long as it recommends his country, and though our hearts may warm to him as a patriot, we cannot accept him as an interpreter. The patriot, whether English or Indian, can only expect to be read by his compatriots. To explain one's country to the foreigner a different method is requisite, a different mind.

Mr. Mitra's method is well exemplified in his essay on "Christianity in Hinduism." He desires the sympathy of Christendom for the proposed University at Benares, and would gain it by showing that the two religions have common fundamentals. He sees, for instance, a "very close parallel" between the Gospel's "Whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also," and the Mahabharata's "If a man should smite off one of my arms, and another should anoint the other arm with sandal unguent, I shall not bear ill-will to the first nor good will to the second." Surely there is no parallel. In the one precept we are told to forgive, in the other that revenge and gratitude are equally futile. Nor is there any parallel between "Love thy neighbor as thyself" and "Love thy neighbor because he is thyself." They imply different views of the universe, yet Mr. Mitra regards the second as a mere amplification of the first. Again, he detects the Christian conception of God as a Father in the following conception: "I (Brahma) am the mother and father, and I am the son. Of everything that is, that was, and that is to come, I am the Soul." The word 'father' occurs in both sentences, and for Mr. Mitra that seems enough. He never reflects that the one deity is personal, while the other includes all personality, all relationship, all life in every form. The Christian promise is that a man shall see God, the Hindu that he shall be God. Christianity may learn

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to respect Hinduism,—we hope with Mr. Mitra that it will,—but it cannot be argued that the two religions have a common conception either of this life or of the unseen.

The writer is best when he is most didactic, and abandons arguments and illustrations that he probably regards as concessions to the Western mind. His accounts of Hindu medicine and Hindu drama are alike charming, and there are several essays on finance and politics which will doubtless receive the attention of experts. But it is as an interpreter of Indian psychology that he comes forward in his introduction, and as that he must be judged. The light he throws is mainly unconscious. As he himself remarks: "Our past is always within us, and the force of national past is irresistible. The pronounced atheist, Bradlaugh, was a gentleman in spite of his atheism, as a result of the eighteen centuries of Christianity which preceded him." We may endorse the principle, whatever we think of the example, and may thank Mr. Mitra for having let us consider some fundamental differences between his past and our own.

E. M. F.

Weybridge, England.

YOUTH AND SEX: DANGERS AND SAFEGUARDS FOR GIRLS AND BOYS. By Mary Scharlieb, M.D., M.S., and F. Arthur Sibly, M.A., LL.D. London and Edinburgh: J. T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1913. New York: Dodge Publishing Co., 1913. The People's Books Series. Pp. 92.

This little book endeavors to express, in sane and simple fashion, the knowledge of experts on a subject the right treatment of which is of profound importance for society. In the first part, Mrs. Sharlieb writes, with the full knowledge of a doctor and a mother, of the development of the adolescent girl, in mind, body, and character: of the interaction of these, and of their care in sickness and in health. In one short chapter of four pages she treats of direct articulate instruction in sex matters. The whole treatment throughout is excellent, the final chapter peculiarly admirable. Cool, quiet, fully-informed, practical, reverent, widely sympathetic, it is preëminently desirable that her words should find their way far and wide to the young mothers of to-day. It is to them chiefly that the appeal is ad-

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dressed. It is they who preëminently need, and who are preëminently able to respond to, and make use of, its admirable helpfulness.

In the second part, Mr. F. Arthur Sibly Housemaster at Wycliffe College, Stonehouse, Gloucestershire, deals with the problem in relation to boys. Mr. Sibly disarms criticism by telling us in his preface that his contribution has been put together "during three weeks of term." His pages abound in a quite passionate sympathy with boys, and a painful sense of the great and unrecognized need that speech and instruction shall break a conspiracy of silence and bring the light of knowledge and sympathy into dark places, where much suffering has resulted from ignorance and silence. He more than proves his case; he conveys his pain to his reader. He advocates the method of treatment and expression which have been so admirably achieved by Mrs. Scharlieb in her part of the book. But Mr. Sibly's task is the more difficult, and it is not wonderful that he has found it a wearing one, and has not altogether attained the ideal of expression which he so obviously and ardently holds. He makes, for instance, an excellent and most important point in saying that simple physiological terms shall be always used, so that a tradition and habit of pruriency and wholly misplaced shame shall be killed, and the subject lifted into the normal, cool, atmosphere of a simple exposition of nature, duty, and self-respect. Nevertheless he repeatedly uses certain colloquial terms ('impurity' is not the most objectionable of these) in which the old false atmosphere of secrecy and shame distinctly makes itself felt. But the atmosphere is not in Mr. Sibly's mind, and all lovers of boys, and all who hold in reverence the highest sacrament of life owe him gratitude. The book cries out especially to mothers. Theirs is the privilege of that tenderest intimacy into which indelicacy cannot enter, and within which trust and confidence is instant and instinctive. Let mothers but be adequate; and then fathers and teachers will find a preparedness of attitude and knowledge which will demand from them only a confirmation by precept and example which will revolutionize the treatment of this subject, and lift a burden, at times hardly to be borne, from the necks of young men and women.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London.

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THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF BURKE. By John MacCunn, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in the University of Liverpool. London: Edward Arnold, 1913. Pp. vi, 272.

This is not a book about which it is possible to say much in a review. And that not, of course, out of any disrepect to the author, but because Professor MacCunn has performed the task he has set himself about as well as it could be done. He has collected all the evidence which is scattered through the voluminous published works of Burke, and skillfully welded it into a whole, showing convincingly that Burke really had a consistent and systematic political creed, even though he never formulated it explicitly even, perhaps, to himself, and that his views on particular political questions were all formed under the influence of this creed. As far as the performance of this task goes, Professor MacCunn's work is open to no serious criticism.

All that we can say is that on some subjects we should have liked more. It would, perhaps, have been out of place for the author to have given us more of his own views on the subjects discussed, though when he does give them to us, as in his reflections on Democracy in the last chapter, they are so suggestive and illuminating that no one would have objected to more of such intrusions. But a more serious deficiency is the lack of a complete historical background for Burke's own views. We want a completer account of the political situation, of the different forces at work, of the views that excited Burke's antagonism, and of the effect he had on subsequent political thinking. Burke was so much the product of his age, his views were formed so much under the stimulus of immediate practical controversies, that a complete analysis of the spirit and situation of the time seems particularly called for in his case. But such a criticism does not detract from the real value of the book. As far as it goes, it is really complete.

I have noticed one misprint. On page 119, in the fifth line, "undetermined" is clearly a mistake for "undermined."

The University, Manchester. G. C. FIELD.

THE YEAR-BOOK OF SOCIAL PROGRESS FOR 1913-14. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons. Pp. 595.

This annual, now in the second year of its existence, is a work which should be in the hands of all who are interested in

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social reform. The year 1912-13 was an eventful period for Great Britain in respect to legislation affecting the lives of the working classes. It saw the passage of a number of important acts,—the Shops Act, the National Insurance Act, and the Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act, which, extorted by a combination of miners threatening to cut away the basis of our national life, extended the principle of the minimum wage to the chief staple industry of the country; it witnessed the beginning of insurance against unemployment, and of the decasualization of labor by the operation of the Board of Trade Labor Exchanges; and it was a period of widespread industrial unrest accompanied by a general rise in wages. Hence, Prof. W. J. Ashley, in the introduction which he contributes, has been able to write an exceptionally interesting general summary of the main movements in the field of social progress. The bulk of the book consists of a round dozen of more detailed essays on such subjects as the Census of 1911, Land and Housing, Wages and Cost of Living, Education, Pauperism and National Insurance. In each case facts and statistics are presented in a convenient form; the matter is well selected and well arranged, and theories are avoided. The index might perhaps with advantage be fuller. The volume, as will be seen, is concerned solely with social progress in Great Britain. It is to be hoped that in time Messrs. Nelson may see their way to enlarging their scope and providing us with a yearly record of legislative and philanthropic activity in the principal countries of the world, for, as a work of reference, such a volume would be a weapon of great value in the cause of the ethical advance of humanity.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

SOCIAL POWERS: Three Popular Lectures on the Environment, the Press, and the Pulpit. By Sir Henry Jones, LL.D., Litt.D. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1913. Pp. 114.

The difference between the written word and the spoken word strikes you with great force in reading these lectures. Sir Henry Jones's radiant and inspiring personality makes it impossible for a lecture by him to be dull to listen to; the man is so much greater than his doctrines that even platitudes, from

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his lips, are felt to be the platitudes of a prophet. And platitudes these lectures for the most part are; set down in black and white, they seem a little dull, though no doubt they were well suited to the popular audiences to whom they were addressed. Certainly there seems hardly enough stuff in them to have made it worth while issuing them as a book. But it is an admirable thing that a man of Sir Henry Jones's attainments and position should be willing to give lectures of this kind; few philosophers bring their philosophy into such close practical relation with their civic life.

J. B. PAYNE.

London, England.

THE UNEXPURGATED CASE AGAINST WOMAN SUFFRAGE. By Sir Almroth E. Wright, M.D., F.R.S. London: Constable & Co., 1913. Pp. xvi, 86.

Sir Almroth Wright says in his preface: "I bring forward these generalizations and definitions because they commend themselves to my diacritical judgment. In other words, I set them forth as results which have been reached after reiterated efforts to call up to mind the totality of my experience and to detect the factor which is common to all the individual experiences." The plain man in a similar case would say: "I can only speak as I know, but my experience leads me to believe." Obviously, the conclusions are unlikely to be of the first order of importance unless two conditions are fulfilled: the investigator's experience must be varied and far reaching, and he must know his personal bias and allow for it. But should he fail to make this allowance, he must be prepared for his readers to do so for him, perhaps even too liberally. It is not unlikely Sir Almroth Wright's readers will find themselves in this position.

The book is full of generalizations. The three following may be taken as examples of the diacritical method. (1) "Only two classes of men have woman's suffrage at heart, the crank and the complemental male." (2) "And so we find women who want everything for nothing and the wives who do not see they are beholden to man for anything . . . flock to the banner of woman's freedom, the banner of financial freedom for women at the expense of financial servitude for men." (3)

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"For electoral decisions are felt to have moral prestige only when the electoral figures quantitatively represent the physical forces which are engaged on either side. And where vital interests are involved, no class of men can be expected to accept any decision other than one which rests upon the ultima ratio."

Now, we do not want to assert dogmatically that Sir Almroth Wright has come to hasty and unscientific conclusions, but those who know supporters of woman's suffrage who are neither cranks nor complemental males, or who have met wives devoted to their husbands and yet desirous of economic freedom, or those who find a more rational basis for moral law than physical strength, must conclude that either his experience is curiously limited or that he is temperamentally incapable of giving impartial judgment on such facts as come within his ken. Indeed, this is so evident that the treatise will probably be read in order to obtain insight into the working of a great physician's mind rather than as a serious contribution to feminist literature.

What Sir Almroth Wright says of woman's mind may with equal justice be said of "The Unexpurgated Case Against Woman Suffrage": "It is over-influenced by individual instances, arrives at conclusions on incomplete evidence, has a very imperfect sense of proportion, accepts the congenial as true, the uncongenial as false."

NANCY CATTY.

London, England.

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## ANNOUNCEMENT.

With its July number THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS will complete its twenty-fourth volume. The quarter century nearly covered since the JOURNAL began publication has been as extraordinary in the development of ethical problems as in the industrial and commercial changes out of which these problems have arisen. The JOURNAL has aimed to represent this development and to contribute to the advancement not only of ethical knowledge, but of ethical practice.

A new set of problems is now coming to the fore which calls for greater recognition. Justice is more definitely the focus of present ethical thinking, and law, as the great agency of organized society for securing justice, is undergoing criticism. But the more thoughtful recognize that the inadequacy of our present administration of justice is not fundamentally due to personal faults of judges and lawyers; nor yet solely to defects in procedure great as these defects may be. The ideas, the principles of justice need reëxamination and restatement in the light of present conditions. The time is ripe for constructive thinking.

The JOURNAL believes this task of considering the underlying principles of law to be so important that it will give especial, though by no means exclusive, prominence to this field, beginning with the opening of its twenty-fifth volume. The Editorial Board will be reorganized so as to include representation of law as well as of philosophy and the social sciences. The personnel of the new Board will be announced in the July number. For this new task the JOURNAL bespeaks the coöperation of all who are interested in constructive efforts toward ethical advance.

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# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JULY, 1914.


## THE NEED FOR A MODERN CASUISTRY.


H. L. STEWART.


MR. F. H. BRADLEY'S famous attack upon casuistry[1] represents, beyond doubt, the feeling of the ordinary man toward that 'false science': and where common sense is supported by such illustrious expert advocacy, it may well feel confident in its own position. Yet it is plain that the attack rested upon one or perhaps upon both of the following assumptions: (*a*) that there are no cases of genuine moral perplexity at all, the intuitions of 'conscience' being always clear and adequate; (*b*) that although difficulties should be found to exist, no help could be got towards their solution from any reflective study of ethical principles and standards. As I am convinced that moral philosophy is not devoid of such practical usefulness, I propose to examine how far these assumptions can be made good. Let us consider them in succession.

It is needless to repeat the argument expounded once for all by the late Professor Henry Sidgwick that the so-called intuitions of Justice, Benevolence, Veracity, Prudence, Self-Control, fail to give definite guidance in certain border cases which undoubtedly arise. It is indeed strange that Mr. Bradley should be the philosopher who lends countenance to belief in the plain man's in-

[1] In "Principles of Logic," pp. 247*f*.




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fallibility in any sphere: for such a view is in flat contradiction to much that he has written about human thinking in general and moral thinking in particular. His characteristic position is rather this, that the moral consciousness conspicuously illustrates the incurable self-contradition which vitiates thought of every kind. In this section I shall adduce some examples which may supplement those mentioned by Sidgwick, and which are drawn from a province somewhat nearer to common experience. For it is not merely in exceptional cases that we find ourselves morally perplexed; those social problems for the solution of which each of us is in some degree responsible fairly bristle with moral difficulties, and he who does not begin by realizing how sharp those difficulties are is of necessity acting in the dark.

I mention first the questions raised by that feminist movement which takes at times such grotesque and such disgusting forms that we are in danger of ignoring the seriousness of the issues really involved. The changes which have passed over the position of women furnish a long chapter in the history of civilization. No man who has read that chapter with discernment is likely to admire very much the part which his own sex is represented as having played, or to minimize the importance of the evolution that it records, or to feel confident that even yet it is finally closed. But what I wish just now to urge is that the problems at present before us with regard to women are no mere matters of social convenience or economic advantage: they are problems which we shall solve in one way or in another in accordance with the moral values which we assign to certain elements and qualities in life.

What we have to do is to weigh against each other on one side the advantage, perhaps the obligation, of allowing free self-development to human beings of both sexes, and on the other side the bad effects for family and domestic life which may be expected from encouraging

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women to adopt independent careers. At present we differentiate sharply: from many callings a woman is legally debarred; from others she is practically excluded by custom and public opinion; even where she is allowed to compete with men, her work is often remunerated on a smaller scale. The effect of these arrangements is to make most women economically dependent: they must look to marriage for a livelihood. Can we reconcile this with the principles of justice and freedom? When Cromwell said that he was in favor of toleration, but not in such a sense as would permit the celebration of the mass, one feels that a more precise formula of religious equality may fairly be asked for. And it is sheer ethical muddleheadedness to repeat phrases about 'the individual's right to self-expression' whilst we concur in preserving by law glaring exceptions to this right and have no rational defense to offer for such infringements of our own rule.

Again, the suffragists are wholly justified in demanding that we shall either cease to ground the right to representation solely upon the payment of taxes, or that we shall produce some reason inherent in sex difference for confining the vote to men. Must we really fall back upon the appeal to brute force? If so, the moral ground on which we have so often declared democracy to rest can never have been sincerely held. Moreover, we are shamefully inconsistent in carrying out even this rough and primitive principle. Do we not for some occult reason distinguish sharply between the municipal and the parliamentary franchise? But moral considerations of very genuine power can be advanced on the other side. When Lord Haldane declared that posterity will look upon our attitude to the suffragists much as we look upon the defenders of slavery, most of us felt that he was guilty of a wild exaggeration if not of a total mistake. The moment we cease to argue the matter upon abstract grounds of 'right' and begin to forecast concrete consequences, feminism seems full of perils. When will the fanatical

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section of the women's leaders begin to realize that no estimate of their sex and of its place in society can be other than futile if it leaves out of sight the cardinal function of motherhood? The significance of woman for family life is vastly greater than that of man. And the growing aversion to motherhood, especially in the upper classes, is already of sinister omen for the future of the race. How far is this aversion due, not indeed to the suffrage movement, which is a mere trifle in a far wider agitation, but to the advance, so marked in our time, of the idea that a woman must be permitted to 'live her own life,' and that the old-fashioned restrictions to which our grandmothers cheerfully submitted were badges of female servitude? We condemn as socially pernicious that worship of virginity in the Middle Ages which, so far as its strength went, struck a blow at the very foundations of the family.[2] Should we not pause before we encourage that disgusting spirit in which women are turning aside from the crowning glory of their sex not through motives of religious fervor, but from unwillingness to forego the social frivolities of a London season? The masculine woman is indeed not only an unlovely but a dangerous type, as the eugenists at least should know. Do we really mean to facilitate by legislation the spread of a similar spirit through the middle and lower classes, where it is happily not yet so influential? If it was a mistaken piety that led the nun to serve God in the cloister rather than in the heroisms of maternal devotion, what shall we say of the woman who will not be a mother that she may direct a business firm or serve in a government office or practise as an attorney? And what sort of wives or mothers may we expect those women to become who have devoted the best years of

[2] Compare Prof. A. E. Taylor's forcible but surely exaggerated outburst: "One might be tempted to ask whether the ithyphallic emblems of antiquity were not in spirit less obscene and less of a crime against humanity than the withered and flat-bosomed Madonnas of the cheap 'Catholic' print shops." ("Problem of Conduct," p. 215.)

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their lives to preparing themselves for efficiency in callings so alien to their sex?

If it be objected that provision must be made for the unmarried women who are obliged to support themselves, it may be replied that something far short of what feminism proposes would meet the needs of this class: surely careers might be distinguished as suitable and unsuitable to female capacity and aptitudes. And the objection to declaring a *carrière ouverte aux talents* without regard to sex difference is partly this, that in time,—and not a very long time,—the nation would have on its hands a disagreeable and inefficient sort of person who had lost the graces of one sex in the effort to acquire the strength of another, and partly this, that such a policy would reinforce the ranks of those who would normally remain unmarried by the addition of others in whom distaste for the natural duties of womanhood had been artificially stimulated.

The moral pros and cons of the suffrage question might be similarly exhibited. Some women, it is said, have a 'stake in the country': have not those who work for their living a greater stake than the women of property, who are, almost all of them, living on the accumulated savings of male relatives? From a practical point of view the omens clearly indicate that any proposal for further strengthening the influence of the propertied classes would not be kindly received. And is there not grave danger that the addition to the electorate of some millions of women would make it a decidedly less competent body for adjudicating upon public affairs? It is idle to point out that many women would be much better judges of a political issue than many men who are now entrusted with votes. Would not the *average* of capacity be seriously lowered by including a class, immense in point of numbers, which *as* a class is notoriously less interested in, less informed about, and, I think, from emotional and temperamental causes, less likely to exercise cool and impartial judgment in public matters

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than the body of men to whom the franchise is now confined?

However, for my present purpose there is no need to attempt a comparative estimate of the value of these conflicting arguments. It is enough if I have shown that the issues involved are at bottom moral issues, not in the sense of speculative difficulties about standard and faculty, but in the sense of urgent questions of practice in which what one man thinks obviously right, another of equally high principle and equally good intentions thinks obviously wrong. The intensely ethical nature of the issue is still clearer when some one objects, as many do object, that this method of forecasting consequences is in such a question essentially immoral; the thing, we are told, is a plain matter of right, and whatever use or misuse women may make of their votes, we are no more entitled to withhold from them what is theirs than to deprive our neighbor of his farm because we think we could till it better than he and thus make the soil more productive. On the other side it is insisted that no intelligent conscience, either personal or social, can prescribe what ought to be done without trying to anticipate the results of each alternative, that there is no such intuition of 'equal rights to a vote,' that in many cases the privilege of self-government is quite justifiably withheld even from a whole nation. It is clear that the question is one which will brook little further delay; and if there is anywhere an issue on which moral philosophy may be expected to throw some light, it is surely this one. Quite possibly the judgment of either side may be right, but certainly both cannot be right, and the system we have in practice is nothing but a compromise in which we act now on the one principle, now on the other,—when asked for reasons, most persons who defend the *status quo* can think of none except such as are so stupid that they are ashamed to produce them. Even if, as may conceivably be the case, such a compromise is on the whole best, it would surely be more intelligent to

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become aware of the grounds which justify it, and it can hardly happen that the *best* compromise is reached by leaving things to random chance.

Again, one may think of the innumerable questions arising from the reciprocal relations of employers and employed, and from the attitude of the State to both. There was a time when those who urged that such problems had a moral aspect were treated as intruders; they were told that the whole thing was purely a matter of business, and that any interference on the part of the State with freedom of contract between the workman and his master would mean the deathknell of commercial prosperity. 'Scientific' evidence was tendered in the same direction: the Factory Acts had nowhere more implacable opponents than amongst the official representatives of economic theory. That time is past: on such matters as rate of wages, hygienic condition of mills and workshops, hours of labor, minimum age for operatives, distribution of profits, the moral consciousness of the present age refuses to be stifled by a reference to the 'law of demand and supply.' And the predictions of the pundits of economic doctrine have been completely, even ludicrously, falsified.

But, while we now definitely recognize the moral issues involved in such problems, the solution to be offered to them on the moral side is far from obvious and the voice of 'conscience' is far from clear.

It is plain that there is something thoroughly immoral in the methods by which the public is exploited by Trusts, Rings, and Bosses: we agree that the man who becomes a millionaire by 'cornering' wheat and thus compelling his neighbors either to buy at his price or to starve, is a scoundrel of the first order; but we also recognize the great social advantages which accrue from the principle of leaving an open field to ability, enterprise, commercial sagacity. Can anyone put his finger on the point at which the legitimate reward of superior business acumen may be said to end and extortion may be said to begin? Is

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there such a thing as a *reasonable* profit? Ought a company to be permitted to pay more than a certain maximum dividend to its shareholders? Should a limit be set, and if so can we so set it as to be able to say with any confidence that until the profits reach that limit, restricting them would mean robbing the company, and, after they pass that limit, allowing them to advance would mean robbing the public? There are signs that the question of the income which a firm may draw from its business must be ethically considered not less than that of the income which a landlord may draw from his rents. But no one who has given it the least thought can doubt that this matter bristles with moral, not less than with economic, difficulties.

Again, what shall we say of the alleged 'right to work' which the Labor party presses upon our notice? Has the unemployed worker a right to demand that he be given something to do by the State and that a 'living wage' be paid to him for doing it? If we answer that question, as many persons do, with a glib negative, what we say is tantamount to this, that for that appallingly large number of persons who can work, who are willing to work, and who cannot obtain work, there does not exist even a right to life. Will the moral consciousness bear us out in this? If not, then how shall we answer the question, "What is a living wage?" Does it mean simply a wage that is sufficient to provide the laborer with bodily sustenance and shelter, or ought it to include the means of education and in some degree the opportunity of mental culture and enjoyment for his family? Ought it to be enough to enable him to marry at an early age? Or should the indigent worker be compulsorily celibate? On the one hand the prevention by economic pressure of early marriages is fraught with obvious moral danger; on the other hand it is widely felt that to burden the public with the necessity of supporting, not only the worker himself, but also as many children as he may choose to bring into the world, would create

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in time an intolerable situation. Very much the same arguments and counter-arguments may be urged in regard to the proposal, so popular among the Socialists, for the State feeding of the pupils in primary schools.

Anyone who has watched the behavior and has listened to the claims of both sides during the fierce industrial conflicts with which we are being made increasingly familiar, must recognize that both employers and workmen are often passionately convinced that they are morally in the right. Each party, I have no doubt, in many cases honestly believes, not only that it is right, but that the other party is for the time being devoid of conscience or sense of duty. The masters speak of the 'rights of property' and the workers speak of the 'rights of man.' Plainly, both these phrases stand for something that the moral consciousness must admit to be real and important; and while heated partisans, whose judgment is warped by passion or by class interest, cannot perhaps be expected to see any side but their own, it is a perfect scandal that men professing to make a study of the principles of right social conduct have so far given so little guidance to public opinion on the matter. Moral philosophers are indeed unanimous in condemning 'theft,' and they are prepared to wrangle at any length in support of many theories of the ethical 'standard' which, though flatly contradictory of one another, have the singular characteristic of leading to precisely the same ethical conclusion; but when in a concrete case the master says that the workman is a 'highway robber' and the workman replies that the master is a 'disguised thief,' professional moralists refuse to arbitrate, taking refuge in the enunciation of abstract principles that are an idle mockery of those who must decide whether the master or the workman should go to gaol.

Another problem is presented, and it recurs under many forms, in the matter of the limits of State interference with the freedom of action of the individual. What else was really at the bottom of the strife between

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the Church of England and Nonconformity regarding the Board Schools and the Voluntary Schools? The complaint of the nonconformists was (1) that they were being forced to contribute rates for the support of religious teaching in which they did not believe, (2) that the State was arranging things so as to make it exceedingly difficult and expensive for a nonconformist father to find a school in which his child might receive secular education without coming under influences which were likely to undermine the faith in which his father desired him to be brought up, and (3) that a religious test was being imposed upon candidates for the State-paid teaching profession. The reply offered by the representatives of Anglicanism took indeed very frequently the form of a denial that such results would follow from the proposed legislation or of a claim that results were exaggerated; and these pleas, in so far as they were true, were, no doubt, legitimately urged, and were by far the most effective for the electioneering platform. But it was plain that when all due allowance had been made for distortions of fact on either side, the issue was in substance just a form of that which divides the supporters from the opponents of State Establishment for a particular church. Preferential treatment for a particular denomination was beyond all question being proposed: nonconformists were undoubtedly to be forced to contribute rates towards the maintenance of Anglican teaching, in a sense in which no Anglican had to assist in the maintenance of nonconformist teaching. Is this morally defensible? Has the State a moral right to insist on its own way; that is, on the way voted for by the majority in a general election, when the matter involved is one that touches the religious scruples of the minority? Has the parent the sole right to decide under what influences, moral and religious or non-moral and non-religious, his child shall be brought up? On the one hand, few, I think, would contend that a father ought to be allowed to have his child nurtured in an educational environment which is dis-

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tinctly and avowedly demoralizing. On the other hand, the justice and expediency of religious toleration and of, in some sense, religious equality, will not be seriously questioned. Surely here is a case for those who profess expert knowledge of social ethics to help that very large number, especially of laymen, who are sincerely perplexed. And if on such a point they say nothing, because they have nothing useful to say, does not that suggest that their speculations have been too much in the clouds, and that it is time for the philosopher to remember Plato's warning and reënter the cave?

Or one may adduce that large group of problems arising from the sexual and family relationships. Here, more perhaps than anywhere else in the sphere of morals, one is safe in relying upon that sort of 'intuitive' conviction which expresses itself in the words, 'I can give no reason, but my feelings tell me that such conduct is wrong.' This arises from the fact that the highest morality in sexual matters cannot be formulated in those utilitarian terms which may plausibly avail us elsewhere, but is a kind of unconscious corollary from that system of feelings, infinitely complex and infinitely delicate, which we call the Christian ideal of marriage. At the same time, whilst on the highest level there is little room for questions to obtrude themselves, one must remember that actual sex relationships are often much lower than the highest, and it becomes a question whether anything is gained by forcing them into formal agreement whilst they remain in essential discord with ideal conditions. No one doubts that it is best for the marriage tie to be permanent; yet the majority of persons, almost all Protestants at least, admit under certain circumstances the legitimacy of divorce. Will anyone pretend that the precise nature of the circumstances is a matter of intuition? And what of those urgent questions of which we are being told so much by the eugenists? The case is very far from being as simple as the rash advocates of particular schemes would have us believe. No one doubts

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the calamitous character of the facts; but the program that is too often set before us recalls the title of Huxley's famous pamphlet, "Social Diseases and Worse Remedies." It is clear that marriages are often contracted by persons who are unfit for parentage, and whose offspring will probably be themselves incurable sufferers, and at the same time a burden, if not a menace, to society. Every effort is commendable which aims at enlightening such persons as to the responsibilities which they are assuming, and at so awakening their consciences on the matter that they may be deterred in time. But when it is proposed to prevent such marriages by legislative enactment, we must surely ask ourselves at what point we mean to draw the line in such State interference, how far we can expect such measures to be efficacious, and how far we are entitled to penalize the living for the sake of problematical advantages to the unborn. If we are right in thinking that to forecast consequences is of the very essence of moral action, then such considerations as these are morally imperative, and we shall find that they often resolve themselves into a comparative estimate of the moral values we assign to this result and to that. Could anything, for example, be more naïve than the proposal to deal with the matter by requiring a medical certificate as a prerequisite to marriage? What appalling moral consequences must ensue! Or shall we boldly adopt that system of wholesale infanticide prescribed by Plato, and, apparently (if he means it in earnest), recommended in modern times by Mr. Bradley? A drastic measure indeed, while our medical authorities are wrangling so furiously with one another as to whether heredity is really of much significance in the spread of disease.

The foregoing may seem truistic; but it seemed worth while to illustrate at such length for two purposes. I wished to show that for instances in which doubt may arise we need not search the biographies of men and women exceptionally circumstanced; nor are they to be

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found merely in the imaginary situations created by the writer of sensational fiction or by the 'problem' dramatist. Even if they occurred only in such places, they would have an interest for the moralist, the kind of interest, for example, that is aroused by the immortal figures of Antigone and Œdipus. But I am speaking of moral philosophy as a guide to practice, and the practical person will at once object that the kind of perplexities there depicted, whilst abstractly conceivable, must occur so seldom as to be negligible in ordinary life. The situations I have instanced are becoming more common and more urgent every day: in a democratic State they have got to be dealt with by the ordinary man. And my second purpose was to show that the issues raised are in the last analysis *moral* issues. Indeed, it is just because they are moral issues that people differ so widely in the way they face them. There is no manner of agreement as to the elements in life which we think it most valuable to produce and to preserve. We have now to consider how far a reflective study of ethics will illumine the road.

It is, I trust, unnecessary to spend time in distinguishing the position that I mean to defend from that of the mediæval casuist, or in showing that I am not committed to an apology for all the abuses of the Roman confessional. In any case, the distinction has been drawn with sufficient clearness by various writers: I refer anyone who is not yet convinced to the unanswerable passage on the subject in Dr. Rashdall's "Theory of Good and Evil." The account there given of the historical origin and actual practice of casuistry ought to dispel the lingering doubts of those who see no difference in principle between, for example, Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics" and the "Artesana" or the "Summa Rosella." It is one thing to think about morality in order to obtain from it the best and clearest light we can; it is another deliberately to prostitute the subtleties of dialectic in order to provide plausible defense for the liar and the perjurer.

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We may endorse Mr. Bradley's lurid judgment: "It was the lust for spiritual tyranny that choked the last whisper of the unsanctified conscience"; but we need not infer that everyone who seeks by the most sincere and persevering reflection to enlighten his own conscience as well as that of his neighbor is aiming at a similar domination. Surgery in the interests of health is different from surgery as an instrument of assassination.

Now, in the first place, it seems fair to insist that the burden of proof lies upon those who deny, not upon those who assert the utility of ethical knowledge. For, *prima facie,* ethics may be expected to throw some light upon the subject which it undertakes to discuss. If it is a genuine science at all, as is surely admitted, why limit it in a way in which no other concrete science is limited? Several reasons are assigned which I shall consider in succession.

(1) It is said that to make moral philosophy a guide to moral action reverses the natural and the genuine order. For a man does not act rightly because he has passed through a process in which the pros and cons of alternative courses are intellectually weighed. It is argued that the true function of ethics is to accept the deliverances of the moral consciousness as its data, and to draw from these whatever philosophical inferences and interpretations they seem to justify. And we are told that one might as well hope to cure his dyspepsia by learning physiology as to become morally better by a course in moral philosophy.

This argument seems to me not only invalid as an objection to casuistry, but to contain the germ of a complete justification of casuistry as a science. I welcome the analogy that it suggests with the theoretical study of digestion. It is true that moral experience is not the consequence, but the presupposition of moral philosophy, just as life is the precondition of physiology, and the plant is the precondition of botany. Digestion was admirably carried out before anyone understood the theory

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of its processes, and is to-day often most effective in those who hardly know that they have stomachs at all. Similarly the moral ideal may be approached with most fidelity and grace by those to whose unsophisticated minds the notion of moral antinomies has never suggested itself. But if digestion goes wrong, is all knowledge of physiology of no use in setting it right? The *vis medicatrix naturæ* may indeed be the best curative agent known; it may be at bottom the sole power upon which therapeutics can rely; but if a man has swallowed a substance with which his digestive organs cannot deal, he will hardly be saved unless some one understands theoretically the results which may be anticipated, and can prescribe the best means, medicinal or surgical, by which those results may be counteracted. Some one, in short, must be able, not indeed to create the *vis medicatrix naturæ* itself, but to remove the hindrances to its efficient working. And, though an effective artificial conscience can no more be created than an effective artificial stomach, yet the action of the organ with which nature has endowed us may be facilitated in the one case very much as in the other. In the case of moral perplexity I shall argue that the source is often removable, because it consists in incomplete analysis of circumstances, in the want of clearness with which the moral problem is formulated, or in mistaken and confused assumptions about what we mean by good, about what things *are* good, and about the proportions in which they are good. It may be within the power of systematic reflection to dispel some or all of these causes of error. That point must be tested by trial, and our justification as casuists, if it should turn out that we *are* justified, must come from our success. The attempt cannot here be made in any detail: what I am now contending for is that the issue should not be prejudged by *a priori* considerations asserting the intrinsic impossibility of our task. Such considerations might be urged with precisely equal force against artificial interference with the proc-



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esses of the body, on the ground that nature as a preserver of health is infinitely superior to the best drugs and the best surgery.

(2) In the second place, it is urged that the introspective habit of mind when directed towards one's moral condition is unhealthy. It is not the robust but the neurotic man who is constantly feeling his own pulse and examining his own arteries; the vigorous leave these alone, and they do their work best when they are not watched. Moreover, constant brooding upon the state of one's soul is not merely a symptom, it is also likely to become a cause of moral enfeeblement. This is conspicuously seen in a special department of wrongdoing with which casuistry has very much concerned itself: for what could be more likely to produce laxity in sexual conduct than the constant turning of one's attention to sexual impulses and the constant analyzing of degrees of refinement and of heinousness in the sins of the flesh? Do we not find in the strenuousness of actual living rather than in the minuteness of a morbid self-scrutiny that moral tonic which the system requires?

There is much in this objection that is both true and important; but it contains also the flaw of assuming that by a practical study of ethics we mean chiefly a process of inquiry into the nature and value of one's motives. Moreover, it erects into a barrier against the whole idea of casuistry a danger which belongs to one of its aspects alone. Our critic is limiting the discussion to a narrow field in which the ground is favorable to himself: for there is obvious tactical advantage in disputing the claims of casuistry solely on that plane where illustrations can be drawn from the manuals of the confessional and the records of monastic practice.

The view that ethics exists for the comparative valuation of 'springs of conduct,' and for this alone, has indeed been advanced, notably by Dr. James Martineau; and for those who accept it I see no escape from the obligation to constant self-analysis, however unpleasant

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and even dangerous this process may at times become. But the difficulty is much lessened if we take the objective standpoint; that is, if we accept it as our business to study primarily the *consequences of different kinds of action,* to estimate in what degree they severally contribute towards personal and social 'good.' Motives may indeed be the things to which the epithet good has the most important application, but they are not the only things which can be so described: they must be treated together with all the rest. Moreover, the quality of a man's motive is as a rule to be judged from the effect of the external acts which he performs: he is responsible, as Henry Sidgwick used to say, for the consequences of his action "so far as those consequences can be foreseen"; we may have enough faith in humanity to believe that many wrong things are done, not because the will is anti-social, but because the results of an act are not fully realized when it is being carried out, and we may hope that when superior insight and more complete knowledge show a man further results which are likely to ensue and which he did not himself anticipate or desire, the act may not be repeated.

Again, it is not maintained that the theoretical study of morality ought to be undertaken by everybody. Least of all should the average person be encouraged to pry into that field, always more or less disagreeable, and sometimes indescribably disgusting, which is presented by sexual aberrations. I am willing to admit that, in this matter, while the expert some time ago was unduly reticent towards the public, just now he shows signs of becoming unduly communicative. Yet even here it may well be contended that we have trusted too far to the 'unsophisticated conscience.' It is noteworthy that the assurance which bids us 'leave those matters alone' is felt and expressed chiefly by those who have no means of knowing what happens where their advice is followed. No medical man, I think, and no clergyman, who have been able to elicit the confidence of those with whom they

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professionally deal, will endorse the judgment that this field of morality can be trusted to take care of itself. And, surely, here at least Mr. Bradley cannot make good his view that ethics is unable to say *why* things are right and why they are wrong. Against the common every-day breaches of sexual morality convincing reasons, domestic, physiological, and in the strict sense moral, can be produced. No doubt, here as elsewhere there is room for difficulty, though I think the 'problems' are far fewer and far more soluble than the sex novelist with a keen eye to circulation among a prurient public would have us believe. By common consent most of the ground constitutes what we may call, to parody a parliamentary phrase, 'agreed morality,' and I cannot help thinking that some instruction on such subjects, other than the usual authoritative prohibitions and the usual silencing of inquiry, ought to be given as childhood passes into youth. Such instruction must even in its simplest form take the line of pointing out the consequences which sexual sins bring after them. I appeal for confirmation to the experience of any schoolmaster who may read these pages.

Further, can any intelligent person in these days of inquiry refrain from some degree of thoughtfulness about the rationale of conduct? Surely, everyone should be encouraged and so far as possible helped towards the habit of forecasting results, of asking himself what influence the things he does and the manner of life he leads are likely to exert upon social well-being. It is, I claim, impossible to draw any sharp dividing line of principle between that practical science of ethics which I am endeavoring to commend and the more or less systematic reflection which all except the most ignorant, the most stupid, and the most reckless, actually bring to bear in some degree upon the ordering of their conduct.

(3) But, it will be asked, do you really suggest the creation of a class of moral 'experts,' possessing a knowledge to which the ordinary person is not advised or is

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perhaps even forbidden to aspire, a class to whom difficulties may be referred and by whom *ex cathedra* decisions will be pronounced? Is not moral choice fundamentally a matter of private judgment? Can I commit my conscience into any man's keeping, however profoundly 'expert' I may think him to be in drawing ethical distinctions and deciding ethical issues?

This is a real difficulty. We cannot too strongly insist that no reason whatever must be held to dispense a man from doing that which in his heart and conscience he himself believes to be right. Nor is it enough to reply that our modern casuist would not, like the confessor, impose an authoritative command, a command which must be obeyed whatever the penitent may think of its justification, and a command whose validity cannot be questioned without further sin. Our practical philosopher will indeed assign grounds for what he says, will aim at convincing the moral reason, or,—perhaps it would be better to put it thus,—he will set before those in perplexity considerations relevant to the case of which they had not themselves thought, and will then leave the burden of decision on the individual conscience of each person who has got to act. But it is plain that where the answer to a puzzling question depends in some degree upon a body of systematized knowledge, the opinion of those who have made such knowledge the subject of prolonged study and have become proficient in dealing with it must carry special weight with the layman. Is there a legitimate place for authority in ethics? On this I offer the following remarks:

(*a*) No one can deny that for some persons, and at some periods of life, moral influence must take the form of authoritative precept. The young child is made truthful and honest and kind, not by a reasoned account of the *rationale* of these qualities, but through the affectionate respect with which he receives the teaching of parent or schoolmaster. If European colonists in a savage district where polyandry was practised could obtain

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the same sort of influence over the natives which a normal parent exercises over his child, would they not be justified in authoritatively stopping that mode of life? Development will bring, we hope, in both cases a condition of mind for which the principle of authority need no longer be invoked; but is there not this preliminary stage? And is there any essential difference between such cases and that, for example, of the person who distrusts his own judgment and seeks advice from his clergyman? So far as the latter is fitted, morally and intellectually, to apply the Christian ethics to the situation, surely such an appeal is both right and reasonable. A person of specially high character may so influence a neighborhood as to transform its moral tone. No doubt he does so as a rule by his example, while the authority which would belong to our supposed casuist would rest on intellectual qualifications. But if a difficulty turns on power to appreciate the intricacies of a complex position, upon matters of knowledge rather than upon delicate ethical discernment, it might be argued that the average man is still more entitled to lean upon the judgment of another whom he thinks wiser than himself. The tables might indeed be turned upon the extreme advocate of moral autonomy. One might say to him: "We both agree that I must bring to bear upon this situation all the light I can. The proper course for me to take is to be discovered in part by accurate knowledge and correct forecasting of consequences. I sincerely believe that my adviser's analysis of circumstances is more likely to be right than my own. Am I not bound in conscience to accept it?" Surely no one but a fanatic for 'autonomy' will say that whoever asks his friend: "What do you think it is my duty to do in this matter," is taking an immoral step. Granted that in the vast majority of cases the responsibility of decision cannot be shifted from one's own shoulders, will not the 'moral consciousness of the best men' support the view that where reasons for and against a proposed action are very evenly

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balanced, a person who is really confused is to be commended rather than blamed if he resorts to a guide on whose superior power of deciding rightly and on whose honesty in giving advice he has good reason to believe that he may rely?

(*b*) Moreover, our supposed casuist will not as a rule venture to say concretely what should or should not be done. Dr. Rashdall has aptly compared his function to that of a judge in charging the jury. He gives no lead on 'questions of fact': he lays down principles, he explains the law as to what is and is not evidence, he sets forth and contrasts the points for and against the prisoner; he tries to save the jurymen from the rhetoric of counsel, from the cunningly devised artifices by which special pleaders excite prejudice and warp judgment. But with the twelve plain men rests the issue of fact and the decision by which the fate of the accused is sealed. Similar help might well be provided for a conscience quite as much exposed in its own inmost recesses to distorting influence and special pleading. Personal interests and personal passions work mightily: which of us has not at times found these forces so strong that we welcomed an unbiased opinion, and when we obtained it, began at once to see things in the situation that we would never otherwise have realized at all? Which of us has not been assisted by having the results of each alternative course set before us with a fullness and a truthfulness with which our emotions and our impulses made it impossible for us to marshal them ourselves?

(4) This last objection is by far the most formidable which the defender of casuistry has to meet, and I have advanced reasons to show that even this one is not insuperable. We may at once dismiss the futile difficulty raised by some that every moral situation is unique, involving many individual circumstances, so that general rules are inapplicable. Whatever force belongs to this argument might be turned with equal plausibility against every practical science whatever, and I think it has al-




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ready been met by implication. Let me conclude with an illustrative case. Most of us are agreed that political science teaches the advantageousness of allowing a community to govern itself. The concrete question arises whether we should or should not give a larger measure of self-government to India. How are we going to answer it? No one but a fanatic of one type would say that it is to be answered by the mechanical application of this general principle. Again, no one but a fanatic of another type would say that the need for common sense in its employment proves the principle to be of no value at all. Self-government is a good thing, but public order and peace are also good; facilities for intellectual progress are good, the restraint of religious fanaticism is good: these and many other considerations must be carefully thought about; we must weigh the probabilities of the concrete situation, we must balance immediate disorders against more remote and problematical advantages,—and we must, if we are to act intelligently, have some clear view of the comparative moral values. General maxims may thus be used without being abused; and some such procedure is plainly followed by those conscientious persons who declaim against casuistry in words, but are often quite competent casuists in practice. What I am pleading for is simply a better informed, a more systematic, and as Mr. Bradley would say, a more 'obstinate' attempt to work out the theory of that code which we all practically, unconsciously, but often incoherently apply.

To sum up very briefly: For about twenty-five centuries the minds of philosophers have been at work on the scientific study of moral phenomena. Generation after generation has had its body of experts who have professed, as the result of their specialized reflections, to know more than the common herd can know about social duties and obligations. The common herd has a right to expect that these experts will have something to say, not merely about those actions of whose morality

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or immorality no decent man has the smallest doubt, but also about situations which involve a conflict of maxims and thus place the ordinary man in grave perplexity. Can no help be obtained in unravelling moral knots from those who have made or should have made the study of such knots their peculiar business? Instead of such practical assistance to persons in distress, what most moral philosophers have to offer is a more or less precarious speculation about the grounds which make it obligatory as a rule to speak the truth, or to abstain from homicide, or to preserve one's sobriety. Of such speculations there seems to be no end: they are, of course, important, and even the 'practical' person will be very patient of them if they give promise of leading through general laws to detailed guidance in doubtful cases. Alas! they show little sign of this. Is it not time for the philosophers to follow the advice of William James that they should cease "pawing the ground and champing their bits"?

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## CASUISTRY AND ETHICS.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

THE prejudice against casuistry is universal. But along with this popular aversion goes an equally general ignorance of the real meaning of casuistry. Those who are loudest in their denunciation of it would be hard put to it to say exactly what it is. They would probably mutter some *cliché* such as 'laxity of morals,' 'Jesuit subtlety,' 'pandering to vice,' and so on. It may be suggested that this popular prejudice against casuistry is one of those unexamined presuppositions which infect all our thought with error. Whatever province of ordinary experience we take, we find that it consists of opinions adopted we know not when nor how nor why.

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These form *das Gemeingut* or *le patrimoine social* of our age, and we simply inherit them without questioning and often without understanding. One of the elements in this spiritual inheritance of ordinary thought is an invincible prejudice against casuistry.

These presuppositions on which the mental life of the ordinary man is based are examined by philosophy. Philosophy tests on the touchstone of reflection the prejudices which, as Hegel says, we suck from the breast of the Universal Ethos. But philosophy seems to have left one prejudice at least unexamined,—the prejudice against casuistry. Aversion to casuistry is almost universal among philosophers. By none has it been stated more strongly than by Mr. Bradley. "There is," he says, "another false science more unlovely in life and more unpleasant in decay, from which I myself should be loath to divide it. Just as Logic has been perverted into the art of reasoning, so Ethics has been perverted into the art of morality. They are twin delusions we shall consign, if we are wise, to a common grave. But I would not grudge Casuistry a Christian burial. I should be glad to see it dead and done with on any terms; and then, if all the truth must be spoken, in its later years it has suffered much wrong. That it became odious beyond parallel and in parts most filthy is not to be denied; but it ill becomes the parents of a monster, who have begotten it and nourished it, to cry out when it follows the laws of its nature."[1] Most other philosophers, while they would not express their views in such harsh and scathing language, would agree in essentials with Mr. Bradley's criticism of casuistry. There is no manner of doubt that hostility to casuistry exists both as an ordinary prejudice and on the level of philosophical conviction.

What are the grounds on which this philosophical conviction is based? What influences have moulded and

[1] Bradley, "Principles of Logic," p. 247.

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solidified the popular prejudice? It will be convenient to consider the latter question first. The influences are, in the main, two. The first depends on the nature of the popular mind itself, the second on certain features of casuistry as it has manifested itself in actual systems.

The popular mind has a real aversion to what is exact, codified, systematic. Consider such a sphere of human life as religion or art. In both these realms the popular mind cries out for freedom, spontaneity, absence of restraint, independence of exact rules and formulæ. The schisms and heresies and secessions in the Christian church have been due not to the desire to forge fresh shackles of dogma, but to the passion of the soul to free itself from religious swaddling clothes. And the same is true of art. The popular mind cares nothing for technique, exact rules and precise methods. It seeks to find in art the spontaneous self-expression of the soul. This opposition of the popular mind to order and system displays itself in an extreme form in the fantastic and grotesque license of 'freak' art movements such as Post-Impressionism, Futurism, and Cubism, and of the multitude of strange religions which find their origin in Boston and their home in London. On a slightly higher level, the same popular attitude is exemplified in the interest that is being taken in the philosophy of M. Bergson. If that philosophy means anything, it means the jettisoning of order and system. Spontaneity, change, uncertainty, vagueness,—these are the marks of the philosophy whose blurred outlines charm the popular mind. In all this we see the penchant of the popular mind for what is vague, unexamined, confused, and unsystematic. The popular mind does not, of course, say this. It says that it is "cabin'd, crib'd, confin'd" by rules and regulations, and asserts its right to the freedom of the spirit. By this freedom it really means, though it does not know it, the worst kind of necessity, the necessity of caprice. Thus the prejudice of ordinary thought against casuistry arises in the first place simply

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from this half-unconscious antipathy to whatever is systematic. Casuistry is taken to involve a system of rules and regulations, codified with meticulous care. And the popular mind regards this as inimical to the freedom which it claims to enjoy, if anywhere, in the realm of morality.

The second reason for the popular antipathy to casuistry is closely connected with those aspects of it which have become best known or most notorious. For the popular mind casuistry means simply the casuistry of Roman Catholic theologians. But this casuistry includes many elements which are certainly not essential to a system of casuistry; and it is these elements which are specially obnoxious to the popular mind. Romanist casuistry is bound up with the system of 'Direction,' in which the priest claims the right to state precisely what must and what must not be done in certain circumstances. He is not content with advising. His counsel is 'Direction.' He really usurps the moral rights of the man whom he directs. The practices of the confessional are also closely connected with Romanist casuistry. Thus the popular mind assumes that casuistry necessarily implies the despotism over conscience and the belief in the value of absolution which are characteristic of the confessional. The morality of casuistry becomes an external thing, dependent on the authority of the confessor and director. An action performed under such circumstances and in obedience to such an authority is merely an action which occurs or takes place. It is not really a moral act, it is not really a manifestation of a man's character.

But the most serious objection to casuistry is founded on the moral laxity with which as a matter of history it has often been accomplished. It is a fact that the practice of casuistry, as it was developed in the earlier days of the existence of the Society of Jesus, did lead to a great relaxation of morals. It was inevitable that this should be so. The great aim of the Jesuit order at its foundation was to win back to Romanism a world which

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was fast disclaiming allegiance to it. It deliberately sought to gain men by minimizing the difficulty of being a Christian, and emphasizing the certainty of salvation for those who accepted this minimum as it was offered by Roman Catholicism. In seeking to attain this end, the two methods which it used were the doctrine of Probabilism and the distinction of Mortal and Venial Sins.

Probabilism is based on the proposition *alii aiunt, alii negant; utrumque probabile.* This proposition is capable of a higher as well as a lower interpretation. The Jesuits gave the lower and more sinister interpretation. Technically, an opinion is 'probable,' *i. e.*, it is approved if it be the opinion of 'one grave doctor,' even though a hundred are against it. If a man who hesitates between two courses of action believes that there is greater weight of authority on the side which he does not take, he is yet justified in taking that which (following his own desires) he does take, on the ground that, even if only one opinion be in favor of it, it is 'probably' right. The opinions of many doctors did not err on the side of stringency. Thus almost any course of action in obedience to inclination and caprice could be subtly justified by a 'probable' opinion. As a concrete example of the license which the system encouraged, take the following 'probable opinions' on fasting. "The fast is not broken by drinking wine or water; no, even if we eat something in order that our drink may not hurt us. Nor the usual night collation, if it be taken in the morning, nor if we eat eggs or milkmeats (provided it be not in the holy time of Lent), nor if after dinner time awhile we eat something at the entreaty of a friend."[2] In each case it is a probable opinion that the fast is not broken.

The possibility of moral holidays provided by this doctrine is increased by the theory of mortal and venial sins. The distinction itself goes back to the Fathers.

[2] "Sancta Aphorismata," s. v. Jejun., n. 11.

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As promulgated by them, the classification of mortal sins had all the severity of the Draconian Code. Pride, Avarice, Luxury, Envy, Gluttony, Anger, Sloth,—these are the Seven Deadly Sins. Wide is the net they spread. They inevitably involve damnation, unless absolution be obtained. Venial sins do not. This distinction is in itself immoral. Ethics cannot admit such a distinction,—a distinction based on the external act and not on the moral culpability involved. But the immorality of the doctrine was increased when it was maintained that it was possible to reduce mortal to venial sins. Mortal sins are reduced to venial sins by 'venial accidents.' One of these venial accidents is a lack of 'perfection' in the sin. Thus, on the authority of St. Alphonsus Liguori, whose "Theologia Moralis" is still a Catholic manual, we have it that drunkenness is mortal, but only perfect drunkenness. If drunkenness does not involve the total loss of reason for one hour, it is venial. Again, theft is a mortal sin, but it is venial "privately against his will and without his knowledge to take a thing from him who is ready to give it if he were asked, but will not endure to have it taken without asking."[3]

Doctrines such as these were bound to have demoralizing consequences. These are the aspects of casuistry which bulk most largely in the popular mind to-day. But the important point is that they are not essential to casuistry. The doctrines of Probabilism and Mortal and Venial Sins, together with the confessional, direction, and all the rest, are refinements introduced by the subtlety of Roman Catholic theologians. Rome, in fact, has falsified casuistry. "Though there the staple is," says Jeremy Taylor, "and very many excellent things exposed to view, yet we have found the merchants to be deceivers and their wares too often falsified." ("Works," xi, 346.) On the other hand, Mr. Bradley, in the passage already quoted, seems to hold that these

[3] "Sancta Aphorismata," s. v. Furtum.

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adventitious products are logically implied in casuistry. But this is not the case. These doctrines in their cruder forms are now repudiated by many Roman Catholic theologians. Even the theological aspect of casuistry is an accidental accretion. We may therefore conclude that these popular objections to casuistry either arise from the unphilosophical character of ordinary thought or rest on a misapprehension of the meaning of casuistry and a failure to separate what is essential from what is accidental.

The philosophic objections to casuistry are more serious. The philosopher retains much of the simple prejudice of ordinary thought, but to this he adds definite grounds on which he questions the possibility or utility of casuistry. First we may mention an objection semi-popular, semi-philosophical. This is based on Carlyle's well-known view stated in the essay on "Characteristics" that reflection is a symptom of disease. When the body is in perfect health we are not aware of the operations of its various organs. But if anything goes wrong with an organ, our attention is immediately directed to it. In general, we are reflectively aware of an organ only when it is functioning improperly. So in the realm of morality, when all is well with the *corpus morale,* we are not reflectively conscious of its existence. Reflection upon morality is a symptom of moral disease. The man who is morally perfectly healthy acts on instinct. If this be so, then the aim of the moralist is that people should think not more about morals, but less. But Carlyle's healthy morality is really non-moral. It is the morality of Adam and Eve in the Gården of Eden, an infra-moral condition. And even if Carlyle's view were sound, it would apply even more strongly to ethics than to casuistry.

Another objection is that casuistry, though it would be very useful if it existed, is impossible. It is impossible because of the complexity of human life,—a complexity so great that no two precisely similar cases of

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conduct will ever occur. It is, therefore, impossible to draw up general rules of conduct that will apply in particular cases. No Nautical Almanac is possible in the sphere of morals. This objection is a weighty one, but it applies with equal force against sciences whose possibility is never questioned. It is quite true that no two precisely similar cases of conduct will ever occur. But will any two precisely similar things or events of any kind ever occur? Leibniz answered in the negative with his doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Every worker in a laboratory knows that precisely similar reactions are not to be expected. The scientist bases his general rules on approximately similar recurrences. The same is true in the sphere of conduct. No two cases of conduct will be precisely the same. But it is possible to find cases of conduct approximately similar. Types of conduct can be relatively fixed and discriminated from other types. Every case of a particular type will have certain features peculiar to it alone, but it will also have other characteristics which it shares with all other cases of the same type. Further, if we raise this objection to the existence of casuistry, we must remember that it applies equally pertinently and equally forcibly against ethics. But the assumption on which ethics is based is that, in spite of the isolation of the soul "within itself in-isled," in spite of the diversity in human conduct, yet there is a certain and sufficient amount of similarity of behavior among men, pointing to the existence of fundamental principles on which all human conduct is based. If this be so, then the complexity of life, though it adds to the difficulty of casuistry, does not render it impossible.

A third objection must now be faced. It is stated in the passage from Mr. Bradley which has already been quoted. Casuistry is a perversion of ethics. Ethics has been perverted into the art of morality. On this view ethics disappears and casuistry takes its place. The assumption is that there is room for only one treatment

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of the facts of morality. Either we have ethics, a purely theoretical science, or casuistry, a perversion of ethics, an art of morality. Mr. Bradley's assumption we must examine. It is an assumption that the *either-or* antithesis here is absolute. But why may we not have both ethics and casuistry? Is there not room for two disciplines? All recent writers on morals have assumed that there is only one science, *i. e.,* ethics. If casuistry is admitted, it is admitted only as a hardly respectable branch of ethics.

I propose to assume, on the contrary, that there are two disciplines, ethics and casuistry, which deal with morality. This assumption appears to have as much *a priori* justification as an assumption ever can have. It has already been shown in detail that the objections to casuistry cherished by the popular mind and maintained by philosophical theory do not prove that such a discipline is impossible. I call these disciplines 'Ethics' and 'Casuistry,' but I make no assumption as to their nature or function. I call them 'disciplines,' in order to leave open the problem whether they are to be regarded as pure sciences or applied sciences or arts. This will emerge later. The term 'discipline' begs no question.

Since both disciplines deal in some way with morality, they will clearly bear toward one another a close relation of some kind. What is this relation? As Professor Taylor has pointed out in examining the relation between ethics and metaphysics, whenever we can say that two disciplines stand in close connection with one another, we must conceive the relation in one of two ways. "Either one of the sciences is actually derivative from the other and dependent upon it for its principles and methods, or else they are independent and coördinate branches of inquiry, and the relation between them is simply one of mutual contact and support at various points." ("The Problem of Conduct," p. 2.) The former type of relation may be illustrated by the connection between mechanics and geometry,—mechanics is



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based upon geometry. Its fundamental principles are supplied to it by geometry. An example of the latter type is the relation which obtains between psychology and physiology. Each science is independent, having its own principles, its own methods, its own subject-matter. But at certain points they come into contact, and towards the solution of certain problems, *e. g.*, the relation of body and mind, they both have contributions to offer.

If we apply these principles to the problem before us, we find that there are three possibilities. (1) Ethics and casuistry may be independent disciplines. Each may have its own peculiar subject-matter, or its own special method of dealing with the same subject-matter. Neither discipline may be dependent on or derived from the other. (2) Ethics may be dependent on casuistry. Casuistry may prove to be the primary discipline. Ethics may be based upon the results obtained by it. (3) Casuistry may be dependent on ethics. Casuistry may be entirely a derivative of ethics. It may be simply applied ethics as mechanics may be regarded as applied geometry. It may consist in the detailed application of ethical principles in particular cases or particular types of cases. Which of the relations is the true one? Something may be said for each.

The first view is implied by Jeremy Taylor, the greatest English writer on casuistry, in his *Ductor Dubitantium*. Taylor calls his work an 'institution of moral theology.' He regards it as a religious trust to be undertaken in fear and trembling and performed with constant prayer for the help of God. The aim of the work is the glory of God and the cure of souls. The atmosphere of the whole book is deeply religious. The rules of conscience are supported by theological maxims. The basis of the casuistry of Jeremy Taylor is not ethics, but theology. But while casuistry is not based on ethics, it has at every point intimate relations with ethics. The analysis of the Rule of Conscience does not comprise the

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whole science of human conduct. In one aspect it supplies data for ethics, in another it provides valuable corroboration for the results which ethics reaches. Such then is Jeremy Taylor's view of the relations of ethics and casuistry. Is it a justifiable view?

In the first place, any relation of this kind is bound always to be vague and unsatisfactory. We have mentioned psychology and physiology as examples of sciences which are connected in this way. But there is no agreement on the question how precisely they are related and in what ways each supports the other. On Taylor's view, we may speak of a relation between casuistry and ethics, but that relation remains little more than a name. Further, on Taylor's view, casuistry is based on theology. This is a real defect. A casuistical system dependent on theology will satisfy those only who accept the theology which forms its basis. It has therefore no chance of becoming a universally accepted and universally applicable system. If casuistry is based on another discipline, there are only two disciplines on which as a matter of fact it ever has been based, and on which it is possible that it ever will be based. These are ethics and theology. The casuistry of Taylor, like that of the Roman Catholics whom he imitated, was based on theology. But we have already seen that this basis is really inadmissible. And it therefore seems clear that we must conclude that casuistry is based on ethics.

Before considering that view, we must discuss the possibility that casuistry forms the basis of ethics. This theory has never actually been held, at least in this form. But it is logically possible, and a word or two may be spared for it. If we adopt such a view, we must interpret casuistry in a way which, though not intrinsically impossible, is very different from any interpretation which has ever been put upon it. On such a view, casuistry will be the science which examines particular cases of conduct in order to discover underlying general prin-

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ciples. It is a purely inductive empirical science, the natural history of morals. It may be styled the positive science of human conduct. It starts with no presuppositions, it is based on no other discipline. It investigates the ordinary experience of men of different ages and different races. In doing this, it may be aided by the sciences of psychology and sociology, in so far as they also seek to systematize the same classes of facts. The aim of casuistry is to sort out the cases of conduct which come within its purview into definite classes of type-cases. It does not deal with particular cases *qua* particular. It seeks to standardize type-cases.

But our problematical casuist, having gone so far, will be faced with a choice between two alternatives. He may hold that when he has systematized his data in this way his work as a casuist is completed. Casuistry seeks merely to classify type-cases of conduct. It will be able to say: "Cases of conduct of such and such a type are considered wrong by such and such a people on such and such grounds. On the other hand, the same type of conduct is regarded as right by such and such a people on such and such grounds."[4] Casuistry will rest satisfied with this. It will not venture to decide between the various criteria of right and wrong which it finds existing among different peoples in different ages. Casuistry is a positive and descriptive science. It leaves to ethics (a normative and interpretative science) the task of determining questions of what is ultimately the best standard, the true criterion, the universal norm.

But our casuist may take another course. He may believe that when casuistry has successfully arranged, described, and classified its type-cases of conduct, its work is only half-finished. It must go on to compare the different standards employed by different peoples, and it must judge on some principle which of these are worse

[4] Casuistry in this sense will be closely akin to such a sociological study as Westermarck's "Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas."

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and which are better. By this process of comparison and discrimination it will eventually reach some one standard of conduct which is not indeed the ideally Right or the absolutely True, but which is better and truer than any other. The great difficulty with which this view of casuistry is faced is that it requires to import *ab extra* some ultimate and universal principle on which to decide between the different standards of conduct which it finds in actual experience. This principle is not itself revealed in the data which the casuist studies. It must be adopted from some other discipline such as metaphysics or biology. The criterion may be some ultimate *a priori* principle, such as that of Green, or some such evolutionary formula as Spencer employs. The important point is that the principle does not come simply from the realm of experience which the casuist studies. Our system of casuistry has gone beyond the assumption with which we began. Not only has our system of casuistry proved to be inconsistent with itself, but it also involves results that conflict with the assumption on which the discussion of the relation of ethics and casuistry started. On this view of casuistry, ethics will become unnecessary. Casuistry with the help of its borrowed principles arrogates to itself the right to set up general standards. It really denies that there is such a discipline as ethics. It is therefore unmeaning to say that ethics is based on casuistry.

It remains for us to examine the third possible view of the relation between ethics and casuistry. On this view, casuistry is based on ethics. This theory, I think, is philosophically tenable and practically satisfactory. Casuistry and ethics are two genuine and distinct disciplines. Casuistry is derived from and dependent upon ethics. Ethics is a purely theoretical science which deals with general principles. It sets up certain norms or standards to which all human actions ought to conform. It does not consider special circumstances or particular cases. Casuistry is an applied science. It involves gen-

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eral principles, but these it inherits from ethics. Its task is the practical one of showing the application of the universal ethical principles to the matter of fact of moral experience. It deals with concrete problems of conduct.

This general statement of the relation will become clearer if we examine it a little more in detail under three of its aspects.

(1) Ethics is a pure science, casuistry an applied science or art. We may point out at once that the frank recognition of this distinction enables us to avoid the mazes of a problem which has seemed to many thinkers insoluble,—the problem of the practical value and applicability of moral philosophy. That problem is insoluble because it involves an irrational element. The only ultimately insoluble problems are those which involve a surd. The irrational factor in this particular problem is the assumption that the single discipline of ethics is at once a speculative science and an art of morality. This is really the assumption that underlies Green's discussion of "the application of moral philosophy to the guidance of conduct" ("Prolegomena to Ethics," Book IV). It is also involved in Dr. Rashdall's view of the nature of ethics,—a theory which seeks to make the best of both worlds. Both these thinkers believe that ethics is a theoretical science. But at the same time their practical interest in the concrete facts of life leads them to insist that this purely speculative science must *somehow* have a real practical influence on conduct. In order to avoid inconsistency with his general view of ethics, Green is forced to hold that its principles do not apply directly to concrete cases of conduct. But in cases of genuine perplexity of conscience, though ethics does not provide any direct assistance, it will have some practical value, in so far as it helps to clear away irrelevant considerations. Ethics is a kind of moral rink-sweeper. Very similar on this point is the view of Dr. Rashdall. Ethics is a branch of speculative philosophy and has a

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value which is primarily purely theoretical. But while this conception satisfies Dr. Rashdall's head his heart revolts. Ethics must be of some practical use in connection with concrete problems of conduct. But on the question *how* this practical applied character is consistent with its purely theoretical nature Dr. Rashdall really gives no guidance.

These difficulties vanish if we cease to attempt to harmonize practical and theoretical elements within ethics, and recognize frankly that there are two sciences, one of which is theoretical and the other practical, the practical science being derived from and dependent upon the speculative. In thus solving the problem, we are not cutting the Gordian knot. We show that the problem has been rendered insoluble by an irrational element introduced by a false assumption. Ethics itself has no practical function and no practical value. It is as purely theoretical as geometry. Geometry as such has no practical relation to human experience, though the sciences based upon it do have such relations. So, the science based upon ethics may have great practical utility. It applies the ultimate principles of ethics in particular types of cases and in particular cases. Casuistry will formulate detailed rules for guidance in type-cases of recognized difficulty. Thus through the practical science of casuistry (and only in this way) ethical principles will become actually operative and influential in the complex realm of human conduct.

(2) The principles of ethics are universal and absolute, but those of casuistry are mere general rules affected by and allowing for circumstances and conditions. Casuistry expressly recognizes that circumstances alter cases. It expressly recognizes that its rules are conditional. Under certain conditions they are imperative, but under other conditions their binding force entirely disappears. While the imperatives of ethics are categorical, those of casuistry are hypothetical. But it does not follow that the rules or maxims of casuistry involve

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heteronomy, in Kant's sense. They are particular practical rules holding only in certain circumstances and under certain conditions, but within the universe of conduct in which they exist their authority is of the same kind as that of the universal laws of ethics. In being made conditional, they do not pander to the lower elements in human nature.

A true casuistry will recognize only certain kinds of circumstances and conditions. The conditions with reference to which casuistry applies the universal principles of ethics must be of such a kind that (*a*) they do not involve an end which rests on an assumption at variance with the system of ethics; and that (*b*) the rules drawn up as means toward an end are not inconsistent with the universal principles from which they purport to be deduced. Both these points may be illustrated from the casuistical literature of the fifteenth century. There are elegant Italian booklets which contain special rules of conduct for the procuress and the courtesan. Such a department of casuistry conflicts with our first condition. Our second condition excludes such a specimen of casuistry as Loyola's rules for the attainment of sanctity. These rules involve the atrophy of the will and the moral cadaverization of the man. In the *end* there is nothing which conflicts with a system of ethics, but the *means* towards that end are strictly immoral.

(3) Ethics is an exact science, casuistry an inexact. Perhaps the authority of Aristotle may be cited against this view that ethics is an exact science. But when Aristotle remarks ("Ethics," I, 3) that in any investigation only that degree of exactitude should be sought which the subject-matter admits of, he is thinking more of what we call casuistry than what we call ethics. There is no reason for expecting an ultimate inexactitude in ethics. The complexity of its subject-matter makes it difficult to attain exactitude. But the class of subject-matter with which it deals is the same as that of logic and æsthetic. There is no essential reason in the nature of things why

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there should be greater inexactness in a science which deals with human conduct than in one which treats of human thinking. But the practical sciences or arts based on these pure speculative sciences are all inexact and necessarily inexact. Rhetoric is inexact, poetics (*e. g.*, such a body of rules for composing successful plays as Aristotle gives us in his "Poetics") is inexact, and casuistry is inexact. The rules which they state to be applicable under certain circumstances and in certain conditions to particular cases are always approximations. They apply with approximate exactness in particular cases of a certain type. The statement of Vauvenargues, "*Peu de maximes sont vraies à tous égards,*" would have been true if he had said '*no* maxims.' All maxims purport to be true only within certain conditions, and even within these conditions they are only approximately true. The particular case is always unique; that is, it occurs only once, and it is to some extent, however slight, irregular and *sui generis.*

But, it may be objected, are not these admissions fatal to casuistry? For two reasons I do not think so. In the first place, casuistry is a practical science. Even though the material it works upon is often recalcitrant, even though it applies in particular cases with only approximate exactness, the margin of error in any case may be very slight,—so slight as not to interfere with its practical utility. An exact parallel is furnished by the practical science or art of medicine. The particular cases with which the medical man deals all differ in certain respects. But in treating a case and applying the general rules which hold in such a type of case, the trained physician distinguishes the significant from the insignificant irregularities which appear in the particular case. Insignificant irregularities may be safely ignored; significant irregularities call for modification in the general rules which apply in that type of case. But nobody would dream of denying, on the ground of this relative inexactness, the practical utility of medical

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science. And it appears gratuitous to do this in the case of casuistry.

Further, inasmuch as the rules of casuistry are not merely formulæ in a Nautical Almanac, its inexactness is not a fatal defect. The rules are not to be applied with unreasoning rigor and inelasticity. It is assumed that the discussion and investigation of concrete problems of conduct is itself a valuable moral training. Thus the chief end of casuistry may be considered to be the training of casuists. The application of the rule in the particular case will depend on the educated judgment of the man himself. There is no essential reason why this should lead to moral laxity. On the contrary, it should provide moral ἀσκησις in which a man is progressively trained so that eventually he will apply habitually the ὀρθὸς λόγος.

In a subsequent article I hope to sketch the main outlines of such a system of casuistry as has been assumed in these last pages; to consider certain further objections which may be brought against it; and to show with reference to actual particular cases how it may be of value in helping to decide concrete problems of conduct.

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## ABSOLUTISM AND THE ETHICAL PROBLEM.

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WE have of late been witnessing something like a revival of Absolutism. The brilliant Gifford Lectures of Dr. Bosanquet are no doubt doing much to keep before our minds, and recommend for our acceptance, that particular view of the world and its problems which is characteristic of Absolutism. It is, further, not without significance that in a statement of Christian belief in the terms of modern thought recently written by Ox-

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ford men and published under the title "Foundations," one of its contributors, Mr. Moberley, seeks to assimilate the God of religion to the Absolute of philosophy, at the same time describing Absolutism, not only as the soundest type of philosophy, but as the theory of reality from which a theologian has most to learn.

It is from the point of view, not of theology, but of ethics, that we propose in this paper to make a study of the Absolutist position. We are so far from regarding such a philosophy as serviceable to the moralist in his search for foundation principles that we find it difficult to see any compatibility between this metaphysic and ordinary ethical facts. We shall try to show that Absolutism 'intellectualizes' moral distinctions, and in consequence does not explain them so much as explain them away. We contend,—what perhaps will be readily granted,—that 'good' and 'evil,' as usually understood, are incompatible with the Absolutist's view of reality. Interpreted, however, as 'appearances' of the real, they then become irreconcilable with the moral consciousness of man and are of the nature of 'illusions.' Our ultimate appeal is to this moral consciousness and its implicates. No doubt any 'fact' is not fully true. But if there are facts which are not merely partially inconsistent, but actually incompatible with a theory, and if ethical experience presents such facts, the metaphysician has reason to doubt the adequacy of his view of the real. "It would manifestly be incompatible with the presence of any rational unity of structure in the experience-world that there should be a final and absolute lack of harmony between that world, as it must be conceived by true thinking, and as it must be if our ethical aspirations are to be satisfied."[1]

We may take, as a typical Absolutist view, the account of reality given by Dr. Bosanquet. It is rigorously

[1] Taylor, "Elements of Metaphysics," p. 386.

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'logical,' and is based upon the principle of non-contradiction. Contradiction being taken as a mark of unreality, the real must be the coherent, and that which is truly coherent will have the character of a self-consistent whole. The mind, unable to rest in a contradiction, must perforce resolve it by uniting opposed qualities within a wider and more comprehensive content, *i. e.*, within a 'world.' Reality, in short, is a spiritual and all-inclusive whole having the identity of a differentiated system. And because "the ultimate tendency of thought is not to generalize but to constitute a world," such a whole is the expression of Reason. Indeed, logic is referred to as 'the spirit of totality,' and the aforementioned criterion of non-contradiction becomes in its actual working the operative principle, not of metaphysical thought merely, but also of life.

Since it is no part of our purpose to enter upon a discussion of the merits of Absolutism as a metaphysical theory, we content ourselves with this brief statement of its presuppositions, and go on specially to consider difficulties which seem to us to beset the theory from the side of ethics.

Now it is essential to Absolutism that there should be no differences incapable of unification. "All differences come together in the Absolute," says Bradley. The differences called Good and Evil cannot be regarded as any exception; the assumption is that moral distinctions like all others are only relative. Indeed, the problem of goodness is identified with that of truth; intellectual and 'practical' satisfaction tend to be undistinguished; and logic, as the spirit of totality, becomes the clue not to reality only, but also to 'value.' How thought and will are merged will be evident from the following quotations which we give from Dr. Bosanquet's "Principle of Individuality and Value": "Thought is not a separate faculty of something known as the intelligence. It is the active form of totality, present in all and every experience of a rational being" (p. 59). "Will and

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activity mean the operation of the nature of thought through the expansion of ideas into fact." In other words, "thought is expressed both in conative and cognitive experience."

Now it must, of course, be agreed that conation and cognition are never in fact independent, and that the one can never exist apart from the other. But to merge the two in one as the expression of what is called 'thought' seems a proceeding by no means free from confusion. When 'will' is spoken of as the operation of the nature of thought through the expansion of ideas into fact, we have surely something like a *circulus in definiendo,* for in the idea of 'expansion' we have the factor of 'will' in disguise. And because conation and cognition are not in fact independent, it does not follow that they are the same process. Conation is never found separate and alone, but it is recognized in experience as being a unique element of any content. Processes primarily cognitive cannot be assimilated to those which are more especially conative without confusion. Many will accept as the most important instance of such confusion Hegel's identification of the dialectical movement of thought with the historical evolution of fact. And we cannot but think it another instance of the same confusion that Dr. Bosanquet should liken the processes by which rhythms, sounds, and colors are harmonized, to the operation of syllogizing. But our more immediate concern in this paper is with such an example of confusion as that where a logical is boldly substituted for an ethical explanation. We now go on to consider at some length this intellectualization of the moral problem.

At the outset we note that the whole is said to have 'value,' and that this 'value' is identified (by Dr. Bosanquet) with the "complete individuality of the universe as a conscious being."[2] This alone is stated to be the

[2] "Principle of Individuality," p. 309.

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ultimate value and standard of value. In short, 'value' means completeness of individuality; and since only the whole can be considered to be fully systematized and self-coherent, only the whole can be regarded as having 'value.' But both 'value' and 'perfection,' which are said to characterize the whole, would seem by such usage to forfeit that ethical meaning which is their usual import. We commonly attribute 'value' or 'perfection' to that which might have been other than it is. But the whole can never be otherwise than it is, and whatever differentiation it is capable of arises out of its nature inevitably. Therefore without its ordinary normative significance the term 'valuable' must be predicated of reality.

And throughout their expositions Absolutist writers tend to merge the ethical into the 'logical.' The difference between good and evil is declared to lie in the adequacy of the contents of the action in which self-completion is sought. The life of a man is moralized in the degree to which it is systematized. "A man is good in as far as his being is unified at all in any sphere of wisdom or activity" ("Principle of Individuality," p. 347). And in the "essential *nisus* towards unification" the conation of the self may take the shape of a bad self from sheer logical necessity. Of this view is Dr. McTaggart, who observes that "the realization that sin cannot give satisfaction is only an incident in the developement of a self which is implicitly moral all through, though it requires to be made explicitly so."[3]

It is also the teaching of T. H. Green that the quality of the will as good or bad depends upon "the specific difference of the objects willed under the general form of self-realization."

Now all these views agree in regarding ethical activity as an aspect of one and the same process of integration

[3] "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," p. 164.

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of the self such as is manifested, not only in the phenomena of volition, but also in every variety of the content of experience. Evil, in short, is just a necessary stage towards that completer synthesis of activity which we call goodness.

Now we submit that such a view of good and evil lacks even that amount of truth which should belong to what are regarded as only 'appearances' of the real. To the Absolutist, as Bradley confesses, good and evil are but one-sided aspects, each overruled and transmuted in the whole. But we cannot resist the conviction that in Absolutism the metaphysician, biased consciously or unconsciously by a preconceived theory of reality, tends so to interpret moral facts as to make them conformable to such theory. In consequence, injustice, we think, is done to the facts. The discrepancy between the Absolutist and the popular view of conduct is so great as to amount to an incompatibility.

We will try to indicate wherein the ethical teaching of Absolutism seems artificial and untrue.

In the first place, the average man does not appear to us to regard the difference between good and evil as a matter merely of the systematization of action. To the ordinary moral consciousness evil is not a partial, as distinguished from good, which is a completer, unification of deeds. Indeed, we have difficulty in finding meaning in the criterion. It is quite impossible to distinguish good from evil on the principle of coherence in activity. Often an evil deed has a content much more highly systematized than that of a good deed. A successful forgery requires a masterly elaboration of detail. Only the most carefully considered adjustment of means to ends can make the clever rogue. And the accomplished sensualist by well-regulated methods of vice unifies his career, making provision for the flesh to fulfill its lusts. In contrast with all this, virtue often presents great simplicity of expression,—such as in the gift of a "cup of cold water,"—and on the score of 'wisdom'

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the children of light may fall far short of the children of this world.

But Absolutists urge that, as an attempt to systematize action, evil sooner or later reveals its fragmentary character. The deeds of a bad man are said to interfere with, or fail to fit in with, the process of the complete unification of his life. But the meaning of this is by no means clear. Suppose that by a course of evil a man loses health, reputation, personal liberty, in what sense do disease, disgrace, and imprisonment show the imperfect nature of the unification of his experience? As 'facts' or 'events' these are as truly parts of the whole of his life as health, honor, and freedom would be. The floor of his cell enters as an item of experience into his life just as truly as does the most sumptuous carpet of a drawing room. In days of disgrace as in days of honor he mingles with his fellows just as actually. Alike in disease and in health his body acts and reacts on its environment. From this point of view there is no 'contradiction' or breach of unity between the one type of life and the other. "If a gasometer were substituted for the tower of Salisbury Cathedral, the new building would be a different unity from the old one, and a much less beautiful unity. It would, I imagine, be, as a matter of empirical fact, much less in harmony with the desires of most of the people who see it and,—partly on this account and partly on others,—the change would diminish the total amount of good in the world. But I cannot see that the new building would be less of a unity, more self-contradictory, or less real."[4]

The 'good' and 'evil' experiences of a man are both real and so far cannot 'conflict.' However diverse in character, such experiences are quite consistent as 'facts'; between them there cannot be even 'inequality.' In this connection one is reminded of Wollaston's view of right action as action which conforms to the truth of

[4] McTaggart in *Mind*, July, 1912, p. 419.

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things. Thus the evil of robbery was supposed to arise out of its being a denial of the existence of a social relationship between man and man. On which Leslie Stephen commented thus: "Thirty years of profound meditation had convinced Wollaston that the reason why a man should abstain from breaking his wife's head was, that it was a way of denying that she was his wife." But as Prof. Mackenzie (who gives this extract from Stephen) points out,[5] a bad action is inconsistent, not with fact, but with an ideal. And similarly we would urge that a life of crime considered in its factual aspect contains within itself no 'contradiction.' Good and bad deeds, *qua* deeds, are in the same man incapable of conflict. To describe an evil person's life as imperfectly synthesized can mean only that sooner or later his deeds or their consequences conflict, not with themselves,—which would be meaningless,—but with some such ideal as happiness or affection. In short, the incompatibility is not between one act and another, but between act and value.

But in the next place we may observe that the Absolutist is led to regard the difference between good and evil as one of their relative systematic character, because he conceives that conduct is concerned primarily with 'objects,' or with a 'content.' And, of course, you can systematize 'objects' in various ways. So also can you alter the detail of the content of your actions. You may seek to satisfy desires of one kind or another, as you may determine. Yet we must not suppose that the Absolutist bases the difference between good and evil on a mere difference of the content of actions. Indeed, in his later volume of Gifford Lectures, Dr. Bosanquet remarks that good and evil, like truth and error, are made of the same stuff, evil being good in the wrong place, just as dirt is said to be matter in the wrong place. If, then, conduct is concerned alone with the content of

[5] "Manual of Ethics," 4th ed., p. 189.



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action, and if the character of that content does not in itself determine the difference between good and evil, that difference can lie only in the extent to which such content is systematized. On the analogy that error is a disarranged truth, evil will arise through the excessive and disproportionate exercise of certain desires.

Now we agree that the 'stuff' of good and evil is the same, that they are formed out of the same content of desires, that when a man is 'bad,' it is in virtue of his making a 'wrong' use of the same powers or appetites of which a 'right' use is made by the good. Death is the same fact whether it follows the operation of a surgeon or the blow of a murderer. Love and lust utilize the same 'raw material.' We think the unshakeable conviction of the ordinary moral consciousness to be that goodness is a matter of motive, that it lies rather in what a man is than in what he does, that morality is an attitude of the self. Almost on the last page of "The Value and Destiny of the Individual," Dr. Bosanquet refers to 'love' as the 'typical self-transcendence.' But, this being accepted, what follows? Love is essentially an attitude of self to self; *i. e.,* an interpersonal relation. And an inquiry into the implications of the acts that men call 'good' will always reveal, we think, this interpersonal relation as their basis. It may indeed be seriously debated whether there are ultimately any duties to self apart from duties to others. However, the most civilized moral codes disclose as their outstanding characteristic this social reference of conduct. Now if 'love' be the typical self-transcendence, we do not see how love is possible apart from the existence and integrity of selves. Dr. Bosanquet suggests that it is 'things' which set the problem of life for persons, and not other persons. It is, he says, such 'negative' things as pain, conflict, and sacrifice. But we contend that the problems of pain and conflict arise in the last analysis out of a problem of persons. We venture to say that a large percentage of the pain and conflict of human life is the re-

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sult, directly and indirectly, of personal action in its avoidable ignorance, negligence, imprudence, and selfishness. Man's inhumanity to man is, in one form or another, the chief source of these 'problems' of life. Think only of the havoc caused by the racial poisons, alcohol and syphilis, in their widespread results of suffering; think also of the multifarious evils wrought by selfishness in national and international politics, as also in industry and commerce. We do not wish to deny that for a complete metaphysic there is a problem of 'things.' But what we do strenuously urge is that the moral problem is a problem of 'selves.' Morality as ordinarily understood appears to us to rest upon interpersonal relationship as its essential basis.

If so much be granted, something else follows. The facts of morality cannot be explained in terms of the category of 'organic unity.' Such a category as used by the Absolutist applies only to a whole of parts where the parts are for the whole but not for themselves, where indeed no real independence of the parts is possible. We claim that the category can be applied to the facts of morality only as these are distorted. For, indeed, the unification of 'selves' cannot be comparable to that of 'things,' but must be *sui generis*. Unlike a whole of 'things,' a whole of 'selves' is a whole of 'wholes,' of which each has existence and meaning.

Now in the interaction of such 'wholes' account must be taken of the psychological fact that each of these 'selves' tends to become so interested in itself as to desire to assume an importance out of all proportion to its position of *prima facie* equality as a whole among wholes. And it is no uncommon occurrence for one whole so to relate itself to other wholes as to endeavor to make them merely 'organic' or contributory to its own life. We do not know if an Absolutist would call such a process 'logical' in that it realizes a certain totality. But from the ethical point of view, men usually regard it as the negation of morality. It is nothing else than

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that treatment of another as a mere means which Kant enunciated in the form of a criterion of evil. Integration of such kind is accomplished only by the will to destroy all that other selves stand for; it is nothing but ego-centric life to which all other selves (and even God) are sought to be made subordinate.

Now this kind of self-realization, obtained at the expense of the ethical integrity of other selves, may be called 'contradictory.' And contradiction arises in a twofold manner. In the first place, it must be called a 'contradiction' that the self-realization of one should mean the self-obliteration of others. That is the kind of unreasonableness referred to by Kant in his first formula of the Categorical Imperative. Its effect virtually is to deprive morality of 'objectivity,'—and to make it the peculiar attribute of only one self in the cosmos, after the analogy of solipsism in the theory of knowledge.

But, secondly, inasmuch as the attempt at domination on the part of one self may be confronted with a similar attempt on the part of another, 'contradiction' of another kind will ensue; *i. e.,* a hostility of wills. Such a contradiction, we submit, is unique, and must have its own peculiar problem of reconcilement. 'Things' may be 'thought' together; but the merging of wills is neither effected nor understood by the application of a category of organic unity. The kind of synthesis relevant in the one case is irrelevant in the other. Wills which, so to speak, move in different planes can become adjusted, not so much by a mutual shifting of the mental viewpoint, as by an actual reconstruction of the attitude of the self as a whole. According to the Absolutist doctrine of degrees of truth, one may transcend oneself by attaining to a more comprehensive view of reality. But it seems to us that by gaining greater comprehensiveness of view a man gets 'outside' himself only in the sense that he obtains a wider horizon. No such increase of the circumference will necessarily effect any displacement of

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the center. And, indeed, you cannot transcend or remove your center, for your center is in the whole, and it is impossible to get outside that. But if our account of morality be true, it is an alteration of the position of the center which is necessary. For nothing can bring about the requisite adjustment of the will of one self to that of others (and of God) save, as Eucken puts it, "the radical displacement of our life-center."

Now a displacement of this kind seems for Absolutism not only impossible but meaningless. We are in the whole and cannot transcend it. Our very freedom seems jeopardized; for to allow to the 'part' any such independence as seems necessary for freedom would compromise the nature of the whole as being Absolute. It is, however, acknowledged that the freedom of the agent is a 'partial fact,' and true for moral experience. But it is none the less firmly held that for metaphysical theory only the whole can be free. It is allowed that though acts are necessitated, the agent is free. But the agent is free only in and with the freedom of the Absolute. It is sufficient to say concerning this view that if an agent is free only in so far as the whole acts in and through him, the agent ceases to be a real doer, and becomes simply a depersonalized aspect of the Absolute. Absolutism cannot tolerate the idea of 'an unrelated will' such as a doctrine of the plurality of selves in some form demands. It seems to us, however, just as absurd to insist upon a 'fully related' will. A will fully related to the whole has ceased to be a 'will' in any sense that is useful for ethics. We fear that it is difficult to overcome the criticism that Absolutism is 'fatalistic.'

In conclusion, may we say that we are of opinion that the criterion of coördination of which Absolutists make so much, is, when adequately interpreted and applied, of great use in the understanding of the ethical problem. What greater coördinating principle is there in the world than love? But the coördination that love effects is not 'logical' in its nature. It does not unite 'things'; it

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does not organize into one a multitude of particulars which apart from their unity have in themselves neither existence nor meaning. But, on the contrary, love coördinates selves; it unites persons; it produces in different souls the marvel of an identical life-interest; it effects in a variety of individuals a unanimity of aim; it makes men throughout the world the same in heart. And such a union of wills would have neither its possibility nor its glory were the separateness of individuals not as real as their moral unity.

Nor must it be supposed that such 'separateness' has necessarily anything to do with egoism. Dr. McTaggart writes as though the isolated nature of the self formed the basis of sin. Dr. Bosanquet, too, considers that the theory of 'relational individualism' is incompatible with the idea of social solidarity. And Bradley, by his contention that self-assertion and self-sacrifice are discrepant and contradictory, seems to imply that there can be no activity of the self which is not one or the other. Against all such views we urge that the separateness (in some way) of selves is without ethical prejudice, having a metaphysical rather than a moral significance; that what constitutes egoism is the isolation, not of the 'nature' of the self, but of its 'interest'; that it is the 'attitude' rather than the 'existence' of individuals which is the great obstacle to social solidarity; that a natural assertion of the self is inevitable in all its activities, even in self-sacrifice, and that 'self-assertion' so called is not the mere assertion of the self, but a kind of conduct which is disrespectful to the claims of others. However, merely to be a 'self' and to exercise a 'bare will' is not to be moral. We become 'moral' only as we get into active relation with the lives of others, and 'good' only as that interpersonal attitude is love.

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# THE VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY AND THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

THE doctrine of Maya is considered by many thinkers, both in the East and the West, to be an integral part of the Vedanta philosophy. The Vedanta system is supposed to be an acosmic pantheism, holding that the Absolute called Brahman alone is real and the finite manifestations are illusory. There is one absolute undifferentiated reality, the nature of which is constituted by knowledge. The entire empirical world, with its distinction of finite minds and the objects of their thought, is an illusion. Subjects and objects are like the fleeting images which encompass the dreaming soul and melt away into nothingness at the moment of waking. The term Maya signifies the illusory character of the finite world. Sankara explains the Maya conception by the analogies of the rope and the snake, the juggler and jugglery, the desert and the mirage, and the dreamer and the dream. The central features of the Vedanta philosophy, as it is conceived at the present day, are briefly explained in the lines:

> Brahman is the real, the universe is false,
> The Atman is Brahman. Nothing else.

Although the doctrine of Maya is viewed at the present day as an essential part of the Vedanta system, Oriental scholars are divided in their opinions concerning the relation of the Maya doctrine to the Vedanta system of philosophy. Mr. Gough, Dr. Deussen of Kiel, and Dr. Prabhu Dutt Shastri have all asserted that the doctrine of Maya is native to the Vedanta philosophy. They are of the opinion that the conception of Maya belongs to the primitive speculation of the early sages of India. "The doctrine of Maya, or the unreality of the

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duality of subject and object and the unreality of the plurality of souls and their environment, is the very life of the primitive Indian philosophy" (Gough, "Philosophy of the Upanishads," p. 237). But, on the other side, Colebrooke and Dr. Thibaut hold that it is a graft of a later growth. Colebrooke, in a paper on the Vedanta, read before the Royal Asiatic Society in 1827, said: "The notion that the versatile world is an illusion (Maya) and that all that passes to the apprehension of the waking individual is but a phantasy presented to his imagination, and every seeming thing is unreal and all is visionary, does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the Vedanta. I have remarked nothing which countenances it in the Sutras of Vyasa or in the gloss of Sankara, but much concerning it in the minor commentaries and elementary treatises. I take it to be no tenet of the original Vedanta philosophy, but of another branch from which later writers have borrowed it and have intermixed and confounded the two systems." Colebrooke is wrong in holding that he finds nothing in the gloss of Sankara which countenances the Maya doctrine. But he is right, according to the present writer, in thinking that the text of the Vedanta, *viz.*, the Vedas, the earlier Upanishads, and the Vedanta Sutras, does not suggest, even remotely, the theory of Maya. On the other hand, it will be possible for us to establish that these texts point to a realistic conception of the universe. It was Sankara, under the influence of the Buddhistic teaching, following the traditions of Gaudapada, who imported the conception of Maya into the Vedanta system. Maya is a pivotal principle of the later Sankara Vedanta, but it is not a part of the primitive cosmological conception of the Vedas and the earlier Upanishads. This controversy over the relation of the Maya theory to the Vedanta philosophy is not peculiar to our age. Even Indian thinkers of the past have doubted the authenticity of the Maya theory. Vignana Bikshu cites with approval a passage from the Padma

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Purana, where the tenet of Maya is said to be crypto-Buddhistic. In the Padma Purana, Isvara says to Parvati, his wife: "I, myself, goddess, assuming the form of a Brahman, uttered in the Kali age the false doctrine of Maya, which is covert Buddhism, which imputes a perverted and generally censured signification to the words of the Veda and inculcates the abandonment of ceremonial works and an inactivity consequent on such cessation" (Muir, "Sanskrit Texts," Vol. III, p. 202). Thus the doctrine of Maya is considered by some to be an *essential* feature of the Vedanta system, while others view it as an *accidental* accretion to the system. What is the place of Maya in the Vedanta philosophy? It is the aim of this paper to contribute to the solution of this problem.

The Upanishads, which are the concluding portions of the Vedas, the Brahma Sutras, and the Bhagavadgita form the texts of the Vedanta philosophy. The latter two are only summaries of the Upanishads, and the Upanishads grew out of the speculation of the Vedas. It is, therefore, our business to describe briefly the systems of thought contained in the Vedas and the Upanishads, and to see if they lend any countenance to the Maya theory.

It is an oft-quoted saying that philosophy begins in wonder. The mystery of the world with all its changes strikes the reflective temper. How does the white milk come from the red cow? How is it that the sun does not fall down? "Unpropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it that downward turned, he falls not downward?" (Rigveda, IV, 13, 5.) Philosophy, according to Hegel, is a thinking consideration of things. In thinking, we reach the law of the object, its essence, its universal element, in a word, its explanation. The Vedic philosophy grew out of a demand for the explanation of actual experience. Philosophy bade men seek beneath all change, which is the law of life, unity and persistency. All things are passing; what remains? Any-

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thing or nothing? The Vedic age raised the problem of philosophy and offered a solution. It was then that attempts to reflect upon the world of experience were made for the first time. But we should bear in mind that the Vedas are a production of a race as yet in its infancy, struggling to give expression to its religious emotions. Viewed with our eyes, they appear unphilosophical. By a rigorous application of the principle of causality, the Vedic philosophers were forced to postulate deities behind the natural forces. Why should the sun rise every morning and the moon every evening, if it is not due to powers working behind them? Such was the origin of the gods Surya and Soma. The ancient Hindu saw a god in the clouds and heard a god in the winds. The world of nature became a divine community. The elemental forces of earth and sky, fire and wind, became small divinities. Polytheism is the doctrine of the Vedas, though there were glimpses of the divine unity underlying all things. These glimpses were few and far between and were not sufficient to raise the people beyond the seeming multiplicity of the divine. The Upanishads, as we shall see, emphasized the unity of all things which was dimly suggested by the Vedas.

During the Vedic period, the universe in all its fullness was conceived as real. Only, the Vedic thinkers asked for an explanation of it: philosophy meant to them a disentangling of the ultimate elements from the chaos in which they are lost. The demand of philosophy, *viz.,* scientific knowledge of reality, led them to postulate a number of agents behind the diversity of things. But there is no suggestion here of the unreality of the universe. In a sense, reality, for these sages, was not something extra-empirical, but the world of experience.

Passing next to the Upanishads, we find that the thinkers of that era were not satisfied with many gods and many lords. They attacked the problem of philosophy boldly. Philosophy always seeks a unifying principle

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by which the immense wealth of phenomena may be articulated into a coherent system or a cosmos: it views the whole universe with its infinite variety as one single system. The sages sought for an ultimate unity that can explain everything, that comprises both the ego and the non-ego. The polytheism of the Vedic age was discarded and the dim hints of monism thrown out by the Vedic hymns elaborated and developed. Thus the Upanishads naturally grew out of the Vedic hymns. That the different agents are one is suggested in several passages of the Rigveda. "They called him Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni; then there is that celestial well-winged bird. Sages name variously that which is but one. They call it Agni, Yama, Mataraisvani" (Rigveda, I, 164, 46).

The philosophic impulse led to the abolition of polytheism and the synthesis of the many agencies. What is the nature of the supreme agency? Is it matter or spirit? The Upanishads declare that it is spirit. The Aitareya Upanishad, after enumerating the principal classes of objects, says: "All this is produced by Reason and rests in Reason, and Reason is Brahman" (Aitareya Upanishad, III, 3). "As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed the Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, IV, 5, 13). Another passage says: "It is the true, the Infinite, and knowledge" (Taittirya Upanishad). In the Brahma Sutras, the theory of the Sankhya philosophers that the Absolute or reality is matter or Prakriti is criticised. Because Pradhana or Prakriti does not possess the power of automatic guidance and control, it cannot be the Absolute. Thus the Brahma Sutras say: "The Pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, since the order and arrangement of the world is impossible on that hypothesis." Hence, the Absolute is not matter; for order, harmony, and rationality cannot be due to the accident of material motions. The

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blind workings of chance cannot give rise to the sublime order which we find everywhere in the universe. A supreme intelligence was made the absolute principle. In place of a plurality of spirits, the Upanishads substituted one supreme spirit. But no attempt was made to explain away as an illusion the world of experience which had aroused curiosity in the inquiring mind. Its explanation, however, was sought and the solution found in a supreme spirit. The supreme spirit was considered to be the explanation of all thinking beings and the object of all thought. In the II Aitareya Aranyaka, 6 Adhyaya, 1 Khanda, it is said: (2) "Who is he whom we meditate on as the self? Which is the self? (3) That by which we see (form), that by which we hear sound, that by which we perceive smells, that by which we utter speech, that by which we distinguish sweet and not sweet, and what comes from the heart and the mind, by perception, command, understanding, knowledge, wisdom, seeing, holding, thinking, considering, readiness, remembering, conceiving, willing, breathing, loving, desiring? (4) No, all these are various names only of knowledge (the true self), (5) and that self (consisting of knowledge) is Brahman, it is Indra, it is Prajapati. All the Devas, those five great elements, earth, air, ether, water, fire, these and those which are, as it were, small and mixed and seeds of this kind and that kind, born from eggs, born from the womb, born from heat, born from germs, horses, cows, men, elephants and whatsoever breathes, whether walking or flying and what is immovable, all that is led (produced) by knowledge (the self). (6) It rests on knowledge (the self). The world is led (produced) by knowledge (the self). Knowledge is its cause. (7) Knowledge is Brahman." (Max Müller, Upanishads, Vol. I, p. 245.) Thus, everything in the universe, instead of being dismissed as illusory, is thought to be produced by Brahman. But this principle of Brahman is recognized as immanent in the universe. It is not a corporeal presence seated on high in the

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heavens, but an eternal spirit manifesting itself in all things. It is not apart from the world,—it is the world. The world is the product of Brahman, and, therefore, Brahman. Hence, instead of being an illusion, the world is the sole reality. There is nothing else besides it. "Believe it, my son. That which is the subtile essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True; it is the Self and thou O! Svetaketu, art it" (Chandogya, VI Prapathaka, 12 Khanda). "That whence these beings are born, by which when born they live, into which they enter when they die, endeavor to know that; that is Brahman" (Taittirya Upanishad, III, 1). Here the highest point of the Upanishad teaching is reached, the identity of the finite self and everything else with the Absolute. The Absolute is the beginning of all things and the end of all things.

We see that the Vedanta philosophers attacked the problem of reality: What is the explanation of this universe? They started out from the answer given by the Vedic sages that a plurality of gods is necessary to account for the universe, and improved upon it by reducing the plurality to a unity; this unity is regarded as a spiritual principle and is called Brahman. The whole world is regarded as nothing more nor less than a manifestation of Brahman, and is, therefore, just as real as Brahman is. Since Brahman is the fulness of being, the world which is but a manifestation thereof must be real. The significance of the different theories of creation discussed in the Upanishads is this, that Brahman and the world are very closely related. The two are one, though sometimes we regard one as the effect, the other as the cause. The accounts of creation in the Upanishads are not to be taken seriously; but they clearly show that the Upanishad writers did not conceive the world as pure illusion. They regarded the world as real and seriously set about accounting for its reality. If the world is unreal, questions concerning creation,—whether it is a product distinct from Brahman

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or only a material modification of it,—can find no place.[1] These accounts of creation, according to the defenders of the Maya doctrine, are only concessions to popular clamor: the ignorant masses cannot be made to accept this lofty philosophy which preaches the reality of Brahman and the illusory nature of the world. The multitude cannot deny the reality of the world. As Dr. Shastri remarks: "This extreme idealism, which refused to grant reality to the world, seemed to be rather too advanced for the ordinary understanding, which could not reconcile the fact that the world was there somehow or other, and it could therefore not be explained away by being called unreal. The inherent empirical tendencies of our nature are too strong to be wholly conquered; howsoever they may be subdued, they still rise up at some time and refuse to harmonize with the metaphysical standpoint. Moreover, to the majority who are not accustomed to transcend the boundaries of empirical understanding, such metaphysical speculations as are contained in the pure idealism of Yagnavalkya seem hardly to convey any meaning. Yet these minds are not totally to be ignored by the old sages, they must then make room for some concession to the empirical consciousness which refuses to part with the idea of the reality of the world. It was possible to do this by granting the existence of the world and yet maintaining at the same time that the sole reality is Atman" ("The Doctrine of Maya," pp. 67, 68). This explanation is, indeed, ingenious and has long been the current one. But it is rather hard to comprehend. If the realistic conception of the universe is merely a concession to the views of the ignorant multitude, it is not easy to see why it is emphasized again and again, in almost every Upanishad. The Upanishad writers, who were wholly untrammelled by authority, cannot be supposed to have

[1] For accounts of creation see Chandogya VI, 2, 3; Aitareya, I; Mundaka Upanishad, first part of the second Mundaka.

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laid stress on a strictly untenable position, if it appeared untenable to them. The untenableness of the doctrine of the reality of the world, and its supposed origin as a device to satisfy the gross and empirical nature of the multitude, are inventions of the later Vedantins who refuse to grant the reality of the world, but who still seek to harmonize their teachings with the Upanishads. If we distinguish the facts from their hypothetical and interpretative gloss, we will see that the accounts of creation are genuine parts of the earlier Vedanta philosophy, and that this philosophy recognized the reality of the world, though it conceived it as an expression of the nature of Brahman.

Thus we see how ancient Hindu philosophy sought for an explanation of the world of experience and arrived at the solution that the whole world is identical with the Eternal Spirit. There is no duality between the two, between the world and the spirit. The world *is* the spirit. But any one portion of the world, any aspect thereof, is only a phase of the eternal spirit and is, therefore, not the spirit. Every part is dependent on the others, which altogether constitute Brahman. Reality is the whole, and it is one system. It is impossible to be satisfied with anything short of the whole. "Sir, in what does the infinite rest? In its own greatness or not even in greatness?" (2) "In the world they call cows and horses, elephants and gold, slaves, wives, fields, houses, greatness. I do not mean this," thus he spoke, "for in that case, one being (possessor) rests in something else (but the infinite cannot rest in something different from itself)." (Chandogya Upanishad, VII Prapathaka, 24 Khanda.) Any part or feature of reality may be regarded as dependent on some other part or parts. In the case of everything but the absolute system as a whole, this dependence is found. Only the Absolute is real. We are unable to rest in any of the objects as an absolute reality, *i. e.*, a reality that does not need to be referred to anything else as its explanation. Reality

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is that which stands in need of nothing else. So a plurality of realities is a contradiction in terms. Reality, in other words, is an organism, furnished with a multiplicity of organs and manifestations of life. The true is the whole, and the untrue is the fragmentary or the limited. The finite is real in so far as it is an organic unity, organic with the whole life of the Absolute. We all exist in and not apart from God. The Absolute is a single, all-inclusive system. The finite, we say, is an expression of the spiritual principle, although the Vedanta does not regard it as an exhaustive expression of the spirit. The finite is an aspect (though a partial aspect) of reality. The finite is the incomplete, while the infinite is the complete and the sufficient. To be finite is to be limited. There is something else to limit it. It is not self-sufficient. As Hegel would put it, the finite always transcends itself. The Absolute is neither this nor that, but the whole in its completeness; the finite is real as a part of the Absolute. The completely independent reality is the whole which we call the Absolute. The finite which sets itself up as a *res completa,* is real only in its relation to the whole. The reality of the finite is not denied. It has a life of its own as a part of the whole. Again, if we look at the parts, we will find change, but if we look at reality as a whole, we find that though there is change, yet there is persistence. Identity is maintained even in change. The whole will remain identical with what it is even if there be change in the parts. If persistence or permanence is supposed to be the test of reality, we find it is only the whole that is real, for only that is unchanging while the finite changes. "Brahman is the unchanging among changing things" (Katha Upanishad, II, 22). The whole remains even though there is change. The whole of nature with all that belongs to it is in a process of change. The parts of nature with their changes are in time, but the whole is out of time. Thus, the permanent or the unchanging or the real or the self-sufficient is the whole or the totality

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of existence, and it is otherwise called Brahman, for Brahman is all modifications. It is everything that exists. Brahma Sutras (II, 1, 22) distinctly declares that Brahman is *adhika; i. e.,* more than the individual souls. The finite modifications, as the poet says,

> . . . are but broken lights of Thee,
> And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

This idea is brought out by the Mundaka Upanishad, which declares that Brahman is that "through which, if it is known, everything else becomes known" (I Mundaka, 1 Khanda, verse 3). Again, the Chandogya Upanishad says, "When Brahman is known, everything is known" (VI, 1).

We see, there is a great difference between this view, which ascribes reality,—though a dependent reality,—to the finite world, and the Maya view, which reduces it to an illusion. The world which our intellect reveals to us is real, though its reality is limited and partial. The finite world is not absolutely real, for it demands something else on which it depends. It is Brahman that imparts its being to the world. But from this it does not follow that our life is a mere dream and our knowledge of the world a mere phantasy. However imperfect and inadequate it may be, it is a real knowledge of a real world. The world, to the Maya theorists, is a false appearance, as unreal as the snake for which a piece of rope is mistaken; according to the strict Vedantic view, it is an inadequate expression of the spiritual principle, and yet as real as Brahman. The Vedanta texts ask us to rid ourselves of the belief in the separate and individual existence of the finite modes. They tell us that their reality is Brahman or the whole. We have to see Brahman in everything and everything in Brahman. "The self in all beings and all beings in the self, thus sees the self-poised with equal vision in all" (Bhagavadgita, VI, 29). "He who sees all beings in the supreme self and the supreme self in all beings, becomes fearless



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and is not anxious about saving his self" (Isavasya Upanishad, mantra 6).

Can this reality be known? According to the view of the Absolute we have just sketched, the absolute reality cannot be known in its entirety. Our intellect is so constituted that it can grasp reality only piece by piece. We can see things only in a fragmentary way. Brahman is infinitely more than what our finite lives can express. Reality is the whole; the finite consciousness is limited, and cannot therefore grasp the whole. Reality can be known by us only dimly as through a glass, but we can never see it face to face. The object of our knowledge is limited, finite, and only partial. It is not as real as the whole. This does not mean that our knowledge is false. We do not know Brahman fully, but we know it partially. Kena Upanishad says: "I do not think, I know Him fully, nor do I say I know Him not at all, for I know. He amongst us who says, 'I know Him,' he knows Him not. He who says, 'I do not know Him,' he knows indeed" (II Khanda, mantra 2). This passage clearly shows that Brahman is unknowable in its entirety, while knowable in part. Reality is neither completely unknown nor completely known. Reality in its wholeness cannot be grasped by the discursive understanding, which distinguishes, separates, and relates. The final unity at which thought aims is beyond all concepts. The feature of selective activity characteristic of the human mind makes it unequal to the task of grasping reality. Thought on account of its very nature is destined to fail in its enterprise. Reality is the whole, and its essence is spiritual, but we cannot grasp it. It is in us, though we do not know it. The following passages bring out the fact that the Upanishad writers considered our understanding inadequate to the task of knowing reality: "The eye does not go thither, nor speech, nor mind. We do not know, we do not understand, how can any one teach it?" (Kena Upanishad, Khanda I, verse 3.) "The Self is to be described by

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no, no; He is incomprehensible, for He cannot be comprehended" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad III, 9, 26). "This idea of the Self that thou hast gained is not to be attained by the discursive intellect" (Katha Upanishad, valli 2). Although the Vedantins were satisfied that the intellect, which works through the categories of subject and object, which breaks up unity and marks off one thing from another, cannot grasp the Absolute, they thought there was a higher kind of knowledge, knowledge of intuition, knowledge of immediate apprehension of reality, which made reality known. The Vedanta philosophy does not stop with a confession of the impotence of the human reason. Immediate apprehension is capable of putting us in possession of reality. In a final intuition we can realize the immediate fact that all is one. Know it we cannot; but realize it we must. Logic does not help us here, but it is life. Though we cannot know it, we can see it. This is an element of mysticism in the Vedanta system. We are told that we know the Absolute immediately, by feeling or by *Anschauung,* but this is not philosophy or a rational exposition of the nature of reality. We want the soul of the seer or the eye of the artist to take in at one glance the whole of reality, which cannot be comprehended by our intelligence. Bhava, questioned by Vashkalin concerning Brahman, explained it to him by silence. He said to him, "Learn Brahman, O Friend," and became silent. Then on a second or a third question he replied: "I am teaching you indeed, but you do not understand. Silent is that Self." This silence is an indication of spiritual rapture where human speech and understanding fail.

Resuming the thread of our argument, we see that the earlier Vedantin does not deny reality to the finite, but grants Brahman or the Absolute a reality that embraces the reality of the finite world. The analogies which the Upanishads use to illustrate the relation between the Absolute and the finite world clearly indicate the reality

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of the finite world. In the Chandogya Upanishad it is said: "My dear, as by one clod of clay, all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay . . ." (VI Prapathaka, Khanda 1). Plainly the finite world is not a *vivasta* or an illusion, but a *parinama* or a real modification of Brahman. The finite world has Brahman for its causal substance, as clay is the causal matter of earthen pots. The illustrative instance of a lump of clay does not say that either the effect is unreal or the process by which the cause is transformed into the effect is unreal. The world is nothing but Brahman, and, therefore, the world is not a baseless illusion or an imaginary dream. But the reality of the world is its dependence on the Absolute. The Vedanta philosophy does not dispute the reality of the world, but simply declares that the world is not unconditioned. In the same Upanishad it is said: "Brahman is the subtile essence . . . by which the whole Nyagrodha tree exists" (VI Prapathaka, Khanda 12). The whole of reality is an organism, and it is a spiritual organism, and the essence of the organism is constituted by Brahman or the eternal spirit. The different parts of the organism are but differentiations of the Absolute. The whole is Brahman. Again, in the Vedanta Sutras, the relation of Brahman to the individual souls is represented as that of the snake to its coils. Apart from the snake there are no coils, just as apart from Brahman there is no world. The snake is the coils and the hood and the erect posture and so on. So Brahman is the whole. The coils by themselves have no independent reality. Just so the finite world has no independent reality. But the coils are as real as the snake. So the world is as real as the Absolute. (See Vedanta Sutras, III, 2-28, Vol. III, p. 174.)

It is supposed that passages which speak of the sole reality of Brahman involve the implication that the finite world is unreal. Dr. Deussen thinks the theory of Maya forms the 'necessary complement' 'to the doc-

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trine of the Atman' ("Philosophy of the Upanishads," p. 44). Dr. Shastri remarks: "The theory may be enunciated in two ways: (1) that the world is an illusion or appearance, and (2) that the only reality is the Atman. These two statements mean the same thing, so that the passages which emphasize the statement that the Atman is the only reality, clearly mean that all else (*i. e.,* other than the Atman, *viz.,* the world, etc.) is not real" ("The Doctrine of Maya," p. 49). We protest against this logic. The inference of the unreality of the world from the sole reality of Brahman is legitimate, if the world is viewed as separate from Brahman. But is there any ground for such an assumption? The defenders of the Maya theory assume that the world is something different from Brahman; they combine with this assumption the premise that Brahman alone is real and logically conclude that the seemingly solid world is illusory. We grant the premise that Brahman alone is real; but we dispute the truth of the other premise that the world is something different from Brahman. The reality of Brahman according to the Vedanta is not exclusive of the reality of the universe. The two are not different. The visible universe has its basis in Brahman. As things made of clay are as real as the lump of clay, the universe is as real as Brahman underlying it. The reality of Brahman everywhere asserted in the Upanishads, instead of implying the unreality of the world, logically involves its reality. Anything apart from the Self is unreal, but the world is the Self. There are passages which say, "It is the air, it is the fire." The Svetasvatara Upanishad says (IV, 3): "Thou art woman; thou art man; thou art youth; thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere." The different theories of creation, however much they differ in regard to details, still agree on this one point that the world has for its creator Brahman. The Chandogya Upanishad says: "Being only, my dear, was this in the

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beginning, only one without a second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth? It sent forth fire" (VI, 2, 1, 3). Again: "In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds?" (Aitareya Aranyaka, II, 4, 1, 12). "That whence these beings are born, by which when born they live, into which they enter when they die, endeavor to know that, that is Brahman" Taittiriya Upanishad).

The Vedanta Sutras, which in concise aphorisms sum up the essential features of the Vedanta system of philosophy, lay down in the second Sutra the definition of Brahman as "that whence the origin and so on (*i. e.*, sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed." The Vedanta Sutras declare that the Brahman is a unity in variety and not a pure blank identity, for they say: "And likewise in the Self there are diversified objects" (Sutras, Pada 1, Adhyaya II, Sutra 28). In the face of these statements, which clearly establish the oneness of the finite and the infinite, it cannot be maintained that the reality of Brahman means the falsity of the finite. The argument will be valid on a dualistic metaphysics which makes the infinite and the finite different, but not on a monistic system like the Vedanta, in which the finite world and Brahman are said to be one.

When confronted with this difficulty, the Sankara Vedantins are ready with the answer that all this belongs to lower knowledge, which has for its aim the satisfaction of the ordinary empirical intellect. The Brahman that is described as the cause of the universe is not the unqualified, distinctionless Brahman of higher knowledge, but the Brahman associated with Maya termed Iswara, belonging to lower knowledge. But to this distinction between higher knowledge, treating of Nirguna Brahman, and lower knowledge, treating of Saguna Brahman, we have to object on the following grounds: The Brahma Sutras are an epitome of the philosophic teaching of the Upanishads. We, therefore, naturally

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expect a definition of the higher Brahman there. They attempt in their very first Sutra to give us an exposition of Brahman, and that of necessity must be the exposition of the higher Brahman belonging to the superior science. The definition given in the second Sutra is that Brahman is the cause of the origin, preservation, and reabsorption of the world. It would be hard to suppose an inquiry into Brahman starting with a false possibility were it not for Sankara's commentary on the second Sutra, in which he observes that Isvara is the Brahman referred to as the originator (and so on) of the world. It is Brahman in union with Maya from whom the false appearance of the world is projected. Sankara, in the interests of his system, has to assume that it is not Brahman, but a false Brahman, that is the cause of the world. He dismisses the world as illusory, but there are texts holding to its reality and even pointing out that Brahman is the cause of its reality. The way out of the difficulty is that all this is lower knowledge, intended to satisfy the ordinary intellect. The world is real. It is projected out of Brahman associated with Maya. The unreal nature of Isvara and his product, the world, will become apparent if one acquires higher knowledge. But in the view of the present writer, this entire difficulty is due to a twisting of the Vedanta doctrine. It is not our purpose just now to criticise the doctrine of Maya. All we are interested in making clear is that it has no support in the earlier form of the Vedanta philosophy. If the Maya doctrine had really been held by the earlier Vedantins, they would have said something about Maya when the theories of creation were described. When speaking of the material cause of the world even, Brahman is asserted to be the material cause. There is not a single word about Maya. The Vedanta Sutra says: "Brahman is the material cause on account of this not being in conflict with the promissory statements and illustrating instances" (I Adhyaya, 4 Pada, Sutra 23). If Sankara's theory

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is held by the earlier Vedantins, then Maya must be supposed to be *upadana* of the material world; but they say that the material cause or *upadana* is Brahman, and object to a suggestion of the Sankhyas which makes the material cause identical with Maya, with which is generally identified the Prakriti of the Sankhyas. Here, if anywhere, we should expect a reference to Maya if the Sutrakara entertained that belief, but there is no reference to it. Secondly, the distinction between higher Brahman and lower Brahman is foreign to the Upanishads. In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Brahman is represented as destitute of qualities in one place (VIII Prakaranam), and in another place Brahman is referred to as the Ruler of the world. "By the command of the Imperishable, the sun and moon stand apart." Even Sandilya Vidya (Chandogya, III, 14) is not aware of the distinction between the lower and the higher Brahman. Sankara holds that this distinction is necessary to synthetize the different accounts of Brahman. It may be regarded as a practical working assumption. In some passages Brahman is described as incomprehensible, in some others Brahman is described as the cause of this, that, etc. How are the two views to be reconciled? To explain the discrepancy it is not necessary for us to assume that the former passages describe the higher Brahman and the latter the lower Brahman, and that the lower Brahman is an appearance of the higher Brahman since Maya is associated with it. For it is quite possible that the Upanishads, when their interest is to lay stress on the finite nature of the human intellect and its incapacity to grasp the nature of reality, speak of Brahman as something that cannot be characterized adequately by the finite mind; and that they describe it as the Self, the life of all, that in which we live, move, and have our being when they are interested in showing that the whole universe is based on and is Brahman. There is no suggestion that the two are different. No doubt the Mundaka Upanishad distinguishes between superior

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and inferior knowledge (see I Mundaka, 1 Khanda, verses 4 to 5). But superior knowledge is not here knowledge of distinctionless Brahman; nor is inferior knowledge that of determinate Brahman. Superior knowledge treats of Brahman, while inferior knowledge treats of sacrifices, modes of performance, etc. The Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita are, according to the Mundaka Upanishad, superior knowledge. They are born of the spirit of revolt against the ceremonial portion of the Vedas. The Vedas lend color to the doctrine that religiosity consists in the observance of the ceremonial. The Upanishads or the higher knowledge point out that the more important thing is the inner mind and right knowledge. So the Vedas, with all their appendages, are held to be inferior to the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita, which speak of the nature of the individual soul and its relation to the Eternal Reality.

Let us conclude this discussion concerning the place of Maya in the Vedanta philosophy with a consideration of the positive or the negative nature of the Absolute. Is Brahman the fullness of being or is it an empty abstraction? The Vedantins, including Sankara and his followers, admit that the Brahman is all-real and all-perfect. But this all-reality of Brahman can be granted only if the world is real. If the world is Maya, then Brahman becomes a pure blank, a negative infinite. It is, as Hegel would put it, a spurious infinite. It is a mere beyond, which we do not know. It can never be the explanation of all that is, for there is nothing. The world is not. But according to the Vedantin, the Absolute is pure affirmative Being, the presupposition from which all determinations of the finite proceed. Knowing it, we know everything. An acosmic interpretation (like the theory of Maya) that denies the reality of the finite world, will make the Vedantic Absolute a pure nothing. Such an interpretation would deserve Erdmann's criticism, which likens this Absolute to the lion's den in the fable, in which all the footsteps of thought are pointed

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inward and none directed outward. But according to the earlier Vedanta, the Absolute is not merely the negation of the finite, but is its explanation. The Absolute includes the finite. It is the whole. It is the self-determining principle which manifests itself in all the determinations of the finite without losing its unity with itself. The Absolute involves the diversified universe as the universal involves the particular. The relation between the Absolute and the finite is that between the universal and the particular. (This is only an analogy, and like all analogies should not be pressed too far.) The particular is an illustration of the universal, and the universal is the ground of the particular. It is that in the light of which the particular becomes intelligible. We do not deny the reality of the particular, but we say its reality is due to the reality of the general principle. The place, the function, and the exact nature of the reality of the particular are brought out by relating it to the universal. In exactly the same way, it is wrong to think that the finite world is a reality by itself. Its reality is due to the spiritual principle underlying it. If you conceive it apart from the Absolute, then you are viewing it from a mistaken point of view. We have to see, as Malebranche saw, all things in God, if we want to see aught. Just as the general exists in the particular, so the Absolute exists in the finite. There is no finite without an infinite, and no infinite without finite. These are the necessary sides or moments of one and the same concrete reality. Reality appears in the finite, and the finite is its revelation. The Bhagavadgita says: "He who sees me everywhere and everything in me, to him I vanish not, nor to me does he vanish" (Chap. VI, 29). The one is in all, and all are the one. The Absolute is inclusive and not exclusive. It is absurd to say that the finite experience is illusory. If you think the world is illusory, then the Absolute becomes pure vacancy and in fact neither more nor less than nothing. It is a matter of indifference whether you call it being

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or nothing, a conclusion with which no Vedantin will agree; and to be consistent no Vedantin should agree with the theory that the world is illusory. The conclusion at which we arrive is that the doctrine of Maya is not an integral part of the Vedanta system of philosophy. The Absolute is not a pure self-identity or a simple reality opposed to the world as appearance; it is an eternal unity involving differentiations, and therefore the Vedanta system is not acosmism.

S. Radhakrishnan.

The Presidency College, Madras.

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## DISCUSSION.

### The Divorce Laws of England and Wales.

I can quite understand that Mr. Haynes does not agree with my views on this subject, but I cannot admit that I have misrepresented the evidence. For instance, I do *not* say in my paper that the recommendation of the Majority Report is "against the evidence"; it is against some of the evidence and has some in support of it. What I say is, that there is strong evidence against it, and I begin by quoting the *majority* report to the effect that of the *specialists* in mental disease only four were in favor of the recommendation and seven were against. I then go on to quote the minority remark about "experts" to which Mr. Haynes objects. Of course much depends upon the meaning attached to the word "expert"; I should not myself have expected to find that all the medical officers in asylums were experts; but as my argument was based upon the evidence of "specialists" it is not affected.

I did not know before that there was anything peculiar with my views about vows. My position is simply that it is a mistake to take, or to encourage young people to take a vow of permanent loyalty, when all that is intended is a temporary and conditional loyalty. Why this should debar me from being interested in securing equality as between men and women, and between rich and poor, I fail to see.

Helen Bosanquet.

Oxshott, England.

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## REPLY TO PROFESSOR LOVEJOY.

In his review of my book in the January issue of this JOURNAL, Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy refers to a paper by Professor George A. Coe in the *Hibbert Journal* for 1908 in which he is said to have shown before me the futility of "empirical apologetics." I do not write to claim priority, but merely to protect myself against the inference that might possibly be drawn that I have taken from Professor Coe certain arguments without acknowledgment. As a matter of fact, I did little more in my book, with regard to the point in question, than reproduce a discussion published in this JOURNAL in 1904 in a criticism of Wm. James's interpretation of religious experience.

JAMES H. LEUBA.

Bryn Mawr.

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## BOOK REVIEWS.

ESSAYS ON TRUTH AND REALITY. By F. H. Bradley, LL.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xvi, 480.

Mr. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" is generally recognized as the most important contribution to constructive metaphysics that has been made in recent times,—perhaps the most important since Hegel. The present collection of Essays,—the greater part of which had previously been published in *Mind*,—may be regarded as a supplement to that work. It is partly an attempt to make the general point of view clearer, partly an application of it to the treatment of some detailed problems, and partly (perhaps mainly) a criticism of some rival theories, —especially those of William James and Mr. Bertrand Russell. Mr. Bradley's criticisms of pragmatism have a special interest, owing to the fact that there are some leading doctrines of pragmatism that he appears to accept. The pragmatists seem hardly to have realized how much he is in agreement with them. He agrees with them in thinking that there is no such thing as absolute Truth. He holds also that Reality has to be interpreted as the Good, or as that which gives complete satisfaction,—a view which is at least closely akin to pragmatism. Most of the other contentions of the pragmatists, however, so far as any definite meaning can be attached to them, are rejected by Mr. Bradley. His criticisms are probably the most searching to which the views of the pragmatists have ever been subjected; but, like most of their critics, he is keenly conscious of the difficulty of ascertaining what their views really are. This difficulty is found also, to some extent, in dealing with the theories of Mr. Russell,—not because they are not clearly explained, so far as they go, but because they are still in the making. Mr. Russell, of course, rejects the two points on which Mr. Bradley is in partial agreement with the pragmatists. The result is that for him truth means the apprehension of 'hard facts,' having absolute and independent reality. Mr. Bradley urges the impossibility, on this theory, of recognizing any real unities, such as Mr. Russell appears, nevertheless, to acknowledge. He rejects pluralism, though he recognizes a plurality of 'finite centers.'

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Mr. Bradley admits that his own doctrine involves certain ultimate difficulties and even unintelligibilities. But this does not imply any real inconsistency, since he believes that there is no such thing as absolute truth. He can still maintain that reality must be thought of as *a completely coherent whole felt as such,* and that what we apprehend is more real in proportion to its more perfect approximation to this standard, though we can never know reality in any absolute sense.

The ethical bearings of his doctrine are not much considered by Mr. Bradley in this volume. Most of the points on which he touches,—such as the significance of the ideas of God and immortality,—have been more fully dealt with in Dr. Bosanquet's recent Gifford Lectures. At the same time, Mr. Bradley's statements have always a freshness and individuality that give them a quite peculiar charm and interest of their own. The following is perhaps the most striking passage bearing upon the conduct of life (pp. 468-9):

"Our real world of fact may, for anything we know, be one of the least pieces of reality, and there may be an indefinite number of other real worlds superior to our own. On the other hand, our world is the one place in which we are able to live and work. . . . *Cultiver notre jardin* is the beginning, and it is in a sense the end, of wisdom. . . . Our world and every other possible world are from one side worthless equally. As regions of mere fact and event, the bringing into being and the maintenance of temporal existence, they all alike have no value. . . . Our life has value only because and so far as it realizes in fact that which transcends time and existence. Goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. But, in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real. And yet these eternal values owe their existence to finite wills, and it is therefore only each in our own world that we can come to possess them. We must till our garden awake, and in no dream, to gain the fruits and flowers for which alone it is worth while to live, and which, if anywhere there are better, at least to us are everything. If this is not Heaven, it at least comes nearer to the reality of the Blessed Vision than any stupid Utopia or flaring New Jerusalem adored by the visionary. . . . 'For love and beauty and delight,' it is no matter where they have shown themselves, 'there is no death

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nor change'; and this conclusion is true. These things do not die, since the Paradise in which they bloom is immortal. That Paradise is no special region nor any given particular spot in time and space. It is here, it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which alone is waking reality."

This passage is certainly eloquent and probably wise, even if the view of reality which it suggests is not easy to make quite coherent. It should be remembered, however, that the gardens that we cultivate are not private preserves. We have to try to plant some perennials in them. And is it so certain that Utopias are always 'stupid'? May not the gardener think of brighter flowers that he might cultivate? Even if Mr. Bradley's doctrine of reality is as true as he believes, the effort after progress would seem to have a considerable 'degree of reality.' But perhaps he does not mean to deny this; and, at any rate, in such a review as this it is not possible to do more than hint at criticisms that might be made. It may be added that the book has an excellent index.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL. Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie, B.A., M.R.A.S. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xxiv, 591.

This interesting work is, in temper and point of view, fundamentally Hegelian. According to its author, Reality is Spirit: this proposition being taken to express the very essence of philosophy. Philosophical discussion must concern itself with one question, that of the *forms* of the spirit's activity. These, according to Croce, are two only, cognition or the theoretical activity, and will or the practical activity. Each has two subforms: those of the theoretic activity are æsthetic, which produces images, and logic, which produces concepts; while those of the practical activity are economic and ethic. Croce, having dealt with the theoretic activity in two earlier works, endeavors in "The Philosophy of the Practical" to complete his exposition of reality.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with

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the practical activity in general, the second and third with its subforms. It begins by the consideration that man is never governed wholly by either theoretic or practical interests, but that every spiritual activity exhibits the presence of both, though not always in equal degree. Neither is at any time altogether absent. This fact cannot, according to Croce, be proved empirically, that is, by the psychological method,—a method that constantly excites his criticism. Cognition and will are the *only* two forms of spiritual activity; and while *illustration* of this thesis is empirically discoverable, its *proof* proceeds by "the philosophic method." This method allows the philosopher to assert that no other forms of the spirit besides cognition and will are conceivable or *possible.* To see this, one must withdraw from the world of events, of changes, and of fleeting particulars; and, instead of directing one's sense-organs toward the external, one must reflect the analytic eye of the mind on the recesses of consciousness, on the eternal and immutable. This, it is said, is what Plato did, and Spinoza, and Hegel. The difficulty is that, if this is not observation, its results are apt to be altogether chimerical.

When we proceed thus, however, we discover, among other things, that feeling is not a specific activity of spirit. By this Croce does not mean that what the psychologist calls 'feeling' does not exist. He recognizes, on the contrary, that *feelings* are members of an empirical class, and is willing and anxious to leave to the scientist his classification. What he denies is that there is any 'feeling' that cannot finally be reduced to, and included in, either the theoretic, or the practical, activity. The discussion here is of considerable interest, especially when viewed in connection with the common, but highly questionable, theory, that 'feeling' is not an 'object'; while, at the same time, Croce's contention is in strong contrast with the doctrines of certain other prominent idealists, such as Mr. Bradley, for whom reality is ultimately a whole of 'feeling.'

In the fourth chapter, it is maintained (1) that *will* and *intention* are identical, and (2) that we err because we desire to err. Both contentions, apparently, are unsound; and though it is probable that neither of them will survive the light of careful investigation, their discussion is marked by great acuteness. It certainly seems strange to hold that, if a physician, desiring to cure a sick man, gives him, by mistake, prussic acid instead

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of potassium bromide, the death of the patient was willed and *intended* by the physician. It seems equally strange to hold that the physician makes the mistake because he desires to make it. In this connection, Croce appears to maintain the uncivilized doctrine that theoretical error should be punished (p. 69). Of course, if, whenever I make a blunder in reasoning, I desire to make it, then, to maintain that, whenever I make blunders in reasoning, I should be punished, seems, at least, to have the merit of being strictly logical. All this will no doubt seem bizarre and barbarous. Croce points out, however, that society constantly punishes its members simply because they make theoretic mistakes. The erring boy is slapped, the erring youth disciplined, the erring artist rebuked. And, generally speaking, the student who does not think in accord with the principles of his teachers is, literally, punished: his teachers will not recommend him.

It is impossible even to indicate the many interesting discussions which this book contains. That on free will and determinism, however, is at least arbitrary: *the* problem is stated to be thus and thus, the question of possible alternative statements never being raised—although it would be more correct to speak of the *problems*, than of *the* problem, of free will.

The book is rendered eminently readable by the frequent discussion of concrete questions as illustrations of the highly abstract problems with which its author is engaged. In addition, the translation is, on the whole, exceedingly clear. It will not be surprising if, in the near future, "The Philosophy of the Practical" takes a place among the best-known idealistic treatises.

BERNARD MUSCIO.

Cambridge, England.

THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by James Hastings. Vol. VI, Fiction-Hyksos. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913. Pp. xviii, 890.

The sixth volume of this Encyclopædia fully maintains the high standard established by previous volumes. It contains several articles of the first importance. As an indication of the care which has been taken to find the foremost authority on



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each subject, it may be mentioned that in this volume one hundred and twenty-eight writers contribute a single article each. Some large subjects have been subdivided: it takes fifteen articles to deal with God. On topics in which religious differences are acute, both sides of the question are stated, *e. g.,* on Grace there are two articles, one by a Protestant, the other by a Catholic. For the volume as a whole nothing but praise is due to Dr. Hastings and his collaborators.

The articles on strictly ethical subjects are not of great importance. Of special interest to the anthropologist are the articles on God (Primitive and Savage), by Andrew Lang (characteristically bright and chatty), Folklore (Sir G. L. Gomme), Greek Religion (Dr. L. R. Farnell), Heroes and Hero-Gods (twelve articles), Human Sacrifice (several articles, including one by Prof. R. A. S. Macalister on its Semitic aspects). The biological aspects of Heredity and Growth are explained by Prof. R. C. Punnett and Prof. J. Arthur Thomson. No article in the volume will give rise to more interest than Prof. Burkitt's on Gospels. It is decidedly 'advanced,' but on several points runs counter to prevailing tendencies of German criticism. Dr. Burkitt does not believe in an *Ur-Marcus.* The first and third gospels are *directly* based on our St. Mark's Gospel. He is sceptical with regard to the possibility of reconstructing Q. He hazards the interesting conjecture that the first twelve chapters of Acts may be largely based on the lost portion of Mark. Strong emphasis is laid on the historicity of the Messianic and Apocalyptic element in this Gospel. The fourth gospel is ruled out of court as a narrative of fact.

On some of the philosophical articles a word or two may be said. In the article First Cause, Dr. James Lindsay objects that "it is an inaccurate mode of speaking to say that God is the cause of Himself" (p. 36). No doubt it would be more correct to say "ground." But if we avoid speaking of God as cause of Himself, we should also in consistency cease calling him the cause of the world. And this Dr. Lindsay does not do. It is a shock to find two or three lines further on that Dr. Lindsay himself uses "an inaccurate mode of speaking." He points out that "the First Cause argument is, properly, not an inference from effect to cause, but from effect to ground." But it is incorrect to speak of effect as correlative to ground. Ground is essentially a logical notion; and logic

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knows nothing of effects. But even if we substitute the relation of ground and consequent for that of cause and effect, I do not see that it improves the argument. Have we any right to conclude from a finite consequent to an infinite ground? In the article Fœticide, the reference to the *Republic* of Plato should be *V*, 461, B. C. *V*, 640 refers not to fœticide but infanticide. In the article Fortune (Greek), I do not think Mr. St. George Stock is right in "saying for Plato" that chance must be excluded from the cosmos. Plato definitely retains the πλανωμένη αἰτία (Tim., 48, A), and in spite of what Mr. Archer Hind and others have said, I think that this involves chance and is connected with the recalcitrant element of matter in Nature. A feature of the very able article on Gnosticism by Prof. E. F. Scott is the emphasis laid on the recently discovered Coptic treatises. Though they represent a decadent type of gnosticism, they are of the highest importance, as the most extensive original sources. And there is every probability that fresh discoveries in Egypt will add to our knowledge of this phase of gnosticism. In the article God (Biblical and Christian), Prof. W. T. Davison takes a very conservative standpoint. An authoritative article on Hegel is contributed by Prof. J. B. Baillie. He might perhaps have said something about the remarkable Renaissance of Hegelianism which Germany is witnessing at present. In the article Heraclitus, it is interesting to note that in a famous fragment Diels returns to the reading αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη (R. P. 42). He takes it in close connection with the doctrine of Fire. The soul, the dry beam, is a spark of the divine Fire.

G. A. Johnston.

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The Beautiful: An Introduction to Psychological Æsthetics. By Vernon Lee. Cambridge: The University Press, 1913. Pp. viii, 158.

I hope the day is not far distant when every new book on æsthetics will require to be reviewed in this Journal. At present writers on that subject tend to lose themselves in the intricacies either of art-criticism or of psychological analysis, and until they emerge from these labyrinths and grasp the truth that æsthetics is a branch of ethics, all one can do is to select

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from time to time some publication of outstanding merit for the purpose of pointing a moral. Vernon Lee is a gifted writer whose work on æsthetics is well known. Combining delicate sensibility and a knowledge of all forms of art with great philosophical curiosity, she is equipped with precisely those qualities, so rarely found together, without which any attack on the problem of beauty is foredoomed to failure. Just because her work is conspicuous always for acute observation, and not infrequently for just reasoning, this little book, which she has contributed to the series of Cambridge Manuals, is, in a way, more disappointing even than the stupidity of the ordinary run of æsthetic treatises.

Her analysis of æsthetic satisfaction is ingenious. What, she asks, are the peculiarities of our thinking and feeling in the presence of a thing which we call beautiful? We feel satisfactions and preferences; but so we do in the presence of things which we do not call beautiful. The problem is to discover what is common and peculiar to our æsthetic satisfactions. It is not enough to add that these satisfactions are 'of a contemplative kind,' that they have no practical aim, and that they involve emotional admiration; evidently more remains to be said, and so far no new ground has been broken. The first decisive step toward a definition of the beautiful is taken in the theory of Chapter III, that it is not things, but aspects of things, that are the peculiar objects of æsthetic contemplation. ('Aspects' are 'sensations grouped together into relations by our perception,' p. 34.) Still the definition is not complete. Æsthetic satisfaction is not constituted by any and every admiring contemplation of an aspect, but is specially connected with one particular aspect, namely, shape. Shapes are preëminently the objects of æsthetic contemplation. Not all shapes, of course; those which create a sense of difficulty are ugly. The contrary, however, is not true; ease of perception, though a necessary condition of beauty, is not enough by itself to make a shape beautiful. The presence of another factor is required, which may be described as empathic quality. We only have beauty, we only have the distinctively æsthetic satisfaction, when the perceptive activities of the subject are merged in the qualities of the object of perception; this process, which the author calls Empathy, is the essence of the sense of beauty. Though I fail to understand much of what is said in Chapter IX about Empathy, the main

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points seem clear enough. They seem to be that, when we exclaim, for instance, at the beauty of a mountain rising against the sky, we are in some sense aware of certain activities taking place in ourselves (muscular tensions and movements), that these activities really are the 'rising' which we admire, and that our awareness of them 'coalesces with the shape we are looking at.' It seems to be held that no object is rightly called beautiful in respect of which this process does not take place, that no satisfaction is æsthetic which does not include it, that only those satisfactions that do include it are æsthetic, and that inspection of this process shows us why we prefer certain combinations of lines to others.

Thus to say that an object is beautiful means that the contemplation of one aspect of it, its shape, sets up a process by means of which the beholder's agreeable consciousness of his own mental activity in constructing shapes is projected into the object. This theory has one unusual merit: it recognizes the supreme importance of the formal element in art. In holding that the differentia of æsthetic appreciation is the emotional contemplation of shapes, I think that Vernon Lee has hit upon a momentous fact which is too often missed; the way in which she brings out the part played by shapes in art, in particular her discussion of visual art, where she puts imitative representation into its proper place as a subordinate factor in the production of beauty, deserves the warmest applause. Less admirable is the argument by which she reaches this conclusion. It starts from a distinction between sensation and perception. In bare passive sensation there can be no æsthetic satisfaction, because there is no activity; it is only where perception, with its activities of comparison and construction, begins, that satisfaction can begin to be æsthetic. And, since in the perception of shapes these activities are at their highest, and the passive sensational element at its lowest, it is in the perception of shapes that the distinctively æsthetic satisfaction consists. Without stopping to inquire why pleasure in activity should be supposed any more æsthetic than any other pleasure, we may observe that the nerve of this argument is the notion that the mind creates the relations perceived between sense-data. But, though the mind is in a sense more active in perception than in bare sensation,—in the sense, namely, that it grasps a complex of parts and relations, and that memory, thought, and attention

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are involved,—this is no warrant for holding that the mind creates the relation between the parts of a percept any more than it creates what is given to it in bare sensation. If by 'activity' is meant creation of its objects, the activity of the mind in perceiving space-relations seems to be a fiction. Further, the mind is no more 'active' in perceiving space-relations than in perceiving non-spatial relations between colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and temperatures; the non-spatial complexes of these elements which we perceive seem to be just as much 'constructions' as do complexes of lines and spaces, and therefore, on the theory, just as capable of being primary objects of æsthetic satisfaction. That the pleasures of music, for instance, have to be derived from the pleasures of space-perception by way of the localization of sounds in an imaginary space, is a grave objection to the theory. Another set of objections arises from the reflection that, after all, the satisfaction evoked by beauty is not a satisfaction with our own activities. It seems impossible to deny that, in contemplating shapes, we may be unaware of our activities. Pages 55 and 56 illustrate the difficulties of hedging on this point,—a process which ends in the admission that it is *not* our activities but their *results* that we are aware of when we feel æsthetic satisfaction.

But, however right or wrong in details, the theory in question belongs to a class which, as a class, has one fatal flaw. In spite of the dictum *de gustibus*, it is a characteristic of æsthetic judgments that it is possible to dispute significantly about them. Now if any theory which, like Vernon Lee's, makes the beauty of objects consist solely in the fact that some person or group of persons experiences some sort of emotion, were true, this would not be possible. If to say that a shape is beautiful merely means that it stimulates in all normal persons, provided they are in a receptive state of mind, certain empathic activities, then a dispute as to the beauty of a landscape or a picture must always resolve itself into a dispute as to whether somebody or other is empathically active or not. And it seems plain that this is not what we dispute about,—that when I say, 'No, this picture you admire is not beautiful,' what I intend to deny is not merely that your mind is in such and such a state. It seems, in other words, that all such theories are bound to neglect one important characteristic of æsthetic judgments, their objectivity. In vain will you try to smuggle in objectivity by a reference

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to 'all normal persons'; even if all human beings at all times responded to beautiful objects in the way that you describe, to call an object beautiful would still mean something more than that.

In what, then, does the objectivity of æsthetic judgments consist? The question cannot be pursued here, but I may perhaps mention that feature of them which it appears most urgent to recognize as fundamental, if æsthetics is ever to be systematized as a branch of philosophy. Whenever an æsthetic proposition is true, a true ethical proposition seems to be implied; for whenever an object is beautiful, it seems true that the contemplation of it with the appropriate emotion would be one of those things of which the existence adds to the sum of intrinsic value in the universe. The investigation of the relation between these two kinds of propositions seems to me the most pressing of the tasks awaiting the student of æsthetics, and it would be fortunate if a writer of Vernon Lee's ability could be persuaded to undertake it.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

DIE THEORIE DES WAHREN INTERESSES UND IHRE RECHTLICHE UND POLITISCHE BEDEUTUNG. By Leonard Nelson. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913. Pp. 31.

This little pamphlet is one of the essays of the Friesian school, and is by an author whose other contributions on various philosophical subjects to the same series are well known. The problem described is the follwing: We ourselves and other people often have interests that conflict, and it is an ethical problem to decide on what principles the choice is to be made of which are to be fulfilled and which neglected. It is clear that the principle is not that the strongest must always be chosen; it is not our duty to allow people to steal our watches merely because their desire for them is stronger than our own. And even where neither of the conflicting interests is a criminal desire, it often happens that it is our duty to fulfil the weaker desire which is more valuable to the neglect of the stronger which is less so. Again there is the case of people whose desire is based on an erroneous belief about matters of fact. If we cannot alter this belief by argument, and if we judge that the fulfilment

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of their desire would be bad for them, it may be our duty forcibly to prevent their fulfilling it.

The author thinks that there is a paradox about this because the moral law tells us to treat other people's interests as if they were our own, and we treat our own interests solely with reference to their strength. He thinks that there is no special difficulty in dealing with criminal interests, on the ground that the moral law cannot order you to help people to break the moral law. Similarly there is no special difficulty about desires based on erroneous information about facts, because they are contrary to desires in the deluded person which are actually stronger. (The point here seems to be that if we know that eating certain oysters will give a man typhoid, and he refuses to believe it, still his wish to eat the oysters is *as a matter of fact* incompatible with his wish to preserve his life, though he does not know this; and the latter desire is the stronger of the two.) But a real difficulty is supposed to arise in the remaining set of cases, where both of the conflicting interests have value, and what really is the weaker is preferred to the stronger.

Just as the strength of the interests is not the sole ground of preference, so their value is not the sole ground, and the first problem is how such heterogeneous things as strength and value can be compared. The second is the one already mentioned about the compatibility with the moral law of a choice on any ground other than relative strength. Nelson's solution is to say that the weight to be attached to the factor of value is the strength that that interest would have for a consciousness which was (*a*) completely enlightened and (*b*) prefers always what it sees to be more to what it sees to be less valuable. And the moral law, I take it, is supposed to say, not that we must treat other people's interests as if they were our own, but as this enlightened consciousness would treat them if they were *its* own.

It seems to me that there are here two criticisms to be made. In the first place, what advantage is there in introducing this hypothetical consciousness? It gives us no general rules for balancing the factor of strength against that of value, for we do not know what strength an interest of given value would have for such a consciousness. If anything can be gained from the conception, it seems to be something contrary to what Nelson has already asserted. For the postulate that this consciousness always prefers what it sees to be more to what it sees to

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be less valuable must surely mean that, whatever the relative strength, it always decides solely on grounds of relative value. This leaves indeed no problem for *it*, because there value and strength never conflict; but it does not tell us what other people ought to do in whom value and strength do conflict. If it tells us anything, it is that value should be the sole deciding ground; yet this I understand Nelson to have denied. The other point to notice is that the necessity of introducing a hypothetical consciousness shows the uselessness of taking anything like the Golden Rule as *the* moral law. To treat other people as you would like to be treated yourself is all very well as an antidote to selfishness, and selfishness is no doubt the root of the greater part of vice. But this rule is not the whole of morality, for if I like people to make me drunk, this will not prove that I ought to make other people drunk.

Nelson argues that we can quite well have interests of which we are not aware, and that the value of interests is not a thing that can be judged in abstraction but must be judged by reference to the whole life of which they form parts. Hence the necessity of determining wherein the value of life lies. He argues that our judgment on such a point is æsthetic in character, and hence, on the rather precarious authority of a dictum of Schiller's, concludes (p. 20) that the ideal of life for the individual is that of culture or rational self-determination. Correlated with this is the duty of society to do nothing to limit our opportunities for culture. The argument here does not seem to me strong, but incidentally Nelson disposes of two very silly dicta about æsthetics. One is that there is no demand that the object of æsthetic admiration should exist, as there is that good conduct should be realized; the other is that æsthetic contemplation is in some special sense disinterested. He answers with perfect cogency that the *physical* existence of beautiful objects is not a demand of æsthetics, but that their existence as sensible objects of perception is. Similarly æsthetic contemplation is disinterested only in the sense that it does not demand actual physical possession of the object admired, and not in the sense that it does not demand that it shall continue to exist and to be capable of being contemplated.

Our duty toward others is to remove obstacles to their self-development; not, of course, to 'self-develop' them, for this is impossible. And, since what is relevant is their interests and not

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their awareness of them, it is our duty to help them in their self-development whether they know that this is what they want or not. All people capable of any self-determination and development have the same right to the external means to it; and this right is inalienable, whether they are prepared to give it up or not. Nelson argues that in any actual society the ideals of freedom and of equality may conflict, and that then it is freedom that must give way. I am not sure that I follow his reasoning, but it appears to be as follows: The moral law demands equality for all ends, and any infringement of the moral law is infinitely worse than any particular evil state that may exist. Now if people were not completely free, the worst that would happen would be that none of them are in quite the best state; but if there be any inequality of treatment, the total state of the society is infinitely bad. This *may*, of course, be true, and it is hardly fair to expect in a short pamphlet like this a discussion of that most difficult of ethical problems, whether no amount of good produced is ever commensurate with the evil involved in treating any person even partially as a mere means; but to answer it in Nelson's sense is to make a very sweeping assertion.

C. D. Broad.

The University, St. Andrews.

Plato: Moral and Political Ideals. By Adela Marion Adam, M.A. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1913. [The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.] Pp. vii, 159.

In this admirable little book Mrs. Adam has achieved a difficult task, *viz.*, "an account of what Plato did in the moral and political sphere," necessarily,—since it was to be "intelligible to the plain man,"—in abstraction from his metaphysical background. The philosophic purist who may object to the separation, as giving an inevitably defective view, will not be heard in our pragmatist age, since whether or not Plato is Plato when deprived of his dialectic, there can be no doubt that the plain man will benefit by an introduction to these moral and political truths. And in Mrs. Adam's skillful treatment, as much of the Platonic philosophy as can be readily introduced is presented with limpid clearness, and without sacrifice of essentials.

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I would refer especially to the account of the True Philosopher (Chapter VIII) and of the central portion of the "Republic" (Chapter X). The restricted scope of the work, however, cannot but cause disappointment to some readers, when the reference is to those most characteristic moments of the Platonic thought in which the metaphysician is indistinguishable from the practical and religious teacher, as, for instance, the proofs of immortality in the "Phædo," "Phædrus," and "Republic." "What concerns us is not the manner in which he seeks to establish his belief, but the belief itself." True, for the purpose of this book. But for the appreciation of Plato as of every great thinker, it is the method of the argument, the process of thought that is of incomparable concern, rather than the result to which it leads. As an example of what may be done in a book of wider scope, in bringing out in fullest measure the practical value of the Platonic teaching together with the philosophical import of the thought, the late Dr. Adam's "Religious Teachers of Greece" may be cited. Mrs. Adam deserves all the more commendation for the art which enables her to give, within the inexorable limits of her task, as faithful a presentation of the real Plato as possible. She maintains Dr. Adam's standpoint in regard both to questions of time-honored dispute,—*e. g.,* in the identification of "the Good" with God, —and to more recent battle-grounds, notably the relation of the Platonic to the real Socrates. "I am not yet prepared to reduce Plato's achievement to the glory of relegating Boswell to the second place among biographers." Against Professor Taylor's brilliant dialectic she still upholds the (now) more conservative theory that the greater Socrates is Plato. In regard to the order of the Dialogues, it is to be noted that she accepts the view which places the "Theætetus" amongst the latest. Surely, it is difficult to resist the arguments of the late Professor Campbell, associating this dialogue, which combines so many of the Platonic excellences, more closely with the Republic period.

Looking at the book as a whole, attention should be drawn to the discrimination with which the development of thought in the Dialogues, on such subjects as "Virtue is Knowledge," is traced, also the relation of the ethical thought of Heraclitus to Plato and of the inner spirit of the "Symposium" to the "Phaedo." The treatment of well-worn topics, such as the nature of the Socratic and the Platonic rationalism in ethics,

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and the theory of education, is fresh and interesting. In her discussion of these and other leading subjects, Mrs. Adam makes us feel the background of profound Plato study, without which even a popular account of his theories would not have real value, as also her familiarity with recent criticism, and capacity for taking an independent view,—not always easy in face of the delight of the modern 'Athenian' in hearing some new thing concerning the ancient.

It would, perhaps, not be within the compass of this book to offer much in the way of original theory or interpretation, but attention may be directed to the suggestive analogy between Stephen the Martyr and Socrates in the rôle of one addressing "a world-wide message to the peculiar people." With this Mrs. Adam completes the more familiar comparison between Paul and Plato, her point being that Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles, followed Stephen, and Plato, who abandoned hope of Athens, followed Socrates. The author's interpretation of Plato's views on the position of women in the State is especially thoughtful, and the exact nature of Plato's modernism in this connection as in others, seems better brought out than by many critics. "Probably Plato's half-unconscious reservation of certain duties for women foreshadows very nearly the course that events are likely to take." Again, with reference to the moral and industrial significance of the communistic principle, the fact that it is the ethical rather than the economic aspect of the refusal of private property, on which Plato is intent, is well indicated. As Mrs. Adam points out, Plato's concern for the well-being of all classes is manifest in the "Laws." Nevertheless, when communism appears in the "Republic," it is only required of the Guardians, and in this more idealistic work it is obviously a discipline in altruism. Herein the spiritual nature of Plato's most earnest teaching is manifest, as Mrs. Adam appreciates in her reference (at this point) to the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. Again it is "his insistence on the divinity of man's soul and his fearlessness of death," which gives the permanent value of Plato's teaching, (final paragraph).

If in this book the treatment of the political ideal is subordinated to that of the moral, the method seems faithful to the spirit of Plato. For in spite of the truth and truism that in Greek thought the two aspects are much more closely allied

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than in modern, it is no less the case that, for Plato, the political is for the sake of the moral, and life in the Cave is the duty rather than the highest sphere of the saint of philosophy.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

London.

THE GOVERNMENT OF MAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS AND POLITICS. By G. S. Brett, M.A. Oxon. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1913. Pp. xiv, 318.

This book represents almost a new departure in writings on the history of political theory. Instead of confining himself almost entirely to a consideration of the great theoretical systems put forward by one or another particular thinker, the author attempts to give an account of the background of ordinary thought and life and conduct in front of which these systems were built up. The great authors fall into their proper place in relation to the general point of view of their age and country. The conception is an admirable one, and, if properly carried out, would supply a long-felt want.

Unfortunately, however, Mr. Brett's performance of his task is by no means adequate to his intentions. It is difficult to lay one's finger on specific points with which fault may be found. But the general impression left after reading the book, in spite of many acute remarks to be found in it, is one of profound disappointment. There is very little in the way of the great generalizations which are necessary to disentangle the threads of the different influences that go to make up the political outlook of every stage of civilization. And the author seems to lack the sense of proportion which would enable him to distinguish between illuminating generalizations of this kind and the trivialities and commonplaces and unimportant details of which, it must be said, the book is full. Nor does there seem to be any one line of argument or principle of connection which would link up the successive parts of the book. It is, indeed, scrappy and discursive in the extreme. And this makes it very difficult to follow or retain in the mind. The difficulty is increased by the fact that when the author does give us generalizations they are too often obscure and ambiguous in their phrasing. What, for instance, is the exact meaning of a phrase like this (p. 255)? "Before his [Luther's] time it was usually felt

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that the existence of a ruler created, *ipso facto,* the duty of submission." The context makes it even more difficult to see what this means. For certainly there is a sense in which this would be true *par excellence* of the political attitude which became dominant *after* Luther and as a result of his influence. If, as has been the fate of the present reviewer, anyone comes to this book after a re-reading of such extraordinarily illuminating works as Mr. Figgis's writings on the history of political thought, its inadequacies become particularly obvious.

Nor is the book guiltless of positive error. For instance, in the chapters on Greek thought, where, it must be admitted, we see Mr. Brett at his worst, we read of the Greeks (p. 68): "The beautiful was their ideal: not the true, nor the good, but the beautiful." Surely at this time of day no one ought to be capable of making a statement like this. But perhaps it was to be expected from a writer who refers only to Walter Pater for a general view of Plato's thought. On the other hand, in the succeeding chapters on the Cosmopolitan Age, and on the Roman Republic and Empire, Mr. Brett is perhaps at his best.

It is very unfortunate that a book so excellent in intention should be so inadequate in execution. But one must recognize that some of the faults are inevitable in a book which attempts to crowd a survey of the whole of history into three hundred pages. To attempt it on such a scale was to court failure, except perhaps for a writer of exceptional gifts.

G. C. FIELD.

University of Manchester, England.

PROPERTY: Its Duties and Rights Historically, Philosophically and Religiously Regarded. Essays by Various Writers. With an Introduction by the Bishop of Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xx, 198.

This collection of essays is better in achievement than in the aim of its proposer. The proposal and the actual working out are described by the Bishop of Oxford in the introduction: "Dr. Bartlet, of Mansfield College, Oxford, had written a letter to the *British Weekly* strongly urging upon Christians the duty of reconsidering their ideas about property in the light of the Bible doctrine of stewardship,—the doctrine that God the Creator is the only absolute owner of all things or persons.

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. . . He was good enough to send me his letter and to suggest that we might combine to issue some literature of a popular kind about the duties and rights of property based on this Biblical doctrine. Naturally I felt a cordial sympathy with the idea, but I said that before anything of a popular kind was issued, I thought that we needed some more thorough or philosophical treatment of property in idea and history." The result is the present series by seven writers, partly lay and partly clerical. To the first two essays, by Prof. L. T. Hobhouse and Canon Rashdall, the description may be applied which the author expressly gives of the first: "The social functions of property are examined by the standard of purely humanitarian ethics." Mr. A. D. Lindsay continues on the same line, though his treatment is slighter. Next (in the central position) follows a paper by Dr. Bartlet on "The Biblical and Early Christian Idea of Property"; and then come three historical essays by the Rev. A. J. Carlyle, Mr. H. G. Wood, and Canon Scott Holland; all referring especially to the development of ideas of property in Christendom. In this branch of the subject the most interesting point made seems to me to occur in Dr. Carlyle's paper; where it is noted (pp. 128, 129) that Aquinas reintroduced the Aristotelian conception of the State as a natural institution, property being regarded as an instrument of personality; but that "his adoption of the Aristotelian conception of nature and the State had little permanent influence, for the theory of the conventional nature of organized society," taken over by the Christian Fathers from the Stoics and, it might have been added as regards the idea of contract, from the Epicureans, "was too firmly rooted to be shaken, even by his authority," and "continued to dominate political theory till the end of the eighteenth century."

It may with truth be said that, apart from an influence such as that which it had on Dante, this humanist view did not return as an active power till the last century. The compliment may fairly be paid to the present volume that it is permeated by it. With differences of phraseology, the writers agree that the only possible ultimate defense of property is that it is necessary to liberty or personality. All agree further that an institution with so varied a history cannot be conceived to have now reached its final form. The paradoxes in its development are well brought out by Prof. Hobhouse: "The institution of prop-

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erty has, in its modern form," defended as this has been especially from the point of view of the individual's rights, "reached its zenith as a means of giving to the few power over the life of the many, and its nadir as a means of securing to the many the basis of regular industry, purposeful occupation, freedom, and self-support" (p. 23). "The rise of large-scale industry" as a consequence of throwing open the career to the individual pursuit of wealth "has abolished the possibility of any form of individualism as a general solution of the economic problem" (p. 21). The balance may be said here to incline to a modified socialism. In Canon Rashdall's paper it inclines to a modified individualism. While "continuance of the whole system of private Capital as it is now understood" cannot be considered essential for the free unfolding of personality, he is himself "disposed to think that the institution of property cannot bring with it its full advantages, economic, moral, and social, without *some* form of capitalization and *some* rights of inheritance, however much these rights may be curtailed and controlled by the State" (p. 63). The particular solutions of the writers I do not attempt to give: in fact, they scarcely amount to definite schemes. With the general solution indicated I am quite in sympathy. Liberty in its sense of the positive development of personality I regard as the end; and this I take to exclude at once economic *laissez faire,* which has been proved by experience to lead to a grinding industrial tyranny, and the extreme forms of communism. Between these two limits, whether we call ourselves individualists or socialists seems to be a question of more or less. My own view is one which, like Canon Rashdall's, may, I think, be best described as individualist in its relation to property; the solution being State-regulation, as distinguished from State-ownership, of the capital by which industrial enterprise is carried on.

In agreement, as I am, with the general spirit of the volume, I wish to say as little as possible on the religious, as distinguished from the philosophical, point of view of some of the writers. I have paid a tribute at the beginning to the admirable modification effected by the Bishop of Oxford in the project as first outlined. The least intrinsically humanist, the most ecclesiastically minded of the writers seems to me to be Dr. Bartlet; and even he admits that the Christian Church, with the world at its feet, failed to transform the social and economic order.

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The Church of the fourth century "simply shared the conventional ideas underlying the existing economic order, and the hand-to-mouth methods of dealing with its anomalies and evils" (p. 114). From Dr. Gore comes the still stronger admission that "the modern Church has generally been on the wrong side" (p. xix). Can it be wondered then if we do not find a solution by way of return to the Church and its ideals very hopeful? That individual churchmen can still aid in the development of humanist civilization there is no reason to deny.

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. Vol. I. Logic. By Arnold Ruge, Wilhelm Windelband, Josiah Royce, Louis Couturat, Benedetto Croce, Federigo Enriques, Nicolaj Losskij. Translated by B. Ethel Meyer. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. x, 269.

This book is the first of a series, later volumes of which are to deal with ethics, philosophy of religion, and other philosophical subjects. In an introduction Ruge sketches the scheme of the undertaking, and points out the differences between it and Hegel's Encyclopædia. The present undertaking is to contain contributions from numerous authors, not necessarily in agreement, and it is to take account of the advance of the special sciences since Hegel's time. This volume contains essays by Windelband, Royce, Couturat, Croce, Enriques, and Losskij; and the articles are, as far as I can see, well translated by B. E. Meyer.

I do not think that the scheme of the book is one that enables the contributors to offer their best. They are bound to be very condensed, and the result is that they cannot fully deal with the reasons for their views, or give the latest developments of them. Certainly they fulfil the promise of the introduction by lack of slavish agreement; thus, if Croce's opinions about symbolic logic be true, Couturat's article will not be worth the paper that it is written on, whilst Royce and Enriques will have spent a good part of their lives in futile pursuits.

Windelband contributes a long and careful article in which he deals with the relation of logic to psychology, —descriptive



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and genetic,—to language, and to theory of knowledge. The best contribution is undoubtedly Royce's. He alone deals at any length with inductive logic, and his view that induction does not involve the assumption of any laws of nature but only of laws of probability, seems to me sound. The reasons that he offers for the advanced state of those natural sciences that can be treated mathematically are also plausible; and it is interesting to note his suggestion that as other kinds of order system beside that of numbers are worked out, we may be able to enjoy the advantages of mathematical methods in regions of investigation where quantitative considerations are impossible. I have less sympathy with his attempt to connect the indefinables of logic and mathematics with possible volitions, and certainly do not think that he makes out his case here. But at this point one of the irritating consequences of this form of literature enters, and he has to refer us to a paper of his for a sketch of his real reasons. Still Royce does good service in referring to Kempe's work on the connection between the fundamental concepts of logic and of geometry, though Kempe's theories are also very fully given in the last volume of Schröder.

There is nothing new in Couturat's article on symbolic logic. Practically nothing is said about the Theory of Types, which seems a grave omission; Couturat's own definition of identity seems to me to offend against the theory. He develops shortly a theory of probability, connecting it with the ratio of the number of values which make a propositional function true to the total number of possible values. It is quite likely that probability *is* connected with functions and not with propositions, but I do not think that Couturat's arguments prove this, and his actual theory seems to me to involve probability when it tries to define it.

Croce's article is mainly of note for its bitter remarks about symbolic logic,—they almost justify the belief that a symbolic logician must at some time have stolen the author's umbrella (and with it his sense of proportion). Enriques denies the necessity for Peano's distinction between 'is a member of' and 'is contained in.' His argument does not seem to me satisfactory. He also thinks that the nature of the laws of logic makes it necessary to postulate certain things about the physical world; *e. g.*, that there are things in it that only very slowly change. This appears to me to be quite a mistake.

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Losskij's article is on the whole sensible; it is strongly realistic in tone, and rather astonishes me by the naïveté, not of its realism, but of the belief that its realism is new. It certainly throws no light on the problems that have been familiar to other people of the same way of thinking (*e. g.*, Russell and Meinong) for years past.

C. D. Broad.

The University, St. Andrews.

The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. By A. D. Lindsay, M.A. London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913. Pp. 89. (The People's Books Series.)

In his foreword Mr. Lindsay assures the reader of his intention not to disregard the warning of Schopenhauer: "Let no one *tell* you what is contained in the 'Critique of Pure Reason.'" His purpose, therefore, is simply to state the problems which drove Kant to think out a solution, and to offer a few suggestions which may help those who read Kant himself, to understand that solution. This would certainly be the kind of introduction to any philosopher that an active mind would welcome. No matter how little previous training a man may have had, if he has philosophic curiosity, it is enough to draw his attention to any of the vital problems of metaphysics: henceforward that problem will torment him, and if he is told that Kant has solved it, he will read Kant. The philosophy books in the People's Series are, presumably, aimed at such minds. But unfortunately, Mr. Lindsay knows too much about Kant's solution to be able to confine himself to the bare statement of the problem: when he has stated the difficulty, he cannot resist sketching the answer. Without such a sketch it would, of course, be hard to find a place for the suggestions which are to help those who read Kant to understand him better, and in the course of this book Mr. Lindsay gives some very helpful explanations of what is essential to Kant's position, distinguishing it from what is merely the result of the deposit of previous philosophies, taken over uncritically. Thus he explains that it does not matter to Kant's argument what type of idealism is assumed: either form of it will fit in equally well with the new position that he wants to establish. From this it follows that many inconsistencies in Kant's account of idealism, which seem at first upsetting, may

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be dismissed as irrelevant to the main position. This would certainly save much trouble for those reading Kant for this first time. Again, Mr. Lindsay's explanation of the importance of synthetic *a priori* judgments would certainly help a beginner to see the vital importance of what must otherwise appear a very remote and technical problem. Whenever Mr. Lindsay allows himself to explain rather than merely to condense, his book is of great interest, but we may perhaps regret that he has felt it necessary to undertake the practically impossible task of giving a resumé of Kant's thought as well as commenting on it. The book itself is so short that such an attempt must necessarily occupy almost the whole of it, leaving very little room for the statement of the difficulties which called for the solution, and although it is as clear as so short a summary can hope to be, and contains much that would be interesting to those who were already familiar with Kant, one cannot help wondering whether it would really be very serviceable to non-philosophers.

Mr. Lindsay has produced a book of much scholarly merit, but as an introduction to Kant for those who have not yet read him, it cannot be regarded as a success.

KARIN COSTELLOE.

London, England.

THE MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY. Second Edition, Revised. By Frederick A. M. Spencer, M.A. London and Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1914. Pp. 350.

Mr. Spencer seeks to present in a modern guise the essentials of the Christian religion, and, it may be added, of Christian theology. One of the merits of the book is its refusal to pander to the popular taste for what is vague and unsystematic by excluding the theological element from Christianity. In Mr. Spencer's free reproduction of Christian doctrine he is not afraid to jettison much that has generally been regarded as essential. He often carries destructive criticism too far. This, I think, seriously weakens his Christology. So far as the constructive part of his work goes, I cannot see that the liberal patches of Positivism and Psychical Research in any way improve the old garment. But it is quite unnecessary to agree

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with Mr. Spencer's spiritualistic humanitarianism in order to be grateful to him for his able and adequate statement of that position.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

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COMMON SENSE: An Analysis and Interpretation. By Charles E. Hooper. London: Watts & Co., 1913. Pp. vi, 172.

In this little book Mr. Hooper discusses the general nature of common sense, its distinction from discursive reasoning, its origin in mental imagery, its theoretical aspects, its relation to scientific knowledge, and its value for practical life and social well-being, —all pleasantly enough, but without saying much that the ordinary man or even the philosopher does not already know. Apart from the immediate subject of common sense, Mr. Hooper contrives to state his views on quite a variety of topics, but often so vaguely as to involve a *suggestio falsi*. To take an example. He speaks of "the day when Heraclitus first glorified the principle of strife" (p. 128). But Heraclitus never glorified strife: on the contrary his emphasis was laid on "the invisible harmony" (fr. 54, Diels). The number of similar loose statements in the book suggests the uncomfortable suspicion that Mr. Hooper simply wrote Heraclitus by mistake for Empedocles.

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University of St. Andrews.

VOLONTÉ ET LIBERTÉ. Par Wincenty Lutosławski. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913. Pp. ix, 352.

This book is an exposition of what, according to the author, is the philosophical position of the most spiritually minded men; together with instructions as to the necessary procedure to be adopted, in order to reach such a spiritual elevation that the view is seen to be true.

The view in question may be stated briefly as follows: the world is essentially spiritual and consists of monads who are potentially free. Only the most developed of these, however, are conscious of their freedom and actually free. The consciousness of being a free spiritual agent, having an existence independent of the body, constitutes "entre les hommes qui la (*i. e.*,

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cette connaissance) possèdent et ceux qui ne la possèdent pas, une différence aussi profonde que la différence entre l'homme primitif et les animaux qui l'ont précedé sur la terre." These superior creatures the author denominates "éleuthères, en se servant de la racine du mot grec éleutheria qui signifie liberté."

It is clear that beings who are as far above man, as man is above the brutes, may be capable of perceiving truths which ordinary people are as incapable of knowing as a dog is of learning mathematics. And it is clear also that the author, who occupies this proud position, cannot prove his theory to creatures who are only like him in possessing human form. To do him justice, he does not attempt it. In the first chapter we are told that people's philosophy depends on their spiritual development. At the lowest stage we are materialists, at the highest we see the truth of "éleuthérisme," while idealism and pantheism occupy an intermediate position between these two extremes. In subsequent chapters, so far as the treatment is theoretical at all, opposing views are rejected because of the objectionable consequences to which they lead, those consequences being objectionable, of course, which hinder man from realizing his true freedom.

But very largely the book consists in the consideration of the effects of various cults and practices on spiritual development, and concludes with practical advice to those desirous of attainment. As this includes injunctions to abstain from meat, alcohol, tobacco, tea, coffee, and cocoa, absolutely, and preferably to be celibate and to live on one meal a day, it is to be feared that few philosophers will ever attain to the position which would render them capable of criticizing M. Lutosławski's views. I, at any rate, do not profess to be other than an ordinary man and am therefore, *ipso facto,* excluded from doing so.

G. H. Geach.

University College, Cardiff, Wales.

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


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